Philosophy terms and claims (Lecture 13-23)

(L14) The identity question

What makes me the same person from one moment to the next?

(L14) Numerical identity

The kind of identity that has to do with being one thing/person

(L14) The afterlife

A state of reward or punishment that comes after the death of the body

(L14) The soul view

You go where your soul goes.

(L14) soul

Soul = an immaterial mind

(L14) mind

A bearer of mental states

(L14) immaterial

no weight, no height, no shape, no color (no physical states

(L14) On the soul view, it is possible for there to be an afterlife

According to the soul view, it is possible for a person’s soul to continue existing after the body dies, allowing for the possibility of an afterlife

(L14) On the soul view, psychology and neuroscience can discover facts about the mind

On the soul view, psychology and neuroscience can still discover facts about the mind, such as behavior, mental processes, and brain activity, without fully capturing the non-physical soul.

(L15) The knowledge problem for the soul view

Since you can’t see the soul, you can never see that a person has the same soul from one moment to the next

(L15)Empiricism

Everything we know must be based on observation

(L15)The body view

You go where your body goes

(L15)Perry’s view of the body

A body is a hunk of cells put together in a human shape

(L15)Resurrected body

A body that has been brought back into existence after its death and improved upon.

(L15)Perry’s view implies that you will survive as a corpse

Your cells will retain a human shape once your brain ceases to function.

(L15)Your cells will retain a human shape once your brain ceases to function.

Organisms are like social clubs in that they cease to exist when their leadership ceases to exist.

(L15)The body view is consistent with the possibility of an afterlife

It is possible to exist as a resurrected body

(L16)The memory view

You go where a large enough portion of your memories go

(L16)

(L16)Question-begging argument

An argument that presupposes its conclusion in one of its premises

(L16)Definition of real memory

Apparent memory + really happened to you

(L16)The circularity problem for the memory view

To say you go where your real memories go is already to presuppose that you are identical to the past self who acquired those memories.

(L16)Modified definition of real memory

Apparent memory + came from your hardware/brain

(L16)On the memory view, you can survive the death of your body

Your body is only the hardware or vessel holding your memories

(L16) The memory view is not circular

Because real memories should be defined as apparent memories that came from your
hardware/brain.

(L17) The duplication problem

The memory view falsely implies that two people can be numerically identical because two people can have all the same memories.

(L17) Single brain transplant

A single hemisphere of a person’s brain is moved from one body to another.

(L17) Double brain transplant

Both hemispheres of a person’s brain are moved are moved to separate bodies.

(L17) Split brain case

A case where the two hemispheres of a person’s brain are separated but left in their body.

(L17) Logically possible story

A story that contains no contradictions

(L17) Physically possible story

A story that contradicts no law of nature

(L17) The memory view is consistent with Quentin’s being the same person

He has not lost a substantial portion of his memories.

(L17) On the memory view, you can survive gradual loss of memory

Because you have a large enough share of your memories from moment to moment

(L17) On Perry’s view, option 2 is true,

The person who wakes up has mostly Bernard’s body.

(L17) On the body as organisms view, option 1 is true

The body goes where enough of the brain goes.

(L17) If a double brain transplant is possible, the body view has a duplication problem

The body goes where enough of the brain goes and both the left and right hemispheres are enough of the brain.

(L17) Double brain transplant is physically possible

It is just like a split-brain case, where the only difference is that the hemispheres are moved out
of the person’s body

(L18) Skepticism

The view that we have no perceptual knowledge

(L18) Perceptual knowledge

Knowledge that we have from our senses (observation): seeing, hearing, tasting, and so forth

(L18) The skeptic’s rule

To have perceptual knowledge, you need to be able to rule out that you are a brain in a vat.

