All of Metaphysics of Mind

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define functionalism

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all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles (how it reacts to environmental effects on the body and how it causes other types of mental states and bodily behaviours) which can be multiply realised

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what are the two strengths of functionalism?

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PUTNAM: overcomes circularity criticism unlike behaviourism

PUTNAM: overcomes multiple realisability theory unlike mind brain type identity theory

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define functionalism

all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles (how it reacts to environmental effects on the body and how it causes other types of mental states and bodily behaviours) which can be multiply realised

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what are the two strengths of functionalism?

PUTNAM: overcomes circularity criticism unlike behaviourism

PUTNAM: overcomes multiple realisability theory unlike mind brain type identity theory

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what is the strength that functionalism overcomes the multiple realisability criticism?

the same way functional objects eg can openers can be made of different substances and systems, mental states can be made of different substances or systems as they all achieve the same function in the end

eg mental state of pain can be caused by either c fibres or o fibres and still be the mental state of pain because it caused the organism to avoid the pain

this could make it a stronger theory than mind brain type identity theory which doesn’t overcome the criticism

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what is the strength that functionalism overcomes the circularity criticism?

functionalism could be argued to be a better theory than behaviourism as behaviourism falls victim to the circularity criticism but functionalism does not

behaviourism says mental states are reduced to behaviours but same mental states can be expressed through any behaviour depending on any accompanying mental states. this means behaviourism eventually becomes circular as when trying to define the accompanying mental states with behaviour, they have to define more accompanying mental states until eventually they try to define the original mental state

functionalism avoids this problem because it is not reducible to behaviour and can also define mental states in terms of other mental states unlike behaviourism

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what are criticisms to functionalism?

inverted spectrum

NED BLOCK: China brain

Mary/ knowledge argument

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what is the inverted spectrum criticism?

if functionalism is true then two functionally identical mental states are the same mental states

my mental state when i look at the sky can be functionally identical to yours ( causes us both to believe the sky is blue) but phenomenally different ( you experience what i call green but you call blue)

so our two mental states are not the same despite being functionally identical

so functionalism is false

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what is the China brain criticism?

imagine we have a complete functional description of human mental states

a human body is hooked up to the entire population of China and each person in China is linked to other people with two way radios

they communicate according to the rules set out by the complete functional description of human mental states

so the Chinese population have recreated a human brain in a functionally identical way

according to functionalism, China brain would actually be in pain if the human body got stabbed but this is not the case

so even though China brain is functionally identical it does not have qualia which means it does not entirely explain mental substances

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what is the Mary/ knowledge criticism?

Mary has never seen colour but knows all physical and functional facts about it

when she leaves her black and white room for the first time, she learns something new about what it feels like to see colour

so there are more to mental states than their physical and functional facts

so functionalism is wrong

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define eliminative materialism

theory which claims that (at least some) mental states as they are currently understood by folk psychology do not exist and our common sense understanding is radically mistaken and neuroscience will eventually explain all the occurrences in our mind with no reference to terminology we currently use to talk about mental states

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give an analogy to help explain eliminative materialism

in the 1300’s the Black Death happened and people explained it by saying it was bad air

science later revealed that the black death was caused by a pathogen on fleas

so bad air was actually false and we no longer use it in our terminology to explain the black death

eliminative materialists would argue that folk psychology is like the ‘bad air’ and neuroscience will later cause it to become false and useless when talking about mental states

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what are the criticisms to eliminative materialism?

the certainty about the reality of mental states

folk psychology has good predictive and explanatory power

is a self-refuting theory

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what is the ‘degenerating research programme’ strength for eliminative materialism? and its counter argument?

successful scientific theories are constantly developing and any theory which doesn’t should be treated with suspicion

Paul Churchland claims folk psychology is a ‘degenerating research programme’ which hasn’t developed overtime and can’t keep up with the developments of the modern world

CA: there are developments in clinical psychology which use folk psychology like cognitive behavioural therapy which focuses on reflecting on the inner mental life and nothing to do with neuroscience

so folk psychology can keep up with the developments of the modern world and is a developing theory

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who are the philosophers behind eliminative materialism?

