PHIL 60: Free Will, Moral Responsibility, & Punishment

Morality seems to require free will, that is if a person is morally responsible for some action, then that person had free will when they acted. Put another way, if if I didn't freely do something, then I cannot be held morally responsible. For instance if I am morally responsible for stealing a car, then I stole the car freely; No one forced me to steal it, I wasn't psychological compelled to steal, etc. Ryan's field-trip to the roof pushing vs tripping off roof and landing on friend case. Free will seems to require that one could have done otherwise. The biggest threat to free will is determinism. Determinism is the view that the laws of nature in conjunction with prior conditions entail present and future conditions.

What does morality seem to require? What does free will seem to require? What's the biggest threat to free will?

We drew an analogy between the universe and a pool table. Imagine a game of 8-ball. One player sets up the triangle of the 15 balls and the other gets ready to break. Suppose we freeze time right after the break. The cue ball is frozen, but when we unfreeze time we can foresee more or less what will happen. The cue ball will strike near the center of the top of the triangle of balls. This will cause a domino effect that will disperse the ball. Maybe the 3 ball will end up near the left corner pocket. The 11 ball might bounce off a couple balls and rails, but be sunk in a side pocket, etc. If we need precisely the initial conditions of the balls, i.e., their masses, densities, volumes, and the of the table as a whole, i.e., if the table were perfectly flat, the size of the pockets, the frictions of the green felt, etc. AND we knew all the laws of physics and geometry, we could perfectly predict how the balls would disperse. Humans may be analogous to pool balls, just like the behavior of pool balls is determined and not free, so might it be for human behavior.

Put the pool table, analogy into your own words.

We explained determinism by telling the causal story of the history of the universe beginning with the Big Bang and ending with my raising my arm. How did that go? What about the Waking Life Clip?

My raising my arm isn't in a vacuum. It's an event that had a cause that can be traced by billions of years ago. 14 billion years ago there was a massive explosion (the Big Bang). Massive amounts of energy was released, so after basic elements formed like hydrogen and helium. Galaxies and stars formed, etc. The Waking Life Clip succinctly explains how our bodies may be confined by physical laws:

The picture of freedom looks like a tree. The trunk is the past and present, which is locked, but the future is represented by the branches of which there are at least too. Consider a student (call her Quinn) sitting in class. Quinn's past is locked, but her intuition is that she could lots of different things: stay alert, sleep, take a drink, sing a pop song, go on her phone. All of these are available on the freedom picture. The determinism picture is just a line: the past present and future are all locked. The alternatives to our actual actions some seem possible, but they are illusions. There is only one, unique future.

How does the picture of freedom like as opposed to picture of determinism?

This notion goes back as far as the ancient greeks (Aristotle) and was fleshed out during the enlightenment by Laplace. He is a recent social media meme version of the problem: "If God knows everything, then he knows what we will do in the future, including what 'sins' we will commit. If God knows what sins we will commit, then these sins are part of a 'universal plan', which means we have no free will. If we have no free will, and are forced by this universal plan to commit these sins, then how can a God judge for those sins and send us to Hell for them? This would mean either God is not omniscient or a gigantic #$%@."

How could the existence of an all-knowing God prevent free will?

The PAP is the principle of alternate possibilities expresses a traditional requirement of free will: Person P performs action A freely only if P does A but could have done otherwise.

What is the PAP?

His appearance on the Daily Show with Jon Stewart and his book "On Bullshit"

What is Harry G. Frankfurt most famous for?

He rejects it. He argues that freedom is possible even if we can't do otherwise, even if determinism is true.

Does Frankfurt reject or accept the PAP?

Frankfurt is a compatibilist who believes we do have free will and are morally responsible, even though our actions are determined.

Does Frankfurt believe we have free will? Does he reject or accept compatibilism.

