realism nog checken

Frontrunners of realism

Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes.

Realism: balance of power tradition — basic characteristics

• Power and interests analysis are central.

  • Power is presented as the essence of international politics (IP): understanding global affairs requires studying how states acquire and use power.

• Realism has a pessimistic view of humanity and/or the international system.

  • States pursue their interests, seek power, and inevitably come into conflict,

    • although realists differ on why this happens.

    • Hobbes argues that conflict is inherent to human nature and can be controlled by a government or Leviathan, but the international sphere remains a ‘war of all against all’.

      • Without hierarchy or a global Leviathan, the international system remains anarchic.

      • International law, organizations, and morality have limited force and largely reflect great-power struggles.

      • Conflict and war are essential aspects of international relations (IR).

Realism versus idealistic approaches to IR

In contrast to idealistic approaches to IR, realism focuses on power and interests, especially national security and economic interests.

• National security is the state’s core task.

• Moral rules do not bind states or their leaders: the state may legitimately use violence to preserve order and protect its citizens from foreign threats.

• →Striving for power therefore becomes almost a normative requirement.

Three key concepts of modern realist theory

1) Security dilemma: when states seek more security, they make others feel less secure, prompting spirals of power accumulation.

2) Balance of power: this accumulation of power tends to produce a kind of equilibrium of power.

3) Polarity: the number of major powers, which shapes how the international system functions.

Classical realism — Carr’

s lessons from the League of Nations

Carr’s critique of liberal idealism was that idealists ignored the centrality of power in international politics, and it was precisely power politics that undermined the League of Nations system. Moral goals and ideals must therefore be paired with a realistic understanding of power relations. After World War II and during the early Cold War, realism gained prominence.

Morgenthau — Principle 1: politics is determined by objective laws

Morgenthau’s first principle is that politics is determined by objective laws and can therefore be studied scientifically. The basis of these laws is human nature, especially animus dominandus: the lust for power that makes every person strive to exercise power over others. The basis of the security dilemma therefore lies in every human being’s pursuit of power. A scientific approach must rationally analyze actual developments: reason and facts are more important than ideas about what should be. Only then can a rational foreign policy be pursued.

Morgenthau — Principle 2: interest defined as power

Interest defined as power is the most important criterion for both analysis and policy. The acquisition of power is the most crucial interest of the state. The power game is the essence of politics. Analysis of power relations is therefore the essence of scientific analysis of international relations and a precondition for rational policy.

Morgenthau — Principle 3: states are driven by interests

States are driven by their interests. This is a universal fact, although the concrete content of those interests is culturally and historically determined; the same applies to power. Human beings, and therefore states, are driven by interests rather than primarily by a will to do good. The essential task of the state is the security of its citizens and its own survival, so it needs power, first of all economic and military power. States must nevertheless realize that their power is always limited by the power of other states. Power evokes countervailing power, so the balance of power plays a central role in international politics.

Morgenthau — Principle 4: morality and political responsibility

Political realism recognizes the moral importance of political action but also the intrinsic tension between moral principles and successful political action. States and statesmen must evaluate the political consequences of their actions. The summary links this to Weber’s distinction between an ethics of conviction or values and an ethics of responsibility. An ethic of conviction is based on general moral principles that everyone must follow, for example ‘do not kill’. Individuals can adopt this principled moral standpoint, but a state cannot simply do so because it must always consider the results and consequences of its actions.

Morgenthau — Principle 5: no universal moral authority

No state can claim universal moral authority. Ideologies often mask national interests and can fuel dangerous absolutism; Nazi Germany is given as an example. This does not mean that morality plays no role in international politics. Morgenthau rejects a purely idealistic approach that ignores power relations; the Vietnam War is mentioned as an unnecessarily ideologically inspired power play. Moral objectives must always be evaluated for feasibility, and the further consequences of actions must be kept in mind.

Morgenthau — Principle 6: autonomy of political realism

Political realism is a specific approach with its own autonomy. It focuses specifically on state interests defined in terms of power. By emphasizing this specificity, Morgenthau implicitly claims a right for international relations and its theories to exist as a separate scientific discipline.

Morgenthau — power as a multidimensional concept

Power is a multidimensional mix of material and non-material factors. Military and economic capabilities matter, but so do psychological factors, national character, and the quality of government. Statecraft itself is a source of power. This differs from neorealists, who place much more emphasis on material capabilities.

Classical realism — states, status quo states and imperialist states

States are the main actors, with little or no attention paid to international institutions or transnational actors. Classical realism distinguishes status quo states and imperialist states. Status quo states seek to maintain the balance of power and are therefore defensive. Imperialist states try to alter the balance to their own advantage and are offensive. The difference is shaped by perception: behavior or intentions that one player sees as aggressive can be understood by another as purely defensive or self-protective.

Neorealism / structural realism — Waltz’s starting point

In the 1970s, neoliberalism emphasized economic interdependence, international organizations, and transnational actors as drivers of cooperation. Kenneth Waltz rejected this liberal optimism and argued that conflict remains inherent in international relations. He also considered classical realism too normative and tried to give realism a more scientific basis modeled on economics and physics. His approach is called neorealism or structural realism.

