Stalin and international relations 1930s chapter 4

Discuss the international position of the USSR

for much of the 1920s the uSSR was in isolation from the international community it was not part of the league of nations and due to the comintern many western powers viewed the USSR with suspicion

from the 1920s (Rapallo and Berlin) the USSR co-operated with Germany for trade and military however , with the rise of Nazism, the USSR sought to counter this threat

when did the USSR join the league of nations

September 1934

collective security against rising fascist threats, especially from Germany and Japan. Stalin used membership to appear a responsible great power and to build alliances like that with France. However, the move was pragmatic, not ideological: Soviet commitment to the League was limited and rooted in suspicion of capitalist powers. Its entry showed both the flexibility of Soviet foreign policy and the League’s growing dependence on major powers it lacked the strength to control.

Soviet-french non aggression pact

November 1932

shift towards collective security, as growing German power pushed Stalin to seek Western partners.

There was deep-seated mutual distrust and anti-communism between the Western powers (including France) and the Soviet Union, which hampered genuine cooperation.

Discuss Japan

some argue Stalin was more concerned with the threat of Japan, this began in 1931 with the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and then the rest of china in 1937 . this was compounded with the anti-comintern pact signed between Japan,Germany and Italy

this exemplified more threats to the soviet union which likely pushed stalin to pursue the pragmatic policies seen in the 1930s

The forgotten war

May and september 1939 when Japanese forces were beaten by a soviet force led by General Zhukov killing 75% of 100,000 troops in battle at Khalkin Gol in Soviet Mongolia

It convinced Japan to abandon northern expansion into Siberia and instead turn south towards the Pacific, easing Soviet fears of a two-front war. This security allowed Stalin to sign the Nazi–Soviet Pact weeks later, calculating that Japan no longer posed an immediate threat

Nazi-soviet pact

23rd August 1939 came as a response from the USSR frustration at a lack of alliance with Britain against the growing nazi threat, this pact involved the division of Poland and allowed the USSR to annex Latvia,Lithuania and Estonia in the future , although stalin did not trust hitler he could not rely on the intentions of the British

the pact was a pragmatic move that protected Soviet security in the short term

why did co-operation with germany slow after 1932

collapse of Weimar and the rise of Hitler destroyed the pragmatic Soviet–German relationship built through the 1920s.

Nazi propaganda increasingly attacked the USSR and international communism

• Hitler becomes Chancellor, Jan 1933 → anti-Soviet, anti-Bolshevik.

• Stalin turns toward collective security with West.

What were the Riga Watchers

The Riga Watchers were Western diplomats, journalists and intelligence staff based in Riga, Latvia, in the 1920s–30s who monitored the USSR from outside because the Soviet Union was closed to foreigners.

Who was instrumental in ending Russia’s isolation?

Maxim Litvinov (Foreign Commissar, 1930–1939) further reduced isolation by:

• pushing collective security,

• bringing the USSR into the League of Nations (1934),

• forming agreements with France and others.

germany and military co-operation with the USSR

• Secret military collaboration continued into Stalin’s rule:

  • Lipezk air base (1925–33) – German pilot training.

  • Kama tank school (1929–33).

  • Tomka chemical weapons station (1926–33).

Results for Stalin

• USSR got cutting-edge German technology for tanks/planes.

• Germany became leading supplier of machinery for the first Five-Year Plan.

Soviet–Czechoslovak Treaty

(May 1935)

• USSR would help Czechoslovakia only if France acted first.

• Stalin’s aid was dependent on France’s movement → again weak.

Stalin adopts collective security after Hitler’s rise.

USSR in the spanish civil war

• War begins July 1936: Republicans vs Nationalists (Franco). Stalin initially hesitated but intervened to counter fascism and protect Soviet influence on the left.

• Sent 2,000–3,000 military advisors.

• Supplied around 1,000 aircraft, 900 tanks, artillery, and ammunition.

