Violence and popular mobilisation

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17 Terms

1
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CODESA 2

CODESA 2 reassembled in May 1992 but soon broke down because violence undermined negotiations.

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June 1992

In June 1992 residents in the township of Boipatong in the Vaal Triangle were massacred by hostel dwellers. Police or 'third force' collusion was not proven but was widely suspected. The ANC thought that the government was doing little to control such violence in the hope that it would divide African communities.

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The ANC and its

The ANC and its allies believed not only that they should try to keep some potential for armed struggle, but also that mass demonstrations and stayaways were essential to keep the political initiative.

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Many African people

Many African people were impatient with the long negotiations and groups within the ANC felt that they should have a more revolutionary approach - that they should topple the government rather than negotiate.

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Ronnie Kasrils,

Throughout the four years of negotiations, elements in the ANC argued strongly for mass action. Ronnie Kasrils, one of those arrested for his role in Operation Vula, where he was characterised as 'armed and dangerous, was particularly militant in his approach.

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One of their key targets

One of their key targets was the homeland governments - still seen as props for apartheid, and as hostile to ANC mobilisation in the rural areas.

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what did The ANC fix on?

The ANC fixed on the Ciskei where the self-styled Brigadier Gozo had taken power in a military coup in 1990 and publicly challenged the ANC.

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Civic organisations

Civic organisations and residents' associations openly challenged Gqozo and the tribal authorities - they had clearly won a majority of support in this old heartland of the ANC.

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had clearly won a majority of support in this old heartland of the ANC.

In September 1992 the ANC organised a huge march of 80,000 people, led by Chris Hani, head of the SACP and MK, and Ronnie Kasrils. Gozo's troops shot at protestors, killing 29 and injuring over 200. A unit from the South African Defence Force was present but did not intervene.

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The PAC

The PAC had fared badly in exile, riven by leadership disputes and unable to develop a secure base. Most of the militant black consciousness youth, who might otherwise have been drawn to PAC, found their way into the ANC and MK.

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On returning from exile, the PAC

On returning from exile, however, the PAC's armed wing, by then named the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), did succeed in recruiting locally. The PAC had never restricted itself to sabotage and it did not suspend the armed struggle as part of the negotiation process, which it largely rejected.

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1993 APLA

In 1993, the APLA staged a number of dramatic attacks on white civilian targets, including a pub in the Eastern Cape where five were killed and a church in Cape Town. These incidents did not attract significant support among black South Africans, who were generally moving in a different direction.

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Multi-party talks

Multi-party talks were restored at the beginning of 1993 and strong personal links forged between two of the chief negotiators: Cyril Ramaphosa of the ANC and Roelf Meyer of the NP. They were deeply conscious of being part of a historically significant process that was attracting intense international attention. The process was nearly undermined again in April 1993.

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White right wing renegades

White right wing renegades - an English-speaker and a Pole, rather than Afrikaners - assassinated Chris Hani, seen as one of the most central figures in the new generation of ANC and MK leaders. South Africa truly stood on the edge at that moment, with the possibility of a mass armed uprising.

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Mandela made a televised address,

Mandela made a televised address, which successfully appealed for calm.

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The Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging,

The Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging, a paramilitary white movement, also threatened violent reprisals. They later briefly invaded the talks and assisted the leader of the Bophuthatswana homeland government, Lucas Mangope, in an attempt to stay in power.

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abyss of uncontrolled violence and civil war.

These threats, together with the PAC killings, the intensity of mass protests, and the civil conflict in the townships, seemed to open the abyss of uncontrolled violence and civil war. The need for negotiations now seemed more urgent than ever.