voting behaviour + the media

politics paper 1

case study: 1992 general election

context: the conservatives had been in power since 1979 + seeking a record length in office. major had become pm after thatcher’s forced resignation in 1990. the economy was in recession + labour (led by kinnock + becoming more centrist) was ahead in the opinion polls → resulted in a 21 seat conservative majority (complete failure of the polls) - kinnock, subsequently resigned as leader of the opposition and was followed by john smith, very popular.

• social factors - middle class spooked by labour’s tax plans - “labour’s tax bombshell”, where claimed that under labour, the average person would pay £1000+ more per annum in tax → late swing to conservatives, despite labour trying to solve the issue with a shadow budget. the decline in the importance of social class → low-skilled/unskilled workers have been diminished in number (labour’s core support base) + women support the conservatives more due to the kinnock effect - he was unnattractive

• issues - the conservative party focused on economic competency → labour’s “double whammy” → despite leading through a recession, the conservative party was trusted to 2sort the economy out”. labour led on education + the nhs → “the war on jennifer’s ear”, was criticised for involving a 5 year old in politics = damaged public perception

• leadership - major was seen as a “safe pair of hands” while kinnock was an “electoral liability” → highlights how the front of the party can significantly influence the outcomes of an election

• media - tabloids were openly hostile towards kinnock + labour → “if the conservative party wins today, it was the sun wot won it”, claiming its criticism influenced the public to vote for tories → kinnock stated that he had never seen the media so hostile

• opinion polls - bad election for the polls due to the increase of silent tory voters → people lied about who they were voting for = boomerang effect as these polls made kinnock more confident

• implications - in order to win another election, it was clear that labour would have to overhaul its support base by moving towards the centre - later resulted in new labour. the conservative support dwindled over time due to their repution of handling the economy + were rocked by sleaze + spits across europe

case study: 1997 general election

context: ended the 18 years of constant conservative government → new labour shifted support to the middle class. despite the thriving economy, the conservatives were punished by the electorate for weak leadership → economic incompetence narrative was controlled by labour. blair’s new labour was swept to office in a landslide victory of an 179 seat majority

• social factors - blair captured the middle class vote - “we are all middle class now” + secured the working class vote + age became an increasingly important factor as an influence of voting behaviour → labour improved its support in all age groups EXCEPT 65+, who voted conservative. record number of female mps - women backed labour, “the blair factor”.

• issues - 1991 - labour had been attacked for its taxation palns under kinnock → blair was careful to ensure this did not happen again so COPIED conservative spending plans. the economy was strong so labour was trusted to continue the trend + labour courted donations from big businesses + blair’s mantra - “education, education, education” + labour led on all issues

• leadership - major vs blair → major was seen as a weak pm who lead a divided party + the tactics used by major in 1992 failed in 1997. blair created new labour + imposed party discipline, displaying charismatic authority

• media - tabloids swung behind labour (even the sun - right wing) → “it was the sun wot won it” - very exaggerated (calculated that it won them 7 seats maximum) + press backed labour

• opinion polls - much more accurate than 1992 election → sharpened up methodology + evidence of a bandwagon effect, due to labours lead + possibly deterred tory voters from voting + evidence of tactical voting (more libdem voters than previous elections)

• implications - large majority security by labour reduced the effectiveness of parliament - only defeated in government 4 times

case study: 2024 general election

context: conservatives had been in government for 14 years - running out of policy ideas + fresh faces as the talent pool dries up - during long periods of government, governments tend to lose elections, rather than the opposition winning them → public just wants to remove this government

• social factors - previous labour campaigning was very left wing and considered the worst defeat in labour history (but corbyn gained more votes than starmer in 2024 - weaker mandate) → the electorate is no longer left wing (increasing middle class), socialism does not win elections - labour loses when it shifts to the left, only labour winners recently have been centrists (blair + starmer). ethnic minorities also had a significant impact on individual seats where they dominate = 6 independent mps elected (all pro-palestine individuals). age was the most important factor (yougov) - 41% of 18-24, but only 20% of 70+

• issues - weak economy due to covid 19, truss’ budget, russia-ukraine conflict, illegal migration, regeneration, israel-palestine conflict → disillusioned tory voters + the working class + labour led on many of these issues. rising popularity of reform uk split the conservative vote

• leadership - previous leadership of johnson → partygate scandal + pincher, truss → economic crisis + mini-budget, sunak → restored financial stability but disliked + both had no mandates as they were not voted for by the electorate. it was less that starmer was liked, it was more that these were disliked

• media - no longer heavily pro-conservative, even the sun (backed conservatives since 2010) - “time for a new manager” → but, notorious, for supporting the likely to win party at the last minute → does not impact public opinion, just reflects it. daily mail, express + telegraph remained loyal to conservatives while the times backed no one - is this a rejection of the conservatives?

