3.) The Global War 1955-1963

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42 Terms

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Destalinisation in the Eastern Bloc
Khrushchev (in power after Stalin’s death 1953)

wanted to achieve long term political stability, economic growth and improved living conditions in EE satellite states through the process of destalinisation

didn’t want to change the basic structure of the communist system

Stalin ensured the EE states were clones of the USSR communist system

the Stalinist system was characterised by a cult of personality, centralised planning, secret police, one party system, dominance of communist party and press censorship

destalinisation involved the removal of some of these controls
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Khrushchev’s secret speech 1956
denounced Stalin- huge change as Stalin had never publically been criticised before

said that elevating one figure into superman like leader wasn’t Marxist-Leninist

criticised his cruel oppression of people and the Great Purge

motives for the speech debated- previously a Stalinist hard liner- did he believe Stalin was wrong or was he just trying to associate himself with reforms

text of the secret speech circulated throughout EE and the W
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Poland Uprising June-October 1956
K charged the Polish leader to carry out destalinisation

many Poles started to demand more political freedom and national sovereignty

June 1956 workers went on strike to protest wage cuts and poor working conditions

led to an anti communist uprising

Gomulka- leader of Polish Communist party- met with K, who threatened military intervention if he didn’t cooperate

K agreed Gomulka could be First Secretary if he agreed not to carry out reforms that threatened communist rule

Poland would remain in Warsaw Pact

Soviet troops ready to intervene in Warsaw, but not needed

force not needed- especially due to the Chinese support for the Polish Communist Party
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Polish uprising impact
* Poles supported Gomulka because he had preserved a Polish path to socialism rather than conform to the Soviet Model
* Gomulka balanced need for Polish security with the presence of Soviet troops in Poland- which placated Moscow- and the USSR would prevent any attack from WG
* Polish Rising showed Moscow would allow some independence if leaders were trustworthy
* K instinct had been to use force, but not used because of China- showed increasing role of China
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Hungary Uprising Oct-Nov 1956
student demonstrations- demanded the appointment of Nagy as PM , withdrawal of USSR troops, freedom of speech and elections

escalated into armed revolt as demonstration was fired upon by Hungarian Secret Police

workers groups joined students and seized power from local communist authorities

Nagy appointed PM , immediately met with USSR to convince them military intervention not necessary

argued the revolt could be calmed and assured them of Hungary’s loyalty

K agreed to withdraw troops - Moscow described the events as a broad national movement

USSR appeared to take a conciliatory role- Red army began to withdraw
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impact of Hungarian uprising
* lack of intervention from the W showed that the status quo had been accepted- EE was under USSR control
* moves towards peaceful coexistence were compromised
* rising showed the need for social and political reform
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Degree of Peaceful coexistence
Feb 1956- 20th Congress of the USSR Communist Party held- fundamental shift in USSR thinking

K abandoned the conventional Marxist view that conflict between socialist and capitalists was inevitable

believed that communism was so powerful it would be victorious without war

believed the downfall of capitalism was inevitable, and therefore open adversary with the W was not necessary as all the E had to do was wait for capitalism to collapse

the USSR would be able to focus resources on internal improvements rather than preparation for war with the W
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Khrushchev’s foreign policy imperatives
* USSR must remain unchallenged leader of the socialist world
* firm grip to be maintained over EE satellite states
* G must be prevented from rearming and becoming a threat to the USSR
* USSR must continue to expand its nuclear capability and stay in the arms race
* spending on the military must be reduced- including Soviet conventional forces in EE
* international tension to be defused and to take care not to provoke the USA

policy of PCE crucial- strategy to consolidate USSR power and security by existing in a less volatile environment

Stalinist aggression had caused an escalation of expenses

understood the risks of nuclear war- wanted to export revolution but wary

PCE involved diplomacy to diffuse tensions and prevention of direct confrontation
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Austrian State Treaty 1955
USSR policy towards Austria closely linked with G, focused on economic reparations

split similarly into occupation zones, had the potential to become a dividing issue

by 1955, USSR wanted to negotiate on the future of Austria

Austria State Treaty was an agreement by all 4 occupying powers

led to the withdrawal of occupying powers and agreement that Austria would be a neutral state

showed serious intent towards mutual cooperation and removed a potential source of conflict

eased the path towards further cooperation

led to the W removing their occupation forces in WG

led to decision to resume summit diplomacy
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Geneva Summit, Sep 1955
USSR still involved in the arms race, but incentive for K to slow it down- USSR needed extensive conventional forces to control EE and needed to promote internal economic development

less confrontational relationship with USA would mean a decrease in expenditure

K was a pragmatist- realised a summit was necessary after the FRG joined NATO in May 1955 and began to rearm