Paul and Patricia Churchland

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what is the certainty about the reality of mental states criticism? and its counter argument?

through introspection, i am directly aware of my desires, thoughts, pains, beliefs etc so they must exist

so mental states must not be false if i am directly aware of them

CA: in the past there are many examples of people believing to be directly aware of false things

eg in the past people believed heat was a fluid called caloric but we know now that that is false as it is the kinetic energy of particles

but people would not believe that caloric was false as they could directly experience it ( when touching a hot surface)

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what is the folk psychology has good predictive and explanatory power criticism?

folk psychology has a lot of success in helping us predict human behaviour eg we can successfully predict someone will say ouch if they step on a nail

neuroscience does not come anywhere near to giving us such predictive power

so folk psychology must be relevant and not eliminated

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what is the self refuting theory criticism? and its counter argument?

if there are no such things as beliefs like eliminative materialism claims, then eliminative materialists can not believe their theory to be true

if they do not believe the theory to be true, then eliminative materialism is a meaningless theory

but if eliminative materialists believe the theory to be true, it is a meaningful but false theory

so eliminative materialism can either be meaningless or false

CA: CHURCHLAND: vital substance

people used to believe in a spirit called ‘vital substance’ which distinguished living things from inanimate objects

in the past, if someone denied vital substance they would be called self-refuting as if vital substance did not exist, they would be dead and their statement meaningless but if they were alive the statement would be meaningful but false

we know now vital substance is false so the criticism that it was self refuting was flawed. it was flawed because it presupposed the truth of vital substance

Churchland argues the self-refuting theory for eliminative materialism has the same flaw in presupposing the truth of folk psychology

so eliminative materialism can still be a meaningful true theory

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define mind brain type identity theory

all mental states are identical to brain states (ontologically reduced to brain states) but mental states and brain states are not synonymous (not analytically reduced). eg mental state of pain is identical to c-fibres firing

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what does it mean to say mental states are ontologically reduced to brain states?

mental states and brain states are revealed to be identical not by philosophical analysis but by empirical investigation. is the same as saying water is h2o as you can not deduce h2o is water by analysis but by empirical investigation.

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what are the strengths of mind brain type identity theory?

fits in better with theory of evolution ( no unnecessary traits like in dualism)

OCKHAM’S razor: states that between two competing hypothesis with equal explanatory power, the simpler hypothesis should be chosen

SMART says that if mental states are not physical they are nomological danglers meaning they would not fit into the system of laws which govern everything in the universe

so the simpler hypothesis is a physicalist theory

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what are the criticisms to mind brain type identity theory?

zombies - can imagine them firing c fibres without being in pain

Mary/ knowledge argument - no matter how much neuroscience knowledge she has, is not the same as experiencing colour

conceivability argument - clearly seperates the mind and body

SMART: illiterate peasant

Spatial Location Problem

Multiple Realisability

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what is the illiterate peasant criticism? and its counter argument?

an illiterate peasant can completely understand and converse about mental states while having no idea about any neuroscientific knowledge

so we are talking about different things when it comes to mental and brain states as if they were the same, the peasant could not understand or converse about mental states

so reducing mental states to brain states would change the meaning

CA: meaning is the way an object is conceived and a reference is the way that object is in the world

two seperate meanings can have the same reference eg the morning star and evening star both refer to the planet venus

so mental states and brain states can have different meanings but the same reference

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what is the spatial location problem? and its counter argument? and the response to the counter argument?

leibniz’s law states that for one thing to be identical to another, then everything true of one must be true of the other

the brain has spatial properties eg it is 15cm

it is nonsensical to say mental states have spatial properties eg my belief is 15cm

so mental states and brain states can not be identical

CA: could argue that language is not yet up to date with neuroscience and in the future it would make sense to say my belief is 15cm

CCA: PUTNAM’S spatial location problem

if two things are identical, they must share the same spatial location

but a pain in my arm and the brain state for pain are in two seperate locations

so my mental state of pain in my arm is not the same as the brain state

so mental states and brain states are not identical

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what is the multiple realisability critique for mind brain type identity theory?