Waltz — three levels of analysis and the systemic focus

Waltz distinguishes three levels of analysis: 1) the individual, 2) the state, and 3) the system. The system is the center of his theory. The typical anarchic character of the international system makes states strive for power. States are treated like billiard balls: internal differences between them do not matter for the theory. International organizations are merely arenas where states pursue power. Because the focus is on systemic structure, the approach is called structural realism.

Waltz — structure of the international system: three features

The structure of the international system is defined by three features. 1) The system is anarchic: there is no higher authority enforcing order. States are not always in conflict, but the risk of war always exists, and this systemic anarchy is the crucial reason why states strive for power. 2) Anarchy produces a self-help system in which all states share the same basic function: guaranteeing their own survival and the security of their citizens in relation to other states. States are therefore systemically similar. 3) Because survival is the main function of all states, power is the key element distinguishing one state from another, just as power relations distinguish one international system from another. Only the truly powerful — the great powers — substantially matter; smaller states play no substantial role. Polarity, the number of great powers — unipolarity, bipolarity or multipolarity — ultimately defines the system’s structure.

Waltz — security dilemma and balance of power

Anarchy inevitably creates a security dilemma: each state wants to increase its security, but other states feel threatened by that buildup and respond in kind, increasing overall insecurity. Lasting cooperation is impossible; at best there are temporary alliances. Alliances such as NATO are not structural elements because they can change through an action-reaction mechanism. The system tends toward an equal distribution of power among the major players: a balance of power. This balance will almost inevitably arise, which gives the theory a deterministic character, although Waltz admitted that states can make mistakes and fail to balance. A state that fails may be punished, marginalized, or even disappear from the map.

Defensive realism — core idea

Defensive realism holds that aggression usually does not pay because defense generally has an advantage. States do not simply amass as much power as possible. They are mainly looking for security — security maximization — and power is only a means to that end. A balance of power creates a degree of stability, so states seek as much power as is necessary to maintain or achieve the balance. They avoid accumulating too much power because excessive power can provoke counterbalancing by other states. This is why Waltz’s neorealism is often labeled defensive realism.

Defensive realism — NATO enlargement and the 2003 Iraq invasion

The summary gives the 1990s enlargement of NATO and the 2003 US invasion of Iraq as examples in the discussion of defensive realism. Such moves were criticized because they could provoke strong reactions from major powers such as Russia and China.

Mearsheimer’s offensive realism — tragedy of international politics

John Mearsheimer is an offensive realist. The ‘tragedy’ of international politics is that anarchy makes conflict and confrontation inevitable. His theory begins with five assumptions about the international system and great powers and leads to the conclusion that great powers seek to maximize power.

Mearsheimer — five basic assumptions

1) The international system is anarchic. 2) All great powers, which are the central actors, possess offensive military capabilities and can harm or destroy one another. They therefore always pose a potential danger to other states; the more military power they possess, measured by the weapons at their disposal, the more dangerous they are. 3) States can never be certain of other states’ intentions, even when those intentions appear peaceful, because intentions may change quickly; uncertainty is therefore persistent. 4) Survival is every state’s primary goal, because territorial integrity and political autonomy depend on it. 5) Great powers are rational actors that assess their environment and the behavior of other states and make both short-term and long-term strategic decisions.

Mearsheimer versus Waltz

Compared with Waltz, Mearsheimer places stronger emphasis on offensive military capabilities and on deep distrust among states. Great powers seek to maximize power rather than merely maintain security. Only clear military superiority provides real security. Mearsheimer also argues that history shows attackers have often won, so the international system encourages offensive strategies.

Mearsheimer — regional hegemony, global hegemony and stopping waters

All great powers ultimately try to become regional hegemons because regional hegemony is the best guarantee of security. The opposing drives for regional hegemony create a balance of power. The United States is the only state that has achieved regional hegemony. Global hegemony is impossible because a state cannot exercise hegemony over a region other than its own. Land forces are the most important form of power and are the basis through which hegemony is established. The ‘stopping waters’ argument says it is impossible to permanently deploy a large army on the other side of the oceans. Even so, a regional hegemon will try to prevent another hegemon from arising elsewhere: the US interventions in World War I and World War II against Germany are given as examples. China is presented as a potential hegemon in Asia, so Mearsheimer argues that the US must prevent this, even if that means blocking China’s economic development.

Criticism of Mearsheimer’s offensive realism

Three criticisms are highlighted. First, Mearsheimer’s empirical basis relies mainly on US behavior. Second, modern military transport reduces the relevance of the ‘stopping waters’ argument. Third, there is a conceptual problem: why would stopping waters prevent global hegemony while not preventing intervention against emerging hegemons in other regions?

Criticism of neorealism — conflict, state-centrism and small states

Neorealism is criticized for focusing excessively on the causes of conflict and war and offering little insight into cooperation, which is also a key feature of international politics. Its state-centered view also limits its ability to explain today’s predominantly internal conflicts. It overlooks the agency of small states, even though several great-power wars were triggered by smaller actors. The example given is Ukraine: treating Ukraine merely as a tool of US expansion ignores that it is an independent state seeking survival and autonomy.

