define functionalism
all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles (how it reacts to environmental effects on the body and how it causes other types of mental states and bodily behaviours) which can be multiply realised
what are the two strengths of functionalism?
PUTNAM: overcomes circularity criticism unlike behaviourism
PUTNAM: overcomes multiple realisability theory unlike mind brain type identity theory
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define functionalism
all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles (how it reacts to environmental effects on the body and how it causes other types of mental states and bodily behaviours) which can be multiply realised
what are the two strengths of functionalism?
PUTNAM: overcomes circularity criticism unlike behaviourism
PUTNAM: overcomes multiple realisability theory unlike mind brain type identity theory
what is the strength that functionalism overcomes the multiple realisability criticism?
the same way functional objects eg can openers can be made of different substances and systems, mental states can be made of different substances or systems as they all achieve the same function in the end
eg mental state of pain can be caused by either c fibres or o fibres and still be the mental state of pain because it caused the organism to avoid the pain
this could make it a stronger theory than mind brain type identity theory which doesn’t overcome the criticism
what is the strength that functionalism overcomes the circularity criticism?
functionalism could be argued to be a better theory than behaviourism as behaviourism falls victim to the circularity criticism but functionalism does not
behaviourism says mental states are reduced to behaviours but same mental states can be expressed through any behaviour depending on any accompanying mental states. this means behaviourism eventually becomes circular as when trying to define the accompanying mental states with behaviour, they have to define more accompanying mental states until eventually they try to define the original mental state
functionalism avoids this problem because it is not reducible to behaviour and can also define mental states in terms of other mental states unlike behaviourism
what are criticisms to functionalism?
inverted spectrum
NED BLOCK: China brain
Mary/ knowledge argument
what is the inverted spectrum criticism?
if functionalism is true then two functionally identical mental states are the same mental states
my mental state when i look at the sky can be functionally identical to yours ( causes us both to believe the sky is blue) but phenomenally different ( you experience what i call green but you call blue)
so our two mental states are not the same despite being functionally identical
so functionalism is false
what is the China brain criticism?
imagine we have a complete functional description of human mental states
a human body is hooked up to the entire population of China and each person in China is linked to other people with two way radios
they communicate according to the rules set out by the complete functional description of human mental states
so the Chinese population have recreated a human brain in a functionally identical way
according to functionalism, China brain would actually be in pain if the human body got stabbed but this is not the case
so even though China brain is functionally identical it does not have qualia which means it does not entirely explain mental substances
what is the Mary/ knowledge criticism?
Mary has never seen colour but knows all physical and functional facts about it
when she leaves her black and white room for the first time, she learns something new about what it feels like to see colour
so there are more to mental states than their physical and functional facts
so functionalism is wrong
define eliminative materialism
theory which claims that (at least some) mental states as they are currently understood by folk psychology do not exist and our common sense understanding is radically mistaken and neuroscience will eventually explain all the occurrences in our mind with no reference to terminology we currently use to talk about mental states
give an analogy to help explain eliminative materialism
in the 1300’s the Black Death happened and people explained it by saying it was bad air
science later revealed that the black death was caused by a pathogen on fleas
so bad air was actually false and we no longer use it in our terminology to explain the black death
eliminative materialists would argue that folk psychology is like the ‘bad air’ and neuroscience will later cause it to become false and useless when talking about mental states
what are the criticisms to eliminative materialism?
the certainty about the reality of mental states
folk psychology has good predictive and explanatory power
is a self-refuting theory
what is the ‘degenerating research programme’ strength for eliminative materialism? and its counter argument?
successful scientific theories are constantly developing and any theory which doesn’t should be treated with suspicion
Paul Churchland claims folk psychology is a ‘degenerating research programme’ which hasn’t developed overtime and can’t keep up with the developments of the modern world
CA: there are developments in clinical psychology which use folk psychology like cognitive behavioural therapy which focuses on reflecting on the inner mental life and nothing to do with neuroscience
so folk psychology can keep up with the developments of the modern world and is a developing theory
who are the philosophers behind eliminative materialism?
