Poli 244 - Midterm

Paradigm

assumptions a theory makes (ex. realist, neoliberal)

Interests

what actors want to achieve, preferences among possible outcomes

Interactions

ways in which choices of two or more actors combine

Bargaining (interactions)

actors decide how to distribute something, increasing one actor’s share decreases the other’s, zero-sum game

cooperation (interactions)

policy that makes at least one actor better off without making the other worse, positive-sum game

Institutions

set of rules shared by a community that sturcture interactions in a specific way

Three I’s - IR Framework

Interests, interactions, institutions

Peace of Westphalia (1648)

Defined the modern state system, emphasized the sovereign state

Levels of Analysis

Individual (1st image), State (2nd image), International System (3rd image)

Realism interests

states dominate, seek security, conflict

realism interactions

bargaining, coercion, rational actors

realism institutions

anarchic system, institutions have little power

liberalism interests

many types of actors, no single state dominates, common interests are basis for cooperation

liberalism interactions

cooperation, conflict when actors fail to act in common interest

liberalism institutions

international institutions, democratic peace theory, non-statist

constructivism interests

culture and identity influence states, norms of behavior important

constructivism interactions

states have multiple identities created by their interactions with other states

constructivism institutions

international institutions shape norms and behavior

relations

interactions between collective social idenities

nation

a people who feel part of some large identity group

state

political organization managing affairs of population in given territory

nationalism

psychological, cultural, social forces that drive formation and maintenance of nation

What does the modern state have?

territoriality, effective control, sovereignty

power

ability to influence behavior of other to get the outcomes one wants

behavioral power

a’s ability to get b to do something that b would not otherwise do

power as influence

achieve desired outcome through control of one’s social and physical environment

active use of capabilities

coercion, military force

passive use of capabilities

threats and promises

structural effect of capabilities

perceptions, instituions alter environment

natural capabilities

geography, natural resources, land, population

synthetic capabilities

economy, military

compellence

ability of one state to coerce another state into action, direct action that persuades an opponent to give something up

deterrence

actions discouraging opponent from an action by threatening punishment

soft power

getting others to want the outcomes you want

hard power

coercion, threats, sanctions, military

structural power

ability of A to influence context or environment surrounding decision

security

ability to consume, invest, use wealth as a state sees fit

three categories of interests

power and security, economic welfare, ideological goals

actors

basic unit for political analysis

state

central authority that has ability to make and enforce laws and decisions within a territory

sovereignty

expectation that states have legal and political supremacy within their borders

national interests

interests attributed to state, usually security and power

strategic interactions

actors trying to get their way while avoiding costly repercussions, depends on anticipated strategy of others

cooperation

actors adopt policies that make at least one better off without making the other worse, positive sum, expand pareto frontier

types of coordination

Coordination: actors benefit from making all same choices, no incentive to defect

Collaboration: individual incentive undermines interest to cooperate

public goods

products that are non-excludable, ex. clean air, national defense

factors that facilitate cooperation

number and size of actors, iteration, linkage, information availability

bargaining

interaction where actors must divide something of value, more one side gets, less other side gets

compulsary power

ability of one actor to compel another to act in certain ways

reversion outcome

outcome that occurs when no bargain is achieved, those who can be satisfied with it have most bargaining power

coercion

threatening other to reduce value of reversion outcome and change behavior, forces actors to consent to painful options when reversion outcome is worse

outside options

alternative to bargaining with a particular partner, actors with better outside option can walk away from bargain

agenda setting

actions taken right before or during bargaining that make reversion outcome more favorable for one, transform setting

rational choice

explains international choice politics as the outcome of individual goal-seeking decision

how does rational choice work

1. actors consider all possible strategies 2. rank order outcome 3. select best strategy given information available

cognitive limits of rationality

misuse of analogies, cognitive dissonance, egocentric behavior, attribution of hostile intention

prospect theory

biased expected utility, frames gains and losses relative to a reference point

game theory

models of decision-making for rational actors

Nash Equilibrium

combination of strategies, each of which is best response to each other

Dominant Strategy

actor makes same choice no matter what opponent does, can be weakly or strongly dominant

expected outcome

combination of strategies determined by each player’s maximization and rational behavior

pareto-optimal outcome

When there is no other strategy that will make one better off without making the other worse off

pareto-suboptimal outcome

there exists another possible outcome that can make another actor better off without hurting one

