NYU Comparative Politics Prof. McClendon Midterm Study Guide

The collective action problem

A situation in which the members of a group would benefit by working together to produce some outcome, but each individual is better off refusing to cooperate and reaping benefits from those who do the work.

State

An entity that uses coercion and the threat of force to rule within a given territory.

State of nature

A stateless society, in which everyone would be better off if nobody took advantage of each other, but it'd be better to be the attacker than the victim.

Democracy

A political system in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm, by citizens acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives (Karl and Schmitter).

Competitive authoritarianism

A political system in which there are elections but also an uneven playing field between opposition and the government.

Describe the Democracy-Dictatorship, Polity IV, and Freedom House Indexes, and what makes them different.

The Democracy-Dictatorship Score is a binary measure that accounts for multiparty elections and alternation of power, but doesn't help in defining competitive authoritarianism.

The Polity IV Index ranges from -10 (most autocratic) to 10, with -6 to 6 marking a mixed government (anocracy). It measures competitiveness and openness of elections, in addition to checks and balances against the executive.

The Freedom House Index measures countries from 1-7 with a designation of "Free," "Partly Free," or "Not Free." It uses expert surveys to measure a country's political and civil rights, such as freedom of expression and equal protection under the law.

Modernization theory

The theory that all societies pass through the same historical stages of economic and political development, passing from agriculture-based societies governed by dictators to industry and service-based societies governed by democratic institutions.

Coordination goods

Public goods that facilitate groups of people coming together, exchanging views, and coordinating their actions. These include access to internet, independent press, access to higher education, etc.

Bottom-up transitions

One in which the people rise up to overthrow an authoritarian regime in a popular revolution.

Top-down transitions

One in which the dictatorial ruling elite introduces liberalizing reforms that then lead to a democratic transition.

Preference falsification

The tendency of people to hide their private preferences while in public, because they believe their preferences won't be accepted or will be persecuted for some reason.

Revolutionary threshold

The size of protest at which an individual is willing to reveal their true preference, rather than their falsified one.

Revolutionary cascade

When one person's participation triggers the participation of another (because it means that the second participants' protest threshold was met), which triggers the participation of another, and so on.

Policy of liberalization

Entails a controlled opening of the political space and might include the formation of political parties, holding elections, writing a constitution, establishing a judiciary, opening a legislature, and so on.

Softliners

Leaders of an authoritarian regime who are willing to consider compromising with opponents as a means to survive demands for democratization. Might give in to some liberalizing policies, but not full democratization.

Federal constitution

Distinguishes between national and subnational tiers of government, and then gives each tier specified areas of autonomy. Requires that there are at least two specified tiers of government, each with at least one autonomous area of control.

Unitary constitution

Can distinguish between national and subnational tiers of government but, unlike a federal constitution, defines the national government as sovereign over all its territorial units in all areas of law/policy.

Decentralization

How much responsibility (not autonomy) is delegated to subnational tiers.

Administrative decentralization

Transfer of managerial responsibilities (bureaucratic authority) from central government to subnational tiers.

Fiscal decentralization

Transfer of revenue gathering and resource allocation responsibilities (responsibility for taxes and spending) from central government to subnational tiers.

Political decentralization

Transfer of policymaking formulation responsibilities from central government to sub-nationally-elected representatives or direct-participation bodies.

Veto players

An individual or collective actor whose agreement is necessary for a change in the political status quo.

Veto player theory suggests that countries with many veto players have:

1. greater policy stability

2. smaller policy shifts

3. less variation in the size of policy shifts

Winset

The set of alternatives that all veto players prefer to the status quo.

Parliamentary system

A system in which the government is chosen by the legislature and serves at the pleasure of the legislature. Usually has high regime stability, low government stability, high level of representation and high efficacy.

Presidential system

A system in which the chief executive is chosen by the people (usually directly) and the chief executive cannot be removed by the legislature without cause. Usually has low regime stability, high government stability, low level of representation and low efficacy.

Semi-presidential system

A system that usually has two executives, one with legislative responsibility (i.e., can be removed by the legislature for political reasons), and one who is popularly elected for a fixed term. Mixes the benefits and detriments of other kinds of governments.

Legislature

An elected, deliberative body with powers to make and/or approve laws ("Congress," "Parliament," "National Assembly," "House of Representatives").

Chief executive

A person who oversees civil service and bureaucracy, responsible for execution and enforcement of laws.

Government

The executive and their ministers/cabinet

Legislative responsibility

When a legislative majority has the constitutional power to remove a government from office for political reasons, that is, without cause.

Vote of no confidence

A vote initiated by the legislature, where the government must resign if it fails to obtain a legislative majority.

Constructive vote of no confidence

Similar to a vote of no confidence, but must also specify who will take over the government if the incumbent fails.

Vote of confidence/snap election

A new vote initiated by the government rather than by the legislature, designed to strengthen a majority.

Formateur

The person designated to form the government in a parliamentary democracy, usually the PM designate.

Minimum winning coalition (MWC)

A coalition in which there are no parties that are not required to control a legislative majority.

Least minimum winning coalition

The minimum winning coalition (MWC) with the lowest number of surplus seats.

Connected coalition

A coalition in which the member parties are located directly next to each other in the policy space.

Majoritarian plurality rule

Also called "First-past-the-post," a one-round electoral system (also assumes a single-member district) in which the candidate with the most votes wins, regardless of whether or not they have an absolute majority.