Paul and Patricia Churchland
what is the certainty about the reality of mental states criticism? and its counter argument?
through introspection, i am directly aware of my desires, thoughts, pains, beliefs etc so they must exist
so mental states must not be false if i am directly aware of them
CA: in the past there are many examples of people believing to be directly aware of false things
eg in the past people believed heat was a fluid called caloric but we know now that that is false as it is the kinetic energy of particles
but people would not believe that caloric was false as they could directly experience it ( when touching a hot surface)
what is the folk psychology has good predictive and explanatory power criticism?
folk psychology has a lot of success in helping us predict human behaviour eg we can successfully predict someone will say ouch if they step on a nail
neuroscience does not come anywhere near to giving us such predictive power
so folk psychology must be relevant and not eliminated
what is the self refuting theory criticism? and its counter argument?
if there are no such things as beliefs like eliminative materialism claims, then eliminative materialists can not believe their theory to be true
if they do not believe the theory to be true, then eliminative materialism is a meaningless theory
but if eliminative materialists believe the theory to be true, it is a meaningful but false theory
so eliminative materialism can either be meaningless or false
CA: CHURCHLAND: vital substance
people used to believe in a spirit called ‘vital substance’ which distinguished living things from inanimate objects
in the past, if someone denied vital substance they would be called self-refuting as if vital substance did not exist, they would be dead and their statement meaningless but if they were alive the statement would be meaningful but false
we know now vital substance is false so the criticism that it was self refuting was flawed. it was flawed because it presupposed the truth of vital substance
Churchland argues the self-refuting theory for eliminative materialism has the same flaw in presupposing the truth of folk psychology
so eliminative materialism can still be a meaningful true theory
define mind brain type identity theory
all mental states are identical to brain states (ontologically reduced to brain states) but mental states and brain states are not synonymous (not analytically reduced). eg mental state of pain is identical to c-fibres firing
what does it mean to say mental states are ontologically reduced to brain states?
mental states and brain states are revealed to be identical not by philosophical analysis but by empirical investigation. is the same as saying water is h2o as you can not deduce h2o is water by analysis but by empirical investigation.
what are the strengths of mind brain type identity theory?
fits in better with theory of evolution ( no unnecessary traits like in dualism)
OCKHAM’S razor: states that between two competing hypothesis with equal explanatory power, the simpler hypothesis should be chosen
SMART says that if mental states are not physical they are nomological danglers meaning they would not fit into the system of laws which govern everything in the universe
so the simpler hypothesis is a physicalist theory
what are the criticisms to mind brain type identity theory?
zombies - can imagine them firing c fibres without being in pain
Mary/ knowledge argument - no matter how much neuroscience knowledge she has, is not the same as experiencing colour
conceivability argument - clearly seperates the mind and body
SMART: illiterate peasant
Spatial Location Problem
Multiple Realisability
what is the illiterate peasant criticism? and its counter argument?
an illiterate peasant can completely understand and converse about mental states while having no idea about any neuroscientific knowledge
so we are talking about different things when it comes to mental and brain states as if they were the same, the peasant could not understand or converse about mental states
so reducing mental states to brain states would change the meaning
CA: meaning is the way an object is conceived and a reference is the way that object is in the world
two seperate meanings can have the same reference eg the morning star and evening star both refer to the planet venus
so mental states and brain states can have different meanings but the same reference
what is the spatial location problem? and its counter argument? and the response to the counter argument?
leibniz’s law states that for one thing to be identical to another, then everything true of one must be true of the other
the brain has spatial properties eg it is 15cm
it is nonsensical to say mental states have spatial properties eg my belief is 15cm
so mental states and brain states can not be identical
CA: could argue that language is not yet up to date with neuroscience and in the future it would make sense to say my belief is 15cm
CCA: PUTNAM’S spatial location problem
if two things are identical, they must share the same spatial location
but a pain in my arm and the brain state for pain are in two seperate locations
so my mental state of pain in my arm is not the same as the brain state
so mental states and brain states are not identical
what is the multiple realisability critique for mind brain type identity theory?