• opinion polls - labour consistently 20% points ahead in the opinion polls → obvious that they would win, but overexaggerated (actually 5-10%) + reform uk popularity overestimated while conservative/lib dem vote was underestimated = less accurate than 2019, but more than 2015

• implications - labour won with only 34% of the vote, weak mandate + has resulted in calls for a second general election = unpopular. it was more a loss of the conservative party, than a win for labour. starmer had to move away from the corbyn era, as it was “riddled with anti-semitism” + unpopular - except with youth

how does the media influence voting behaviour?

media acts as a conduit (channel of communication) between politicians + the electorate → two-way process - used by politicians to help set the political agenda, but the media also helps to report on public opinion.

the media may exert significant influence over the political process as it is a key source of information. since the 80s, media has expanded significantly expanded its scope - 24/7 media is driven by technology → political information spreads like wildfire.

media can be divided into:

• printed media - newspapers → broadsheets/compacts = more detailed new/analysis, more educated readership, more rigid in political views = more difficult to change. the tabloids (MORE POPULAR - MORE INFLUENCE) are less sophisticated, dumbed down politics, more “sensational” - seeking out scandals, less educated readership + more fluid is political views → easier to persuade + often change to support the obvious winner - the sun

• broadcast media - tv + radio, includes coverage of leadership debates, the press is partisan, primarily right-wing + conservative → does this contribute to the fact that the majority of electoral successes have been conservative?

• digital media - social media is growing in prevalence → digital bubbles + pluralism

traditional forms of media are waning, while social media is on the rise → makes it more difficult to control the flow of news as social media is in the hands of the user

ways of analysing media influence

• politicians use the media to “transmit” political news in a certain way (spindoctoring) → the media then controlled top-down

• the media helps set the political agenda + politicians have little control over the narrative e.g. telegraph - expenses scandal 2009. the majority of press rejected gov’s view of remaining + campaigned to leave the eu → resulted in a narrow leave victory

• the press merely react to public opinion - they act as a conduit which broadcasts messages to politicians about audience views on particular issues → the media is reactive not proactive, merely reflecting the views of their readers + the public

the hypodermic syringe model of media influence (marxist concept)

the model suggests that the press have significant control over what people think + how they digest politics. hwoever, the model is not sophisticated, ignoring other influences in socialisation + does not consider yhe more rational electorate.

people receive a range of contradictory socialising influences that limit the impact of the press, the uses + gratifiicaitons model suggets that people do not just buy newspapers that follow their political views e.g. around 30% of mirror readers voted conservative (mirror is pro-labour) while 30% of sun readers voted corbyn in 2019 - despite the criticism of corbyn by the sun

broadcast media (tv + radio)

has a far greater reach to a potentially larger audience - the broadcast media is neutral, which weakens influence (though it is often accused of bias) + some channels e.g. gbnews have become more partisan. tv is now multiplatform/multichannel = wide scope for influence e.g. 1989, tv broadcasted from parliament for the first time, altering public perception of the political process (negatively). due to the need for more content, politics become dumbed down with politicians becoming “celebrities”, fueling mistrust. broadcast media has lost control of the narrative, due to declining audiences as a result of digital pluralism (use of media in different ways). despite this, there is still potential for “bighitters” - bbc, digitial elitism.

the introduction of leadership debates has increased the influence of the broadcast media → 2017 - 7 way leadership debate where may refused to attend - did this impact her hung parliament? + it gets the electorate interested in the electoral process. however, their role is still limited.

the press

often contradict themselves, sending out mixed messages → 2016 daily mail suggested leave, then switched quickly to remain. the press merely play to the views of a given audience, e.g. conflicting news sources, the mirror + express, are owned by the same publisher. the press is not without influence, 1997 “it was the sun wot won it” + same claim in 1992 → crewe argues it only won labour 7 seats. the influence of the press is in decline:

• declining circulation figures - impacts influence over the audience

• papers have to compete with alternative news sources (digital) which are often free, so losing control of their narrative.