Criticism of neorealism — billiard balls, welfare, ideology and historical specificity

States are not simply ‘billiard balls’ driven only by survival or power, and it is relatively unlikely today that a state will simply disappear. States may pursue welfare or commercial interests that contradict security requirements. Ideology also matters: the Cold War was not only a bipolar power struggle but also an ideological contest between two visions of humanity and society. Neorealists also treat anarchy and the modern state as universal and timeless even though both stem from a specific European historical experience. This can blind them to alternatives, such as tribute systems in Chinese history, and makes them less able to account for developments such as European integration, which neorealists often dismiss as irrelevant.

Neoclassical realism — core principles

Neoclassical realists accept core neorealist principles such as anarchy, polarity, the balance of power, and security dilemmas, but they do not focus exclusively on the system level. They introduce non-systemic factors. The international system is composed of concrete states that can differ significantly and respond differently to the systemic conditions of anarchy and polarity. The views and character of policymakers also matter.

Neoclassical realism — implications of non-systemic factors

Because domestic and individual factors matter, state policies can shape power relations and can even alter the structure of the international system. Choices about military spending or economic reform influence polarity. Two examples are given: the collapse of the Soviet Union was an internal process that shifted the system from bipolarity to unipolarity; and growing European Union integration can change the polarity configuration.

Neoclassical realism — why states do not always balance as predicted

States often do not behave as neorealism predicts; in particular, less balancing or counter-power building occurs than neorealists expect. Four explanatory factors are listed. 1) Perception: short-term behavior is shaped more by perceptions of power than by power itself. Policymakers may misread or misinterpret information, receive incorrect information, or misjudge the consequences of their actions. 2) Ambiguous signals: threats are rarely clear. 3) Limits of rationality: leaders’ psychology and biases affect decisions. Stalin is the example: he dismissed warnings of a German attack because they conflicted with his own view of relations between Russia and the capitalist powers. 4) Internal capacity: states must actually be able to mobilize resources.

Neoclassical realism — domestic constraints and overall synthesis

Domestic constraints such as weak executives, coalition politics, elections, economic priorities, and strategic culture shape foreign policy. Neoclassical realism therefore blends neorealism’s systemic focus with domestic and individual-level analysis, creating a more nuanced approach that reconnects with classical realism.

Critique of neoclassical realism

Because the approach is so broad, almost every policy, development, or fact can be made to fit within the framework. The result is a criticism that neoclassical realism lacks scientific parsimony and coherence.

Anarchy and the security dilemma — core concept of the balance of power tradition

The security dilemma means that many of the means by which one state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others. It forms the core of the realist tradition’s pessimistic view of human nature and/or the world and is not specific to any single realist subcurrent.

Jervis — what causes the security dilemma?

For Jervis, anarchy causes the security dilemma more fundamentally than misperception or particular state policies. The absence of binding rules makes distrust an intrinsic characteristic of relations among states. At the same time, the intensity of the security dilemma depends on the concrete situation, and at that point perception does play a role. Jervis starts from the perspective of a status quo state: a state that does not seek conquest or offense.

Jervis — four worlds of the security dilemma

Jervis combines two dimensions: whether offense or defense has the advantage, and whether an offensive posture can be distinguished from a defensive one. This produces four worlds. World 1: offense has the advantage and offensive posture is not distinguishable from defensive posture — ‘double dangerous’. World 2: defense has the advantage but offensive and defensive postures are not distinguishable — there is a security dilemma, though security requirements may be compatible. World 3: offense has the advantage and offensive posture is distinguishable from defensive posture — no security dilemma, but aggression is possible and status quo states can follow a different policy from aggressors. World 4: defense has the advantage and offensive posture is distinguishable from defensive posture — ‘double stable’.

Jervis — World 1: double dangerous

World 1 is extremely unstable. Arms races occur and there is a risk of preventive strikes. There is a security dilemma because offensive weapons and policies cannot be distinguished from defensive ones. There is also a security problem because offense has the advantage.

Jervis — World 2: moderately dangerous / safe

World 2 contains a security dilemma, but the risk of preventive war is much lower because defense has the advantage. Status quo states can seek compromise, for example through disarmament agreements. Security requirements may therefore be compatible even though uncertainty remains.

Jervis — World 3: moderately dangerous / safe

World 3 has no security dilemma because offensive and defensive postures can be distinguished. It does, however, contain a security problem: a status quo state still risks attack from an offensive state because offense has the advantage. Status quo states can therefore follow a policy different from that of an aggressor.

Jervis — World 4: double stable

World 4 is completely safe in Jervis’s framework. Defense has the advantage and offensive postures can be distinguished from defensive ones. There is therefore neither a security dilemma nor a security problem.

Jervis — factor 1: can offensive and defensive weapons or policies be distinguished?