if mental states supervene on brain states, there can be no change in brain states without a change in mental states
when c fibres fire in humans, it creates the mental state of pain
when o fibres fire in octopuses it creates the same mental state of pain
the brain state changed without the mental state changing
so mental states don’t supervene on brain states and mind brain type identity theory is wrong
define physicalism
theory that everything is physical or supervenes on the physical. so mental states can not exist within a non-physical substance or be a set of non-physical properties
define philosophical behaviourism
mental states can be reduced to behaviour and behavioural dispositions so statements of the mind are the same as statements of behaviour
what are the strengths of philosophical behaviourism?
has meaning under Ayer’s verification principle since it can be empirically observed unlike dualism
overcomes problem of interaction
define hard behaviourism
all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions about behaviours and bodily states using the language of physics
give an example of a hard behaviourist
Carl Hempel
define soft behaviourism
propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions
give an example of a soft behaviourist
Gilbert Ryle
What are the criticisms of philosophical behaviourism?
Multiple Realisability
Circularity
Zombies
Mary/ Knowledge Argument
Asymmetry
Super Spartans PUTNAM
Perfect Actors
What is the multiple realisability criticism?
The same mental states may be expressed through different behaviours depending on a person’s accompanying mental states
Eg Sarah and joe are both thirsty. sarah drinks water but joe does not as he believes the water is poisoned
these accompanying mental states also need to be explained in terms of behaviour but these mental states may also be expressed through different behaviours depending on other accompanying mental states
eg joe and mike may both believe the water is poisoned. joe does not drink the water but mike does because he is suicidal
this could go on forever so behaviourism is flawed because it can never fully reduce mental states to behaviour
what is the circularity criticism?
the same mental states may be expressed through different behaviours depending on a person’s accompanying mental state
these accompanying mental states also need to be explained in terms of behaviour but these mental states may also be expressed through different mental states depending on other accompanying mental states
this creates a cycle of trying to explain mental states with behaviour and their accompanying mental state until eventually the accompanying mental state is the original mental state meaning you will never be able to fully reduce the mental state to only behaviour
how do philosophical zombies and the Mary argument criticise philosophical behaviourism?
prove physicalism is untrue and philosophical behaviourism is a physicalist theory
What is the asymmetry criticism?
if mental states were reducible to behaviour, i would infer my mental states from my behaviour the same way i infer mental states from other people’s mental states
but i know more about my mental states in quantity and certainty than i do about the mental states of others
so i must infer my mental states from something more than behaviour
so mental states are not reducible to behaviour
what is the super spartan criticism? and its counter argument?
imagine a society of super spartans who have been trained to show no signs of being in pain when they experience it
the super spartans admit it takes a lot of effort to hide but they are in fact in pain
philosophical behaviourism would argue that the super spartans are not in pain but they are indeed in pain so this shows behaviourism is flawed
CA: criticism only works on hard behaviourism and not on soft behaviourism
can argue the super spartans do not currently display pain behaviour, they are still disposed to it
eg if they were in a closed room with no one around and stepped on a nail, then they would exhibit pain behaviour as they are disposed to it
what is Putnam’s response to the counter argument to super spartans? and its counter argument?
Super Super Spartans: these are super spartans who in addition to not exhibiting pain behaviour, don’t even admit they are in pain anymore which means they would not exhibit pain behaviour even in a closed room
Putnam argues behaviourism has made the flaw of believing the evidence for mental states are the mental states
he takes the analogy of polio saying that before the cause of polio was discovered, it was identified by the symptoms but now that the cause of polio is known, the symptoms can be seen to be only evidence someone has polio and not actually polio (as you can have polio without the symptoms)
similarly pain behaviour is evidence of the mental state of pain but is not pain as you can have pain without pain behaviour as seen by the super super spartans
CA: HEMPEL sometimes symptoms are the illness eg a person with all the symptoms of depression has depression
what is the perfect actor criticism?
perfect actors depict mental states that you can not distinguish from real mental states
if the behaviour of the perfect actor is indistinguishable from behaviour of someone with that mental state, behaviourism says must be experiencing same mental state
this is false so behaviourism is wrong
who created the super spartans argument?
putnam
What are the issues for dualism in general?
