Philosophy Terms and Claim (Lectures 1-13)

L1) Two crimes socrates was charged with

corruption of the youth and impiety towards the gods

L1) Socrates’ Principle

a good person cannot suffer harm

L1) Socrates defintion of true harm

true harm is what makes you a worse person

L1) Why was socrates unafraid of death

socrates was unafraid of death beavause he believed death either to be nothing or a better state, either which didnt scare him

L2) Why socrates’ principle is true

he believed the only truly harmful things are those that make you a worse person, as doing wrong damages the soul

L2) Sophist

a paid “reputedly wise teacher in oratory” who claimed to teach success often without concern for truth

L2) Dialect

a conversation consisting of answers to questions, arguments for answers, objections, and replies to objections

L2) Socratic conception of philosophy

a dialect around socratic questions conducted on basis of reasons

L2) Faith is not opposed to reason because

faith seeks understanding, and reason helps support and clarify what is believed

(L2) why is the belief that you should only believe what can be experimentaly tested self defeating

because the belief its self cannot be experiementally tested therefore fails its own test

(L3) restricted argument principle

Accept no answer to a major philosophical
question unless it is based on some good
argument

(L3) unrestricted argument principle

Everything needs an argument

(L3) Argument

A set of statements consisting of premises
and conclusions

(L3) Valid argument

It is impossible for the premises to
all be true and the conclusion be
false.

(L3) modus ponens

1) If A, then B

2) A

therefore

3) B

(L3) modus tollens

1) If not A, the not B

2) Not A

therefore

3) Not B

(L3) sound arguement

Sound = valid + all true premises
All sound arguments are valid
But not all valid arguments are sound

(L3) why unrestricted argument principle leads to a vicious regress

(L3) The first Waldo argument is valid

(1) If Waldo is a walrus, then Waldo is a mammal.
(2) Waldo is a walrus.
Therefore,
(3) Waldo is a mammal.

(1) If A, then B
(2) A
Therefore,
(3) B

so the arguement is valid because of modus ponens

(L3) The second Waldo argument is valid

(1) If Waldo is a walrus, then Waldo is a mammal.
(2) Waldo is not a mammal.
Therefore,
(3) Waldo is not a walrus.

(1) If A, then B
(2) Not B
Therefore,
(3) Not A

arguement is valid because of modus tollens

(L3) The second Waldo argument is unsound

(1) If Waldo is a walrus, then Waldo is a mammal.
(2) Waldo is not a mammal.
Therefore,
(3) Waldo is not a walrus.

though this is valid because of motus tonnes, premise 2 is false as if waldo is a walrus, then he has to be a mammal

(L3) Example 2 is invalid:

The president of the U.S. in 1905 was Roosevelt.
Therefore,
Roosevelt won a presidential election

it is invalid because though roosevelt was president in 1905 it does not mean he won an election as there are other ways to become president.

(L3) Example 6 is valid:

Everyone knows the professor is wise.
Therefore,
The professor is wise.

it is valid because everyone “knows” the professor is wise, which implies thats the truth, if all premises are true the conclusion cannot be false

(L4) original Parks case

Parks was unconscious he was not able to
control his body.

(L4) modified Parks case

Parks is conscious but not able to consciously
control his body

(L4) Free will

A capacity to act such that when you take it away, you
cannot be morally blameworthy

(L4) Conditional

whenever P is true, Q must also be true.

(L4) Antecedent

is the “if” part of an if–then statement (a conditional) A

(L4) Consequent

 the second part of a conditional statement the part after “then” B

(L4) pro-free-will argument is valid

(1) If we do not have free will, then no one can ever be morally blameworthy.
(2) Sometimes people can be morally blameworthy.
Therefore,
(3) We have free will.

(1) If not A, then not B
(2) B = Not (not B)
Therefore,
(3) A = Not (not A)
Modus tollens

(L4) negation of (1)’s antecedent is the claim that we have free will

we have free will

(L4) negation of (1)’s consequent is a sometimes claim

someone can sometimes be morally blameworthy

(L4) first premise of the pro-free-will argument is true

blameworthiness requires that there were other option that a person couldve done

(L4) The second premise of the pro-free-will argument is true

if i break something intentionally, i am morally blameowrthy. therefore sometimes people can be morally blame worthy

(L5) The simple view

Free will is the ability to act on the basis of
what you consciously want to do

(L5) Ends

= heath

The goals or outcomes you ultimately aim at
Health > staying home
Choose the means of working out (even though the means isn’t liked as much).