USA agreed to keep a large and permanent force in Europe in order to reassure the French, which concerned K

overall the summit was not practically valuable as no satisfactory outcome was agreed

marked the beginning of a dialogue between the E/W

marked a point of calm in relations and the foundation of PCE were in place
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Geneva summit- open skies proposal
Eisenhower’s attempt to end the deadlock over the issue of each inspecting the others nuclear arsenal

proposed each side to provide details of military installations and to allow aerial reconnaissance

this was rejected by K
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Geneva summit- future of Germany
Eisenhower proposed reunifying Germany with free elections and the right to ensure its own security (which effectively meant joining NATO)

K would only consider reunification if G was demilitarised and neutral

K refused to discuss the future of EE- free elections were agreed but no procedures set up to ensure this
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Camp David talks Sep 1959
Khrushchev became the first USSR leader to visit the USA when he participated in Camp David talks with Eisenhower

discussed disarmament and Berlin

agreed to settle international disputes through diplomacy

reaffirmation of K’s belief in PCE

caused a deterioration in USSR relations with China

led to the Paris summit
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Paris Summit May 1960
K was committed to PCE- faced major internal and Chinese opposition

K wanted a deal over Berlin and an agreement to ban nuclear weapons in the Pacific- China put an end to this by saying they wouldn’t follow any agreement they weren’t part of

summit collapsed because of the U2 incident
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U2 incident May 1960
U2- US spy plane

was shot down over the USSR

pilot was imprisoned in Moscow

caused the end of the Paris Summit
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Khrushchev/ Kennedy 1960
JFK elected P 1960, declared in inauguration speech that the US would do whatever necessary to protect freedom- reaffirmation of the Truman Doctrine

this made the future of PCE uncertain- JFK increased defence spending

K and JFK me in Vienna June 1961

little was achieved- K came out with the impression JFK was young and inexperienced (reinforced by Bay of Pigs)

future of Germany still an issue

JFK refused to compromise on Berlin as it was a symbol of freedom and of Cold War confrontation

after Vienna, JFK increased defence spending and called for a build up of NATO forces
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extension of the arms race - US
US policy contradictory- Eisenhower condemned the military industrial complex, yet supported the development of new and more weapons

March 1954 US successfully tested H bomb- 1500 times more powerful than Hiroshima bomb

USA developed the Strategic Air Command- organisation set up to serve as primary defence system through strategic bombing

popular view that USSR had caught up to USA

tested the first ICBM in 1957- Eisenhower wanted to prove that the US controlled the arms race

US developed new ICBM tech- Atlas and Titan

negotiated an agreement with B in 1957 which agreed the US could station ICBMs in B

1959 development of SLBM systems- Polaris- plus the new ICBMs Thor and Minuteman
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Gaither report
1957 Eisenhower commissioned the Gaither Report- looked at US/USSR nuclear capacity

Gaither report- revealed missile gap between US/USSR - predicted a 100 to 30 lead for the USSR

started fears of US danger and becoming a lesser power

Eisenhower trusted intel from U2 spy planes rather than the report - as this suggested a slow rate of nuclear production by the USSR

Gaither report based on inadequate evidence
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extension of the arms race- USSR
Soviet foreign policy- both summit diplomacy and PCE, and support for revolution and stockpiling of weapons

partly because of new challenge of China

by Sep USSR had similar H bomb tech

1957 USSR developed missile delivery systems for nuclear warheads

by 1959 only 10 ss-7 ICMBs deployed - SS-7s more mobile

comparison:

* ICBMs 1960

US 295

USSR 75

* ICBMs 1964

US 835

USSR 200
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Space Race
continuation of the arms race- similar tech used for both

Oct 1957 USSR launched first satellite to orbit the Earth - Sputnik

Sputnik II launched Laika the dog into orbit

alarmed US as it appeared the Soviet tech had surpassed theirs

US convinced that the USSR had developed Sputnik as a way of firing missiles from space- something that there was no defence against, which was terrifying

undermined the massive retaliation policy and caused criticism against Eisenhower’s administration

sense of urgency for US- launched rocket Dec 1957 which failed

1958 Eisenhower launched NASA

Oct 1959 USSR launched the first satellite to orbit the moon

April 1961 USSR launched the first manned satellite to orbit the Earth- Yuri Gagarin became the first man in space