epistemological problem of other minds
WITTGENSTEIN: conceptual problem of other minds
RYLE: category mistake
what is the epistemological problem of other minds?
according to dualism, my own mind is perceived directly by introspection and the external world is perceived indirectly by the senses
this means i can only know about other people’s minds indirectly
so there is no firm evidence that other minds actually exist
what is the conceptual problem of other minds?
imagine everyone was given a box containing a beetle and each person could only look at their box and no one else’s
we would suppose everyone’s beetle is the same but we could never check this is the case so everyone may be using the word beetle to refer to something different or maybe even nothing at all (if their boxes are empty)
this is the same for the term ‘mind’
each individual can only experience their own mind and so only understands the concept of mind through their individual experience
we suppose this concept is the same for everyone but can not check this
so it is problematic to generalise the concept of other minds based on the concept of my mind which i gain from my individual experience
so i can not even form the concept of other minds and so can’t prove they exist
what are the responses to the problem of other minds?
HUME: argument from analogy
existence of other minds is the best hypothesis
what is the argument from analogy counter response?
i learn there are law like connections between my mind and body
eg if i step on a nail i feel the mental state of pain and my body shouts while trying to remove the nail
so by analogy if i observe others behaving similarly to similar occurrences, i can infer they have similar conscious experiences
eg if someone steps on a nail and shouts while trying to remove it, i can infer they feel the mental state of pain like i do
what is a counter argument to the argument from analogy?
one case is not sufficient for an analogy
imagine walking across a garden, finding a red fruit that is blue on the inside
it would be unwise to then conclude all red fruit are blue on the inside as you have only experienced this once
the same mistake happens with the argument from analogy- it is unwise to conclude all behaviours of a specific type relate to certain mental states as i have only experienced this once (with myself)
what is the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis response?
scientists believe in atoms even though they are unobservable entities
this is because they are the best explanation of the phenomena we can and do observe
we can correctly predict results such as heated copper will gain weight because the o2 atoms bind to the Cu atoms because of our belief in atoms
belief in mind is the same as belief in atoms because it is the best explanation for the behaviours we observe
we can correctly predict behaviours like shouting when stepping on a nail because of our belief in the existence of other minds
what is the category mistake criticism?
claims dualism makes a category mistake as it confuses one concept for another
imagine a visitor is shown around oxford university and is shown the lecture halls, the dorms, the libraries etc and at the end of the tour he asks ‘ but where is the university?’
here the visitor has made the categorical mistake as he mistakenly put oxford university in the category of individual buildings when the university is in fact the collection of buildings he was shown
ryle says dualism makes the same categorical mistake by assuming the mind is in the category of things when it is just the collection of our behaviours
define interactionist dualism
dualist theories which believe the mind can interact with the physical (cause physical actions) and the physical can cause mental states. eg state of hunger can cause you to get food and being hit in the head can cause you the mental state of pain
what is an example of interactionist dualism?
substance dualism
what are criticisms to interactionist dualism?
PRINCESS ELISABETH OF BOHEMIA: the conceptual interaction problem
the empirical interaction problem
what is the conceptual interaction problem?
it is inconceivable for two things to causally interact unless their surfaces come into contact with each other
the mind has no surface
so it is inconceivable for the mind to interact with the body and vice versa
if such interaction is inconceivable, it is impossible
so mind body interaction is impossible
how does the conceptual interaction problem attack substance dualism?
in the conceivability argument descartes states he has the clear and distinct idea that the mind is a non-extended thing but if the mental can cause the physical then it must have a purpose and be extended
what is a response to the conceptual interaction problem?