2010 - press was incredibly pro-conservative, but cameron failed to secure a majority = bad election for the press

2015 - cameron’s narrow majority might have been due to the warning in the press of miliband’s “coalition of chaos” = good for press

2017 - terrible for press - despite attacking corbyn the conservatives lost there majority and labour secured more votes than 2024

2019 - the press backed a johnson lead government and the conservatives won big → did this just reflect public opinion?

opinion polls

these play several important functions in the political process

they give a snapshot of voting intention + informs public about the popularity of political parties. issues include:

1. encourages apathy - 59% turnout in 2001

2. boomerang effect - voting for a party that is close second because of the perception of the leading party - 1992.

3. bandwagon effect - people vote for the party - simply because it is going to win - 1997.

4. they may encourage tactical voting - they would make opinion representative .

they give political parties important information regarding the popularity of politicians + policies - this helps both time + frame the campaign. + popular politicians receive more focus during campaigns. + parties can focus on issue which they are perceived to be strong as e.g. Labour + NHS conservative + immigration.

issue: the reputation of opinion polls depends on their accuracy (significant margin of error) → polls tend to exaggerate support + people often lie (1992 - quiet tories) . should parties take polls at face value?

social media

increasing rapidly in importance - 56% of people reported getting their main political news from social media platforms during 2019 election versus 36% in 2017

this is reflected in parties having active social media teams → turning point of the social media was 2016 eu referendum where facebook advertising from the conservatives influenced the outcome + labour used snapchat to popularise corbyn

advantages:

• social media offers the influence of public opinion → users also create content + tackle the bias of the printed press

• social media is a useful platform to boost participation among young people who were apathetic/disengaged from politics

• allows for short, focused messages + direct communication with politicians, building the link with the electorate

• allows for digital pluralism, it encourages political debate by offering a range of different public opinions

disadvantages:

• fake news - proving authenticity of news stories is difficult + AI is making this worse - social media outlets can combat this e.g. twitter allows users to add additional content to misleading stories

• short messages limit the substance of new stories + dumb down politics

• direct communication with politicians has lead to abuse + death threats = dangerous

• digital pluralism is a myth as social media users live in digital bubbles, filtering out news they disagree with + social media becomes an echo chamber of existing news → doesn’t influence, merely enforces

social media is growing in importance + continues to impact the outcome of elections.

models of voting behaviour

party identification - the idea that children identify with a political party + stick to that for the rest of their lives → may vote a different party in exceptional circumstances, but tend to stay loyal - has the electorate become more volatile?

social class - party alignment based upon class has been a traditional predictor of a person’s voter behaviour, however this has declined over time + there is significant evidence of class dealignment

class + partisan dealignment

voting behaviour used to be relatively simple - turnout exceeded 80% + the majority of the working class voted labour, while the middle voted conservative → however, class dealignment e.g. 1974 - 57% of working class voters supported labour, vs 34% in 2024.

but social class still has some effect → partisan dealignment is making other factors more influential on voting behaviour e.g. geography, age, gender, etc

but why? - “we are all middle class now” - prescott → new labour’s strategy using centrist strategies + the socioeconomic trends of class (rising living standards - accelerated in the 1980s)

but its not only class that is becoming less politically aligned, partisan dealignment considers the general trend of people being less strongly affiliated to parties, especially youth

general model of voting

• rational choice voting

• partisan identification

• dominant ideology model

• social structures model

all are interlinked + connected

rational choice voting

himmelweit referred to this as “shopping trolley voting” where parties offer deals, and voters shop around for deals that best reflect their own concerns. no party fulfils these completely, but voters make rational decisions, weighing up the options - can include tactical voting.

rational choices reflect higher levels of political literacy within the electorate - “information society”. characteristics of rational voting include:

1. issue based - several issues are valence (fixed) + always important e.g. tax, economy, crime, NHS, education (tony blair) - heath points out that the importance of issues is influenced by social characteristics e.g. immigration - key concerns of the working class (stealing jobs). some issues are fluid, only featuring in a few elections e.g. the iraq war. parties pay careful attention to issues raised by the electorate + often set their campaign around this.

when parties stray from core issues, it can be costly e.g. hague in 2001 focused on “saving the £” - nobody cared + miliband in 2015 campaigned on peripheral issues e.g. the bedroom tax.

when parties focus on key issues, they win the vote e.g. 1992, conservatives won a narrow victory by highlighting labour’s “double whammy”.

parties tend to have core strengths on issues e.g. labour + nhs/education, when a party looses its hold on this it loses voters e.g. 2015 conservative spending plans won over the NHS.

whiles issues are important, heath found that had people voted based on issues alone, labour would have won in 1987 (focused on education + nhs).

this indicates that other factors are important + it raises the possibility over what is deemed important by the electorate may not be as important as you’d think e.g. 1992 people didn’t admit that they were opposed to tax increases → silent tory voters = inaccurate opinion polls = tory victory.

