Property Dualism

Define property dualsim

There are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties

What does property dualism claim?

The brain has a special set of non-physical properties alongside its ordinary physical properties; properties possessed by no other kind of physical object. Consciousness is a real phenomenon which is dependent on the living brain for its existence. There could be a change in mental properties without their being a change in physical properties. Mental states are properties of a functioning brain which emerge when brains are sufficiently developed.

What does the term irreducible to matter mean?

Mental properties cannot be explained in terms of physical properties of the body/brain, therefore there are non-physical facts concerning consciousness.

Define supervenience.

One set of facts (A) is said to supervene on another set of facts (B) if you cannot change the A facts without changing the B facts. The set of facts (A) are called the supervening facts, the set of facts (B) are called the subvenient facts.

What does it mean to say that mental properties are not supervenient upon physical properties?

There could be a change in mental properties without their being a physical change in physical properties.

What does Chalmers characterise consciousness as?

By the subjective quality of experience, qualia.

What does Chalmerrs argue about needing two concepts of mind?

A ‘phenomenal’ concept (subjective quality of experience) and a ‘psychological’ concept (what the mind does and how we explain behaviour).

What’s an example of supervenience?

The aesthetic properties of a painting (e.g balanced) supervene on the physical properties (e.g the distribution of paint). The aesthetic properties supervene on the physical ones.

What book does David Chalmers argue this in?

In the conscious mind.

What’s the argument of the dependence of the mind on brain for favouring property dualism to substance dualism?

It is compatible with evidence provided by modern neuroscience. Examples: if certain areas of the brain are simulated, the person may experience certain sensations or recall certain events, brain damage can cause memory loss and disrupting the operations of the brain disrupt consciousness. This suggests that the mind depended on the brain and destruction of the brain would eradicate consciousness, therefore substance dualism must be false unlike property dualism which accounts for this evidence.

Property dualism is compatible with the view that the destruction of the brain must destroy consciousness.

What is the argument of evolutionary history to favour property dualism so substance dualism?

Evolution suggest that the mind evolved as increased consciousness increases the chance of survival

What is the philosophical zombies argument for property dualism?

It is conceivable that philosophical zombies exist (there is nothing contradictory in the idea and so they are logically possible), a world full of philosophical zombies is metaphysically possible

What does David Chalmers term ‘the hard property of consciousness’ refer to?

Refers to the apparently irreducible nature of subjective experiences.

Outline Chalmers philosophical zombies argument.

P1) Physicalism claims that consciousness is ultimately physical in nature.

C) If physicalism is true, it follows that any world which is physically identical to this world must contain consciousness (a zombie world would be metaphysically impossible).

P2) But we can conceive of a world which is physically identical to this one but in which there is no conscious experience (a zombie world).

P3) What is conceivable is metaphysically possible.

C2) Therefore a zombie world is metaphysically possible.

C) Therefore physicalism is false.

What is a philosophical zombie?

An entity physically and behaviourally identical to a normal human being except that it lacks consciousness with its phenomenal properties.

What is a philosophical zombie world?

A world (universe) just like ours except all the individuals there are philosophical zombies not normal human beings.

What does consciousness involve according to Chalmers?

Perceptual experience, bodily sensations, mental imagery, emotional experience, occurent thought, and more.’

What does Chalmers mean by the ‘phenomenal character’ of conscious states?

What is is like to be in such a state or how they appear in my mind, the have qualia.

What is the response against the philosophical zombies argument that a zombie world is not conceivable?

In P2, Chalmers argues that we can conceive of a world that is physically identical to this one but in which there is no conscious experience (a zombie world). He basis this conceivability off of the belief that there is no evident contradiction in the ideas of a zombie world. However, there may be a contradiction which we are not aware of if our understanding of how the physical properties of our brain produce consciousness is incomplete. If physicalism is true, in principle, an account of how the properties of the brain cause the properties of the mind could be given and so we could recognise the contradiction in the claim that a zombie world is conceivable, P2 would be false if an account is given/ if we recognise the incompleteness of our knowledge

Note that there are different responses to this.

What is something that is conceivable but not metaphysically possible?

Putman gave an example of being able to conceive of water not being H2O, before the molecular composition of water was discovered, people could conceive of water to be of a different molecular composition than H20 as it doesn’t produce a contradiction and is logically possible. However, this conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility as there is no possible world in which water is not composed of H2O molecules. Therefore what is conceivable is not metaphysically possible.

We are able to conceive of water not being not being H20 when we have incomplete knowledge of the molecular structure of water, if out knowledge were to be complete, we would not be able to conceive of water not being H20 as it is a contradiction. When we have complete knowledge of something, if it is conceivable, it is in fact metaphysically possible.

What is the response against the philosophical zombies argument that which is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world?

Despite the argument that we can conceive of philosophical zombies and that they are logically possible, they are not metaphysically possible since there is no possible world in which the physical duplicates of human beings lack consciousness as phenomenal consciousness is just something to do with the way a human beings lack consciousness.

What is the response to the philosophical zombies argument what which is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible?

What is the knowledge/ Marys argument for property dualism?

P1) Mary knows everything there is to know about the physical process involved in colour vision before being released from her black-and-white room.

P2) On being released from her black and white room, she learns something new when she experiences colour vision herself.

C1) Therefore there is more to know about colour vision than what is given in a complete physical account of it.

C2) So physicalism is false.

What is the main question that arises in Mary knowledge argument?

Whether Mary learnt anything when being released from the black and white room, namely qualia.

What is the acquaintance knowledge response to the knowledge (Mary) argument?

P1 claims that Mary has complete proposition knowledge (knowledge of facts which can be expressed in propositions) of colour whereas P2 concerns the knowledge of acquaintance which Mary has gained upon seeing colours. C1 does not follow, Mary has learnt no knew facts (has gained no new propositional knowledge). The criticism rests on the equivocation on the word ‘know’, if we use it in the sense of only one of the two types of knowledge, the argument fails.

What is the ability knowledge response to the knowledge argument/ Marys room?

This argument also rests on the equivocance on the world knowledge. Mary has not acquired any new propositional knowledge, but rather acquires new ability knowledge. After leaving the room, Mary now has the ability of remembering and imagining colours, recognising objects of similar colours by sight, to group objects together according to similar hues etc. Despite Mary having full factual knowledge prior to leaving the room, she still acquired new abilities, therefore the argument doesn’t disprove physicalism.

What is a counter argument to the ability knowledge response to the knowledge/ Marys argument?

While Mary does acquire new abilities, she also acquires factual beliefs about the mental lives of others.

What is a second counter argument to the ability knowledge response to the knowledge/ Mary’s argument?

All physical knowledge would include qualia.

What is the new knowledge/ old facts response to the knowledge/ Marys argument?

While Mary gains knowledge of what it is like to see colours and acquires new concepts, based on her new phenomenal properties, and can now describe the process of colour vision she didn’t previously know, these are not any new facts. Mary is simply experiencing the fact in a different way, this time using phenomenal properties.

What is the main question concerning the knowledge/ Mary argument for property dualism?