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eliminativism
some or all mental states do not exist
folk psychology is false or at least radically misleading
our concept of mind is fundamentally flawed
should abandon ‘mental’ and replace with brain processes
elimination
not reductive, but eliminativist
NO mental properties - nothing corresponds to mental terms eg belief or desire
folk psychology
redundant talk of the mind and mental
based on common-sense
empirical theory about human behaviour
Churchland’s argument against folk psychology
folk psych is an empirical theory about human behaviour, so can be tested
if it is inaccurate, we should abandon it
some successful, and some unsuccessful scientific theories
common sense cannot reduce to neuroscience because folk psych is wrong
Churchland’s rejection of folk psychology SHORT
if theory = wrong, reject it!
common sense = wrong, reject it!
neuroscience is better than folk-psychology
Churchland’s three reasons for rejecting folk psych
many aspects of mental life that folk psych cannot explain (eg mental illness, intelligence, learning)
no progress throughout history (but neuroscience is constantly growing)
incoherent with other successful scientific theories (especially the central idea of intentional content)
Intentionality
mental states directed towards an object
eg my belief that Paris is the capital of France is directed towards Paris
belief, desires, emotions
the problem of intentional content
folk psych cannot reduce to neuroscience
the physical cannot have intentional content
everything is physical (mental = chemical process in brain)
intentional states (folk psych) not fit with brain states (neuroscience)
Obj. the intuitive certainty of my mind
eliminativism is simply very counter-intuitive
having thoughts and desires etc = immediately and directly obvious
eg Descartes first certainty ‘I think’
I have mental states (and will not give up that belief)
response to the intuitive certainty
“obvious” ideas are problematic
eg sun moves around the earth is FALSE!
AND misunderstands - does not deny phenomenal psych, but folk psych not the right account of it
Obj. folk psych has predictive and explanatory power
Churchland attacks folk psych ability to explain mental illness etc
but not meant to be a theory of mental states (it explains human behaviour)
eliminating belief, desires etc would eliminate science as well as folk psych
response to predictive and explanatory
must know human action relates to mental life
different sorts of theories is unsatisfactory
developments in folk psych are superficial and less powerful than science
Obj. self-refuting
Churchland’s P1 = folk psych. is an empirical theory, so can prove false
misunderstanding!
eli. relies on expressions of beliefs to change folk psych. but claims there are no beliefs
if no beliefs, incl meaning and reasoning, the E.M arguments are meaningless
(concludes that there are no beliefs but presupposes that there are)
response to self-refuting
this objection begs the question
presupposes that folk psych. gives the correct theory of meaning
E.M claims that we need a new theory
rebuild of the self-refuting objection
E.M are wrong that they do not need Intentionality to make their claims
cannot conceive that folk psych is false because it presupposes that we have Intentional content, E.M undermines itself
you cannot eliminate folk psych because it is not an empirical theory but a condition for thinking and reasoning
irreducibility
if Churchland is right that we cannot reduce intentional content to neuroscience, then not an objection to Intentionality, just an argument in favour of the irreducibility of mental properties