US rapidly caught up- by 1962 US had successfully launched 63 space missions, to the USSR’s 15

1960 US developed Discoverer satellite programme which gave long range intelligence photos from space
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Berlin crisis- factors in K decision
* USSR space programme appeared ahead of US
* WG member of NATO- could result in nuclear weapons
* USSR hold on EE fragile, heavy military spending required
* no significant restrictions on GDR citizens leaving for the W which undermined its economy
* W had not yet recognised the existence of GDR (Hallstein Doctrine 1955, K recognised GDR as an independent nation, FRG announced in the Doctrine that any nation that recognised GDR apart from the USSR, with who they had diplomatic relations, would be seen as unfriendly and the FRG would end diplomatic relations)
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Berlin Crisis - background
Berlin became a focal point of K’s objectives of strengthening USSR economy and defense, and global ideological expansion

1950s W heavily invested in WB and made it into a flagship of W capitalism

made EG/ EB look worse

Moscow feared the US would address the rapidly accelerating competition from the USSR in the space/arms race by placing missiles in WG

K wanted to minimise US influence in G and gain assurances that the US wouldn’t place nuclear in G

wanted a propaganda victory in B to secure USSR position

also decline in Sino-Soviet relations meant K needed to strengthen USSR’s position as the dominant communist power
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Berlin Crisis
Nov 1958 USSR issued a 6 month ultimatum

demanded the withdrawal of W troops from WB and B should be a free city

if no agreement was made, the USSR would sign a separate treaty with GDR, and GDR would have control of access to WB

this would threaten W access to WB and force the W to negotiate with GDR- which would make the Hollstein Doctrine irrelevant

Dec W rejected ultimatum- but still desire from W to lessen confrontation with the USSR

worried Adenauer- leader of FRG- that the US would betray them

Paris summit then ruined, which stopped all talks on G
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Berlin Wall Aug 1961
K had previously aimed to avoid closing EB border

during first half of 1961, 10,000 GDR citizens migrated to W

talented EG had been migrating for years (300,000 in 1953), which damaged EG economy

Aug 1961 construction of the Berlin Wall began- initially wire fences, but replaced with a concrete wall and perimeter defences
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Significance/ Impact of Berlin Wall
* physical symbol of CW
* Berlin was a test of the West’s commitment to defend freedom by
* GDR immediate economic crisis controlled- skilled workers now unable to leave
* inaction of W and its tolerance of the wall showed a degree of recognition of GDR
* some argue that the wall guaranteed no military conflict between the US/USSR- JFK saw wall as unacceptable but better than a nuclear war
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Ho Chi Minh and NV
the decision not to hold national elections in 1956 forced Minh to concentrate on consolidating communist control in NV

a strong NV was needed to fight for reunification

key part of his Vietnam Worker’s party (VWP) was land reform- collectivisation, the regime seized private land and redistributed it amongst the rural farmers

thousands of landlords executed and many more imprisoned

1956 military had to put down a revolt-c6000 killed

Minh forced to issue an apology for the aggressive implementation of the scheme- much advice on the scheme had come from China

about 1 million refugees fled to SV

full scale collectivisation in place and agricultural production had increased
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Revolutionary violence strategy
by end 1958, decision taken by the VWP to commit to a strategy of reunification

initial strategy of strengthening communism in NV well underway- power of the party well established

aim was to use military force to overthrow Diem’s regime and remove the imperialist Americans from SV

powerful emphasis on political struggle- based on creating national unity in SV in order to overthrow Diem

meant that NV started a policy of supporting anti-Diem groups in the SV

culminated in the creation of the National Liberation Front in SV
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Diem and SV
Diem- corrupt and nepotistic, which contributed to his downfall

Dulles- US only supported him because there was no one better

Diem’s brother was PM and other family were in high government posts

large amounts of US aid- meant for things like agricultural improvement- were fraudulently taken by Diem

Diem’s strategy for governing was based on repression and the silencing of political opponents

US support didn’t stop growing internal opposition to his regime- and Diem’s response to the opposition only fuelled it

