models of voting behaviour knowledge flashcards

Social Structures Model:

Voters will cast ballots according to long terms factors such as partisanship, class alignment, ethnicity, education and age. 

Rational Choice Model:

Voters act in their own self-interest, based on a rational, clear and informed judgement. Since the individual is also part of society, this will also include some consideration of the best options for society as a whole.

Issue Voting:

Voters select their choice based on a party’s policy on one key issue. As a result, they may pick a party whose other policies they don’t support or may have no interest in, eg. voting for the Labour party in 2017 based solely on their policy on abolishing university tuition fees.

Valence Voters:

Valence issues are those that all or most voters share a common preference. A guaranteed valence issue is the state of the economy - virtually everyone in the UK wants this. 

Until the 1970s, class was seen as the key determinant of voting behaviour. Traditionally the working class have mainly voted Labour and the middle to upper classes Conservative. The class system is explained through …

social grades. Social grades can be further split into sub categories, through A to B: 

• AB - middle class: higher and intermediate managerial, administrative and professional occupations.

• C1 - lower middle class: supervisory, clerical and junior managerial, admin and professional occupations.

• C2 - working class: skilled manual occupations.

• DE - lower working class: semi-skilled and unskilled occupations and the unemployed.

In 1966, 64% of working class voters (C2, D, E) voted Labour, whereas 62% of middle-class (A,B,C1) voted Conservative. Overall in this year, 66% of voters could be classified as ‘class voters’ ie. supported their natural ‘class party’. In a Butler and Stokes electoral survey …

it was determined the most important social factor in the 1960’s was social class with voters having strong alignments based on their class.

Class links heavily to other factors  such as partisanship, region and education, given the influence of family tradition, local neighbourhoods etc. around those of the same class. These have evolved over time…

In 1979, the population percentages according to ‘Class voting in britain in 1979’ BY Jacqueline Mart were AB - 22%, C1 - 22%, C2- 29% and DE - 17%. This doesn’t necessarily mean Labour will win as they have more voters in the larger population groups. It would depend on how many voters choose to ‘vote with their class’ and in the 8 elections between 1945-1974 both parties won 4 elections each.

 from the 1970s onwards the UK has experienced an accelerating process of ‘class dealignment’ - the weakening relationship between …

 a particular party and a particular class. By 1979, only 51% of voters were ‘class voters’ ie. supported the ‘natural party’ of their class (and by 1987 this had fallen to just 44%).  

The British working class was the key change in the 1979 election - more of the working class overall still voted Labour, but the C2 group were evenly divided and the DE group were down to just a 15% Labour lead, compared to 35% in 1974. In 1979 …

Trade Union membership was a better indicator of voting intent than class - as of the 87% of all voters who choose one of the two major parties, 69.5% of members voted Labour, whilst 30.5% voted Conservative - a surprisingly high figure given the context.

Social changes in the 1980s changed the class profile of the UK and reduced many elements of the traditional working class: manufacturing, mining, trade unions, council housing etc. This created a much broader and diverse middle class that all political parties tried to appeal to.  Labour’s 1997 victory was however…

seen as the product of appealing beyond traditional class boundaries. Labour’s swing was pretty consistent - a 27% swing to Labour in the AB and C1 categories, 22% in C2 and 20% in DE. Here there was no marked class difference, rather a reaction to short term factors such as the unpopularity of the Major government.

 But, the fact Labour were able to reduce the Conservative lead in the A-C1 category overall to just 5%, can be seen as a ‘class breakthrough’ due to the …

new rebrand and style under Blair. By 2010, just 38% of voters could be seen as ‘class voters’, rising to only 40% in 2015. 

In 2019 the Conservatives won across all social classes:

• This would seem to suggest other issues are more important eg. the appeal of ‘Get Brexit Done’, Boris Johnson and the lack of appeal of Jeremy Corbyn. 

• In the 100 most working class constituencies in 2019, the gap from 2017 narrowed significantly - so Labour won 53 (compared to 72 in 2017) and the Conservatives 31 (compared to 13 in 2017).

In 2024, Labour won across all social classes:

• This would seem to suggest people no longer identify with class interests. The only real pattern is the big extra percentages in the Reform share of the vote. But the fact the percentages of ABC1 and C2DE voter difference is only a +/- of 3% for Labour and 2% for the Conservatives suggests class doesn’t matter much.

• ABC1 voters voted 36% Labour, 25% Conservative and 11% Reform.

• C2DE voters voted 33% Labour, 23% Conservative and 20% Reform.

The links of class to region must also be recognised - with party support typically concentrated - mostly due to social and economic factors. The south-east tends to be most loyal to the Conservatives being the most prosperous region with high level of property ownership, an ethnically white rural area and has little tradition of industrial trade unionism, making it typically higher class. However …

Labour tend to dominate ethnically diverse big cities with large working class populations eg. South Wales, Merseyside, Manchester etc. As a rule, the industrial north has been more likely to vote Labour and the south Conservative. Lib dems have fared disproportionately badly across the UK because of FPTP due to a lack of geographically concentrated support, but where it has done well is usually the celtic fringe of the south west, wales and scotland. 

The relationship between voters and class is now very fractured. The Conservatives will normally win the AB voters (this is doubly helpful due to turnout levels eg. typically AB class has around 15-20% higher turnout than DE class (eg. turnout 2015 AB = 75%, DE = 57%)

The Conservatives are likely to win the C2 class of skilled manual workers too. Labour will win the DE voters. They are also strong in the C1 class - other than that there is little certainty. If the old working class are C2DE then which party will win, is not clear. 

