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I know through introspection the thoughts in my mind (eg that I want to go to Seville next summer).
Others might be able to infer this from my behaviour (eg reading holiday brochures). However, they cannot possess the unique knowledge about the contents of my mental states that only I possess. Only I have the privileged access to the privacy of my mind.
Latin: Qualitative aspects of conscious experience. These properties are subjective, our particular points of view or 'what it is like 'to experience the world as us.
It is argued that what is subjective cannot be reduced to what is objective. We might know everything there is to know about the physicality of another person but we can't know what it is like to be them.
The fact some mental states are 'about' something whereas physical states are not. Desires, beliefs etc. all point to something else E.G. a memory of your first love. The memory is 'about' the desire to see that person again.
A brain cell couldn't have this property, the neuron firing in a neural network to make you think this, isn't 'about' anything.
How things could be. True propositions describe our world, the way things are.
False propositions can be either necessarily or contingently false. Necessary ones are always false, contingent ones could be otherwise - a way things could be.
We can say in a possible world a currently contingent falsehood, could be true.
1) It seems that zombies are at least conceivable. I've just described them, and there isn't an obvious contradiction in the idea.
2) Given their conceivability, we may argue that zombies are therefore metaphysically possible. There is a possible world which has all the same physical properties as the actual world, but has no properties of consciousness.
3) Now, if consciousness were identical with physical properties, it would be impossible for a creature to have the same physical properties but lack consciousness.
4) This is Leibniz's Law. If A is identical to B then you can't have A without B.
they are the same thing
6) So, if zombies are metaphysically possible, then consciousness is not identical to any physical properties, and property dualism is true.
1) The first premise of the zombie argument claims that we can conceive of beings that have the same physical properties as us but without consciouness.
2) The objection is that, despite appearances, zombies are not conceivable.
If we think they are conceivable it is simply because we are not thinking clearly.
3) Dennett says that when we examine the idea of a zombie more carefully we discover that we have been fooling ourselves. We think we can remove consciousness from a person's ability to function normally but this is wrong. He claims that having a conscious mind is absolutely necessary in order to perceive objects, react to our environment, etc.
4) Therefore, it isn't conceivable that a zombie would be able talk with you without having any consciousness about what it was talking about. Similarly, they cannot react to the taste of a cup of tea without any qualia.
5) Dennett makes and analogy with health to strengthen his argument. He says that thinking you can remove consciousness from the brain and leave all of its functions intact is like thinking you can remove health from a body and leave all of its functions intact. Health and a fully functioning body are inseparable. Health is not something you can remove from a fully functioning body and neither is consciousness something you can remove from a fully functional brain.
1) Issue with the second premise: "if it is conceivable that there are zombies, it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies."
2) Though we can conceive of water as not being H2O it is not possible that it is. The 2 concepts of water and H2O are distinct, they are not tautological. Before it was discovered that water was H2O people could have thought "I wonder if water is H2O." this is a coherent thought. In this sense, it is at least conceivable that water isn't H2O.
3) We can imagine a possible world where water is not salty as salt is not a necessary part of water. We can't imagine a possible world where water is not H2O as it is necessary chemical definition of water.
4) Identity claims 'A is identical to B' are necessarily true, in all possible worlds. We can conceive of water not being H2O but it isn't possible for it not to be in another world.
5) The same applies to zombies, we can conceive of them, this doesn't mean they are possible. If mental properties are necessarily defined as physical and functional properties it isn't possible for these zombies to exist.
1) Even if zombies are possible there is an objection to the inference that because they are possible, property dualism is true.
2) "If it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies, then qualia are non-physical...Therefore property dualism is true."
3) At best the argument shows zombies are possible in another world, that physical and phenomenal properties are distinct in that instance.
4) But that doesn't entail that they are distinct in the actual world. Many things are metaphysically possible (true in a possible world) but that does not entail that they exist in the actual world.). Just because giant mice are metaphysically possible does not mean they exist in our world too.