Diem’s regime based on the appearance of democracy- in reality it was a few ruling, and based on the preservation of Diem’s power

achieved by a loyal and corrupt ruling group and US support
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formation of the National Liberation Front
Dec 1960- NV established a new nationalist organisation in SV- the National Liberation Front (NLF)- purpose to free SV from US imperialism, and create a unified independent V

powerful motivation was Diem’s quasi-imperialistic policies- embarked on a campaign to find and destroy communists in SV, largely ignored the interests of most in SV- especially the rural peasantry- and replaced local councils with gov officials

many of these officials were Catholic- which reminded them of the former French imperialists- most didn’t want the French replaced with Vietnamese rulers

nationalistic and democratic imperatives drove many SV to support the NLF- appealed to intellectuals, students, and the middle and working class

NLF had a symbiotic and mutually supportive relationship between nationalism and communism- and a common view of American imperialism as the enemy

NLF leader Tho was merely a figurehead- Minh was really in charge

NLF agent of communisation- a way that communists could infiltrate and influence SV groups, but presented as a SV resistance group- and therefore in line with the Geneva conference which forbade NV forces in the S

NV established a complex support network for the NLF, based on the Ho Chi Minh trail which provided a supply route into the S
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JFK policies towards Indochina
saw V as very important to the US

emphasised that ensuring SV stayed democratic was of fundamental importance to the security of SE Asia- committed to containment and domino theory

policy was focused on flexible response

convinced the US non-nuclear capabilities should be expanded as this would reduce the threat of nuclear war and enable the US to react to a wider range of threats- such as insurgency and subversion

therefore flexibility would end the constraints of Eisenhower’s massive retaliation strategy

reflected JFK’s fear of the threats of China and the USSR

JFK backed counterinsurgency methods (tactics used to defeat guerrilla warfare, usually intelligence and infiltration)

State Department report 1961 recommended an increase in helicopters, greater training for the SV army, increase in US combat forces and some strategic bombing of NV
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Strategic Hamlet Programme 1962
part of Operation Sunrise in March 1962

aimed to create armed stockades which would house SV rural peasants

this would isolate them from the Vietcong (VC)- the name used by Diem to describe the NLF

for Diem, this was a way to spread their own influence, rather than a way of encouraging the V peasants to challenge the VC

peasants under pressure to move into the hamlets but little planning to facilitate the process- in effect the programme was forced relocation

by Sep 1962, the SV regime claimed over 4 million people were in such hamlets

largely a failure- often led to improved recruitment of peasants into the Vietcong

programme compelled peasants to build fences and moats against the VC- who were targeting gov officials not peasants

corrupt officials who took money intended for medical aid, irrigation projects and agriculture further alienated the peasants

scheme was flawed because it was impossible to isolate VC agents from the hamlets- the programme soon collapsed
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Buddhist Crisis 1963
Diem- Catholic, and he favoured that religion- many got employed in the military or government

Diem made the mistake of persecuting Buddhist community- most of V population were Buddhist

crisis in 1963- Buddhists were banned from flying flags in honour of the Buddha’s birthday whilst Catholics were encourage to hang Papal flags

military used to prevent Buddhists hearing a speech from their leader Tri Quang- 9 killed

caused Buddhist protests across SV- which became organised and coordinated

formed cells and trained in developing anti-gov propaganda, organised hunger strikes and engaged with foreign press- esp US media

crisis worsened when an elderly Buddhist monk publically burned himself alive

story was picked up by the US media, and the photograph of it was on every front page
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Assassination of Diem
Aug 1963, renewed assault on Buddhists in V

State department send a telegram to SV ambassador Lodge, emphasising Lodge should find a replacement leader- which was approved by JFK

JFK conscious of the implications of the US being directly involved of the removal of a state’s elected leader

JFK sent McNamara to V- who reported that Diem was not prepared to relax on the repression of SV

reinforced the view that the war couldn’t be won with Diem in charge

McNamara recommended a reuduction in US support to put pressure on Diem to cooperate

the extent to which the Kennedy administration encouraged or participated in the coup has never been resolved

Nov 1963, SV rebel generals activated a coup against Diem, who was assassinated

Lodge told JFK that the coup was purely a V affair, but acknowledged that without the US it wouldn’t have happened
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Cuba pre-1959 background
Caribbean regarded by US as own backyard- stability important to protect US national interests

Cuban constitution gave the US rights of intervention and gave the US naval bases there

US had huge influence in affairs

Fidel Castro and Che Guevara won power in Cuba through guerrilla war 1959
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Cuba 1958-1960 background
US had shown little support for the existing regime during Castro’s revolution- mainly because it was a nationalist, non communist internal struggle