DESCARTES argues that the mind-body union is a basic notion in itself and can’t be explained in terms of anything else
explaining mind-body interaction in terms of body-body interaction is like trying to explain the colour blue in terms of yellow
what is the empirical interaction problem?
the law of conservation of energy states ‘in a closed system, energy cannot be added or removed - only transferred’
our universe is a closed system
if substance dualism is true, energy would constantly be added into the closed system of our universe when the mind causes the physical (as causation transfers energy)
so if substance dualism is true then the law of conservation of energy is false
there is more evidence for the law of the conservation of energy than substance dualism so substance dualism is wrong
define epiphenomenalist dualism
dualist theory which believes that the physical world can interact with/ cause mental states but mental states can not interact with/ cause the physical world. eg getting hit in the head can cause the mental state of pain but getting food is caused by the brain and not my mental states
what is an example of epiphenomenalist dualism?
property dualism
what are the criticisms to epiphenomenalist dualism?
introspective self-knowledge
phenomenology of our mental life
natural selection/ evolution
what is the introspective self knowledge criticism? and its counter argument and counter counter argument?
introspection shows mental states are causally linked to one another eg smell of melted butter on toast may cause me to think of my grandma’s kitchen
so introspection shows mental states are capable of causally linked events
CA: conceptual interaction problem by princess Elisabeth of Bohemia
CCA: if epiphenomenalist dualism were true then i would not be able to express my beliefs about my mental states
eg when i say i am in pain this would not come from my introspective self awareness of the mental state of pain
but if my being in pain does not cause me to say i am in pain then the statement i am in pain could not be possible
but it is a possible statement so epiphenomenalist dualism is not true
what is the phenomenology of our mental lives criticism based on sensations cause our actions? and its counter argument?
our reaction to sensations seem to show the mental can cause the physical
eg when i hit my thumb with a hammer, it is the mental sensation of pain which causes me to remove my hand, i would not remove my hand if there was no pain
so without mental states some actions would never happen showing that they do cause the physical sometimes
CA: JACKSON: when watching a punch happen in a cowboy film, it appears that the punch causes the one being punched to collapse
but even though these events are regularly conjoined, there is no direct causal link between one frame causing the next, the real cause is the projector
so just because two events are regularly conjoined it does not mean they cause each other, there may be a hidden third factor
so just because pain and pain behaviour are regularly conjoined, they are not necessarily causally linked, there may be a hidden factor (the brain) causing these events to happen one after another
what is the phenomenology of our mental life criticism based on will causing our action? and its CA and CCA?
we have the notion that we have free will
if my actions are only caused by physical processes, then my desires for what actions i take are irrelevant
so if my actions are only caused by the physical i have no free will
CA: since we do not know everything about the brain, it is possible that what we understand as free will is just another physical process in the brain
CCA: this would be too complicated for the justice system as any criminal could say they had no choice in doing the crime as it was forced by the physical process
what is the problem of natural selection criticism? and its counter argument?
species go through natural selection meaning they evolve with the traits beneficial to them
if mental states are causally redundant it makes no sense that they survived the process of natural selection
so they must have some causal value
CA: JACKSON: a polar bear evolved with a thick coat to stay warm
so the polar bear also evolved to have a heavy coat which does not benefit its survival
this is because a heavy coat is a by product of the warm thick coat
jackson argues the same case happens with the brain and mental states
humans evolved a brain to help survive but also evolved mental states which are causally redundant as a by product of this brain
define property
a quality of a substance dependent on that substance to exist
define property dualism
there exists only one kind of substance (physical) and the brain is made of this substance but has both physical and mental properties. these mental properties are emergent ( only appear once biological matter organises itself into a complex system) and irreducible to matter ( can’t be explained in terms of matter) but are not substantial ( can’t live without the brain)
what are the strengths of dualism?
LEIBNIZ: thinking and perceiving machine
CHALMERS: philosophical zombie
JACKSON: Mary/ Knowledge Argument
what is the thinking and perceiving machine?
imagine a thinking and perceiving machine
if you walked into the machine, you would only find cogs and parts pushing against one another which causes the machine to function
you could not find anything to explain the perception of the machine
similarly if you were to enter a human, you would see muscles and organs which cause it to function but nothing to explain perception
so physicalism is wrong since even if the only substance to exist is physical, it must still have some mental property to explain perception
define phenomena
the appearance of things as they appear in our experience
what is the philosophical zombie argument?
philosophical zombies are beings which are physically identical to a normal human but who don’t have qualia
physicalism claims that consciousness is ultimately physical in nature
so any world physically identical to this world must also contain consciousness
we can conceive of a physically identical world which has no consciousness ( full of philosophical zombies)
a zombie world is metaphysically possible so physicalism is wrong
what are the criticisms to the philosophical zombie argument?