A participant in a psychology experiment is asked to wait in a room with two doors: Door A & Door B. A neuroscience grad student is watching the participant behind a two-way mirror. The grad student desperately wants the participant to walk through door B (maybe they get a $10k research grant). They've even rigged it so that if the participant even thinks about doing anything other than going through Door b, they will be a big red button in front of them that will trigger the person to be robotically forced to walked through Door B. (Perhaps this was accomplished by the grad student performing stealth brain surgery on the participant the night before and surgically implanting wireless electrodes in their brain giving the grad student the means to remotely control them.) The grad student is just about to push the big red button, but then something amazing happens, the participant gets up and walks through Door B on their own. Most people would count this as an act of free will, but notice, say Frankfurt that the person could not have done otherwise, i.e., they were going through Door B no matter what. Since this is a case where someone has free will although they were determined and couldn't do otherwise, Frankfurt argues we should reject the PAP and embrace compatibilism.

What is Frankfurt's 'Door A/B or neuroscientist behind the 2-way mirror' case supposed to show.

Suppose a friend promised to pick you up. After waiting an hour, you walk the 5 miles to their house to confront them for flaking on you. Upon arrival, you find the police not letting anyone in and out of the area (there was a loose gunman -- say). Luckily they have just apprehended the gunman and leave the neighborhood. You enter your friend's house and find them. You say, "Wow I was about to be so mad that you flaked, but then I saw that you couldn't have picked me up because the police wouldn't let anyone leave." They respond, "Police? The police were here?" "Yeah, you didn't hear the sirens?!" "No I was playing video games with headphones!" "Well why didn't you stop to pick me up?" "I just got lazy, sorry." Does the friend have the right to be mad at you for flaking? Presumably, yes, because they decided to be lazy and didn't know they couldn't have left. Further, it seems right to hold the friend morally responsible for flaking -- even though they were determined to stay home (because of the police). This story is an argument for compatibilism: a case where someone couldn't have done otherwise (i.e., they were pigeon-holed/ locked into/ determined to perform one and only one action) and yet they still seem to freely do something and are morally responsible for it.

What's an updated version of Frankfurt's thought experiment where someone still seems to be morally responsible and act freely, even though they couldn't have done otherwise?

Where our brain behaves like an electron (i.e., like a indetermined quantum system) NOT like an pool ball on a pool table (which is a classical Newtonian determined system)

What's picture of indeterminism look like?

Not so much.

Does science suggest our brain is indetermined?

Hard determinism: Determinism is true and we don't have free will. Soft determinism/Compatibilism: Determinism is true and we have free will. Metaphysical libertarianism: much of the world is determined but many human actions are not because humans have free will. Indeterminism. Human actions are akin to quantum behavior, i.e., not determined.

What's hard determinism, soft determinism (compatibilism), metaphysical libertarianism, and indeterminism?

The bit of indeterminism might be amplified by the chaos effect.

Even if our brain had bits of indeterminism, how would that be enough for free will and big changes in our environment?

The chaos effect (also know as butterfly effect) is where a small change in the environment very quickly leads to big change, like butterfly flaps wings, then tsunami in Japan. Or the coffee can pool example.

What is the chaos effect? What is an example of a chaotic system?

Not so much.

Does science suggest our brain is a chaotic system? See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qRKXFDNjwJ0

Even though it's not the person's fault that they contracted ebola (it's not like they intentionally went to an ebola invested village and asked people to cough on them), we are still justified in quarantining them. Similarly, it might not be a serial killer's fault (i.e., they are not blameworthy) that they kill (because of universal determinism or genetic/environmental reasons), but we still could be justified in isolating them to protect society.

Gregg Caruso in a philosophy bites podcast interview makes an analogy between quarantining someone with ebola and imprisoning a serial killer (maybe like a Ted Bundy). How did this analogy go?

The Backward looking view emphasizes retribution, the idea that the person deserves punishment just in virtue of the fact that they committed the injustice. Kant supports this view. The Forward looking view says that what's done is done, hurting or punishing the person who committed the injustice is not inherently good. It can only be justified if their is a net good in the future, e.g., it serves as a deterrent, rehabilitates/reforms, protects society from more harm. Mill & utilitarians are fans of this view.

