Phil - Moral philosophy definitions

Utility

Either the tendency of something to cause good effects or the good effect itself that is caused. How 'good' is then understood differs, including some seeing it in terms of pleasure (hedonistic accounts) and some in terms of preference-satisfaction (non-hedonistic preference accounts).

Bentham’s quantitative hedonistic utilitarianism

An action is morally right if and only if [we can reasonably expect/predict that] it maximises utility, where (a) utility is understood as pleasure/absence of pain and (b) only the quantity of pleasure/pain is considered

Utility

Either the tendency of something to cause good effects or the good effect itself that is caused. How 'good' is then understood differs, including some seeing it in terms of pleasure (hedonistic accounts) and some in terms of preference-satisfaction (non-hedonistic preference accounts).

Bentham’s quantitative hedonistic utilitarianism

An action is morally right if and only if [we can reasonably expect/predict that] it maximises utility, where (a) utility is understood as pleasure/absence of pain and (b) only the quantity of pleasure/pain is considered

Bentham’s utility calculus

Steps/criteria to consider when measuring/predicting utility caused by an action: (1) intensity and (2) duration of the sensation, (3) certainty that the sensation will occur, etc.

Mill’s qualitative hedonistic utilitarianism

An action is morally right if and only if [we can reasonably expect/predict that] it maximises utility, where (a) utility is understood as pleasure/absence of pain and (b) some pleasures (higher pleasures) are of higher quality than others (lower pleasures) and are therefore given more weight.

‘Higher’ pleasure

A more valuable pleasure. The best test for pleasure A being a higher pleasure than pleasure B is that pleasure A is preferred by someone who has experienced both.

For Mill pleasures unique to human beings (such as those that employ the intellect, e.g. reading, debate etc.) are higher than those that are possible for both humans and non-human animals (e.g. those based on sensations).

‘Lower’ pleasure

A less valuable pleasure. The best test for pleasure A being a lower pleasure than pleasure B is that pleasure B is preferred by someone who has experienced both.

For Mill pleasures that are possible for both humans and non-human animals (e.g. those based on mere sensations) are lower than those that are unique to human beings (such as those that employ the intellect, e.g. reading, debate etc).

Mill's 'proof' of the greatest happiness principle

Mill argues that because happiness is desired/valued it is therefore desirable/valuable. He then argues that because only happiness is valuable for its own sake we therefore ought to maximise happiness and actions are morally right to the extent that they cause happiness.

Non-hedonistic utilitarianism

An action is morally right to the extent that [we can reasonably expect/predict that] it maximises utility, where utility is not understood as pleasure/the absence of pain.

Preference utilitarianism

An action is morally right if and only if [we can reasonably expect/predict that] it maximises utility, where utility is understood as preference-fulfillment.

Act utilitarianism

An action is morally right if and only if [we can reasonably expect/predict that] it maximises utility. This is decided on a case-by-case basis, such that it is possible for the same type of action (e.g. a lie) to be morally right on one occasion and not on another.

Rule utilitarianism

An act is morally right if and only if it is in accordance with a set of rules that [we can reasonably expect/predict] will, if accepted, maximise utility.

Whether pleasure is the only good (Nozick’s experience machine)

A thought-experiment in which there is a machine that can cause you to have experiences indistinguishable to the subject from experiences of the real world. Once plugged in you would not know/remember that you were plugged in.

Nozick argues that pleasure cannot be all that was valuable to us, since we have good reason/s not to plug in, even if doing so would guarantee that we had more pleasurable experiences than 'real life' would give us. It is used to object to hedonism in general (the view that only pleasure motivates us and/or has value) and thus also to object to hedonistic utilitarianism.

Individual (moral) right

A moral right is an entitlement (not) to do something or (not) to be some way, or an entitlement that others (not) do something or (not) be some way. The existence of such moral rights is used to object to utilitarianism since maximising utility might require violating such rights.

Individual liberty

In its most straightforward sense liberty is the absence of obstacles/constraints external to you (sometimes called 'negative' liberty). The existence of such liberties is used to object to utilitarianism since maximising utility might require violating such liberties.

