PART 2 — THE CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

What does the following quote mean: "The materialization of United States foreign policy has been characterized by the bureaucratic political competition [struggle] between the Legislative and the Executive powers (namely: the Congress and the Presidency) over the American policy making, coordination, and regulation."

(1.) "MATERIALIZATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY": Policy isn't handed down whole; it emerges — it is produced through a process, not authored by one actor.

(2.) "BUREAUCRATIC POLITICAL COMPETITION [STRUGGLE]": The engine is INSTITUTIONAL RIVALRY, not a shared grand plan. Each branch pursues its own institutional interest. Echoes HAROLD LASSWELL'S definition of politics: "WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW".

(3.) "between the Legislative and the Executive": The two branches share and overlap constitutional powers (Jackson's "twilight zone"), so overlap → friction.

(4.) "over policy making, coordination, and regulation": They fight over THREE DISTINCT THINGS: who decides it, who runs it day-to-day, and who oversees/constrains it. BEST ONE-SENTENCE ANSWER: It is a restatement of Corwin's "invitation to struggle" in bureaucratic-politics language: US foreign policy is not designed, it is the residue of a continuous institutional tug-of-war between Congress and the presidency over who makes, executes, and polices it.

The Bricker Amendment (1950s)

A SERIES OF PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS led by SENATOR JOHN BRICKER (R-OHIO) in the 1950s, driven by conservatives worried about America's expanding global involvement. It proposed that any treaty or executive agreement infringing the constitutional rights of American citizens be considered unconstitutional, and that Congress have the right to enact legislation to put into effect any treaty or executive agreement made by the president. → OUTCOME: FAILED. The closest vote, in 1954, fell ONE VOTE SHORT of the necessary two-thirds.

The Case–Zablocki Act (1972)

Named for SENATOR CLIFFORD CASE (R-NEW JERSEY) and CONGRESSMAN CLEMENT ZABLOCKI (D-WISCONSIN), and passed OVER NIXON'S VETO, this law requires the executive branch to report all international agreements (other than treaties) to Congress within 60 days of their entering into force. Classified agreements go to the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations committees under an injunction of secrecy. It is the first significant piece of legislation in the commitment-making area and is normally carried out through the STATE DEPARTMENT. → BOTTOM LINE: Congress began a resurgence in commitment-making, but was unwilling to go much beyond the reporting mechanism.

The War Powers Resolution (1973)

ORIGIN: Passed over President Nixon's veto in November 1973, spurred by frustration over presidents using the commander-in-chief and executive clauses to intervene abroad, and by Nixon's indifference to the 1970 repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. It remains the most significant congressional attempt to reassert control over committing American forces abroad.

What were THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT PROVISIONS of the The War Powers Resolution (this is an essay question — learn these cold)

(1.) THE THREE CONDITIONS FOR USING FORCE.

(2.) CONSULTATION AND REPORTING.

(3.) THE 60-DAY CLOCK (+30) AND THE CONCURRENT-RESOLUTION WITHDRAWAL.

(1.) THE THREE CONDITIONS FOR USING FORCE.

The president may introduce armed forces "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances" ONLY under three conditions: (a) a DECLARATION OF WAR,

(b) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION, or

(c) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories, or its armed forces. Significance: for the first time, Congress specified the conditions under which the president could use the military; previously the power was discretionary and ambiguous.

(2.) CONSULTATION AND REPORTING.

(1.) The president "in every possible instance shall consult with Congress" before sending forces into hostilities or anticipated hostilities, and "SHALL CONSULT REGULARLY" until they are removed. → Congress expects involvement from beginning to end.

(2.) Where forces are introduced without a declaration of war, the president must submit a WRITTEN REPORT WITHIN 48 HOURS to the Speaker of the House and the president pro tempore of the Senate, explaining the reasons, his constitutional and legislative authority, and the "estimated scope and duration." He must then report AT LEAST EVERY SIX MONTHS while troops remain deployed.

(3.) THE 60-DAY CLOCK (+30) AND THE CONCURRENT-RESOLUTION WITHDRAWAL.

(1.) Military action is limited to 60 DAYS, plus 30 MORE DAYS FOR WITHDRAWAL (90 total), unless Congress declares war or authorizes otherwise.

(2.) Congress may, by CONCURRENT RESOLUTION (a simple majority in both houses, NO PRESIDENTIAL SIGNATURE), direct that the troops be WITHDRAWN IMMEDIATELY — even before the clock runs out.

