Mind as a Causal System & Causal-Theoretical Functionalism

This set of vocabulary flashcards covers the key concepts, methods, and philosophical challenges of Causal Theoretical Functionalism as presented in chapter six of Jaegwon Kim's book.

Multiple Realizability

The concept that types of mentality or mental categories cannot be linked to specific types of brain events, allowing minds to be defined by function rather than physical composition.

Functionalism

A philosophy of mind that defines mental event types by their functions and roles in an input-output system rather than the material that constitutes them.

Causal Theoretical Functionalism

An attempt to preserve functionalism by using the Ramsey-Lewis method to define mental properties without relying on complete, manually provided definitions of functions.

Ramsey-Lewis Method

A method developed by David Lewis that functionalizes mental concepts by replacing them with variables ($x$) within the set of all true sentences describing causal regularities.

Existential Generalization

A process in symbolic logic where a specific term is replaced by a variable ($x$) preceded by a quantifier, asserting 'there is an $x$ such that' certain conditions are true.

Ramification

The process of replacing a specific psychological term with a variable in a set of truths, named after the philosopher Frank Ramsey.

Frank Ramsey

The philosopher for whom the process of 'ramification'—replacing specific terms with variables—is named.

David Lewis

The philosopher associated with the Ramsey-Lewis method of causal theoretical functionalism.

Physical Realizer

A physical neural state that fulfills the variable slots ($x$, $y$, $z$) in a ramified psychological theory, mapping psychological roles to the material brain.

Folk Psychology

Also referred to as common sense psychology; the everyday ordinary sense of what states like beliefs and pains do.

Kim's Paradox of Disagreement

The problem on page 174 where two psychologists who disagree on a psychological generalization must be using different concepts, meaning they are not actually disagreeing about the same thing.

Machine Functionalism

A functionalist model that views the mind as a complex computer-like information processing system with specific inputs and outputs.

Qualitative Aspect (Qualia)

The sensory, 'hurting' or 'itching' feature of an experience that critics argue is ignored or 'missed' by functionalist definitions.

Cross-Wired Brain

A thought experiment where the sensations for different functional roles (like itch and tickle) are swapped, presenting a challenge to functionalism.

TR (Ramified Psychological Theory)

As described on page 178, the theory resulting from ramification which affirms that the variables ($m_1$, $m_2$, etc.) representing mental states are physical neural states.