What's the difference between backward and forward looking views on punishment?

Forward looking.

If determinism is true, which view on punishment makes more sense to employ?

Leeway incompatibilism is the idea that we don't have free will because we can never do otherwise than we in fact do. Source incompatibilism is the idea that we don't have free will because we are not the ultimate source of our actions, i.e., don't blame me blame the deterministic causal chain that led to me and my actions. (This could be traced all the way to the Big Bang.) Passing the 'buck' of moral responsibility to past events, e.g., a shoplifter blaming the pandemic, blaming the pandemic on Wuhan lab negligence, blaming this negligence on China policies, blaming China's policies on competitive global climate, etc. "Your honor, I'm not guilty (or ultimately responsible), it was past events that pressured or forced me to shoplift."

What's the difference between leeway and source incompatibilism?

The maximum sentence in Norway is 21 years, so pretty much everyone is getting out, so there's more of an incentive to rehabilitate. This model is much more about forward looking rehabilitation than backward looking punitive retribution. It seems to be much more effective.

What this Bloomberg report on a prison in Norway ("THEN THIS HAPPENED S1 • E6

How Norway Reinvented Prison" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fb-gOS3p44U). How is this different than prisons in US?

It's a mix, but probably more the former.

Is the US model of corrections/prisons more retributivist or about reform/rehabilitation?

Politicians (usually more conservative ones) found an effective wedge issue that pushed voters toward more conservative candidates: the war on drugs/crime.

Politicians who were weak on drugs/crime were having difficulty getting elected. This led to more three strikes laws, more minimum sentences for non-violent offenses, etc. This led to more arrests and more people in the system. This led to the need for more prisons/guards, etc. This extra spending cut into higer-ed spending (in the last 25+ years, CA prison spending double and we build 20+ prisons and only 1 4-year college (UC Merced). The criticism is that this is ineffective, costly and cruel, because it doesn't really rehabilitate people, it just produces future criminals the recidivism rate over 5 years is 70+, creates need for more prisons and outsourcing to private prisons who have less of an incentive to reform.

Discuss the connection between the war on drugs/crime, prison/higer-ed spending, prison overcrowding, private prisons, and recidivism.

Libet's work suggests that unconscious parts of our brain prepare the body for action before one makes a conscious decision. So, it seems that our unconscious brain is really running the show and not our will. Free will, then, may be an illusion.

What does the work of Benjamin Libet suggest about free willl?

1. The act is caused by a desire.

2. Nothing prevented one from performing the act.

What are Hobbes' two requirements for free will

Hard determinists argue that we don't have free will because we can't do otherwise than what we actually do. Ayer and Moore maintain that we can do otherwise than we actually do -- at least hypothetically. For instance, even if we choose vanilla ice cream, we, hypothetically, could have opted for chocolate (if prior conditions or the laws had been different). This is problematic because what we get aren't actually alternatives. It's like if one went to an ice cream shop and behind the counter there is a carton of vanilla ice cream and next to just a sign that says 'hypothetical chocolate'. That's not a real choice! Lehrer says it's like a

What's Ayer & Moore's conditional freewill and what's a problem for it.

He is a compatibilist and argues that it is morally irresponsible and harmful for neuroscientists to suggest that people don't have free will because it's at least and open question and people who question their free will start to behave immorally.

What's Dennett's view on free will: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBrSdlOhIx4

Stace provides a common sense definition of free will: it's the difference between, say, Gandhi fasting for peace in India (a free action) and a person fasting in the desert because there's no food (not a free action). One acts freely, for Stace, when they do want they want and they are not internally or externally forced. An internal force might be a compulsion to gamble or to move one's face (like in the case of Tourette's syndrome). An external force could be one being held at gunpoint.

What's Stace's free will look like