The first factor determining whether the security dilemma increases or decreases is whether the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons or policies is clear. If the distinction is clear, as in Worlds 3 and 4, there is no security dilemma or it is very limited, although a state may still face a problem if another state adopts an offensive stance, as in World 3. Realists, especially offensive neorealists, argue that in most real cases there is a security dilemma because the distinction is rarely clear. Offensive and defensive weapons are often used simultaneously in both offensive and defensive operations. It is also usually unclear whether a policy is offensive or defensive. NATO expansion is the example: Russia can view it as expansionism, while NATO members bordering Russia can view it as a defensive measure against potential Russian aggression. A further problem is that states without offensive intentions today may develop them in the future. For these reasons, realist analyses usually focus on Worlds 1 and 2.

Jervis — factor 2: does offense or defense have the advantage?

If offense has the advantage, as in World 1, the situation is dangerous because even a defensively oriented state can be tempted to intervene as quickly as possible, contributing to wars and arms races. If defense has the advantage, as in World 2, a security dilemma still exists because uncertainty about defensive versus offensive weapons remains, but the situation is less dangerous for a status quo state because an offensive state is at a disadvantage and therefore less likely to attack.

Jervis framework — Mearsheimer and defensive realists

Neorealists mainly position themselves in Worlds 1 and 2. Mearsheimer sees the world largely as World 1: because of uncertainty, states should not take risks, so they adopt an offensive posture and accumulate as much power as possible; this is offensive realism. Defensive realists such as Waltz are closer to World 2: states seek security rather than power, know one another to some extent, respect one another’s security, and may give up power or make concessions to the other side.

Limits of Jervis’s offense-defense framework and the role of polarity

The framework assumes that offensive and defensive advantage can be clearly distinguished, but this is not always the case. Jervis argues that the advantage depends on factors such as geography and technological development. Military strategists and policymakers therefore have to evaluate where the advantage lies. Perception and assessment matter, and mistakes can be made. Neorealists also argue that multipolar systems are more complex than bipolar ones: more players create more potential conflict lines and alliances, increasing the likelihood of misjudgments and therefore intensifying the security dilemma.

Power in realism — compulsory power and differences between strands

All realists define power as compulsory power transmitted through a direct relationship between specific actors, but they focus more on power resources than on the relationship itself. Classical realists use a complex and multidimensional definition: material capabilities such as economic and military power are combined with national character, the quality of diplomacy, and statesmanship. Neoclassical realists broadly agree because they emphasize first- and second-level analysis. Neorealists focus on hard, material power, especially the economic and military power of states. They examine indicators such as GDP, the technological level of a society, military spending, troop strength, and the size of armaments. Intangible elements such as soft power and ideological appeal play no independent role because other forms of influence are seen as traceable back to material power. An advantage is that power becomes somewhat measurable, which is easier than estimating the influence of actor A over actor B or measuring the quality of diplomacy and statesmanship.

Mearsheimer — how should military and economic power be measured?

For Mearsheimer, winning or losing a war is not itself a valid measure of military power because chance and military strategy can also determine outcomes. Napoleon’s defeat in Russia due to winter cold is the example: that result alone tells us nothing definitive about Russian or French military power. Land forces are the most important element of military power. Economic power is ‘latent power’: it is the foundation on which a state can build military power over time.

Mearsheimer — China’s economic growth as latent power

Mearsheimer warned that China’s growing economic power could, in the long term, allow it to become a military competitor to the United States. From this perspective, China’s economic development should be halted. The summary also notes a limitation: it is not self-evident that states will actually convert their economic strength into military power.

Polarity and polarization — basic definitions

Polarity is the number of great powers in the international system. A bipolar system has two great powers and can contain two distinct and hostile blocs or alliance systems. A multipolar system has more than two great powers, usually four or five; before World War I, for example, there were five great powers. Waltz was the first to emphasize a distinction often described as the difference between power polarity and cluster polarity.

Power polarity versus cluster polarity

For neorealists, power polarity means that the system’s structure is defined by the number of truly powerful states — the great powers. There is a neorealist consensus that power polarity is the sole structuring element of the international system. Cluster polarity refers to alliances or other groupings such as the European Union. These are not structural elements because they result from interaction and can change. Polarity analysis is therefore about more than simply assessing power relations among great powers; it is about the number of great powers. Balance-of-power mechanisms, crisis management, and the way states interact vary according to that number. This focus distinguishes neorealists from their classical predecessors.

Power polarity — numerical versus hierarchical definitions

The numerical definition of power polarity simply counts the number of great powers in the system and assumes one major dividing line: great powers versus all other states. The hierarchical definition divides great powers into two subcategories: ordinary great powers and polar powers, the latter corresponding to what everyday language calls superpowers. Applied today, the hierarchical approach could describe the system as bipolar, with the US and China as the two polar powers. The numerical approach could describe it as multipolar because Russia, India, the EU, and Japan would also count as great powers.

Polarity and stability — Waltz

Waltz argues that bipolarity is intrinsically more stable than multipolarity, and ‘stability’ has two meanings. First, bipolarity can last for a long time and does not easily give way to multipolarity because the two superpowers are much more powerful than other states. Second, the risk of war between superpowers is lower in bipolarity than in multipolarity. In multipolarity there are more conflict lines, alliances can switch more easily, and states depend on allies in order to balance. Uncertainty increases and crisis management becomes more difficult.