Tyranny of the majority

A situation where the majority (or at least the most active group) oppress a minority (or less active group) through social opinion ("social tyranny") or law ("legal tyranny"). Used as an objection to utilitarianism since maximising utility might require such tyranny.

Problems with calculation

Issues with carrying out the calculating/predicting required for determining what to do according to utilitarian theories. This might include:

(a) difficulties knowing the future and the causal connections between events

(b) difficulties knowing what counts as utility for people (what they find pleasurable/prefer)

(c) difficulties with measuring utility (e.g. for Mill, is any amount of ‘higher’ pleasure of more value than an infinite amount of ‘lower’ pleasure?)

(d) difficulties about how much of the future can/should be taken into account

(e) difficulties with making calculations quickly

(f) difficulties relating to which beings are included in the calculation (just humans? animals also?).

Partiality

Giving/desiring to give preferential treatment to particular individuals (e.g. those we love/relatives/compatriots etc.). Used to object to utilitarianism since maximising utility might preclude such preferential treatment

Moral integrity (Williams)

Someone acts/lives with moral integrity (for Williams) to the extent that they make decisions based on their own commitments, projects, values, ways of living. Used to object to utilitarianism since the utilitarian decision-making procedure is incompatible with moral integrity as a decision-making procedure.

Intentions of the individual

The objection that intentions are important in determining the morality of an action and that utilitarianism, due to its focus on consequences alone, cannot account for this importance of intentions.

Good will

A person has a good will if they make their decisions for moral reasons alone (i.e. out of duty, rather than merely in accordance with duty).

Acting (merely) in accordance with duty

Acting as duty demands, but motivated by something other than a recognition of your rationally-determined duty. For example, a shopkeeper treating a customer honestly because it is good for business.

Acting out of duty

Acting as duty demands and motivated by a recognition of this rationally-determined duty. For example, a shopkeeper treating a customer honestly because it is his duty to do so.

Hypothetical imperative

It is an imperative: a statement commanding a course of action; it is a statement about what one ought to do. It is hypothetical: it applies to agents on the condition that they have (in Kant’s wording, that they “will”) specific ends/goals. It has the form "Do X if you will Y".

Catgorical imperative

It is an imperative: a statement commanding a course of action; it is a statement about what one ought to do. It is categorical: it applies to all agents regardless of their specific ends/goals. It normally has the form "Do X".

The first formulation of the categorical imperative

Act only according to maxims which you can will as a universal law (one followed by everyone) without this leading to a contradiction.

Contradiction in conception

A maxim leads to a contradiction in conception if acting on that maxim is not conceivable (/possible) in a world in which all people acted as you propose to act.

Contradiction in will

A maxim leads to a contradiction in the will if a world in which all people acted as you propose to act would conflict with other things that you must rationally will.

The second formulation of the categorical imperative

Act in a way that treats yourself and others never solely as a means but always as an end in themselves.

Clashing/competing duties

A perfect duty clashes with another (different) perfect duty when fulfilling one perfect duty means that you cannot fulfill the other. A perfect duty clashes with itself when fulfilling that duty in one sense (or to one person) means that it cannot be fulfilled in another sense (or to another person). Note that for Kant if a perfect duty clashes with an imperfect duty, you must fulfil the perfect duty.

Not all non-universalisable maxims are immoral

There are maxims which cannot be universalised without contradiction but are moral (intuitively or according to Kant's second formulation).

We cannot universalise “doing better than 90% of students in a test”, as if everyone did this, it would become impossible for anyone to achieve that standard.

Not all universalisable maxims are distinctly moral

There are maxims which can be universalised without contradiction but are either immoral (intuitively or according to Kant's second formulation) or are neither moral nor immoral.

We can universalise “kill everyone with 9 letters in their name” but this isn’t moral.

Consequences of action determine their moral value

The objection that consequences are important in determining the morality of an action and that Kantian ethics, due to its focus on intention/motive alone, cannot account for this importance of consequences.

