Week 4 Parties and Populism

Why parties?

• For politicians:

• Recognition, brand

• Solving the problem of coordinating interests and preferences

(voting the same on many issues)

• Solving the problem of collective action: the party leader takes on

the costs – in return he gets leadership

• For voters:

• Information shortcut – information costs are reduced

Agenda

• Populism: definitions and examples

• Political theories of populism

• Economic populism?

• Success of Populism

• Success of Far Rights

• Consequences of Populism

What Populism is Not

• Not Popular

• Not demagogue (what people want to hear)

• Not necessarily anti-immigrant

• Not necessarily right-wing

• Not a tool

POSSIBLE TRUE OR FLASE

Minimalist Definition of Populism

• “a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be

ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic

groups...and which argues that politics should be an

expression of the general will of the people” – volonté

générale (Mudde 2004, p. 543)

• Thin-centered – no rigid ideological principles; both right and left

• Critique: how is it different from other traditions? From

democracy?

• Reply: yes, every politician might say smth populist, but how

fundamental and consistent it is (Benny Sanders – populist?)

Maximalist Definition of

Populism

• “... is a process by which a community of citizens constructs

itself freely and publicly as a collective subject (the people)

that resists another collective (not popular or the elite) and

opposes an existing hegemony with the goal of taking power”

(Laclau (2005a,b; Laclau & Mouffe 2001) (Urbinati, 2019: 117)

• Too broad (bigger than democracy and politics) and too

“constructivist”: a community of citizens constructs itself

freely – how is it possible – only through a leader? Then....

• Radical version of democracy – isn’t it a dictatorship?

Hmmm....

Definition of Populism

• “The analysis of populism in power leads me to conclude that,

although it is an internal transformation of representative

democracy, populism can disfigure it by making the principles

of democratic legitimacy (the people and the majority) the

possession of a part of the people, which a strong leader

embodies and mobilizes against other parts (minorities and

the political opposition). Populism in power is an extreme

majoritarianism.” (Urbinati, 2019: 113)

• What about populism in authoritarian settings?

Main Features of Populism

• Anti-establishment

• One true majority instead of multiple majorities that alternate in power

(people are imaginary)

• Direct connection to the leader - without mediation by traditional

institutions of representative democracy (Twitter) (is it really partyless?)

• One true leader (Trump’s campaign was called “locker room talk”; Alberto

Fujimori - “A President Like You” slogan (Levitsky & Loxton 2013, p. 167) -

an ideology based on trust rather than deliberation

• Permanent electoral campaign ( President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela “spent

more than 1,500 hours denouncing capitalism on Alo Presidente, his own

TV show” (Morozov 2011, p. 113).

• Continuous anti-establishment rhetoric

• Context specific

• Can be both rightist and leftist (In Greece both)

• Not necessarily anti-democratic, however...

Populism and The People

• “The people—the actual, existing people of the nation—is the

right sovereign, and nobody outside can question it or limit it

[Schmitt 2008 (1928), p. 370].

• “What truly matters is not which party controls our

government, but whether our government is controlled by the

people“ (Trump‘s inaugural speech)

Populism and Free Elections

• “Unlike fascism, however, populism does not suspend free and

competitive elections, nor does it deny them a legitimate

role.” (Urbinati, 2019: 115).

• Polarization of the society -> increase in intimidation during

elections bc people are willing to give up democratic norms

(Arbatli and Rosenberg, 2020)

• Populism -> polarization?

Populism in Europe

• Populism as a reaction against modernization (first in Russia

(narodiniki – but the peasant “was busy”) and then in the United

States (the People’s Party)

• Peasantry in the Tsarist Russia was not “poisoned” by capitalist

relations; direct route to socialism

• Farmers in the US -> against consolidation of land ownership,

monopolization of the railroads etc. -> democratic governance

• Early 20th century populism in Western Europe -> fascism and

agrarian populism in Central and Eastern Europe

• Populism - marginal in post-war Europe until 1980s

• Radical right populism – big success in the 1990s (16% in France,

27% in Austria in 99)

• Great Recession after 2008 - > even more success stories (average

vote share of 15% in 28 European countries, acc to Cas Mudde)

• Contemporary examples of populism

Populism in Latin America

• Latin American populism in the age of modernization

• Latin American populism after World War II

• Contemporary examples of populism (Hugo Chavez in

Venezuela, the Kirchners in Argentina, Evo Morales in Bolivia,

Alan García in Peru, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador)

Economic Definition of Populism

• Political populism exclusively as being directed against

“minorities and foreigners (in the case of right-wing populists)

or financial elites (in the case of left-wing populists)” (Rodrik,

2018)

• Economic populism- e.g., against policies built by special

interests

• “global and regional trade agreements now incorporate stringent

patent and copyright rules, the main purpose of which is to

create and distribute rents for big pharma, Hollywood, and tech

firms.” (Rodrik, 2018)

• Economic populism is not necessarily bad, as economic

populism ruins economic vested interests in order to throw off

the power of narrow special interest groups

• Economic populism can “prevent” political populism!

• “We offer a simple model of populism defined, following

Dornbusch and Edwards (1991), as the implementation of

policies receiving support from a significant fraction of the

population, but ultimately hurting the economic interests of

this majority.”

• Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin, 2013, QJE.

Populism as a Strategic Choice

• Politicians often promise redistribution to the poor, but end

up colluding with the rich -> (e.g., Partido Revolucionario

Institucional in Mexico, the policies of traditional parties in

Venezuela and Ecuador, Fujimori in Peru, and Menem in

Argentina)

• It is smart for political candidates to signal integrity – that

they will never collude with the rich. How?