Polarity and stability — Mearsheimer

Mearsheimer agrees that bipolarity is relatively stable, but he adds that a multipolar system can also be stable when power is distributed fairly evenly among the great powers.

Polarity — critical remarks

The first criticism concerns explanatory value. Europe’s multipolar eighteenth century produced constant great-power wars, while the equally multipolar nineteenth century saw far fewer conflicts between the great powers. Likewise, even if the world is moving toward Chinese-American bipolarity, it does not follow that the same mechanisms as in the Cold War must reappear. The Cold War featured an arms race, polarization, profound ideological confrontation, and two radically different economic systems; growing US-China tensions do not automatically reproduce that pattern. A second criticism is the lack of a commonly accepted definition. The continuing relevance of polarity can also be questioned as the combined economic and demographic weight of smaller powers such as South Korea or Brazil increases and power becomes more diffuse.

Balance of power — definition

A balance of power is a situation in which power is evenly distributed among the great powers. It can occur in either a multipolar or bipolar system. Unipolarity is, by definition, unbalanced. The balance of power is usually defined in military terms, though not in every case. In everyday press and political commentary, the phrase ‘balance of power’ is often used more loosely to mean power relations in general, whether they are evenly distributed or not.

Balance of power is not the same as stability

A balance of power is not identical to stability. A balanced distribution can be stable in the sense that it lasts, or unstable in the sense that even a small change can disrupt it. A situation can therefore be balanced but extremely fragile and collapse after the slightest disturbance. Balance is not inherently stable.

Neorealism — balance of power as a structural tendency

Neorealists do not use the balance of power only as a descriptive concept. They see it as an inherent tendency of the international system: power relations among the great powers tend to evolve toward a balanced distribution of power. After the Cold War, neorealists therefore predicted that US unipolarity would inevitably give way to multipolarity. They saw the unipolar moment as temporary, although Waltz had to admit that his theory could not predict how long it would last. Older classical realists such as Morgenthau did not view the balance of power as a structural tendency. They emphasized the strategies and policies needed to create a balance and the practical difficulties policymakers encounter in trying to do so.

Balance of power strategies — balancing versus bandwagoning

Even if an anarchic system creates structural pressure toward balance, states and statesmen still have to apply policies that can produce a balance of power. The distinction between balancing and bandwagoning is therefore crucial to realist analysis.

Balancing — definition, internal balancing and external balancing

Balancing means building countervailing power against a state that is already too powerful or risks becoming too powerful. Neorealists see balancing as the systemic reaction through which the system automatically evolves toward equilibrium. Internal balancing means military buildup and armament by one state or by several states individually, strengthening each state’s own position. External balancing means forming alliances or coalitions with other states or great powers according to the idea ‘strong together’: by cooperating, the members’ power can be added together and the balance restored.

Bandwagoning — definition and examples

Bandwagoning means joining a successful and powerful state, initially often to avoid being attacked by that state, although other motives are possible. Fear-based example: Central European countries made alliances with Hitler in response to the rise of Nazi Germany. Bandwagoning for profit: Poland and Hungary were dissatisfied with the borders created at Versailles in 1919 and hoped to obtain border corrections with German support, which they did. Some countries may also be paid or receive favors to support the position of large countries in institutions such as the UN. Ideological or model-based bandwagoning is also possible: some Central and Eastern European countries joined NATO because they preferred the Western social and economic model. Belarus is described as bandwagoning with Russia because of a shared authoritarian outlook, combined with the motive of avoiding attack by Russia.

Why neorealists consider bandwagoning less important

For neorealists, bandwagoning is far less important than balancing by great powers. They do not treat bandwagoning as a normal systemic reaction because it does not create countervailing power. It is considered suboptimal behavior, typical of small states that cannot balance on their own through internal balancing and cannot find allies that would allow them to balance externally.

Balance of power versus balance of threat

A refinement of balancing is the idea of balance of threat. Neorealists generally argue that balancing is a reaction to the economic and especially military power of states. The summary attributes the balance-of-threat argument to Waltz: a state will balance only when another state poses a threat, and not every great power with enormous economic and military capabilities is necessarily threatening. Four conditions determine threat: 1) the state is large in surface area, population, and economic capacity; 2) it is geographically close to the threatened state; 3) it has offensive military capacity; and 4) it has offensive or aggressive intentions. The more a state meets these conditions, the more likely others are to balance against it.

Hard balancing versus soft balancing

Hard and soft balancing differ mainly in the means used. Hard balancing is classic military balancing, including both internal and external balancing. Soft balancing uses non-military means, especially diplomatic cooperation, to create a counterweight to a particular power without necessarily involving military cooperation.

