Soviet foreign policy

Soviet Union foreign policy was often contradictory, due to the unusual nature of the state

• As a revolutionary state, its mission was to spread Marxist-Leninism to achieve a worldwide, classless, stateless communism

  • Established the Comintern in 1919 to assist communist revolutionaries to overthrow their governments

  • Did not attend 1919 Paris Peace Conference or join the League of Nations, which was a coalition of capitalist states that distrusted the Soviet Union

• However, pragmatism forced foreign policy to evolve as uprisings in Europe failed, and the Soviet Union had to coexist with capitalist states

  • As the Comintern was trying to overthrow British, French and German governments, the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs aimed to develop cordial relations

    • ‘International communism’ was replaced with ‘socialism in one country’, as the west was still needed for trade and capital

Despite the ideological fervour of the Bolsheviks, the periods between 1917-1921 saw foreign policy aimed at survival at all costs

• Lenin’s insistence of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was necessary, especially after it destroyed Kerensky’s government, and opposed Bukharin’s romantic views of revolutionary war

• Lenin knew survival was paramount in the face of the civil war, allied intervention and war with Poland

  • The Bolsheviks were vastly outnumbered by the Whites and were surrounded by capitalist forces eager to destroy the regime at its birth

Although victory in the civil war brought survival, the dream of world revolution was distant, and foreign policy attempted to normalise foreign relations in the 1920s

• In 1920, friendship treaties were signed with Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and in 1921 with Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan

• In 1921, commercial agreements were signed with Britain and Italy, and David Lloyd George’s attempts to pull Russia into mainstream commerce was opposed by France and Belgium due to Bolshevik repudiation of pre-war debts

  • Anglo-Soviet relations was often contradictory, as Lloyd Geroge’s cooperative attempts were at odds with conservative party sentiment

• By 1930, Russia had relations with all major powers except the US, and was attending the League of Nations conferences

The Soviet Union’s diplomatic successes was with its relationship with Germany, similar in their isolation as pariah states by the League of Nations and economic issues

• Germany helped Russia during the 1921 famine, and Russia allowed the German army to make military goods and exercise its troops in Russia

• This alliance was cemented in the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo

  • Cancelled each power’s reparations and functioned as a ‘marriage of convenience’, as the two powers were ideologically, socially, politically and economically opposites

EH Carr

• “Rapallo secured for the Soviet Union its first official recognition by a great power”

Despite these successes in foreign policy with Germany, these relations were strained with

• he attempted 1923 communist coup in Germany

• The Soviets were alarmed with Germany’s ratification of the 1925 Locarno Treaty and entry into the League of Nations in 1926

• However, economic trade and the German army’s clandestine activities continued strong

Within the onset of the depression in the 1930s, the ambiguities of Soviet foreign policy reappeared, as the upheaval of western nations revived hopes of world revolution

• Stalin ordered communist parties to separate from moderate socialist parties as communist revolution was near, which ironically led to fascism emerging

  • For example, the separation of Germany’s moderate socialist party (SDP) and the communist party (KPD) allowed Hitler to rise to power

• By the mid-1930s, Stalin saw the dangers of Nazi expansionism in Europe and Japanese militarism in the East and reversed foreign policy to avoid war

  • Hitler’s Non-Aggression Pact with Poland threatened joint military invasion during the internal upheaval of collectivisation and industrialisation

  • Stalin ordered western communist parties to cooperate with anti-fascist groups in lieu of world revolution, joining ‘Popular Front’ governments

  • The Soviet Union attempted to forge ties with non-communist nations against Nazism

Soviet Foreign policy (1932-1939)

Key Date:	Soviet Foreign Policy:
1932	Treaty of Friendship signed with Italy, although short-lived when Mussolini signed the Anti-Comintern Pact
1933	The USSR and US establish diplomatic relations
1934	Soviet Union joins the League of Nations
2 May 1935	Soviet Union and France sign an alliance
16 May 1935	Czechoslovakia joins the Franco-Soviet alliance
May 1936	Communists join Popular Front governments in France
1936-9	Stalin strongly backs Republican anti-fascist forces in Spanish Civil War to defend against fascism

23 August 1939, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, one of the greatest feats of diplomacy

Why did this happen?