2. leadership perception - campaigns are media-driven = 24/7, success of a party is tied up with how people perceive the party leader/senior figures → governing competency. strong leadership leads to a unified party, vice versa → impacts electoral fortunes. e.g.

• 2019 - boris factor → appealed to tory voters = damaged “red wall” while corbyn lead a divided labour party (left wing vs centrists)

• 2015 - cameron viewed as safe despite oil spills over the eu, while miliband viewed as incompetent

• 1997 - blair’s new labour with a charismatic authority vs major viewed as boring = divided conservative party.

kinnock + foot seen as a liability for labour, which contributed towards 83, 87, 92 defeats.

recent leadership debates have influenced leadership perception.

3. prospective voting model - voters choose parties that they feel will improve their standard of living over the course f the next parliament e.g. 1997, despite the strong economic outlook, labour was trusted to sustain economic growth, in comparison to the tory party. balir was seen as a leader who would take the UK forward

4. retrospective voting model - voters consider parties’ previous record in government voting accordingly on how competent parties seem e.g. 1992, despite economic recession, the conservative record of handling the economy was stronger than labour + voters remembered the winter of discontent (1979) - “better the devil you know”. e.g. 2024 - discontent over conservatives office record

5. dominant ideology model - suggests voters are persuaded by dominant groups + institutions in society such as governments, political parties + business interest groups - using the mass media to communicate the dominant ideology. governments have opportunities to persuade the voters to re-elect them + pms have the chance to solidify their image as world leaders.

social structures model of voting

social factors are the main determinant of voting behaviour e.g. social class, gender, ethnicity, religion, age → FIXED. do not take social factors in isolation - the social characteristics of a voter influence the issues that a voter connects with e.g. working class benefit system.

key debate is whether social class is still the main factor influencing voting behaviour:

• class may never have been the sole factor determining voting behaviour, e.g. butler + stokes in the 50s, argued it was the dominant factor = CLASS ALIGNMENT → flawed theory as labour is the party of the working class - 1945-1979, there was a majority working class but 1951-1964 there was a period of conservative government, due to:

  • there were deviant voters, with secular voting (voting for their pockets) + differential voters - “tories are born to rule”

  • there are also middle class deviant voters + middle class radicals

  • in the 70s, voter volatility increased - crew, CLASS DEALIGNMENT = floating voters

  • class as a social indicator began to blur by the 80s.

anthony heath defined two kinds of working class voters in the 1980s:

• traditional (in decline) - north, public sector, rent property, unionised - LOYAL LABOUR VOTERS

• new working class (GROWING) - south, private sector, affluent, eventually homeowners, not unionised - conservative voters or new labour

1992 - richard rose - “labour could never win another election due to the decline in its suppot base”. however by 1997, blair created new labour + pitched it to the expanded middle class, creating a “catch all” party. this secured the c1 vote (office workers), however, even at its height labour never gained the c2 vote (high professionals e.g. lawyers). blair argued “we are all middle class now” → it is arguable that the middle class kept labour in power until 2010 - class is still important = CLASS REALIGNMENT - the party that gains the middle class vote wins

after 2010, middle class began to realign with conservatives - labour’s problem was two-fold → too left for the middle class, too right for the working class = successful in 2024.

to evaluate, class has been diminished + other factors challenge its importance, however there is a relationship between social class + issues. further, the decline of class should not be over-exaggerated while the link between party + class has been broken.

other social factors that influence voting behaviour

• gender - once invisible, it is evident that gender is important → women have backed the winning party at every election since 1945. women are more volatile in terms of voting intent, while men are more fixed.

  • 1992 - women were switched off of labour (kinnock effect) → women backed major giving the conservatives a narrow majority

  • 1997-2005 - women backed blair + new labour due to the greater female representation in parliament

  • 2010 - women voted ambiguously + no party gained a majority

  • 2015-2019 - women tended to favour conservative, especially johnson.

• ethnicity - growing in importance - uk is more culturally diverse who typically vote labour - but this is impacted by global issues such as israel-palestine conflict → 2024 labour lost 6 seats to independents ^ and the iraq war lost blair votes. there are class differences in voting among ethnic minorities, the black vote is very labour; reflecting social class + locality

• age - becoming more important, young voters are more left-leaning (labour, greens, libdem). they rent homes + earn less - labour is usually stronger on these issues - however, they are less likely to vote creating issues for the labour party - expand the franchise to 16 year olds? older voters are more conservative (47+), worried about tax, pensions, crime - conservatives lead + older people are more likely to vote.