if mental states supervene on brain states, there can be no change in brain states without a change in mental states

when c fibres fire in humans, it creates the mental state of pain

when o fibres fire in octopuses it creates the same mental state of pain

the brain state changed without the mental state changing

so mental states don’t supervene on brain states and mind brain type identity theory is wrong

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define physicalism

theory that everything is physical or supervenes on the physical. so mental states can not exist within a non-physical substance or be a set of non-physical properties

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define philosophical behaviourism

mental states can be reduced to behaviour and behavioural dispositions so statements of the mind are the same as statements of behaviour

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what are the strengths of philosophical behaviourism?

has meaning under Ayer’s verification principle since it can be empirically observed unlike dualism

overcomes problem of interaction

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define hard behaviourism

all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions about behaviours and bodily states using the language of physics

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give an example of a hard behaviourist

Carl Hempel

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define soft behaviourism

propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions

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give an example of a soft behaviourist

Gilbert Ryle

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What are the criticisms of philosophical behaviourism?

Multiple Realisability

Circularity

Zombies

Mary/ Knowledge Argument

Asymmetry

Super Spartans PUTNAM

Perfect Actors

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What is the multiple realisability criticism?

The same mental states may be expressed through different behaviours depending on a person’s accompanying mental states

Eg Sarah and joe are both thirsty. sarah drinks water but joe does not as he believes the water is poisoned

these accompanying mental states also need to be explained in terms of behaviour but these mental states may also be expressed through different behaviours depending on other accompanying mental states

eg joe and mike may both believe the water is poisoned. joe does not drink the water but mike does because he is suicidal

this could go on forever so behaviourism is flawed because it can never fully reduce mental states to behaviour

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what is the circularity criticism?

the same mental states may be expressed through different behaviours depending on a person’s accompanying mental state

these accompanying mental states also need to be explained in terms of behaviour but these mental states may also be expressed through different mental states depending on other accompanying mental states

this creates a cycle of trying to explain mental states with behaviour and their accompanying mental state until eventually the accompanying mental state is the original mental state meaning you will never be able to fully reduce the mental state to only behaviour

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how do philosophical zombies and the Mary argument criticise philosophical behaviourism?

prove physicalism is untrue and philosophical behaviourism is a physicalist theory

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What is the asymmetry criticism?

if mental states were reducible to behaviour, i would infer my mental states from my behaviour the same way i infer mental states from other people’s mental states

but i know more about my mental states in quantity and certainty than i do about the mental states of others

so i must infer my mental states from something more than behaviour

so mental states are not reducible to behaviour

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what is the super spartan criticism? and its counter argument?

imagine a society of super spartans who have been trained to show no signs of being in pain when they experience it

the super spartans admit it takes a lot of effort to hide but they are in fact in pain

philosophical behaviourism would argue that the super spartans are not in pain but they are indeed in pain so this shows behaviourism is flawed

CA: criticism only works on hard behaviourism and not on soft behaviourism

can argue the super spartans do not currently display pain behaviour, they are still disposed to it

eg if they were in a closed room with no one around and stepped on a nail, then they would exhibit pain behaviour as they are disposed to it

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what is Putnam’s response to the counter argument to super spartans? and its counter argument?

Super Super Spartans: these are super spartans who in addition to not exhibiting pain behaviour, don’t even admit they are in pain anymore which means they would not exhibit pain behaviour even in a closed room

Putnam argues behaviourism has made the flaw of believing the evidence for mental states are the mental states

he takes the analogy of polio saying that before the cause of polio was discovered, it was identified by the symptoms but now that the cause of polio is known, the symptoms can be seen to be only evidence someone has polio and not actually polio (as you can have polio without the symptoms)

similarly pain behaviour is evidence of the mental state of pain but is not pain as you can have pain without pain behaviour as seen by the super super spartans

CA: HEMPEL sometimes symptoms are the illness eg a person with all the symptoms of depression has depression

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what is the perfect actor criticism?

perfect actors depict mental states that you can not distinguish from real mental states

if the behaviour of the perfect actor is indistinguishable from behaviour of someone with that mental state, behaviourism says must be experiencing same mental state

this is false so behaviourism is wrong

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who created the super spartans argument?

putnam

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What are the issues for dualism in general?