(L5) To want to do something

To have an internal desire that motivates your action on the simple view

(L5) The conditional clause

If you were to want to do something else, you would

(L5) Hume’s view

The simple view + the conditional clause.

“the ablitly to do what on wants to”

(L5) Premise (1) of the no-free-will argument is true

(1) All our actions are caused by events in the past which we have no control over.
Therefore,
(2) None of our actions are free

our actions are cause by our past (nurture/nature)

(L5) On Hume’s view, the no-free-will argument is invalid

Because even if past events cause your desires, you still act freely when your action matches your desires, and you would have acted differently if you wanted to

(6) Determinism

The facts at the time of the big bang together with the laws of physics perfectly predict everything that will happen.

(6) The compatibilist question

Is free will compatible with determinism?

(6) Compatibilism

Determinism and free will are compatible.

Even if causes determine your actions, you’re free if you act from your own motives without external constraint.

(6) Incompatibilism

Determinism and free will are incompatible.

if determinism is true → no free will, no real praise/blume.blame

(6) Libertarianism

Incompatibilism + free will

cause influence but don't guarantee actions

(6) Hume’s reason for rejecting libertarianism

because he argues true "liberty of indifference" (action without necessity/cause) is just chance, making actions random and not attributable to a person's character, thus destroying moral responsibility

(6) An atheist can be a determinist

This claim is correct. Belief in a determining power (such as physical laws) does not require a belief in a deity. Hard determinism is a philosophical position, and many atheists accept a deterministic view of the universe, grounded in scientific principles.

(6) Compatibilism is not the same as determinism

This claim is correct. A compatibilist can agree that determinism is true, but they differ from a hard determinist by asserting that we still have a meaningful form of free will.

(6) On libertarianism, the no-free-will argument is invalid

(1) All our actions are caused by eventsin the past which we have no control over.
Therefore,
(2) None of our actions are free.

Because libertarianism denies determinism, premise (1) of the no-free-will argument is false

(L7) Deism

God simply created the world and left it to itself

(L7) The conclusion of Pascal’s wager

It is in your rational self-interest to believe in a God that rewards believers with eternal bliss.

(L7) Expected utility theory

A method for figuring out how to act in your rational self-interest in the face of uncertainty

(L7) The principle of max EU

It is always in your rational self-interest to act to achieve the greatest expected utility.

(L7) Acts

ask, don’t ask
What you do

(L7) Possibilities

she likes you, she doesn’t like you
Outside influences

(L7) Outcomes

acts + possibilities

(L7) The first step of decision making

Rank outcomes

(L8) The third step of decision making

Assign chances to the possibilities (columns)

(L8) The fourth step of decision making

Multiply numbers and add up each row

(L8) The definition of ‘God’ in the wager

A powerful and knowledgeable being who rewards you with eternal bliss

(L8) The hardened atheist

believes the probability of God is zero

(L8) The value of being right when you bet on God is infinite

If God exists and you believe, the payoff is infinite reward

(L8) The value of being wrong when you bet on God is the same as the value of being right you bet
no God

If God does not exist, believing or not believing gives the same finite, earthly outcome

(L8) The value of being wrong when you bet no God is average

If God exists and you don’t believe, the payoff is finite and bad, not infinite

(L8) Betting on God has infinite expected utility

Because one outcome includes infinite value, the expected utility of believing is infinite

(L8) The first premise of the wager is true

If an action uniquely maximizes expected utility, it is rational to choose it

(L8) The second premise of the wager is true

Believing in God uniquely maximizes expected utility because it yields infinite EU

(L9) The many gods objection

The wager fails to show which of the many gods we should bet on.

(L9) Anti-god

A very knowledgeable and powerful being who rewards atheists with eternal bliss.

(L9) The anti-god objection

Because it is at least somewhat probable that anti-god exists, it is just as much in one’s rational self-interest to be a theist as it is to be an atheist

(L9) Pick the Probable (Schlesinger’s principle)

When choosing among actions with infinite expected utility, it is in your rational self-interest to choose the most probable.