THE PURPOSE of War Powers Resolution (TWO LEVELS):

(1.) LEGAL/INSTITUTIONAL: stop the president from miring troops in an open-ended conflict — "to reduce the possibility of future Vietnams" — and reassert Congress's Article I war powers. It does not prevent the president from acting when necessary; it promotes SHARED RESPONSIBILITY.

(2.) POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL RESTRAINT: the president must now calculate whether Congress and the public will support a deployment, must PUBLICLY JUSTIFY military action, and may face FORMAL CONGRESSIONAL SCRUTINY.

To what extent have presidents adhered to the WPR?

"MIXED AT BEST." Evidence of non-compliance — memorize 3–4 examples:

(1.) G.H.W. BUSH: failed to report sending military advisors to COLOMBIA, BOLIVIA, AND PERU, and conveying BELGIAN TROOPS INTO ZAIRE (Sept. 1991).

(2.) CLINTON (1998): did not report the BOMBING OF IRAQ targeting WMD-capable facilities.

(3.) OBAMA / LIBYA (2011): the best example. A June 2011 House resolution charged the administration had "failed to provide Congress with a compelling rationale" and failed to explain US security interests. The action EXCEEDED THE 60-DAY LIMIT and neared 90 days. The administration's defense: the president's commander-in-chief and chief-executive authority, plus "the limited nature, scope and duration of the anticipated actions," and — the famous move — that US operations in Libya "are distinct from the kind of 'hostilities' contemplated by the Resolution's 60-day termination provision."

What are the Controversies surrounding the War Powers Resolution?

(B.) THE CONSTITUTIONALITY PROBLEM: The constitutionality of the 60-day time limit has never been resolved by the Court or even directly challenged there. This is why every president since Nixon has challenged the constitutionality of the WPR as a whole.

(C.) Repeal / reform attempts — all failed.

(D.) Has it worked at all? — YES, partially (argue this in an essay): It has generally limited the executive's use of force without involving Congress in some fashion. It has PREVENTED LONG-TERM MILITARY INVOLVEMENTS on the scale of Vietnam. It has probably made presidents MORE CIRCUMSPECT AND CAUTIOUS. It likely prevented US ground forces in Central America (1980s) and Syria (2000s).

Do you agree with these provisions? (your own view — pick a side and support it)

(1.) Pro: Article I gives Congress the power to declare war; without a clock, "temporary" operations become open-ended wars (Vietnam, Afghanistan). Deliberation before commitment is a feature, not a bug.

(2.) Con: modern threats move faster than 60 days; telegraphing a deadline informs adversaries they can outwait the US; the concurrent-resolution mechanism was struck down anyway, so the statute is half-dead; and presidents evade it by relabeling "hostilities."

(3.) A middle position: the reporting requirement works; the enforcement mechanism doesn't. Reform (like the 2008 Commission's 30-day approval requirement) rather than repeal.

DEFINE the "Power of the Purse"

Congress's EXCLUSIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OVER APPROPRIATIONS — "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law" (Art. I). In foreign policy it is exercised by cutting off funds, conditioning funds, earmarking funds, and refusing to fund presidential requests, making it Congress's most potent instrument against the executive.

Examples of CUTTING OFF / CONDITIONING funding (know 3–4)

(1.) 2010FF: Congress blocked Obama's EO to close GUANTÁNAMO by refusing funding to convert mainland facilities.

(2.) 2016: refused to vote on the TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP).

(3.) 2020: tried to stop the Trump arms sale to the UAE — failed to override the veto.

Earmarking

A use of the purse strings in which Congress DESIGNATES FUNDS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES rather than leaving allocation to executive discretion. It covers: (a) funds for specific REGIONAL OR FUNCTIONAL PROGRAMS (e.g., the African Development Foundation, refugee assistance); (b) PROHIBITIONS on using funds for particular countries (Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria); and — THE MOST COMMON MEANING — (c) "specific amounts of foreign aid for individual countries."

Two examples of the use of earmarking (the exam asks for two)

(1.) ISRAEL AND EGYPT — the classic pair. Both have LONG RECEIVED EARMARKED/DESIGNATED FUNDS year after year, reflecting enduring US interests in the Middle East.

(2.) AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ — received designated funds in light of US EFFORTS AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM in those countries.