DENNET: philosophical zombies are not conceivable
what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing new about the world
what is conceivable need not be metaphysically possible
what is the criticism that philosophical zombies are not conceivable?
I can not conceive of a being with all its bodily functions and powers intact without having health
similarly i can not conceive of a being with all its cognitive systems intact without consciousness
the reason i believe i am able to conceive of such a thing is because i do not yet possess the knowledge of the neuroscience that they are connected
just because i am lacking this knowledge does not mean that cognitive systems without consciousness are conceivable
what is the metaphysically possible tells us nothing new about the real world criticism?
physicalists would argue that they can accept a possible world where philosophical zombies do exist and physicalism is wrong but that this does not mean physicalism is wrong in our world
the same way ‘bruce wayne is not batman’ is metaphysically possible but not possible in our world and so tells us nothing new about the world, philosophical zombies being metaphysically possible tells us nothing new about this world so it doesn’t disprove physicalism
what is the being conceivable does not mean being metaphysical possible criticism?
water is H2O is not an analytical truth so it is conceivable to say water is H3O
but some philosophers would say water is H3O is in fact a logical impossibility as even though ‘water is H2O’ is not logically necessary, it is still a necessary truth only discoverable by a posteriori means
so H2O is an essential property of water meaning water is H3O is a logical and hence metaphysical impossibility
so it is possible to conceive the metaphysically impossible
so if qualia were to be an essential property of brains only known by a posteriori means, this would make philosophical zombies metaphysically impossible even though we can conceive of them
what is the Mary/ Knowledge argument?
Mary is a brilliant neuroscientist who has only ever seen black and white but knows everything about the physical processes involved in colour vision
when she sees colour for the first time, she learns something new (what it feels like to experience colour)
so there was more to know about colour vision than the complete physical account of it
so physicalism is false
what are the criticisms to the mary/ knowledge argument?
mary gains new acquaintance knowledge, not propositional
mary gains new ability knowledge, not propositional
new knowledge/ old fact
what is the mary gains new acquaintance knowledge not propositional argument?
commits the fallacy of equivocation because initially uses the word know in terms of propositional knowledge but finishes by using the word know in terms of acquaintance knowledge
imagine being a fan of a celebrity and knowing everything about their life and then meeting them. you do not know anymore facts about the celebrity than you did before despite having the new experience of meeting them
what is the counter response to the mary gains new acquaintance knowledge criticism?
Jackson argues that mary gains both acquaintance and propositional knowledge
imagine mary had a companion called marvin who was in the same situation as her ( only seen black and white but knows everything about colour vision)
when mary experiences colour and returns to marvin, she would try to explain to him her experience but without success and marvin would remain lacking important factual knowledge showing mary did gain propositional knowledge
what is the mary gains new ability knowledge, not propositional criticism?
commits the fallacy of equivocation because initially uses the word know in terms of propositional knowledge and ends using the word know in terms of ability knowledge'
this is not the same as we could imagine mary knowing everything physical about how to ride a bike and once she rides a bike she gains new ability knowledge but not propositional
what is the counter argument to Mary gains new ability knowledge not propositional criticism?
jackson claims mary gains new propositional knowledge about the mental life of others
after experiencing colour, she can ask herself the question ‘do people see red tomatoes the same way i see them?’
this is a propositional question that mary asks which she could not have asked before seeing colour
so she gained propositional knowledge along with the ability knowledge
What is the new knowledge/ old fact criticism?
when mary sees colour for the first time, she gains no new knowledge but rather is presented with the same facts she already knew in a different way making it appear to be new knowledge
imagine mary goes to a party and meets batman who she finds out is a millionaire
later on in the party she meets bruce wayne who she discovers is also a millionaire
despite this being new knowledge to mary, she is not learning new facts about reality since she already knew batman (who is bruce wayne) was a millionaire
similarly before seeing colour mary could describe it in a physical sense and after seeing it she could describe it ina phenomenal sense but all this shows is mary can represent the same physical facts in two different ways
What is substance dualism?
