eliminative materialism

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16 Terms

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eliminativism

some or all mental states do not exist

folk psychology is false or at least radically misleading

our concept of mind is fundamentally flawed

should abandon ‘mental’ and replace with brain processes

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elimination

not reductive, but eliminativist

NO mental properties - nothing corresponds to mental terms eg belief or desire

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folk psychology

redundant talk of the mind and mental

based on common-sense

empirical theory about human behaviour

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Churchland’s argument against folk psychology

folk psych is an empirical theory about human behaviour, so can be tested

if it is inaccurate, we should abandon it

some successful, and some unsuccessful scientific theories

common sense cannot reduce to neuroscience because folk psych is wrong

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Churchland’s rejection of folk psychology SHORT

if theory = wrong, reject it!

common sense = wrong, reject it!

neuroscience is better than folk-psychology

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Churchland’s three reasons for rejecting folk psych

  1. many aspects of mental life that folk psych cannot explain (eg mental illness, intelligence, learning)

  2. no progress throughout history (but neuroscience is constantly growing)

  3. incoherent with other successful scientific theories (especially the central idea of intentional content)

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Intentionality

mental states directed towards an object

eg my belief that Paris is the capital of France is directed towards Paris

belief, desires, emotions

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the problem of intentional content

folk psych cannot reduce to neuroscience

the physical cannot have intentional content

everything is physical (mental = chemical process in brain)

intentional states (folk psych) not fit with brain states (neuroscience)

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Obj. the intuitive certainty of my mind

eliminativism is simply very counter-intuitive

having thoughts and desires etc = immediately and directly obvious

eg Descartes first certainty ‘I think’

I have mental states (and will not give up that belief)

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response to the intuitive certainty

“obvious” ideas are problematic

eg sun moves around the earth is FALSE!

AND misunderstands - does not deny phenomenal psych, but folk psych not the right account of it

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Obj. folk psych has predictive and explanatory power

Churchland attacks folk psych ability to explain mental illness etc

but not meant to be a theory of mental states (it explains human behaviour)

eliminating belief, desires etc would eliminate science as well as folk psych

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response to predictive and explanatory

must know human action relates to mental life

different sorts of theories is unsatisfactory

developments in folk psych are superficial and less powerful than science

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Obj. self-refuting

Churchland’s P1 = folk psych. is an empirical theory, so can prove false

misunderstanding!

eli. relies on expressions of beliefs to change folk psych. but claims there are no beliefs

if no beliefs, incl meaning and reasoning, the E.M arguments are meaningless

(concludes that there are no beliefs but presupposes that there are)

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response to self-refuting

this objection begs the question

presupposes that folk psych. gives the correct theory of meaning

E.M claims that we need a new theory

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rebuild of the self-refuting objection

E.M are wrong that they do not need Intentionality to make their claims

cannot conceive that folk psych is false because it presupposes that we have Intentional content, E.M undermines itself

you cannot eliminate folk psych because it is not an empirical theory but a condition for thinking and reasoning

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irreducibility

if Churchland is right that we cannot reduce intentional content to neuroscience, then not an objection to Intentionality, just an argument in favour of the irreducibility of mental properties