Simon Bulmer and William Paterson, “Germany and the European Union”

The European Union

What is the main argument?

Germany’s role in the EU has changed from being a “tamed power” to a “normalized power.” This is seismic for the EU given Germany’s historical central tole as an advocate of European integration.

What was their role as a “tamed power”?

German political leaders exercised power through multilateral institutions like the EU, which softened their power.

Germany avoided unilateral actions (Alleingang) and focused on building alliances like the Franco-German one.

Germany used indirect institutional power rather than hard bargaining.

Germany sought to shape the regional agenda by creating an arena of multilateral cooperation where its interests could flourish.

Germanys strong support of the EU allowed it to upload its preferences to the Eu level, as this method was viewed as non-threatening. 

How has Germany transitioned to a “normalized power”?

Germany is now more assertive, and it is willing to proceed alone rather than exhaustive consultation.

Germany is willing to seek out alternative intra-EU policy venues to pursue its national interests.

Germany now uses hard bargaining power through its power. 

What are some examples of this process happening in terms of leadership?

There is more assertive German leadership.

German leadership is not putting forward a vision of the EU.

The rhetoric of a common European destiny has disappeared from Germany’s policy and has shifted towards more calculating. 

What was the eurozone crisis?

a period of sovereign debt crisis that began around 2009 and peaked between 2010 and 2012, where several European countries faced financial instability due to high government debt and collapsing financial institutions

How did Germany react to the Eurozone crisis?

Germany sought to ban short selling in the financial market without consultation.

Germany raised the prospect of excluding states from the common currency if they jeopardized the eurozone (differed from its traditional solidaristic approach to EU partners).

Germany gave conditional assistance to Greece and gave self-interested conditions for the loan.

Germany shifted away from a strategic, consensus-building advocate for integration towards being a more robust negotiating partner, especially where financial resources are at stake, willing to assert its national interests and act unilaterally.

What is the domestic landscape of Germany?

The public approval toward European integration has become weaker (more concerned with costs of integration and financial bail-outs).

Germany must now account for compelling demands stemming from domestic actors such as state governments and the Federal Court. Germany must adhere to them before the EU.

The eurozone crisis led to the first major breakdown in EU policy consensus between main political German parties. 

What is the conclusion?

Germany no longer puts forward a “vision” of the EU, preferring to act as a broker or focusing on domestic motives.

The Franco-German partnership (the “motor” of integration) is no longer relied upon as much.