• USSR demanded payment through Spanish gold reserves (“Moscow Gold”) — 510 tonnes, 2/3 of Spanish gold.

results of USSR intervention in the civil war

• Stalin's Ambitions: While aiming to counter fascism, Stalin also sought to promote Soviet influence, using the conflict to project power

• USSR failed to stop Franco (Republic collapses March 1939).

• Stalin learned Britain & France wouldn’t oppose fascism.

Evaluation

• Politically useful: tested Soviet weapons, spread influence.Soviet tanks and aircraft were initially superior, helping to turn the tide in early battles, particularly the defense of Madrid in late 1936.

• Strategically negative: weakened confidence in Western democracies → pushed Stalin toward Nazi-Soviet Pact. When Britain and France maintained a rigid "Non-Intervention" policy despite open German and Italian support for Franco, Stalin viewed it as a sign they would not stand up to fascist aggression.

Stalin foreign policy aim

he wanted to protect the USSR - there was the threat of the capitalist west and also the threat of fascism (germnay,italy,japan)

His overall aim was to defend the soviet state against rivals and to enable the Soviet State to continue its political and economic transformation. although the underlying strategic goal was consistently the defence and security of the Soviet state

Social fascists

The comintern under stalin instructed foreign communists to denounce any socialist parties as collaborating with fascism

soviet invasion of poland

• 23 Aug 1939 – Nazi–Soviet Pact (Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact)
  → Secret protocol divides Poland: USSR gets Eastern Poland.

• 1 Sept – Germany invades Poland.

• 17 Sept – USSR invades Eastern Poland, claiming to “protect” Belarusians & Ukrainians as the Polish state had “collapsed”.

• Major shift in Soviet foreign policy: Clear abandonment of collective security after Munich → now pursuing territorial expansion.

• Strengthened USSR before 1941: New western frontier gained time/space for defence.

winter war

• 30 Nov 1939 – USSR invades Finland after demanding border moves + bases (Finland refused).

• Dec 1939 – Jan 1940 – Finnish resistance strong; USSR suffers heavy losses on the Mannerheim Line.

• Feb–Mar 1940 – Red Army reorganises, breakthroughs achieved.

• 12 Mar 1940 – Moscow Peace Treaty ends war.

• Soviet casualties: ~125,000+ killed; Finnish: ~25,000.

• USSR gained: Karelian Isthmus, Viipuri, parts of Lapland; ~11% of Finland’s territory.

• Damaged Soviet prestige: Red Army’s poor performance exposed effects of 1937–38 purges.

• Triggered Western hostility: USSR expelled from the League of Nations (Dec 1939).

• Encouraged Hitler: Convinced him the USSR was weak → factor in decision for Operation Barbarossa (1941).

economic ties with Germany

Germany was the USSR's major trading partner, providing loans and significant financial and technical help during the First Five-Year Plan; by 1932, 47 per cent of total Russian imports came from Germany

intervention in the spanish civil war

(1936–1939): Stalin intervened in the Spanish Civil War starting in September 1936, sending limited, covert support, including military advisors, tanks, and aircraft, to the Republican side. The initial objective of helping the Republic later shifted to prolonging the conflict to exhaust German and Italian forces

• this was a strategic move toward collective security

Exclusion from Munich

The Soviet Union was excluded from the Munich Conference in September 1938, where Britain and France negotiated with Hitler over Czechoslovakia. This event confirmed Stalin's view that the Western powers were unreliable and intended to direct German aggression eastward

• path to the nazi-soviet pact

pathway to the nazi societ pact

In May 1939, Litvinov, who was identified with collective security and was deeply suspicious of Germany, was replaced as Foreign Commissar by Vyacheslav Molotov, signalling Moscow's readiness to negotiate with Germany.

• Nazi-Soviet Pact (23 August 1939): The pact of non-aggression was signed between Ribbentrop (German Foreign Minister) and Molotov, shocking the world due to the ideological opposition between Nazism and Communism.

