Phil - Metaphysics of Mind Glossary

Qualia

Intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible

Intentionality

Intentionality is the feature of mental states by which they are about or directed at something. For example, beliefs, desires, and thoughts are intentional because they represent or refer to objects, properties, or states of affairs—real or imagined.

Phenomenal properties

Phenomenal properties refer to the qualitative aspects of conscious experience—what it feels like to have a particular sensory experience. These properties are also known as qualia, and they describe the subjective, internal experience of sensations like the color red or the taste of sweetness.

Substance dualism

A version of dualism in which minds are not identical to bodies or parts of bodies. Minds (or mental states) and bodies (or physical states) constitute distinct substances: they are ontologically independent and bear different properties.

For Descartes, the essence of mind is thought, while the essence of body is unthinking extension.

Property dualism

A version of dualism which claims that while there are only physical substances (e.g. bodies) there are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties, and are therefore ontologically distinct.

(Some property dualists may hold that mental properties do supervene on physical properties in this world, as a matter of contingent fact, but this is not true in all possible worlds.)

Interactionist dualism

A version of dualism – the view that the mind (or mental states) and body (or physical states) are ontologically distinct substances or properties – which holds that there is (two way) causal interaction between mental and physical states (substances or properties): mental events affect physical events, and physical events affect mental events (e.g. desires can cause bodily movements, and bodily impacts can cause pain).

Dualism

The view that the mind (or mental states) and body (or physical states) are ontologically distinct substances or properties

Epiphenomenalist dualism

A version of dualism – the view that the mind (or mental states) and body (or physical states) are ontologically distinct substances or properties – which holds that mental states have no physical effects. On this view, mental states and events are epiphenomena: causally impotent by-products caused by physical processes.

(An epiphenomenalist dualist may hold that while mental states and events cannot causally affect physical states and events, they can causally affect each other.)