theory that human beings are composed of two distinct substances (res extensa- physical substances and res cogitans- mental substances). the mind and body are independent of one another.
define substance
a thing which can exist on its own without depending on anything else to exist
what are the two arguments in support of substance dualism?
the conceivability argument
the divisibility argument
who created the arguments in support for substance dualism?
descartes
what is the indivisibility argument?
uses Leibniz’s Law which states if two things share all the same properties, they are one thing. if one thing has even one property which the other lacks, they are two distinct things
my mind is indivisible
my body is divisible
my mind and body do not share all the same properties
so my mind and body are two distinct things
what are the criticisms to the indivisibility argument?
the mental is divisible ( DID and HUME)
not everything physical is divisible
what is the criticism to the indivisibility argument based on the menatl being divisible?
dissociative identity disorder is a condition where one mind has multiple identities so it can be argued this shows that the mind is divisible.
HUME: self is a bundle of perceptions
we only experience a bundle of perceptions but never actually experience an actual self
so i am nothing more than just a bundle of perceptions
so the mind is not a singular entity but rather a collection of perceptions
these perceptions are distinct from one another so the mind is divisible
what is the criticism to the indivisibility argument based on not everything physical is divisible?
if you keep dividing your body, you eventually get to a point where you can no longer divide it eg you get to a string of energy
so it is possible for the physical to be indivisible
so just because the mind is indivisible, it doesn’t mean it can’t be a physical substance
define logically possible
what is possible without contradictions, they are possibilities consistent with the laws of thought
define physical possibility
possibilities consistent with the laws of physics
define metaphysically possible
logical possibilities which are physically impossible and logical possibilities that are physically possible, what is possible in all possible words
what is the relation between logical and metaphysical possibility?
any logical impossibility is a metaphysical impossibility
what is the conceivability argument?
if i can clearly and distinctly conceive of the essential natures of two things separately, it must be metaphysically possible to separate them
i clearly and distinctly perceive myself to be essentially a thinking and unextending thing
i clearly and distinctly perceive my body to be essentially a non-thinking and extended thing
it must be metaphysically possible for mind and body to be separated meaning they are distinct substances
what are the criticisms to the conceivability arguments?
being conceivable doesn’t mean being metaphysically possible
masked man fallacy
mind without body is not conceivable
what philosopher is behind the being conceivable doesn’t mean being metaphysically possible argument?
ARNAULD
what philosopher is behind the mind without body is not conceivable criticism?
HUME
what is the being conceivable does not mean being metaphysically possible criticism and its counter argument?
it is possible for someone who is unaware of the Pythagoras theorem to conceive of a right angle triangle where a2 + b2 = c2 is not the case
it is logically impossible for a right angle triangle to not follow the Pythagoras theorem
so just because it is conceivable , it doesn’t make something metaphysically possible like the conceivability argument claims
CA: in the analogy the person does not know the whole truth about right angle triangles which is why they can conceive of the metaphysically impossible
descartes argues he does know the whole truth of the mind and body so he can’t conceive the metaphysically impossible when it comes to them
What is the masked man fallacy?
i conceive of batman as a caped crusader
i conceive of bruce wayne as a billionaire who is not a caped crusader
so batman is not bruce wayne
this shows a conclusion which is metaphysically possible but not possible in our world as we know that bruce wayne is batman
so the conceivability argument which has the same layout as the masked man fallacy could lead us to a metaphysically possible conclusion that is not possible in our world so it doesn’t prove substance dualism
what is the mind without body is not conceivable criticism?
Hume argues genuine concepts must originate from sense experience
dualists claim the mind is immaterial and unextended
if i had no body and just my mind, i would have nothing material or extended
without anything material or extended, i have no sense experience
so a mind without body would lack meaning or genuine concepts meaning it would not be conceivable
What properties do mental states have?
all or at least some mental states have phenomenal properties
all or at least some mental states have intentional properties
define introspection
our ability to examine the contents of our own conscious experience
define phenomenal properties
the subjective experience that comes along with some mental states ed what it feels like to see red or have the sensation of pain