(3.) WHAT EARMARKS REVEAL: the top-ten recipients shift with international events (in FY2002 the list included COLOMBIA, TURKEY, PERU, AND INDIA) but some are constant (Israel, Egypt, Jordan). Aid recipients reflect the priorities of American foreign policy — and earmarking lets CONGRESS help set them.

How would you judge earmarks? Should Congress use them?

A defensible middle position for an essay: Earmarks should be used, but sparingly and transparently — with waiver authority for the Secretary of State on national-security grounds (which existing appropriations legislation already provides, so long as the Appropriations Committee is fully informed). The problem isn't congressional direction of aid; it's undisclosed, permanent direction that can't adapt.

What is the Most important Senate Committee for foreign affairs?

THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. WHY IT MATTERS (THREE REASONS):

(1.) CONSTITUTIONAL AND OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITIES — it monitors foreign affairs and is required to advise on and consent to treaties and diplomatic nominations. It has been viewed as the most prestigious committee in the Senate (and perhaps in Congress) and is a springboard to national politics — Kerry, Biden, Dodd, and Obama all served on it and sought or won presidential nominations.

(2.) QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP — especially SENATOR J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT (D-ARKANSAS), chair for 15 YEARS, whose penetrating VIETNAM HEARINGS shaped the national debate and contributed to US withdrawal, and who drove the reform efforts of the late 1960s–early 1970s.

(3.) Later chairs of note: RICHARD LUGAR (R-IN) — consensus-builder, pushed multilateralism, worked with JOHN KERRY to pass NEW START; JESSE HELMS (R-NC) — showed how one chair can reshape a committee's priorities; then Menendez / Corker / Risch / Menendez as control flipped.

Explain the level of influence that THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE has as of recent?

Its influence has DECLINED CONSIDERABLY in recent decades — some evidence points to reputational decline relative to the Senate Armed Services Committee, and it "continues to struggle to regain its previous high profile."

Compare the House Committee on Foreign Affairs with THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: historically LESS PRESTIGIOUS, less useful for constituency service or reelection, a weaker springboard, and with a narrower agenda (mainly the foreign assistance bill). It surged in the 1970s (younger, more liberal, anti-Vietnam members; structural reforms) — 700+ hearings per Congress in the 1970s–80s, ~500 by 2000.

"Advice and Consent"

From ARTICLE II, SECTION 2 of the Constitution. The president makes treaties and appoints ambassadors "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate," and treaties require that TWO-THIRDS OF SENATORS PRESENT CONCUR. It is the Senate's constitutional check on COMMITMENT MAKING and APPOINTMENTS, and it is the reason presidents increasingly prefer EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS — which carry the same force of law but REQUIRE NO SENATE CONSENT.

"Power of the Purse"

Congress's exclusive control over appropriations — the tool it uses to cut off, condition, or earmark funds. Byrd: "the greatest power in our Constitutional system."

"Meet the Press"

Shorthand for the individual legislator's nonlegislative, media-based route of influence: members of Congress use television interview programs on major and cable networks, and "talk radio," to make their case on foreign policy issues — pressuring the executive and shaping public opinion without passing a single law. On the lecture slide this falls under individual legislators' actions: "leveraging policy by the media." It sits alongside newsletters, policy analyses, floor speeches, and public/private letters as ways a single member can move foreign policy.

How can INDIVIDUAL legislators influence foreign policy? (slide 10)

By LEVERAGING POLICY BY THE MEDIA, by PUBLIC AND INSTITUTIONAL SPEECHES, by Addressing (public and private) letters to political actors, by LEGALLY CHALLENGING EXECUTIVE POWER ACTIONS, and by EXERTING DIRECT DIPLOMACY. However, through LEVERAGING POLICY BY THE MEDIA legislators can Using TV interview programs, cable news, "talk radio," newsletters, and published policy analyses to shape the debate with "Meet the Press"–style appearances. Through PUBLIC AND INSTITUTIONAL SPEECHES, legislators can use Floor speeches during regular debate or at the start/end of the legislative day when time is set aside for individual members. Ultimately, Congress's real individual power is the power to obstruct, and obstruction is bargaining leverage.

COMPARE AND CONTRAST legislative vs. executive prerogatives (slide 11)

The executive holds the power of INITIATIVE; Congress holds the power of the purse and the veto point. The Constitution's ambiguity means neither can be excluded, but the executive's structural advantages — speed, unity, secrecy, information, and a purpose-built bureaucracy — mean that Congress's realistic role is not to make foreign policy but to CONSTRAIN, CONDITION, AND PUBLICIZE it.