• By choosing populist policies (also more extreme)

Bottom-up Populism

• Populist movements - “ non-institutional collective

mobilization along a catch-all political platform of grievances

that divides society between an overwhelming majority of

“pure people” and a “corrupt elite,” demanding the

restoration of popular sovereignty in the name of the former”

(Aslanidis, 2017: 306-307)

• The Yellow Vests (YV) movement in 2018 in France

• Trigger – high oil prices; reason – gap between ordinary citizens and

elite; support from 70% of population

Populism and Far Right Parties

• Populism is central to the ideological appeal of many far right

parties (Betz, 1994; Betz and Immerfall, 1998; Betz and

Johnson, 2004; Taggart, 1995, 1996, 2000).

Coalition government between left-wing populist

Syriza and right-wing Independent Greeks

Yep

Demand-Side Explanations of Far-Rights’ Rise

• Modernization grievances: e.g., losers from globalization; backlash against

postmaterialist values

• Economic grievances: “Eliminate Unemployment: Stop Immigration”

• “When there is economic scarcity and immigrants have electoral power,

incumbents have incentives to direct material benefits toward

immigrants and away from the native population.” (Dancygier, 2010)

• Context-specific, type of immigrants etc.

• Crisis-driven economic insecurity ->political distrust (Algan, Guriev,

Papaioannou & Passari)

• Cultural grievances

• Surveys consistently show that many Europeans hold anti- immigrant

attitudes, and yet relatively few vote for far-right parties

• Social desirability bias

Supply-Side Explanations of Far-Rights’ Rise

• Electoral rules: system permissiveness

• Party competition

• Far right parties face a favorable environment when mainstream

parties converge in the policy space (Kitschelt 1997)

• Far right parties fare better when mainstream right parties adopt

centrist positions

• Parties’ strategies on Issue salience and issue ownership

• Dismissive - ignore

• Accommodative – stealing issue ownership or proving its

legitimacy?

• Adversarial

• Media

• Criticism – still proving issue salience?

Why Populism is Successful

• Important issues are not addressed by elites, as many people

feel

• Elites are all the same

• People are better educated -> more confident on political

issues ->hold politicians accountable

• Populist actors are attractive

• Media structure is more favorable ( private media want

money->ads->readers->scandal)

*From C. Mudde’s talk

Social Media and Populism

• Donald Trump - 70 million followers, more than any media

organization

• What makes social media so suitable for populist message

(Zhuravskaya, 2020):

• No entry barriers

• Direct connection to “the people”

• Simplistic messages

• Falsehood-based narratives within “echo-chambers” – “like-

minded friend groups that increase political polarization”

(Sunstein 2001, 2017)

• Easy spread of fake news

• Guriev et al. (2019): “Moving from zero to full 3G coverage results in 7

percentage points higher vote share for right-wing and 6 percentage points

higher vote share for left-wing populists”

• Durante, Pinotti, and Tesei (AER, 2019): Mediaset, Silvio Berlusconi's TV

network in the 1980s, with random coverage -> higher vote share of

Berlusconi's Forza Italia in the 1990s and Five Star Movement

• Mediaset – NO politics, only entertainment! So WHY?

• “As children were less cognitively sophisticated and civic-minded as

adults, and ultimately more vulnerable to Berlusconi’s populist rhetoric”

• Allcott et al. (2019) (via experiment): a month-long deactivation of Facebook

accounts significantly reduced users' political polarization

• Variation in TV or Internet availability must be exogenous: signal’s strength

etc.

Consequences of Populism

• Re-politicization of certain “dogmatic” issues (EU; austerity

measures; EU’s pressure for privatizing public transport)

• Polarization of political debate

• Increase of (opportunistic – to confirm what has been done)

use of plebescitarian institutions (referenda)

• Weakening of non-majoritarian institutions (e.g., courts and

media)

• Orban – lowered retirement age of judges -> replaced with his

friends

• His friend buys media☺ (if close down – EU might be pissed off),

after which he closes it bc no demand...

• Change of liberal democracy into illiberal democracy or even

autocracy (Venezuela)

• “Populism is an illiberal democratic response to undemocratic

[a lot of issues are taken out of electoral agenda) liberalism”

*From C. Mudde’s talk

Brexit

• 2016 – the UK voted to leave the EU by 52 to 48%

• Statistics on who voted yes

• Older people

• People with lesser educational attainment

• Conventional wisdom on who voted “yes”:

• Those left behind by modernization and globalization

• Novel research:

• Class and income -> only 55% accuracy in predicting Brexit vote

• Attitudes toward death penalty (proxy for traditional values) ->

70% accuracy (E. Kaufman, 2016)

• Attitudes toward immigration -> 80% accuracy

• Tricky: based on culture or economics?

• Cultural differences trump economic ones

Consequences of Populism

• 50 populist presidents and prime ministers in the period

1900–2018 (1500 leaders, 60 countries)

• “(1) populism has a long history and is serial in nature – if

countries have been governed by a populist once, they are

much more likely to see another populist coming to office in

the future;

• (2) populist leadership is economically costly, with a notable

long-run decline in consumption and output;

• (3) populism is politically disruptive, fostering instability and

institutional decay.”

An Online Intervention

Reducing Ethnic Prejudice

• Simonovits, Kezdi & Kardos (2018)

• Choose-your-own-adventure-game -> “perspective of a

member of a marginalized ethnic minority group”

• A story of an 18-year-old Roma adolescent who arrives in

Budapest, Hungary to start a new life.

• “Randomized placebo-treatment design with several

hundred young adult participants”

• Immediate and outcomes with one-month delay

• Outcomes -> questions on prejudice & intentions to vote

for a far-right party

• Results: reduced vote intentions for the racist party Jobbik by

12 percentage points