Morality is a system of hypothetical, rather than categorical, imperatives (Philippa Foot)

Foot argues that while moral imperatives might seem to be categorical, they are in fact hypothetical because it is not irrational to disobey them (unless they contradict our desires/aims).

Eudaimonia

The 'good', the final end that we are all striving for, desirable as an end in itself and not for the sake of anything else. It is best translated as "flourishing", living/doing well.

The relationship between Eudaimonia and pleasure

Pleasure is good when it is taken in virtuous forms of activity. However, pleasure, unlike eudaimonia, is not the only good, and is not an end-in-itself. It is part of eudaimonia which is an end-in-itself.

The function argument

Aristotle's argument that the function of humans is what humans can do that non-humans can't, namely reasoning/acting for reasons. Performing this function well (by way of the development of virtues) is what a good life for a human requires.

Virtues

Positive moral character traits/dispositions acquired through habituation. Possession of virtues enables human beings to fulfil their function through making good/rational moral choices thus living a good (eudaimon) life. Virtues (e.g. courage) lie between a vice of excess (e.g. rashness) and a vice of deficiency (e.g. cowardice).

The skill analogy

An analogy made by Aristotle where he compares the development of virtues with the development of a skill. They have the following similarities: they require practice/habituation, an exemplar/teacher can be helpful, they are not innately present.

The importance of feelings

To feel [emotions] at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue

This means that the virtuous person is not just someone who acts correctly, but who also feels correctly. A courageous person does not simply perform brave acts; they feel an appropriate level of fear and confidence. Likewise, someone who experiences too much fear (cowardice) or too little (rashness) fails to be virtuous.

The doctrine of the mean

Moral virtue lies between two extremes of excess and deficiency, and this mean is determined by reason.

“Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.”

This “mean relative to us” does not imply a strict mathematical average but rather the appropriate response in a particular situation, considering who we are and the context we’re in.

Voluntary action (VE)

A voluntary action is one that meets two conditions: (1) the control condition (it is done intentionally by the agent and not compelled externally) and (2) the epistemic condition (the agent is aware of the non-moral facts about what it is they are doing).

Involuntary action (VE)

An involuntary action is one that (1) is not voluntary (either because it is done under compulsion (so fails to meet the “control condition”) or because it is the result of ignorance (so fails to meet the “epistemic condition”)) and (2) is regretted.

Non-voluntary action (VE)

One that (1) is not voluntary (either because it is done under compulsion (so fails to meet the “control condition”) or because it is the result of ignorance (so fails to meet the “epistemic condition”)) and (2) is not regretted.

Practical wisdom/reasoning (the relationship between virtues, actions and reasons)

Practical wisdom is the reasoning we use to make choices about our actions and it requires (1) general knowledge of the good, (2) particular knowledge of how to achieve that good, (3) good reasoning skills, and (4) willpower. Practical wisdom is context-dependent and requires experience/practice/habituation.

Practical wisdom is what helps us to identify how to achieve our virtuous ends, is required for an action to be fully virtuous (it is additional to just doing what a virtuous person would do, which could be done with no understanding at all and/or for the wrong reasons) and it also requires virtue since it must have a morally good aim/end.

The issue of whether VE can give sufficiently clear guidance on how to act

Aristotle's virtue ethics does not make it clear how we should act. The doctrine of the mean does not give specific enough guidance about how to act and what constitutes virtue in specific situations. According to Aristotle, ethics is not rule-based. This is seen as an objection because a successful ethical theory should give clear guidance on how to act and moral knowledge should be possible.

Clashing/competing virtues

A virtue clashes with another virtue when exhibiting one means that you cannot exhibit the other

The circularity involved in defining virtuous acts and virtuous persons in terms of each other

The objection that Aristotle’s ethics defines a virtuous person as someone who does virtuous acts and defines virtuous acts as acts done by a virtuous person. This is an example of a circular definition making it impossible to learn what a virtuous person or virtuous act is unless we already know what one of them is.

Whether a trait must contribute to Eudaimonia in order to be a virtue; the relationship between the good for the individual and moral good.

Aristotle says that virtues are traits that contribute to human flourishing; that doing what is morally good contributes to one's individual good. However, there are examples of people who don’t flourish (where their lives are not good for them) but who live a good/virtuous life (they do what is morally good).