epistemological problem of other minds

WITTGENSTEIN: conceptual problem of other minds

RYLE: category mistake

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what is the epistemological problem of other minds?

according to dualism, my own mind is perceived directly by introspection and the external world is perceived indirectly by the senses

this means i can only know about other people’s minds indirectly

so there is no firm evidence that other minds actually exist

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what is the conceptual problem of other minds?

imagine everyone was given a box containing a beetle and each person could only look at their box and no one else’s

we would suppose everyone’s beetle is the same but we could never check this is the case so everyone may be using the word beetle to refer to something different or maybe even nothing at all (if their boxes are empty)

this is the same for the term ‘mind’

each individual can only experience their own mind and so only understands the concept of mind through their individual experience

we suppose this concept is the same for everyone but can not check this

so it is problematic to generalise the concept of other minds based on the concept of my mind which i gain from my individual experience

so i can not even form the concept of other minds and so can’t prove they exist

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what are the responses to the problem of other minds?

HUME: argument from analogy

existence of other minds is the best hypothesis

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what is the argument from analogy counter response?

i learn there are law like connections between my mind and body

eg if i step on a nail i feel the mental state of pain and my body shouts while trying to remove the nail

so by analogy if i observe others behaving similarly to similar occurrences, i can infer they have similar conscious experiences

eg if someone steps on a nail and shouts while trying to remove it, i can infer they feel the mental state of pain like i do

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what is a counter argument to the argument from analogy?

one case is not sufficient for an analogy

imagine walking across a garden, finding a red fruit that is blue on the inside

it would be unwise to then conclude all red fruit are blue on the inside as you have only experienced this once

the same mistake happens with the argument from analogy- it is unwise to conclude all behaviours of a specific type relate to certain mental states as i have only experienced this once (with myself)

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what is the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis response?

scientists believe in atoms even though they are unobservable entities

this is because they are the best explanation of the phenomena we can and do observe

we can correctly predict results such as heated copper will gain weight because the o2 atoms bind to the Cu atoms because of our belief in atoms

belief in mind is the same as belief in atoms because it is the best explanation for the behaviours we observe

we can correctly predict behaviours like shouting when stepping on a nail because of our belief in the existence of other minds

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what is the category mistake criticism?

claims dualism makes a category mistake as it confuses one concept for another

imagine a visitor is shown around oxford university and is shown the lecture halls, the dorms, the libraries etc and at the end of the tour he asks ‘ but where is the university?’

here the visitor has made the categorical mistake as he mistakenly put oxford university in the category of individual buildings when the university is in fact the collection of buildings he was shown

ryle says dualism makes the same categorical mistake by assuming the mind is in the category of things when it is just the collection of our behaviours

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define interactionist dualism

dualist theories which believe the mind can interact with the physical (cause physical actions) and the physical can cause mental states. eg state of hunger can cause you to get food and being hit in the head can cause you the mental state of pain

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what is an example of interactionist dualism?

substance dualism

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what are criticisms to interactionist dualism?

PRINCESS ELISABETH OF BOHEMIA: the conceptual interaction problem

the empirical interaction problem

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what is the conceptual interaction problem?

it is inconceivable for two things to causally interact unless their surfaces come into contact with each other

the mind has no surface

so it is inconceivable for the mind to interact with the body and vice versa

if such interaction is inconceivable, it is impossible

so mind body interaction is impossible

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how does the conceptual interaction problem attack substance dualism?

in the conceivability argument descartes states he has the clear and distinct idea that the mind is a non-extended thing but if the mental can cause the physical then it must have a purpose and be extended

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what is a response to the conceptual interaction problem?