• Stalin realised that by late 1938, hopes of forming a united western front against German Nazism had failed

  • Nazism was seen as the lesser evil to Bolshevism as Bolsheviks remained an enigma

  • The Soviet Union was isolated and vulnerable due to the convulsions of collectivisation, industrialisation and the purges, and a lack of military alliances

  • Fears were increased after the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis (Anti-Comintern Pact) was created in September 1937, and their expansionist pursuits were appeased

• Hitler and Stalin were both opportunists

  • Hitler believed that with Russia neutralised, he could defeat Poland swiftly and eliminate the west, returning later for a longer campaign in the east

  • Stalin believed that Poland would provide a buffer, hoping that Germany would exhaust itself in the west allowing time for Russia to prepare

• Neither side intended to honour this agreement, and Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa ended the agreement

Richard Overy

Antony Beevor

Gordon Greenwood

• “Russia’s chief concern was to avoid involvement in any major war at all costs. Soviet foreign policy aimed to play one power off against another in the hope of escaping the impending conflict”

• “Stalin, the totalitarian dictator, still could not come to terms with the idea that events might be outside his control”

• “The absence of the Soviet Union from Munich, the half-hearted western methods of negotiation for an alliance against Germany after the guarantee to Poland, only solidified these suspicions”

November 1917 - June 1918

Ideology v National State Interest

Officially there are calls for World Revolution and genuine hope held by Lenin and Trotsky

Survival is crucial as Bolsheviks are in a weak position, needing to establish peace with Germany (Treaty of Brest-Litovsk)

June 1918 - 1921

Ideology v National State INterest

The Comintern is established under Zinoviev to promote and assist revolutions across Europe, particularly in Germany and Hungary

Despite revolutionary slogans, Bolsheviks main emphasis is on survival amidst the Civil War, enforcing War Communism and revolts at Kronstadt

After the Civil War, there is no intention of launching a revolutionary war against the west, as national self-interest is deemed more vital

1921 - 1929

Ideology v National Self-Interest

National recovery takes precedence over ideology, particularly while pursuing NEP

1923 communist coup in Germany is welcomed, but not acted upon, and the Zinoviev Letter affair in Britain reflects wishful thinking rather than serious attempts at overthrowing British government

Trotsky’s support for ‘Permanent Revolution’ is replaced with Stalin’s popular ‘Socialism in One Country’, further solidified with Trotsky’s expulsion from the party

The defeat of the left in the power struggle prioritises national recovery over ideology with NEP

The need for stability promotes normal state relations with all major powers, except US

Economic agreements are important, as seen in the Genoa Conference and Treaty of Rapallo, despite ideological differences

1929 - 1933

Ideology v National State INterest

The Great Depression increases ideological fervour, and ordering the Comintern to avoid cooperation with other parties as capitalist systems were on the brink of collapse

Fascist regimes were welcomed as this was the final stage before communism

Despite renewal of ideological fervour, Russia was preoccupied with internal economic development (collectivisation and industrialisation)

Ideology plays a bigger role in national reconstruction than foreign affairs

1933 - 1938

Ideology v National State Interest

Pursuit of ideological goals has disappeared in the face of Nazism and fascism

The Comintern and foreign communist parties are to best promote national interests of the Soviet Union by cooperating with anti-fascist ‘Popular Front’ governments in France and Spain

Soviet Union attempts to join League of Nations and form military alliances with western capitalist powers to form a unified front against Germany

Stalin is forced to place his nation’s interests first as the country is weak after economic upheaval and purges

Trade, defence and security requires cooperation with hated western powers

Involvement in Spain is driven by national interest rather than ideology, defending against a Fascist front in western Europe

Spain is also used to eliminate Trotskyites and purge foreign communists

1938 - 1939

Ideology v National State Interest

Soviet Union is an unrecognisable socialist country as it reapproaches military alliance with Nazi Germany

National defence and security dictate Nazi-Soviet Pact, and Five-Year Plans focus on military armaments

1939 - 1941

While war wages in Europe, only national self-interest matters

Stalin aims to keep Russia out of the war as it prepares against German invasion

Isaac Deutscher

“He tried to lay the ghosts of the past, the giant ghost of world revolution first of all…The bourgeoisie of the western countries now found it hard to believe that all this was merely a comic or tragic-comic misunderstanding”