Battlefield medic: courageous, compassionate, gets PTSD, not flourishing

Utilitarianism on stealing

Stealing is wrong if it causes more harm than good (e.g. if the person who steals harms others or undermines trust).
Context matters — if stealing maximises overall happiness (e.g. stealing to save a life), it could be justified.

Fancy: rule utilitarianists may say that a general rule against stealing will maximise overall utility. A society in which people stealing was permitted whenever it increased happiness could indirectly lead to greater unhappiness caused by a lack of trust

Kantian ethics on stealing

Formulation 1 – If we Universalise stealing, it causes a contradiction in conception. If everyone steals then the idea of private property ceases to exist. If it ceases to exist, you can’t steal

Formulation 2 – Stealing from someone treats them merely as a means to an end (you getting the object)

Fancy: Kant argued that to break the law is to treat everyone in society as a means to an end – why should they keep to laws but not you? Everyone benefits from laws being upheld so to break them is irrational – it undermines laws for yourself as well as everyone else. Therefore, the only time it is acceptable to break the law is when the law is unjust

Virtue ethics on stealing

Only morally impactful if the action was done voluntarily

Even then, depends on whether it was done out of a virtue or a vice - whether it was in the golden mean and led to eudaimonia

But stealing is often immoral because it reflects vices like greed or dishonesty. A virtuous person would act with integrity, showing respect for others' property.

Fancy: stealing concerns justice, and Aristotle understands justice in fairly strict terms – stealing is never in the mean? Stealing as a result of a prior unjust action could be ‘justice in rectification’

Stealing

Taking something that someone else owns with no intention of returning it and without their permission. Violating someone's property right

Utilitarianism on eating animals

Bentham: “The question is not, ‘Can they reason?’ nor ‘Can they talk?’ but, ‘Can they suffer?’”

If animals’ pleasure/pain is of the same quantitative value as that of humans, then eating animals is wrong if it causes them pain - which rearing in cramped conditions does, as well as then killing them. Perhaps we could only eat animals that die naturally.

Singer: speciesism is immoral discrimination against animals just because they are not humans

Kantian ethics on eating animals

Kant: “Animals are not self-conscious and are there merely as a means to an end. That end is man.”

The reason humans are to be treated as ends is because they are rational – animals are not and therefore can be used as means to our end

Fancy: Humans have a moral obligation to treat animals with kindness, as treating them with cruelty develops a disposition that would lead to treating other humans unkindly, damaging our good will

Virtue ethics on eating animals

Aristotle said that since animals don’t have rationality then they have no part in eudaimonia as all humans can have. Therefore, they aren’t worthy of consideration. However, we could argue that is is not virtuous to mistreat animals.

It could be pointed out that even though animals aren’t rational, it is not the status in the animals themselves that is important.

Instead, it is our ability to have relationships with them (like pets) that means we should practice our virtues as part of these relationships (a form of habituation)

Lying

Making a statement that one does not believe with the intention that someone else believe it.

Utilitarianism on lying

Act forms of utilitarianism (either hedonic or preference) are straightforward; it is permissible to lie if it causes happiness, but immoral if it does not

Fancy: rule utilitarianism may argue for a rule against lying - lying undermines trust and honesty in society, which can ultimately lead to more harm than good.

Mill does recognize that lying may be permissible in some circumstances – where it is necessary to fulfil some other rule of utility

So, if for example we wanted to save someone’s life, then protection of life is more important than only speaking the truth

Kantian ethics on lying

Formulation 1 – If we Universalise lying, it causes a contradiction in conception. If everyone lies then the idea of a truth ceases to exist. If it ceases to exist, you can’t lie

Formulation 2 – Lying to someone treats them merely as a means to an end

Virtue ethics on lying

Interpretation 1: “Falsehood is in itself mean and culpable, and truth noble and worthy of praise”

It could be argued that lying is always a vice of some kind and telling the truth is an essential part of living a eudaimonic life in an ordered society