DESCARTES argues that the mind-body union is a basic notion in itself and can’t be explained in terms of anything else

explaining mind-body interaction in terms of body-body interaction is like trying to explain the colour blue in terms of yellow

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what is the empirical interaction problem?

the law of conservation of energy states ‘in a closed system, energy cannot be added or removed - only transferred’

our universe is a closed system

if substance dualism is true, energy would constantly be added into the closed system of our universe when the mind causes the physical (as causation transfers energy)

so if substance dualism is true then the law of conservation of energy is false

there is more evidence for the law of the conservation of energy than substance dualism so substance dualism is wrong

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define epiphenomenalist dualism

dualist theory which believes that the physical world can interact with/ cause mental states but mental states can not interact with/ cause the physical world. eg getting hit in the head can cause the mental state of pain but getting food is caused by the brain and not my mental states

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what is an example of epiphenomenalist dualism?

property dualism

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what are the criticisms to epiphenomenalist dualism?

introspective self-knowledge

phenomenology of our mental life

natural selection/ evolution

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what is the introspective self knowledge criticism? and its counter argument and counter counter argument?

introspection shows mental states are causally linked to one another eg smell of melted butter on toast may cause me to think of my grandma’s kitchen

so introspection shows mental states are capable of causally linked events

CA: conceptual interaction problem by princess Elisabeth of Bohemia

CCA: if epiphenomenalist dualism were true then i would not be able to express my beliefs about my mental states

eg when i say i am in pain this would not come from my introspective self awareness of the mental state of pain

but if my being in pain does not cause me to say i am in pain then the statement i am in pain could not be possible

but it is a possible statement so epiphenomenalist dualism is not true

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what is the phenomenology of our mental lives criticism based on sensations cause our actions? and its counter argument?

our reaction to sensations seem to show the mental can cause the physical

eg when i hit my thumb with a hammer, it is the mental sensation of pain which causes me to remove my hand, i would not remove my hand if there was no pain

so without mental states some actions would never happen showing that they do cause the physical sometimes

CA: JACKSON: when watching a punch happen in a cowboy film, it appears that the punch causes the one being punched to collapse

but even though these events are regularly conjoined, there is no direct causal link between one frame causing the next, the real cause is the projector

so just because two events are regularly conjoined it does not mean they cause each other, there may be a hidden third factor

so just because pain and pain behaviour are regularly conjoined, they are not necessarily causally linked, there may be a hidden factor (the brain) causing these events to happen one after another

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what is the phenomenology of our mental life criticism based on will causing our action? and its CA and CCA?

we have the notion that we have free will

if my actions are only caused by physical processes, then my desires for what actions i take are irrelevant

so if my actions are only caused by the physical i have no free will

CA: since we do not know everything about the brain, it is possible that what we understand as free will is just another physical process in the brain

CCA: this would be too complicated for the justice system as any criminal could say they had no choice in doing the crime as it was forced by the physical process

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what is the problem of natural selection criticism? and its counter argument?

species go through natural selection meaning they evolve with the traits beneficial to them

if mental states are causally redundant it makes no sense that they survived the process of natural selection

so they must have some causal value

CA: JACKSON: a polar bear evolved with a thick coat to stay warm

so the polar bear also evolved to have a heavy coat which does not benefit its survival

this is because a heavy coat is a by product of the warm thick coat

jackson argues the same case happens with the brain and mental states

humans evolved a brain to help survive but also evolved mental states which are causally redundant as a by product of this brain

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define property

a quality of a substance dependent on that substance to exist

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define property dualism

there exists only one kind of substance (physical) and the brain is made of this substance but has both physical and mental properties. these mental properties are emergent ( only appear once biological matter organises itself into a complex system) and irreducible to matter ( can’t be explained in terms of matter) but are not substantial ( can’t live without the brain)

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what are the strengths of dualism?

LEIBNIZ: thinking and perceiving machine

CHALMERS: philosophical zombie

JACKSON: Mary/ Knowledge Argument

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what is the thinking and perceiving machine?

imagine a thinking and perceiving machine

if you walked into the machine, you would only find cogs and parts pushing against one another which causes the machine to function

you could not find anything to explain the perception of the machine

similarly if you were to enter a human, you would see muscles and organs which cause it to function but nothing to explain perception

so physicalism is wrong since even if the only substance to exist is physical, it must still have some mental property to explain perception

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define phenomena

the appearance of things as they appear in our experience

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what is the philosophical zombie argument?

philosophical zombies are beings which are physically identical to a normal human but who don’t have qualia

physicalism claims that consciousness is ultimately physical in nature

so any world physically identical to this world must also contain consciousness

we can conceive of a physically identical world which has no consciousness ( full of philosophical zombies)

a zombie world is metaphysically possible so physicalism is wrong

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what are the criticisms to the philosophical zombie argument?

