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How did positivist legal thinking in post-Westphalian Europe view the "bellum justum" doctrine?
It abandoned the doctrine. Whereas international law imposed limitations on “measures short of war” and restricted situations in which States could intervene in another state’s domestic affairs, it did not forbid actual resort to war.
War was described as "the continuation of politics by other means." War was seen as a permissible means to settle inter-state disputes.
It prohibited the use of armed force for recovering contract debts due to a state’s nationals, unless arbitration, an agreement on a compromise or arbitral award was refused or rejected.
Members were bound not to resort to war for three months after an award or decision and when the other state complied with the settlement outcome.
To strengthen the Covenant of the League of Nations.
The Pact did not allow any exceptions to the outlawing of war itself but many states issued reservations concerning the right of legitimate self-defense.
No, since states still believe threats of force are sanctioned by Article 2(4).
Intervention at the request of the government of a state, issued prior to intervention and from the de jure government, normally also holding de facto control.
Failure to report may weaken a state's claim of self-defense. It is not part of custom.
An "armed attack" must involve force producing or liable to produce serious consequences, such as territorial intrusions, human casualties, or considerable property destruction.
Does the de minimis threshold exclude smaller border incidents from being considered armed attacks?
No, isolated encounters near a border may reach the de minimis threshold if they involve a significant scope and consequences, circumstances and motives are also looked at. If there is no offensive intent, it does not warrant recourse to self-defence.
It did not directly address the matter, but there was very little support for it in State practice and opinio juris.
What did the National Security Strategy state about anticipatory self-defence?
Does Article 51 restrict "armed attacks" to those carried out by States?
No, but legal literature and state practice have traditionally linked it to acts of state.
What is the distinction between "indirect military aggression" and "direct military aggression"?
Indirect military aggression involves attacks carried out by private actors with State support/responsibility, while direct military aggression involves actions by State agents.
What does Article 3(g) of the UNGA Definition of Aggression include according to the Nicaragua case?
It includes armed attacks by armed bands, irregulars, or mercenaries carrying out acts of armed force on behalf of a State, as well as the State’s substantial involvement therein, provided the scale and effects of the attacks exceeded those of mere frontier incidents.
The ICJ rejected the provision of weapons or logistical support to rebels as sufficient to qualify as substantial involvement.
States have justified self-defense against other States due to active support or inability/unwillingness to prevent cross-border attacks from their territory.
The ICJ asserted that self-defense was permissible only against attacks imputable to a State and noted that Israel could not reference UNSC Resolution 1368 for Palestinian terrorist attacks, as they emanated from territory over which Israel exercised effective control.
Q: What is the Court's position on self-defense in cases where a State "fails to prevent" cross-border attacks by non-State actors?
A: Attacks by non-State actors may qualify as "armed attacks" if they are of sufficient gravity or part of a sustained campaign, potentially triggering the right of self-defense, even if not attributable to a State.
A: Self-defense is allowed if the territorial State is unwilling or unable to tae appropriate action within its borders.
A: Defensive measures must strictly target the non-State presence abroad, unless the attacks can be imputed to the territorial state in accordance with the secondary rules on state responsibility.
A: The debate includes whether armed attacks extend to attacks on a State's nationals abroad, whether States can resort to force to protect their nationals without the host State's consent.
A: Some view it as a customary exception to the prohibition on the use of force, requiring imminent threat of injury to nationals, failure/inability by the territorial sovereign, and strictly confined to measures of protection against injury.
A: Recent State practice shows a tendency to condone non-combatant evacuation operations of nationals threatened by civil war or internal unrest, without requiring host State consent.
A: Many developing countries view it as a pretext for intervening in domestic affairs, making it a highly debated legal issue. Illustrations: used by Russia in regard to its interventions in Georgia and Ukraine.
A: Necessity entails that no alternative means of redress are available, and force should be directed against the source(s) of the armed attack. “Necessity" requires the time lapse between the armed attack and the response to self-defense to be reasonably short, accounting for the need to carry out investigations or negotiations or military preparations.
"Proportionality" requires the defensive response to match the gravity, intensity, duration, location, and range of targets of the initial armed attack without exceeding it.
The ICJ requires the victim State to declare itself as the victim of an armed attack and issue a formal request for assistance. The latter is not an absolute requirement and may be set aside if eg impossible.
Are necessity and proportionality interpreted restrictively?
No, both criteria should be interpreted in a flexible manner, having regard to the factual circumstances and the aims of the defensive response.