Institutional balancing — inclusive, exclusive and inter-institutional

Institutional balancing is a specific form of soft balancing that occurs through international organizations. Inclusive institutional balancing means incorporating a powerful state into an international organization so that it is bound by rules and norms; using a veto in the UN Security Council is given as an example. Exclusive institutional balancing means excluding a powerful state from an organization while strengthening cooperation among the organization’s members; the post-World War II creation of Western economic organizations such as the OECD, from which the Soviet Union was excluded, is the example. Inter-institutional balancing occurs when actors excluded from an organization, or dissatisfied with it, create competing organizations. Examples are the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), created under Chinese impetus as a response to US power in institutions such as the IMF, and BRICS as an alternative to the G7. International institutions thus become important, but mainly as instruments of states or arenas for the power game rather than as independent actors.

Ultimate objectives of the realist strands

The summary distinguishes the ultimate objectives emphasized by different realist strands. Neorealists seek a balance in military power. Classical realists emphasize a balance of interests. Neoclassical realists combine interests and power.

Balance of power, polarity and balancing — Morgenthau and Waltz

Morgenthau argued that under bipolarity the balance of power had lost much of its flexibility, creating risks to stability. Waltz argues that the polarity configuration determines how the balance of power is established. In bipolarity, internal balancing is crucial, which makes bipolarity clearer, simpler, and less risky. In multipolarity, external balancing is crucial, producing a coalition problem because decisions are difficult when many partners are involved. Multipolarity also creates a risk of buck-passing: when an aggressor emerges, states may fail to react appropriately and hope others will ‘pull the chestnuts out of the fire’, weakening the balancing mechanism. There is also a risk of chain-ganging: states try to prove that they are good allies and allow themselves to be dragged into conflicts in which they have few direct interests, as in the run-up to World War I. Waltz expects unipolarity sooner or later to produce balancing behavior.

Brooks and Wohlforth — was the balance-of-power mechanism switched off after the Cold War?

Brooks and Wohlforth argued that the balance-of-power mechanism was effectively switched off after the Cold War because the United States remained the only surviving superpower. In their view, only bandwagoning was still possible. The summary criticizes their narrow definition of balancing: they focused on hard balancing and internal balancing and therefore attached importance almost exclusively to military power. Their argument essentially became the claim that no state dared to enter a direct arms race with the US. The summary asks whether China’s current buildup of power in Asia should instead be interpreted as balancing against the United States.

Critiques of the balancing versus bandwagoning distinction

The distinction between balancing and bandwagoning is not always clear, especially when the reasons behind a state’s policy are uncertain. Balance-of-threat thinking raises the same issue: whether another state’s power is perceived as a threat depends on interpretation. Neorealists treat internal balancing as the most important and preferred state response, but strict hard internal balancing is rare in practice because armament is expensive and tends to be a last resort rather than a routine response; the bipolar Cold War may be an exception. There is also a puzzle about polarity: if both unipolarity and multipolarity can apparently produce similar effects on state behavior, how important is the polarity configuration? More generally, neorealists can force too many policies into the balancing-versus-bandwagoning framework, even though states have many motives that are unrelated to creating countervailing power against a great power.

Other motives for economic and armament policies

Policies can have motives unrelated to balancing or bandwagoning. Economic policies may be driven by internal political motives, such as the position of a domestic elite, or by general human motives, such as the idea that everyone has a right to a minimum level of well-being and prosperity. Armament policies may support a state’s own arms industry or be pursued for employment or prestige. Neoclassical realists pay more attention to these kinds of phenomena.

Hiding, transcending and hedging

Realists and other IR approaches identify strategies beyond balancing and bandwagoning. Hiding means neutrality or isolationism in order to avoid involvement in war and reduce the risk of being attacked. Transcending means adopting international norms or creating international organizations in order to avoid conflicts; the summary notes that this lies outside the realist framework. Hedging is a strategy used by smaller players that lies somewhere between balancing and bandwagoning. Its main purpose is to protect the smaller state’s own interests without allowing itself to be dragged into a polarized confrontation between two or more great powers.

Hedging — smaller Asian states facing US-China rivalry

The example of hedging concerns smaller Asian states facing the rapid rise of an increasingly aggressive China and fearing that they will become trapped in an American-Chinese confrontation. They try to persuade the United States to remain active in the region without always entering formal alliances and while maintaining trade relations with the US. At the same time, they try to develop a workable economic, political, and strategic relationship with China, for example through ASEAN.

Realism: dominance and cyclical theories — introduction

The chapter next discusses authors usually classified within realism who nevertheless differ significantly from the balance-of-power tradition. Organski, Gilpin, and Modelski are treated as dominance or cyclical theorists.

Dominance and cyclical theories — four common elements

Despite differences among Organski, Gilpin, and Modelski, the summary identifies four common elements. 1) They use historical analysis to support their theses. Modelski’s World Leadership Theory, for example, sees world history as a cyclical process marked by the rise and decline of a system leader. 2) They do not focus only on military power and security, although these remain crucial; they also stress long-term economic, technological, and political developments. 3) They reject or qualify the idea that anarchy is the basic feature of the international system: some order exists and is created and controlled by a dominant power, system leader, or hegemon, producing a degree of hierarchy among great powers. 4) The balance of power is not the main driving force of interstate relations; unequal economic and technological development among states is more central.