1959 Castro introduced agrarian reform, which led to considerable numbers of US owned property being seized by the state- moderate reforms that didn’t generate hostile US response

US fears of Cuba being a USSR satellite state were increased when the Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan visited Cuba in 1960

tied Cuba into an economic and political relationship with the USSR

first shipment of crude oil from USSR arrived in Cuba in April 1960

when US owned oil companies refused to refine it, Cuba nationalised them- led to US sanctions on Cuba and reduction of sugar imports by 95%

Castro seized $1 billion worth of US assets in Cuba Oct 1960- Castro needed the USSR

by 1961, US decided they needed to remove Castro
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Bay of Pigs invasion April 1961
planned during Eisenhower, executed under JFK

plan was for 1500 anti-Castro exiles to land on Cuba and carry out a coup to remove Castro

JFK supported the CIA plan to land these exiles at the Bay of Pigs

absolute failure, embarrassment for JFK - and confirmed Soviet fears about US plans for Cuba

ensured that Castro’s power was consolidated as he protected Cuba from US imperialism
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Operation Mongoose Nov 1961
aim to overthrow Castro, mainly through covert operations within Cuba to destabilise the regime and facilitate an internal revolt

combination of air and land strikes

USSR had been supplying Cuba with weapons for some time, but US didn’t intervene as no suggestion this was a threat to the US

March 1962 US military manoeuvres began- Soviet Defence Minister predicted Cuba would fall in a week

Khrushchev decided to deploy Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuba in 1962
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Operation Anadyr- Soviet placing of missiles on Cuba
USSR willing to support Castro politically, economically and militarily

installation of nuclear weapons plus fighter planes, bombers and 14,000 ground troops

Cuba geostrategic opportunity for the USSR- USSR missiles weren’t as long range as USA’s and having nuclear weapons on Cuba would address this disparity

reducing missile gap one of K’s aims, and would help to reduce spending on the conventional forces

depended on a major nuclear build up taking place without US knowledge
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Cuban Missile Crisis 1962
14 Oct- U2 spy plane captured images of a missile site in Cuba

16 Oct- JFK informed of presence of USSR nuclear missiles on Cuba, who immediately assembled ExComm advisory committee (Executive Committee of National Security Council)- provided policy options

consisted of hawks (wanted military action) and doves (diplomatic solution)

became clear that air strikes were impossible, so JFK opted for a military blockade that would stem the flow of missiles entering Cuba

blockade would have been an act of war- referred to as a quarantine

aimed to give JFK time to focus on a diplomatic solution and forced the USSR to decide whether to recognise the quarantine

classic brinkmanship

also put US bases on maximum alert to prepare for a possible military strike against Cuba

UN security council met- US ambassador condemned USSR deployment

by 24 Oct the first Soviet ships to reach the blockade either stopped dead or turned around
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End of Cuban Missile Crisis
neither JFK or K had presented a significant diplomatic solution

brinkmanship high risk strategy which could only be successful if both sides recognised that military confrontation in a nuclear age was unacceptable

K began to rethink position- he had failed to protect Cuba from US aggression by placing nuclear missiles

26 Oct K sent a telegram to JFK which proposed the US would pledge not to invade Cuba if the USSR removed its missiles from Cuba

this was perfect for US- as the blockade didn’t affect the missiles already on Cuba

Soviet ambassador met with Robert Kennedy- informed the USSR that JFK was willing to remove missiles from Turkey, but only in secret- couldn’t be included in any formal or public agreements

JFK couldn’t be seen to conceding to USSR pressure

28 Oct K agreed to remove the missiles from Cuba

Castro incensed- saw it as a betrayal
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Significance of the Cuban Missile Crisis
brought the world closer to nuclear war than ever before

showed international relations couldn’t be conducted through crisis management methods

immediate response was the creation of a hotline between Moscow and Washington in 1963- symbolically significant

led to awareness of the need for restrictions and control of nuclear weapons

CMC involved US using its military power to pressure the USSR - seen as offensive use of military

seen as a humiliation for the USSR, perceived Cold War defeat and a constraint on USSR actions

USSR emerged from crisis with a desperation to restore international status

Cuba remained a committed communist state- showed US failure of containment and Truman Doctrine

Cuba’s survival was a success for K
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Moscow Test Ban 1963
agreed to ban tests of nuclear weapons ‘in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water’

didn’t ban testing underground which led to nuclear proliferation

also agreed that the powers could test weapons if they thought that their vital national interests were at stake

no obligation to sign- China and France didn’t

contributed to detente