DENNET: philosophical zombies are not conceivable

what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing new about the world

what is conceivable need not be metaphysically possible

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what is the criticism that philosophical zombies are not conceivable?

I can not conceive of a being with all its bodily functions and powers intact without having health

similarly i can not conceive of a being with all its cognitive systems intact without consciousness

the reason i believe i am able to conceive of such a thing is because i do not yet possess the knowledge of the neuroscience that they are connected

just because i am lacking this knowledge does not mean that cognitive systems without consciousness are conceivable

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what is the metaphysically possible tells us nothing new about the real world criticism?

physicalists would argue that they can accept a possible world where philosophical zombies do exist and physicalism is wrong but that this does not mean physicalism is wrong in our world

the same way ‘bruce wayne is not batman’ is metaphysically possible but not possible in our world and so tells us nothing new about the world, philosophical zombies being metaphysically possible tells us nothing new about this world so it doesn’t disprove physicalism

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what is the being conceivable does not mean being metaphysical possible criticism?

water is H2O is not an analytical truth so it is conceivable to say water is H3O

but some philosophers would say water is H3O is in fact a logical impossibility as even though ‘water is H2O’ is not logically necessary, it is still a necessary truth only discoverable by a posteriori means

so H2O is an essential property of water meaning water is H3O is a logical and hence metaphysical impossibility

so it is possible to conceive the metaphysically impossible

so if qualia were to be an essential property of brains only known by a posteriori means, this would make philosophical zombies metaphysically impossible even though we can conceive of them

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what is the Mary/ Knowledge argument?

Mary is a brilliant neuroscientist who has only ever seen black and white but knows everything about the physical processes involved in colour vision

when she sees colour for the first time, she learns something new (what it feels like to experience colour)

so there was more to know about colour vision than the complete physical account of it

so physicalism is false

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what are the criticisms to the mary/ knowledge argument?

mary gains new acquaintance knowledge, not propositional

mary gains new ability knowledge, not propositional

new knowledge/ old fact

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what is the mary gains new acquaintance knowledge not propositional argument?

commits the fallacy of equivocation because initially uses the word know in terms of propositional knowledge but finishes by using the word know in terms of acquaintance knowledge

imagine being a fan of a celebrity and knowing everything about their life and then meeting them. you do not know anymore facts about the celebrity than you did before despite having the new experience of meeting them

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what is the counter response to the mary gains new acquaintance knowledge criticism?

Jackson argues that mary gains both acquaintance and propositional knowledge

imagine mary had a companion called marvin who was in the same situation as her ( only seen black and white but knows everything about colour vision)

when mary experiences colour and returns to marvin, she would try to explain to him her experience but without success and marvin would remain lacking important factual knowledge showing mary did gain propositional knowledge

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what is the mary gains new ability knowledge, not propositional criticism?

commits the fallacy of equivocation because initially uses the word know in terms of propositional knowledge and ends using the word know in terms of ability knowledge'

this is not the same as we could imagine mary knowing everything physical about how to ride a bike and once she rides a bike she gains new ability knowledge but not propositional

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what is the counter argument to Mary gains new ability knowledge not propositional criticism?

jackson claims mary gains new propositional knowledge about the mental life of others

after experiencing colour, she can ask herself the question ‘do people see red tomatoes the same way i see them?’

this is a propositional question that mary asks which she could not have asked before seeing colour

so she gained propositional knowledge along with the ability knowledge

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What is the new knowledge/ old fact criticism?

when mary sees colour for the first time, she gains no new knowledge but rather is presented with the same facts she already knew in a different way making it appear to be new knowledge

imagine mary goes to a party and meets batman who she finds out is a millionaire

later on in the party she meets bruce wayne who she discovers is also a millionaire

despite this being new knowledge to mary, she is not learning new facts about reality since she already knew batman (who is bruce wayne) was a millionaire

similarly before seeing colour mary could describe it in a physical sense and after seeing it she could describe it ina phenomenal sense but all this shows is mary can represent the same physical facts in two different ways

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What is substance dualism?

theory that human beings are composed of two distinct substances (res extensa- physical substances and res cogitans- mental substances). the mind and body are independent of one another.