• Gains for Stalin: The pact was seen as the only way to ensure Soviet security by avoiding a war on two fronts (Germany in the West and Japan in the East) and guaranteed a crucial breathing space for the USSR to consolidate economic changes and rearm after the purges.

what gains did the nazi soviet pact have for Stalin

The pact included a secret protocol that divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence, allowing the USSR to gain control of eastern Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and parts of Romania (Bessarabia). Stalin's ultimate hope was that the inevitable war would be long, allowing the capitalist powers (Germany vs. Britain/France) to exhaust themselves while the USSR remained neutral.

Stalin's foreign policy throughout the 1930s was thus defined by constant maneuvering and a pragmatic prioritisation of Soviet national security and territorial interests over rigid ideological commitments to spreading world revolution

what were the aim of stalin foreign policy

The most fundamental and overarching aim of Stalin's foreign policy was the defence of Soviet interests and the national security of the USSR. This aim was considered the top priority for all Communist parties worldwide under the Comintern.

A secondary, yet crucial, aim was to establish and maintain stable, working diplomatic relationships with other countries, particularly to facilitate trade and gain economic and technical advantages.

Orthodox Marxism stressed the need for revolution in other countries for socialism to survive in the USSR. However, under Stalin, this ideological aim was often secondary to national security

success of stalin foreign policy

The most successful aspect of Stalin's foreign policy stems from his decision to sign the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August 1939, which served his immediate security needs:

• Avoiding a Two-Front War: The USSR was engaged in hostilities with Japan in the Far East, and Germany was aligned with Japan through the Anti-Comintern Pact. The pact with Germany guaranteed Stalin would avoid fighting a war on two fronts.

• Gaining Time and Resources: The pact was seen as the only way to be sure of avoiding war in the West and guaranteed a crucial breathing space. This time was needed because the Soviet armed forces had been significantly weakened by the purges, and the rearmament programme was incomplete.

• Acquiring a Buffer Zone: The secret protocol of the Nazi-Soviet Pact allowed Stalin to make substantial territorial gains, including eastern Poland, the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and parts of Romania (Bessarabia). This expansion created a vital defensive buffer zone against German aggression.

• Dividing Capitalist Enemies: The policy aligned with Stalin’s desire to stand aside while the capitalist nations fought each other. The pact was intended to ensure the exhaustion of both the German Reich and the Anglo-French bloc, allowing the USSR to intervene later

failures of stalin foreign policy

Despite the short-term gains, the policy ultimately failed its primary mission of guaranteeing Soviet security, climaxing in the disastrous German invasion:

• Ideological Self-Sabotage: The Comintern's initial radical line (1928–1935) of attacking German Social Democrats as 'social fascists' fatally divided the Left and is argued to have contributed to Hitler’s rise to power.

• Failure of Collective Security: Stalin’s subsequent attempt at collective security (1934–1938) failed due to the British and French policy of appeasement and their profound distrust of the USSR. The final blow was the USSR's exclusion from the Munich Conference in September 1938, which confirmed Stalin’s suspicion that the Western powers wanted to direct German aggression eastward

miscalculations of the nazi-soviet pact

He expected the war between Germany and the West to be a long, drawn-out conflict like the First World War. The rapid collapse of France in June 1940 contradicted this assumption, leaving Germany stronger and in control of Western Europe.

    2. He mistakenly trusted Hitler to honour the pact until the USSR was ready for war. Stalin adhered strictly to the economic terms, but he ignored numerous warnings about the impending German invasion.

• Exposure of Weakness: The Red Army's poor performance in the Winter War against Finland (1939–1940) exposed gross defects in organisation and planning, highlighting the military weakness caused by the purges.

• The Ultimate Failure: When Germany launched Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, the Soviet military was caught unprepared and suffered immediate, massive losses. This event is cited as demonstrating the "failure of Stalin’s diplomatic strategy

conclude Stalin’s foreign policy

In conclusion, while Stalin’s foreign policy succeeded in being highly pragmatic and achieved significant short-term goals like acquiring a buffer zone and avoiding immediate conflict in 1939, the sources suggest that the disastrous consequences of the German invasion in 1941—a direct result of Stalin’s fatal miscalculation of Hitler’s intentions and military timelines—represent the ultimate failure of his policy to guarantee the long-term security of the Soviet borders