5) It could be physicalism is true in our world but property dualism is true in another world. Therefore the philosophical zombies argument does not work
1) Mary has been confined to a black and white room for her entire life and only has access to a black and white television screen.
2) We suppose that she has never seen any colours herself, yet she has studied the science of vision and knows everything it is possible to know about what happens in physical terms when someone sees and talks about colour. How wavelengths of light produce an effect on the retina and how this leads to colour sensations.
3) Mary leaves the room for the first time, does she learn something new she didn't already know about colour?
4) Jackson assumes she does, she is having the qualia of colour for the first time, something she can't have understood as she hadn't previously experienced it.
5) Therefore there is more to vision than is physically explainable.
6) So physicalism is false.
1) There is more than one meaning of 'knowing' something, more than one kind of knowledge.
2) Mary may gain knowledge when she first sees colour but it is not factual.
3) Mary gains acquaintance knowledge, she becomes acquainted with the phenomenal characteristics of colours - their qualia.
4) She doesn't gain factual knowledge as she already knew everything there was to know about colours factually before leaving the room.
5) If you know all of the information about a celebrity before you meet them, meeting them doesn't provide you with new factual knowledge about them.
1) Mary actually acquires new ability knowledge, she acquires the capacity to now imagine ripe tomatoes, or recognise similarly coloured objects by sight - a skill she didn't previously possess.
2) This doesn't undermine physicalism as she still already has complete factual knowledge of colour.
3) You could know how to ride a bike and then learn to ride a bike, you don't gain anything other than a new skill. Knowing that riding requires good balance is different from actually having the skill of riding a bike.
4) She doesn't gain factual knowledge as she already knew everything there was to know about colours factually before leaving the room.
5) You don't gain factual knowledge.
When Mary leaves the room and sees red, she acquires the phenomenal concept of red for the first time. She couldn't have known what it was like to see red before then. But, we can claim her new concept of red is the same thing as her physical concept. She only gains a new concept, she already knew about the property of red.
The knowledge argument shows there are different ways of thinking about physical things, some of which depend on experiencing, rather than describing.
To know what it is like to see red, you need to have a phenomenal concept of red, and this you can only gain from experience.
So Mary gains knowledge of a new fact that relates to concepts.
However property dualism makes claims about what exists. They are claims about properties not concepts.
The knowledge argument doesn't show that Mary gains knowledge of a new property.
So it fails to show that physicalism is false.
1) There is an explanatory gap between physical facts about our neurophysiology and the subjective feel of our phenomenal experiences.
2) If qualia could be shown to not exist then we don't need to suppose Mary learns anything by leaving her room.
3) Patricia and Paul Churchland claim the range of mental states which are part of our common sense picture of our mind, such as; qualia, beliefs and desires etc. should be eliminated from proper understanding of human mentality. This because there is nothing in reality that corresponds to terms such as 'qualia', 'beliefs' or 'desires'.
4) When neuroscience develops in the future we will abandon talk of these things and instead speak of brain processes. - Eliminating Folk Psychology.
5) Modern science is making advances in its ability to unravel the complex relationships between the brain and behaviour. It seems to be more fruitful than folk psychology as a way of understanding behaviour. It explains the cause of mental illness, how we remember and so on. Once we adopt the new science of the mind we will see there is no place within it for qualia.
Similarities
Both theories are dualist can claim that the mind is ontologically distinct from the physical.
Both theories face problems with how the mind and body interact.
The conceivability argument for SD and the zombies argument for PD are both subject to the objection that conceivability does not mean possibility
Differences
SD claims that mind and body are ontologically different substances (Descartes) whereas PD says that there is only one material substance (monist) but that it has distinct physical and mental properties (dualist) (Chalmers and Jackson).
PD claims that there are distinct mental properties such as qualia, privileged access, intentionality which distinguish it from the material whereas SD argues that because the mind it indivisible it must be distinct from the body.
SD and PD have differing problems concerning mind and body interaction (SD interactionist dualism - how can something non-spacial affect a physical substance?) (PD epiphenomenalism: causal redundancy of the mental)
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