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define substance

a thing which can exist on its own without depending on anything else to exist

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what are the two arguments in support of substance dualism?

the conceivability argument

the divisibility argument

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who created the arguments in support for substance dualism?

descartes

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what is the indivisibility argument?

uses Leibniz’s Law which states if two things share all the same properties, they are one thing. if one thing has even one property which the other lacks, they are two distinct things

my mind is indivisible

my body is divisible

my mind and body do not share all the same properties

so my mind and body are two distinct things

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what are the criticisms to the indivisibility argument?

the mental is divisible ( DID and HUME)

not everything physical is divisible

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what is the criticism to the indivisibility argument based on the menatl being divisible?

dissociative identity disorder is a condition where one mind has multiple identities so it can be argued this shows that the mind is divisible.

HUME: self is a bundle of perceptions

we only experience a bundle of perceptions but never actually experience an actual self

so i am nothing more than just a bundle of perceptions

so the mind is not a singular entity but rather a collection of perceptions

these perceptions are distinct from one another so the mind is divisible

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what is the criticism to the indivisibility argument based on not everything physical is divisible?

if you keep dividing your body, you eventually get to a point where you can no longer divide it eg you get to a string of energy

so it is possible for the physical to be indivisible

so just because the mind is indivisible, it doesn’t mean it can’t be a physical substance

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define logically possible

what is possible without contradictions, they are possibilities consistent with the laws of thought

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define physical possibility

possibilities consistent with the laws of physics

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define metaphysically possible

logical possibilities which are physically impossible and logical possibilities that are physically possible, what is possible in all possible words

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what is the relation between logical and metaphysical possibility?

any logical impossibility is a metaphysical impossibility

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what is the conceivability argument?

if i can clearly and distinctly conceive of the essential natures of two things separately, it must be metaphysically possible to separate them

i clearly and distinctly perceive myself to be essentially a thinking and unextending thing

i clearly and distinctly perceive my body to be essentially a non-thinking and extended thing

it must be metaphysically possible for mind and body to be separated meaning they are distinct substances

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what are the criticisms to the conceivability arguments?

being conceivable doesn’t mean being metaphysically possible

masked man fallacy

mind without body is not conceivable

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what philosopher is behind the being conceivable doesn’t mean being metaphysically possible argument?

ARNAULD

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what philosopher is behind the mind without body is not conceivable criticism?

HUME

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what is the being conceivable does not mean being metaphysically possible criticism and its counter argument?

it is possible for someone who is unaware of the Pythagoras theorem to conceive of a right angle triangle where a2 + b2 = c2 is not the case

it is logically impossible for a right angle triangle to not follow the Pythagoras theorem

so just because it is conceivable , it doesn’t make something metaphysically possible like the conceivability argument claims

CA: in the analogy the person does not know the whole truth about right angle triangles which is why they can conceive of the metaphysically impossible

descartes argues he does know the whole truth of the mind and body so he can’t conceive the metaphysically impossible when it comes to them

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What is the masked man fallacy?

i conceive of batman as a caped crusader

i conceive of bruce wayne as a billionaire who is not a caped crusader

so batman is not bruce wayne

this shows a conclusion which is metaphysically possible but not possible in our world as we know that bruce wayne is batman

so the conceivability argument which has the same layout as the masked man fallacy could lead us to a metaphysically possible conclusion that is not possible in our world so it doesn’t prove substance dualism

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what is the mind without body is not conceivable criticism?

Hume argues genuine concepts must originate from sense experience

dualists claim the mind is immaterial and unextended

if i had no body and just my mind, i would have nothing material or extended

without anything material or extended, i have no sense experience

so a mind without body would lack meaning or genuine concepts meaning it would not be conceivable

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What properties do mental states have?

all or at least some mental states have phenomenal properties

all or at least some mental states have intentional properties

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define introspection

our ability to examine the contents of our own conscious experience

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define phenomenal properties

the subjective experience that comes along with some mental states ed what it feels like to see red or have the sensation of pain