Sincerity is a virtue in itself according to Aristotle and therefore lying would seem to be a vice and immoral

Interpretation 2: many virtue ethicists argue it is not this simple; lying is often what a person of virtue would do in order to fulfill a virtuous act

Lying is an act and acts are not immoral on their own, but only on how they impact a character

Moral naturalism

The view that mind-independent/objective moral properties/facts are natural/physical. This involves (1) moral realism (there are mind-independent/objective moral properties/facts) and (2) moral cognitivism (moral utterances (e.g. "murder is wrong") are true or false, they express propositions/beliefs). This is often connected with empiricism - we come to know about them using the senses/scientific investigation

Moral realism

The view that there are mind-independent/objective moral properties/facts.

Moral anti-realism

The view that either (a) there are no moral properties/facts at all or (b) there are moral properties/facts but they are all mind-dependent.

Cognitivism about ethical language

The view that moral utterances (e.g. "murder is wrong") are true or false, they express propositions/beliefs

Non-cognitivism about ethical language

The view that moral utterences (e.g. "murder is wrong") are not true or false, they do not express propositions or beliefs. Instead they have some different function/express some other mental state.

Moral non-naturalism

The view that mind-independent/objective moral properties are non-natural/non-physical. This involves (1) moral realism (there are mind-independent/objective moral properties/facts) and (2) moral cognitivism (moral utterances (e.g. "murder is wrong") are true or false, they express propositions/beliefs). This is often (and is for Moore) connected to rationalist intuitionism - we come to know about these moral properties through our faculty of intuition (non-inferential a priori knowledge).

Moore’s ‘open question’ argument

Moore argued that if naturalism were true, the result would be illogical. Take any naturalist claim about what goodness is, such as that goodness = pleasure.

IF: goodness = pleasure

THEN: (goodness = pleasure) = (pleasure = pleasure).

BUT: goodness = pleasure is informative, telling us about the world.

YET: pleasure = pleasure is not informative (tautology).

An informative statement cannot be equal in meaning to an uninformative tautological statement. So, goodness cannot = pleasure, or any other natural property. Therefore, naturalism is false.

If 'good' just meant 'pleasurable', it wouldn't make sense to ask “But is pleasure really good?” — showing they aren’t identical

Moore’s naturalistic fallacy

Moore argues that moral goodness is a simple concept which cannot be analysed/understood/defined in terms of any other concept/s. Someone commits the naturalistic fallacy when they attempt to give an analysis/definition of moral goodness. Moral goodness might be correlated with other properties but it is not identical/reducible to them, it is an irreducible property (and, for Moore, a non-natural property).

Hume’s fork against moral realism

The division of knowledge into only two types (a) "matters of fact" (a posteriori, contingent, synthetic) and (b) "relations of ideas" (a priori, necessary, analytic). Used to challenge the claim made by moral realists and moral cognitivists that moral knowledge is possible by arguing that moral utterances are neither "matters of fact" nor "relations of ideas".

They can’t be matters of fact because you can’t observe wrongness with your senses

They can’t be relations of ideas because no logical contradiction arises when we assert the opposite

This means moral statements are not genuine knowledge claims because they don’t describe the world or express logical truths.

AJ Ayer’s verification principle

A proposition is meaningful if and only if either:

(1) it is analytically true/false

(2) there are conditions under which its truth could be empirically verified

Used to challenge the claim made by moral realists/cognitivists that moral utterances express meaningful propositions/beliefs by arguing that moral claims meet neither condition.

Hume’s motivation argument

Hume argues that a moral judgement/commitment/state of mind (by itself) motivates us to act in a particular way, whereas believing a proposition (by itself) does not. This shows that moral judgements/commitments/states of mind (like “X is wrong”) are not beliefs (so are not true or false) and so do not express propositions, showing that moral cognitivism is false.

Hume’s is-ought gap

Hume's claim that we cannot justifiably infer what ought to be done (‘ought’ statements) from facts about what is the case (“is” statements) alone. Used to challenge the claim made by some moral realists that moral obligations/duties can be justified by statements about what is the case. Some see it as showing that moral utterances are non-cognitive.