(L18) Justified belief

A belief supported by good reasons

(L18) The epistemic regress argument

Because we cannot have an infinite chain of justified beliefs, some of our beliefs must be basic

(L18) Basic belief

A justified belief that is not based on any other belief

(L18) Knowledge requires justified belief

Knowledge can’t be the result of guesswork

(L19) The method of doubt

Nothing that can be doubted can serve as a basic belief

(L19) Infallible belief

A belief it’s impossible to have and at the same time be wrong about

(L19) The cogito

I exist

(L19) Introspective knowledge

Knowledge about one’s own thoughts

(L19) Classical foundationalism

1. We have basic beliefs.
2. Basic beliefs must be infallible.
3. All our other justified beliefs ultimately rely on our basic beliefs

(L19) Descartes’s rule

Every fallible belief must be able to trace its way down a chain of arguments to some infallible
basic beliefs

(L19) Solipsism

The belief that you are the only thing in existence

(L19) Knowledge about appearances is basic

It is a special case of introspective knowledge.

(L19) Premise (3) of Descartes’s argument against skepticism is true

We can show that God exists merely by appealing to infallible beliefs (our own existence)

(L19) Premise (2) of Descartes’s argument against skepticism is false

It is possible for God to have good reasons to allow massive deception to occur temporarily

(L20) Methodism

To figure out the correct view of knowledge, begin with a method

(L20) The main reason for methodism

Everyone assumes a method

(L20) The greater confidence principle

If two beliefs conflict with each other, we should adopt the belief we are more confident in

(L20) Particularism

To figure out the correct view of knowledge, begin without a method (begin with particular beliefs)

(L20) Phenomenal conservatism

Trust your appearances, unless you have some specific reason for doubting them

(L20) Moderate foundationalism

Just like classical foundationalism except that basic beliefs can be fallible.

(L20) We should reject the skeptic’s rule and Descartes’s

They conflict with the fact that we have perceptual knowledge (which we are more confident in)

(L20) Some of what we believe does not require a method

Otherwise, we’d need an infinite number of methods

(L21) Three doxastic attitudes

Belief, disbelief, suspension of judgment

(L21) Epistemic peer disagreement

i. The people who disagree are epistemic peers
ii. They’ve shared a sufficient amount of their evidence.

(L21) Epistemic peer

Someone roughly equal in intelligence, reasoning powers, and background knowledge

(L21) Shared a sufficient amount of evidence

Provided enough of it to understand why the other person has their beliefs.

(L21) Some disagreements should not lead towards agnosticism

Sometimes one person in the disagreement has better evidence

(L21) People who have not talked to each other can share their evidence

They can come to understand why a person has their position from other sources (reading stuff they wrote)

(L22) Two stages of disagreement

Reflection, Disclosure

(L22) The equal weight view

Do not base your beliefs on evidence contested at the second stage of disagreement

(L22) The main reason for the equal weight view

Epistemic peers treat each other’s opinions fairly when they give each other equal weight

(L22) Relativism

All truth is subjective

(L22) Relativism is false (for two reasons)

There are obviously some objective truths (science and math)
Relativism licenses intolerance towards other’s beliefs and reasons

(L22) Argle and Bargle must suspend judgment, on the equal weight view

All of their evidence is shared and hence contested

(L22) The equal weight view does not require you to suspend judgment in the modified restaurant case

You can conclude independently of the contested evidence that the tip is $43

(L23) Private evidence

Evidence which it is impossible to share with an epistemic peer

(L23) Self-undermining

Assuming that view is true, we cannot justifiably believe or know it to be true

(L23) Intuition

A feeling that some claim is true.

(L23) Margle and Nargle are in an epistemic peer disagreement in spite of note sharing all their evidence

They are peers and they have shared enough of their evidence to understand why the other person holds their beliefs

(L23) Margle and Nargle must suspend judgment, on the equal weight view

It’s 50:50 which of their experiences is right once they’ve shared their evidence

(L23) Assuming the evidence for the equal weight view consists entirely of arguments, the equal weight view is self-undermining

Its proponents are left with nothing (just like Argle and Bargle)

(L23) Assuming the evidence for the equal weight view consists entirely of intuitions, the equal weight view is self-undermining

Absent a special reason to think your intuition is right, it’s basically 50:50.