(L9) Schlesinger’s response to the many gods objection

We should bet on the god that is most probable rather than trying to consider every logically possible god

(L9) The wager fails to show which of the many gods we should bet on

Because different gods offer different rewards and punishments, Pascal’s wager alone cannot determine which god yields the highest expected utility

(L9) On Schlesinger’s principle, the anti-god objection fails

Since the true-God hypothesis is more probable than the anti-god hypothesis, “Pick the Probable” makes anti-god too unlikely to block the wager

(L10) The why question

Why would God allow evil?

(L10) The logical question

Is God’s existence incompatible with evil

(L10) Evil as used in the problem of evil

Suffering (anyone/anything)

(L10) Three divine attributes

All-powerful (omnipotent)

All-knowing (omniscient)

Wholly good

(L10) Definitions of the three divine attributes

All-powerful: Able to do anything that is logically possible

All-knowing: Knows every true fact (past, present, future)

Wholly good: Always prefers and promotes good over evil

(L10) The lack of an answer to the why question is not in itself a reason for atheism

Not knowing why God allows some evil does not logically show that God does not exist

(L10) A positive answer to the logical question shows that theism is false

If we can prove that God’s existence is logically incompatible with the existence of any evil, then theism must be false

(L11) Reductio ad absurdum

1. Suppose some claims are true
2. Derive an absurd conclusion
3. Reject the supposition(s)

(L11) Syllogism

All humans are mortal.
Socrates is human.
Therefore,
Socrates is mortal.

ll As are Bs.
x is an A.
Therefore,
x is a B

(L11) Steps 1 and 2 of the two-step reasoning for premise (1) of sub-argument 2

Step 1: An all-powerful being can do anything (any action).
Step 2: Eliminating every evil is a thing (action)

(L11) The paradox of the stone

An all-powerful can do anything, including lift any boulder. But it can also do this: make a boulder that even it can’t lift

(L11) Significance of KeyboardTentacleFreeforall

Omnipotence doesn’t require doing meaningless or impossible tasks

Helps answer the paradox of the stone

Supports the claim that “God can eliminate every evil” because that is a real action, unlike nonsense tasks

(L11) Step 3 of three-step reasoning for premise (1) of sub-argument 2

Eliminating every evil is a thing because we can imagine Goddoing it. (Never creating anything)

(L11) Higher-order good

A good that it’s impossible to have without there being some evil.

(L11) Premise (1) of sub-argument 1 is false

Why premise (1) is false

• It assumes a wholly good being must eliminate every evil, but that ignores cases where allowing some evil produces a greater good

• Eliminating an evil might require doing something morally worse, which a wholly good being would not do

(L12) Gratuitous evil

An evil which God would have no reason to allow.

(L12) The evidential problem of evil

(1) There are apparently gratuitous evils.
So probably,
(2) There are gratuitous evils

(L12) Premise (1) of sub-argument 1* is true

(1) A wholly good being eliminates every gratuitous evil it can.
(2) God is a wholly good being.
Therefore,
(3) God eliminates every gratuitous evil God can.

is true because a wholly good being would eliminate any evil that lacks a morally sufficient reason for being allowed

(L12) The conclusion of the improved argument is not logically absurd for the theist

The improved argument concludes that God eliminates all gratuitous evil

This is compatible with theistic beliefs because theists already accept that God may allow non-gratuitous evil for greater-good reasons

Therefore the conclusion is not logically absurd for a theist

(L12) The evidential problem of evil makes it conclusion very likely

The evidential problem of evil points out the observed existence of gratuitous or apparently unnecessary evil in the world

Even if logically possible for God to exist with some evil, the sheer amount and kinds of evil make it very likely that a wholly good, omnipotent God does not exist

Thus, the evidential problem supports the conclusion

(L12) We should accept premise (1) of the evidential problem of evil

Observing evils that seem pointless or unnecessary provides probabilistic support that some evils are indeed gratuitous,

(L13) Theodicy

A story that shows that God has a good reason for allowing all the evils there are.

(L13) The recipe for making a theodicy

For each evil point to a good that has these features:
(i) It’s a higher-order good
(ii) It needs to be an outweighing/justifying good

(L13) Free will theodicy

God allows evil in order for us to experience the consequences of our free will.

(L13) Soul-making theodicy

God allows evil in order for it to build character.