Dominance theories — why rising powers challenge hegemons

Wars do not arise mainly because states want to restore a balance of power. Instead, a rising power challenges the old hegemon, creating competition for leadership between the two strongest powers. Two causes are emphasized. First, economic growth is uneven: an emerging power can grow rapidly by adopting already existing modern technology and can therefore rise quickly in power. Second, the old hegemon tries to maintain its relative position by acquiring ever more power, expanding territory or its sphere of influence, or increasing armament, but the additional value of each expansion can decline. This can create overstretch: the hegemon takes on too much, which accelerates its decline.

Balance-of-power theorists versus dominance theorists

The balance-of-power tradition expects the presence of one dominant power to trigger balancing and therefore potentially war. Dominance theorists argue almost the opposite: a situation in which power is evenly spread can be dangerous, while order and stability require a dominant power.

Why dominance and cyclical theorists are still realists

They remain realist because power is central in international politics and is ultimately based on material resources, even though these theories also pay attention to non-material elements. States remain the central actors in the international system, and powerful states are usually the key players.

Organski’s Power Transition Theory — aims

Power Transition Theory (PTT), associated with Organski, aims to answer two broad questions: what causes wars between great powers, and what causes wars between states more generally?

PTT — dominant power and challenger

The dominant power is the strongest state at the top of the system. It is a status quo state: it is satisfied with the way the system works, wants to maintain its position, and tries to remain more powerful than its rivals. It gives the international system rules that benefit itself and its allies, thereby creating order. A challenger is an emerging and industrializing great power that eventually becomes approximately as powerful as the dominant power. It challenges the dominant power because it is dissatisfied with how the international system works and wants to impose its own order.

PTT — three determinants of power

Power is determined by three factors. 1) Population size and possible population growth or decline. Highly developed countries with small populations, such as Belgium, can never become truly major players in this view; a growing population is the long-term power factor par excellence, as illustrated by India and China. 2) Economic and technological development. 3) Political capacity: a state needs internal stability and must be able to exercise real authority over its population, develop public administration, impose taxes, and so on.

PTT — operationalizing power and the Relative Political Extraction measure

Political capacity is largely non-material and difficult to operationalize, so PTT scholars long focused mainly on population and economic development. A simple formulation was population size × economic development = power. Because number of inhabitants × GDP per inhabitant equals total GDP, GDP became a usable and predictable indicator, which is useful for applying a theory. Only in roughly the last fifteen years did PTT scholars also develop an indicator for political performance: the Relative Political Extraction measure, which assesses a government’s ability to capture fiscal resources from its population and allocate those resources to advance government goals.

PTT — causes of great-power war and the danger zone

War between great powers occurs when a dominant power faces a challenger that becomes approximately as strong as the dominant power. The ‘danger zone’ is when the challenger’s economy reaches about 80–120% of the dominant power’s economy. In this zone, a transition of power can lead to war. A crucial condition is dissatisfaction: war occurs only if the rising challenger is dissatisfied with the existing order. The nineteenth-century rise of the United States relative to the United Kingdom did not cause war because the US had no major problem with British dominance. Germany’s rise relative to the UK at the end of the nineteenth century did contribute to war because Germany was dissatisfied with its place in the international system and with British dominance. The summary identifies this dynamic as the cause of World War I and World War II.

PTT — remarks and criticisms

PTT places strong emphasis on economic power and technological development while giving relatively little attention to military developments, even though explaining war is one of its main purposes. PTT explicitly rejects the idea that nuclear weapons are what preserved peace among great powers after 1945. It explains the peaceful character of the Cold War mainly by arguing that the Soviet Union never became capable of economically challenging the United States because Soviet GDP remained far behind. PTT also argued that integrating China into the US-led international system was crucial to avoid creating a dissatisfied challenger, but the theory did not clearly specify what level or form of integration was required. The summary notes that by 2025 China is deeply integrated into the world economic order and yet continues to build up its military apparatus, while the United States itself can appear increasingly frustrated with the international order. This raises the question whether the dominant power is always satisfied. Another unresolved issue is why the US was satisfied with the existing order while Germany was not; PTT tends to fall back on internal state characteristics, which are conceptually different from the transition of power itself.

Modelski and Long Cycle Leadership Theory — general approach

Modelski’s Long Cycle Leadership Theory offers a broad, cyclical, and systemic interpretation of global politics since the early modern period. Modelski rejects a direct link with hegemonic stability theory. His approach resembles Wallerstein’s world-systems theory but without Marxist or Braudelian foundations, and it was influenced by Power Transition Theory.

Modelski — world system as a social system and four functional subsystems

For Modelski, the world system is a social system, not merely an anarchic struggle for power. Order is provided by a world leader. Drawing on Parsons’ functionalism, the world system contains four functional subsystems: 1) economy, corresponding to adaptation; 2) politics, corresponding to goal attainment; 3) the integrative subsystem, corresponding to social, legal, and community integration; and 4) the cultural subsystem, involving education, values, and role patterns, corresponding to latency or pattern maintenance. International relations are therefore not merely relations among states but also relations among other actors.

