metaphysics of mind - key terms

Ability knowledge

Knowing 'how' to do something, e.g. 'I know how to ride a bike'.

acquaintance knowledge

knowledge of someone or something gained by direct experience, e.g. 'I know the manager'

Category mistake

treating a concept as belonging to a logical category that it doesn't belong to, e.g. a university is a 'collection of buildings' not a 'building'

China thought experiment

Objection to functionalism by Block - if the population of China duplicated the functioning of your brain, would you have consciousness?

conceivable

capable of being imagined without incoherence or contradiction

conceptual interaction problem

objection to interactionist dualism that mind and body cannot interact causally, because they don't share the same properties (in vs outside space)

consciousness

the subjective phenomenon of awareness of the world/one's mental states

the easy problem of consciousness

The problem of analysing and explaining the functions of consciousness, e.g. the facts that we can consciously control our behaviour, report on our mental states, and focus our attention. It is 'easy' to provide a successful analysis in physical and/or functional terms.

the hard problem of consciousness

The problem of analysing and explaining the phenomenal properties of consciousness, what it is like to undergo conscious experiences. It is 'hard' to provide a successful analysis in physical and/or functional terms.

eliminative materialism

some or all mental states do not exist - folk psychology is false

empirical interaction problem

objection to interactionist dualism that the claim that the mind or mental states causes changes to the body or physical states conflicts with scientific theory or evidence, e.g. that the total energy in the universe stays constant.

epiphenomenalism

mental states are epiphenomena - by-products - of physical processes, with no causal influence

folk psychology

a theory to predict and explain people's behaviour based on what ordinary people would normally do (if someone is thirsty, they will normally try and find a drink)

functionalism

all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised

ghost in the machine

ryle's name for substance dualism

hard behaviourism

all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about behaviours

intentionality

where mental states are 'directed' towards an 'object' - they are 'about' something

interactionist dualism

mental events and physical events cause one another even though the body and mind are distinct substances

introspection

direct, first-person awareness of one's own mental states

inverted qualia

thought experiment that supposes that two people experience subjectively different colours when looking at the same object, but otherwise think and behave in identical ways, e.g. they both call the object 'red' - objection to functionalism

logically possible

when something doesn't involve a contradiction or conceptual incoherence

masked man fallacy

I believe batman is a masked crusader, I believe bruce wayne is a billionaire not a masked crusader, therefore batman is not bruce wayne - challenges the use of conceivability to infer what is possible

materialism

the only substance is matter - everything that exists depends on matter

mental states

mental phenomena and mental properties - beliefs, desires

metaphysically possible

where there is at least one world in which something is true

multiple realisability

there are many ways in which one and the same mental state can be expressed in behaviour, or the claim that one and the same mental state can have its function performed by different physical states

ontologically distinct

Two things are ontologically distinct if they are not the same thing, neither is able to be reduced to the other, and the existence of one is not determined by the existence of the other, e.g. substance dualists claim that mind and body are ontologically distinct substances.

phenomenal concept

when you recognise something as of a certain kind when experiencing or perceiving it, e.g. a phenomenal concept of red as 'this' colour.

theoretical concept

describing something in theoretical terms, e.g. a theoretical concept of red as light with a frequency of 600 nanometres.

phenomenal consciousness

A form of consciousness with a subjective experiential quality, as involved in perception, sensation, and emotion. 'What it is like' to experience something

phenomenal properties

Properties of an experience that give it its distinctive experiential quality, which are apprehended in phenomenal consciousness

physicalism

everything is physical or supervenes on the physical (properties, objects, substances)

physically possible

it could be true given the laws of nature in the actual world.

problem of other minds

how can we know that there are minds other than our own, given that our experience of them (if they exist) is through behaviour

property dualism

There are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to or supervenient upon physical properties.

proposition

what is claimed by a declarative statement, e.g. I know/ believe that ... 'mice are mammals'

propositional knowledge

knowing 'that' a claim/proposition is true or false, e.g. 'i know that paris is the capital of france'

qualia

intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible

reducible to

one thing is reducible to another if the first can be completely explained in terms of the second, e.g. MB-identity theory says mental properties are reducible to physical properties

soft behaviourism

Propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions

substance dualism

Minds exist and are not identical to bodies or parts of bodies

super-spartans

People in Putnam's thought experiment who so completely disapprove of showing pain that all pain behavior has been suppressed and they no longer have any disposition to demonstrate pain in their behaviour - objection to behaviourism

supervenient upon

properties of A are supervenient on properties of B if any 2 things that are exactly alike in their B properties cannot have different A properties - aesthetics supervene on physical if 2 paintings that have identical physical properties cannot have different aesthetic properties

Mind-Brain type identity theory

mental properties are identical (ontologically reducible) to physical properties - mental properties identical to physical properties of the brain

Zombie argument

if consciousness were identical to some physical properties, it would not be metaphysically possible for something to have that physical property without consciousness. However, 1) philosophical zombies are conceivable, and so 2) metaphysically possible. Therefore, 3) consciousness is non-physical and physicalism is false - Argument for property dualism

Philosophical zombies

an exact duplicate of a person, existing in another possible world, without any phenomenal consciousness. It has identical physical properties, but different mental properties