Mackie’s argument from relativity

Mackie argues that moral anti-realism can give a better explanation of the differences in moral views across time/geography ("moral relativity") than moral realism can.

Mackie’s argument from queerness

Mackie argues that moral properties (were they to exist as the moral realist thinks they do) would be unlike any other properties we know of and would have to be accessed in a way unlike our normal ways of gaining knowledge:

• Metaphysical queerness: Mackie argues that objective moral properties, if they exist, would be unlike anything else in the universe. For instance, if something is "good," it would have to have a built-in "to-be-done-ness," and if something is "bad," it would have a built-in "not-to-be-done-ness." He argues that such properties, which would seem to be inherently motivating or prescriptive, are not found in our naturalistic understanding of the world.

• Epistemological queerness: Mackie argues that if objective moral properties existed, we would need some special faculty of moral perception or intuition to know them. This faculty would be utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else, which is a mysterious and unconvincing idea

The existence of such properties is implausible, and so, therefore, is moral realism.

Error theory

The view that there are no mind-independent/objective moral properties and so all moral utterances (which presuppose the existence of such properties) are false (i.e. are in error).

This involves both (1) moral anti-realism (there are no moral properties/facts) and (2) moral cognitivism (moral utterances (e.g. "murder is wrong") are true or false, they express propositions/beliefs).

Emotivism

The view that the function of moral utterances is (merely) to express the emotions of the person. Often referred to as the “boo-hoorah!” theory of morality – “X is morally wrong” is best understood as an expression of emotion such as “X boo!”.

This involves both (1) moral noncognitivism (moral utterances (e.g. "murder is wrong") are not true or false, they are doing something other than expressing propositions/beliefs) and (2) moral anti-realism (there are no moral properties/facts).

Prescriptivism

The function of moral utterances is to prescribe (to command) ways of acting/living which apply universally (to everyone, including the speaker). So “x is morally right” means “do x” (an imperative) and includes the commitment that everyone in the same (/sufficiently similar) situation should do x (universality).

This involves both (1) moral non-cognitivism (moral utterances (e.g. "murder is wrong") are not true or false, they are doing something other than expressing propositions/beliefs) and (2) moral anti-realism (there are no moral properties/facts)

Whether non-cognitivism can account for how we use moral language, including moral reasoning, persuading, disagreeing etc.

Moral reasoning or persuading is the use of moral claims within arguments as premises and/or conclusions. For example:

1. If murder is wrong, then paying to have someone murdered is wrong

2. Murder is wrong

3. Therefore paying to have someone murdered is wrong

This seems like a valid argument – the conclusion seems to follow logically from the premises. But if non-cognitivism is correct, it’s hard to see how this is a valid argument at all.

Moral disagreement occurs when people take opposing moral views. For example:

Person A: “Abortion can be the right thing to do”, person B: “Abortion is always wrong”

If non-cognitivism were true, then there would be no point in debating about such issues, as people would just be expressing different emotions towards abortion which cannot be true or false. Non-cognitive states like emotions can conflict, but they cannot ‘disagree’ because they do not represent reality.

Used as an objection to moral non-cognitivism, since the existence of such practices shows that moral statements express propositions.

The issue of anti-realism accounting for moral progress

Moral progress appears to occur. E.g., society used to accept slavery and deny women the vote.

The concept of ‘progress’ relies on an objective standard towards which increasing gains can be made. If moral progress exists, then objective moral values exist. It seems it exists, so it seems objective values exist.

Counter to moral progress critique

However, this criticism begs the question. Anti-realists would deny that there is an objective moral standard and so they would deny that progress has occurred. Certainly moral change has occurred, but to call it progress begs the question regarding the truth of moral realism.

The issue of whether anti-realism might destroy society (Nihilism)

Moral nihilism is the view that because there is no right or wrong, morality is pointless. Anti-realists like Ayer and Hare claim that there are no objective moral values. Many object that this view leads to the moral nihilist conclusion.

The concern arising from moral nihilism is that people might not bother to be moral. If everyone lost their belief in morality, society might struggle to maintain social order.