Modelski — four levels of interaction

The modern world system contains four levels of interaction: the global system, regional systems such as Europe, national systems, and local systems. These levels intersect with the four functional subsystems — economy/adaptation, politics/goal attainment, social-law-community/integration, and education-values-role patterns/culture or latency-pattern maintenance. The table in the summary places Modelski’s own analysis primarily at the global-system level within the political or goal-attainment subsystem.

Modelski — the global level, global actors and global culture

Modelski is primarily interested in the global level. Global actors include global economic actors such as transnational companies and global cultural actors such as media and universities. The global system, operating on a planetary scale, has its own global culture. The summary also describes an elite active on the international stage that develops mutual bonds of solidarity and forms an international, cosmopolitan community.

Modelski — global polity and global powers

Modelski focuses on the global political subsystem, the ‘global polity’, which is composed of states active at the planetary level — the global powers. These global powers shape the world system. Modelski identifies a small group of states that have qualified as global powers since the early modern period: Portugal, Spain, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Russia/USSR, Germany, the United States, and Japan; the summary notes that China could probably be added today. Within this group, the world leader and the challenger play the central roles.

Modelski — world leader versus challenger

The world leader is a dominant maritime state that is technologically advanced, often geographically insulated, and has an open political system. It provides public goods by setting agendas, building coalitions, and enforcing decisions. The challenger is typically a large continental land power and is perceived as threatening for that reason. The dynamic between the leader and challenger sets the cyclical process of the world system in motion.

Modelski — leadership cycles and historical sequence

Following Kondratiev’s long-wave theory, Modelski sees world history as cycles of roughly 100–120 years. The cycle consists of global war, world power, delegitimation, and deconcentration, with a challenger emerging as the cycle advances. The historical sequence in the summary is: Italian and Indian Ocean wars → Portugal cycle, with Spain as challenger; Spanish-Dutch War → Dutch cycle, with France as challenger; Wars of Louis XIV → First British cycle, with France as challenger; Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon → Second British cycle, with Germany as challenger; World War I and World War II → American cycle, with the Soviet Union as challenger. The table frames global war as major warfare and the world-power phase around the leading nation-state.

Modelski — phase 1: global or system war

A global or system war is a military phenomenon with major political significance because it produces a shift of power from the old world leader to a new one. After the war, the new world leader sets the agenda and imposes its values and order.

Modelski — phase 2: world power

In the world-power phase, power is highly concentrated in the hands of the world leader. The leader enjoys high legitimacy because, after the ‘great war’, there is a strong desire for order and stability.

Modelski — phase 3: delegitimation

During delegitimation, the great war lies further in the past and the world leader’s legitimacy weakens. A challenger emerges and begins to contest the leader’s position.

Modelski — phase 4: deconcentration and transition to a new cycle

During deconcentration, the world leader’s power base erodes further and the perceived need for order largely disappears. This culminates in a new cycle in which a new world leader comes to power. Importantly, the new world leader is not the challenger. Instead, the new leader is a member of the old leader’s coalition and has strong ties to the previous leader.

Why Modelski’s cycles are realist but differ from the balance-of-power tradition

The theory remains realist because the cycles are based on the rise and decline of the world leader’s power. Yet it differs fundamentally from the balance-of-power tradition because it focuses on more than raw material capabilities. Legitimacy — understood as accepted power — is also important.

Modelski — cycles as learning processes: negative and positive feedback

The cycles are not mere repetitions; they are learning processes shaped by negative and positive feedback. Negative feedback includes balance-of-power dynamics, as when Britain led a coalition against revolutionary and Napoleonic France. The balance of power therefore still matters, but it is not the dominant mechanism. Positive feedback means that each world leader introduces innovations and new responses to problems emerging in the world system. Portugal, for example, advanced maritime technology and global navigation, while the United States embodies the knowledge society.

Modelski — technological and social modernization; nuclear weapons

Technological and social modernization drives the historical unification of the world system. Modelski argues that nuclear weapons create the central challenge for the current cycle because they make transitions of power through global war impossible.

Modelski — strengths and critiques

Strengths of the approach include its systemic perspective and its clear differentiation between global, regional, national, and local systems. Critiques include the claim that cyclical theories impose rigid patterns on complex history. The classification of Portugal and the Netherlands as world leaders is debated. The early global system was still embryonic, which raises doubts about comparing it directly to today’s highly integrated world. The theory is also criticized for a total neglect of colonialism, for questionable claims about US world leadership during the Cold War, and for assuming that world leaders are pluralistic nation-states.

Concluding remarks — balance of power and dominance theories today

China’s spectacular economic growth over the last two decades, the 2008 financial crisis in the Western world, and internal political instability in the United States since 2016 raise two major questions: is the US a world leader in decline, and does China’s growing economic power inevitably lead to a change of leadership at the top of the system? And will these developments lead to a new war? The chapter concludes that the boundaries between the balance-of-power tradition and the dominance tradition are becoming increasingly blurred. Contemporary authors combine elements from both traditions to analyze the current situation among the great powers.