Majoritarian absolute majority rule

An electoral system in which a candidate must earn an absolute majority to win office. If this isn't obtained after one round of voting, then there will either be a runoff election between the two leading candidates, or an alternative voting system will automatically reassign votes until one candidate has a majority.

District magnitude

The number of representatives elected in a district

Closed-list proportional representation

An electoral system in which each party presents a ranked list of candidates, voters vote for the party rather than for individual candidates, and each party awards the seats it wins to the candidates on its list in rank order.

Open-list proportional representation

An electoral system in which voters can indicate their preferred party and also their favored candidate within that party.

Electoral threshold

The minimum level of support a party needs to obtain representation. Can be anywhere from 0.2% to 10%.

Under what conditions might we expect a citizen to exert "voice" against a state that has in the past instituted some policy against her interests? Under what conditions might we expect the citizen to exit? To remain loyal to the state?

Voice - a citizen would exert voice if they have a credible exit option and if the government is dependent on them. (Voice, Exit; Respond).

Exit - a citizen would exit if they have a credible exit option and if the government is autonomous. (Exit, Exit; Ignore).

Loyalty - a citizen would remain loyal if they don't have a credible exit option, whether the government is autonomous or dependent. (Loyalty, Loyalty; Ignore).

Why might people with mutual interests not join together to pressure the government to serve those interests? What are some ways in which the "collective action problem" is typically solved?

Olson and Shepsle argue that:

- The outcome from collective action is a public good, so people can free ride.

- The likelihood that any one individual's participation is pivotal is usually low.

Therefore, ways to solve the collective action problem would be to increase pivotality or introduce selective incentives.

What are some ways to measure "state-ness"?

The Fragile States Index measures the extent of non-legitimate violence within a state. Other ways include extent and professionalism of the state bureaucracy, compliance with conscription, and tax revenue as % of GDP ("fiscal capacity").

Under what conditions might two citizens want a state to govern them (rather than stay in a state of nature)?

Because the state of nature encourages stealing and taking advantage of people, two citizens would want a state to govern them in order to ensure that refraining from stealing is better than stealing. In game theory form, when p (punishment for stealing) is >1 and when t (taxes) are <1.

Why does Tilly compare the state to the mafia (i.e., to organized crime or a protection racket)?

States face their own security threats in the form of rivals trying to take their place, and they need resources in order to fight off these rivals.

Why, according to Tilly, has war historically "made states"?

Because war requires a state to tax, maintain a monopoly of internal violence, and conscript citizens, it helps a state to become stronger and more secure. Example: medieval Europe.

What are the differences between a minimalist and a maximalist definition of democracy?

A minimalist view classifies political regimes according to their formal institutions and rules. A maximalist view does this, in addition to how those institutions and rules are utilized in practice, and to the outcomes they produce. A maximalist view, like Levitsky and Way's, might include suffrage and political and civil rights.

Why might economic development be linked to democracy?

Either modernization theory, or Przeworski's theory about income and democracy: higher average wealth makes a transition from to democracy to dictatorship quite low, while lower wealth makes such a transition more appealing. Also, wealthy people having exit threats and exerting voice.

Thinking about the logic of the exit, voice and loyalty, under what types of economic conditions (or changes in economic conditions) might we expect to see more demands from citizens for open/representative institutions? Under what conditions might we expect governments to be responsive to those demands?

As economies advance and structurally change, citizens get more credible exit threats which make them more inclined to use their voice. The government is likely to be responsive to these demands if they're dependent on the citizens, and if not, then they will probably ignore the citizens' demands, and they will exit.

Why might bottom-up transitions to democracy be so surprising (unanticipated ex ante) in the moment they occur but they seem almost inevitable after the fact?

Because of preference falsification, it's likely to seem like nobody supports a revolution before one actually happens. After the revolution, people who supported the status quo are likely to falsify their own preferences, making it seem like everyone supported the revolution the whole time in hindsight.

Under what conditions might we expect "softliners" to institute a policy of liberalization? Under what conditions might the move to liberalize end up leading to a full democratic transition?

Softliners are likely to institute a policy of liberalization if they view the opposition as weak, since they assume the opposition wouldn't have the strength to push for full democratization or an insurgency. Because softliners don't truly know how strong the opposition is, however, a full democratic transition is most likely to occur in situations where the opposition is unexpectedly strong, and the softliners make the mistake of beginning to liberalize.

What are the differences between federal and unitary constitutions? What is the difference between federalism and decentralization?

Federal constitutions must have at least one subnational level of government, and each level of government must have autonomy in some specific way. Unitary constitutions might or might not have subnational levels of government, but all power always rests with the national government.

Federalism necessitates that the subnational levels of government have autonomy, while decentralization simply involves how much responsibility is delegated to subnational tiers.

What are the definitional differences between presidential and parliamentary systems?

- Legislative responsibility

- Popularly elected head of government

- Executive with veto power

What are some of the arguments against presidentialism, according to its critiques? What are some of the concerns about parliamentary systems? On what institutional features do these critiques/concerns hinge?

Presidential governments tend to have low regime stability (executive's emergency powers and fixed terms), low representation (strong president relative to legislature), and low efficiency (veto powers, separately elected executive/legislature), while parliamentary systems often have low governmental stability (snap elections, weak coalition governments.