Prisoner’s Dilemma

collaboration problem, captures strategic dilemma of collective action

Chicken game

coercion, brinksmanship, key is to do the opposite of what the other actor does

Stag Hunt

Coordination problems, can only do what they think other actor will do

Realism

emphasizes anarchic system, competition, power, anarchy

4 Points of Realism

Groupism, Egoism, Anarchy, Power Politics

Classical Realism

emphasizes selfishness of human nature and says that this is reflected in states by conflict and agression

Neorealism (structural realism)

conflict results from anarchic nature of the intl system, system is distinct from internal nature of states, self-help system

Defensive realism (neorealism)

states maximize security, maintain moderate policies to attain national security and maintain position

Offensive realism (neorealism)

states maximize power, aime to expand or strengthen in order to survive

Realism theories

balance of power, security dilemma, hegemonic stability theory, power transition theory

Balance of power theory

National security is enhanced when power is distributed throughout system so no one becomes to powerful. When one becomes too powerful, other states will form defensive alliances

Security Dilemma

One state increasing their security leads to other states fearing their own security and kick-starting defensive action

Hegemonic Stability Theory

powerful states seek dominance which fosters hierarchy, explains how intl orders with rules, norms, and institutions emerge and are sustained

Power Transition Theory

Explains how orders break down into war, rising states strengthen and reach parity with powerful states, they want to change system, so they start a war

Neoliberalism

emphasizes international cooperation, interdependence, counters anarchy and state-centrism

How do institutions affect cooperation

Set standards of behavior, verify compliance, Reduce cost of joint decisions, mechanisms for resolving disputes

neoliberal institutionalism

institutions limit anarchic nature of intl system, provide incentive for cooperation in agreements

Why do states comply with insitutions?

value of cooperation by institution outweighs costs of disadvantageous bargain, they are already created with rules outlined, so it is cheaper

International Regimes

Broader than institutions, informal

Do not enforce, but can help to solve cooperation problems, stop defection in every round of prisoner’s dilemma

Prisoner’s Dilemma problems

1. tit for tat: do what other actor did in the previous round

2. Grim Trigger: cheating by one player triggers breakdown for future cooperation

3. needs to be no known last round, because then both states will always defect

Atomistic States

states more concerned with individual gains in absolute terms, allows for possibility of cooperation

Positional States

states care about relative gains, how much one state has compared to another

realists: given anarchic system, you always have to concerned with relative gains

Why does cooperation fail

Offensive realists: inevitability of conflict

Defensive realists: limited feasibility of cooperation

Neoliberalists: strategies of cooperation, intl regimes

Shadow of future

one-shot vs. iterated games, more repetitions allows for prospect of cooperation

Choice ambiguity

institutions can help states see which choice is best choice through standardizing the setting

issue-linkage

link issues where there are two scenarios that are zero-sum, each helps the other

Constructivism

sees the world as socially constructed, driven by ideational factors, rivalries between states are not product of international system, but historical relationship

Constructivists and Materialism

how we think of material resources defines their power, we attach meaning to certain resources

Realists on Materialism

objects don’t have meaning, exist independently whether we think about them or not

intersubjective reality

exist in human mind and are given force through collective belief, socially constructed

Constructivist international system

examine historical construction of national interests, changes in system possible, identity and interest changeable

International norms

standards of behavior for actors with a given identity in a given social context, they attach meaning to certain behaviors and define what actions are right under particular circumstances

Logic of consequences

Realism (interests —> expected outcomes, —> behavior)

Logic of appropriateness

constructivist (social identity/context —> appropriateness as defined by norms, identities, behavior

Transformation of Power politics

sovereignty as norm and mitigator of self-help systems

collectively attainable gains become collective identity

• incremental, usually unintended, path dependent practice

Hobbesian anarchy

realism, focuses on competitive interests

Lockean anarchy

neoliberal institutionalism, individualistic interests allow states to have overlapping interests