Given this was the very demographic Labour was set up to represent, this change - where Conservatives may well win the working class - is pretty extraordinary. That is the huge and most significant class shift of the last 50 years.

2019 and 2024 are difficult elections to judge much on, other than the fact that the UK electorate are fickle. 2019 was Labour’s worst election results since 1935. Just 5 years later, and the Conservatives endured their worst election result ever since their formation in 1834. 

Despite this fractured voter - class link, the parties will appeal in part to their ‘old’ demographics. For example …

the Conservatives focus on lower taxes, defense of property and free market, smaller state, accepting inequality etc, whilst Labour campaign on better welfare, stronger state intervention, challenge inequality etc.

Partisanship or voting attachment is where voters feel strongly attached to one political party, which it sees as representing their voice, community and type of person. Family loyalty to a party as well as community, workplace, cultural and personal influences can play a role - where …

through family and sociology, people vote as their parents and local community votes. In post-war Britain most voters claimed to identify with a party, with 44% of voters ‘very strongly identifying with a party. 

Party loyalty has declined markedly since the 1970s through ‘partisan dealignment’ - partly due to the growth in individualism, decline in social deference and decline in party membership. This has led to …

the rise of the ‘floating voter’. By 2005 only 10% of voters claimed to ‘very strongly’ identify with a party. 

Parties still seek to communicate their overall values and mission to voters, many of which will retain a loose association with one main party. They can rebrand themselves when they feel they need to widen their appeal to reflect changes in society. For example …

New Labour from 1995 and Corbyn’s return to socialism alternative in 2015, or Cameron’s ‘Compassionate Conservative’ leadership of the Conservatives from 2005, or Theresa May’s pitch for the “just about managing” voters 2016. 

Issue-based voting is of much greater importance than partisan alignment in modern times. For example:

• Labour voters in 1980s who were attracted to Thatcher eg. over Council House sales.

• Rise of UKIP to secure support from Conservative and Labour voters over the EU.

• The solid national backing for Johnson in 2019 on the basis of his pledge to ‘get Brexit done’ 

• The rise of Reform appealing to those who feel ‘left behind’?

In 2019, the Conservatives hung on to 85% of their voters from 2017, compared to Labour who maintained only 72% of theirs. The Conservatives lost 7% of these voters to the Lib Dems and 4% to Labour. Labour however …

lost 11% of their voters to the Conservatives and 9% to the Lib Dems.  The Liberal Democrats however hung on to 72% of their voters - and other surveys put this lower at around 59%.

In 2024, the Conservatives lost 47% of their voters. However 25% of these went to Reform and only 10% went to Labour. This would suggest right-wing voters will stay right-wing  - the Conservatives disaster was due to this switch of voters, but equally, the failure of their supporters to turn out to vote):

• 71% of 2019 Labour voted Labour in 2024. So the Labour Party managed to lose 29% of its voters from 2019. These mainly switched to the Greens (10%) and Lib Dems (8%).

• Only 49% of 2019 Lib Dem voters remained Lib Dem voters in 2024. 30% switched to Labour - which seems pretty clear evidence of tactical voting. 10% perhaps surprisingly, switched to the Conservatives.

There will always be a core of supporters who will remain loyal. Perhaps parties can assume around ½ their voters from the previous election will continue to back them in the next election? But clearly, times are very volatile and people in the 21st century feel notably differently than those in the 20th century over switching party loyalties. The biggest example of this from 2024 could be …

loss of 29% of its voters, despite the Conservatives awful reputation by 2024. However this may be instead because some people in 2019 voted Labour in 2019 to oppose the Conservatives and then switched to more favoured parties in 2024, because they knew Labour was going to win anyway and no longer ‘needed’ their votes. 

Historically, black and other ethnic minority voters have usually voted Labour, which was seen as offering them more opportunity and promoting toleration and diversity. Labour traditionally supported …

immigration and promoted BME candidates more than other parties and the Conservatives have been opposed to higher immigration. 

Some Asian communities - particularly in Sikh and Hindu groups - have been more attracted to Conservatives thanks to pro-business approaches and the growth of education and Asian participation in professional-level jobs. Since the Commonwealth …

immigrant communities have been more aligned with C2, D and E classes, which are more likely to vote Labour. Labour’s commitment to multiculturalism is far clearer than the Conservatives, having introduced the race acts of 1965, 1968 and 1976 to outlaw racial discrimination.

In 2015, Labour had a lead of 42% over the Conservatives amongst voters with a Black African or Caribbean heritage. Labour also enjoyed an 18% lead amongst voters with a South Asian heritage and a 13% lead amongst the much smaller group of other Asian voters. The 2015 election perhaps suggested …

that traditional support for Labour was being eroded and ethnic minority voters were becoming less partisan and more like the rest of the electorate … but this theory doesn’t hold up when looking at the 2017 and 2019 figures…

In 2017, 73% of ethnic minority voters supported Labour in 2017 - the harder line on immigration held by the Conservatives reduced support for them. Ethnic minority votes played a key role in some urban marginal seats in 2017. The British Future think tank’s 2017 report argued that if the Conservatives were as popular with non-white voters as they were as popular with non-white voters as they were with white voters, they would have …

picked up 1.2million more votes, and an extra 28 seats - leaving them with a 42 seat majority in 2017 … rather than a 1 seat minority government. However, ethnic minorities typically have low turnout - 11% lower than whites in both 2017 and 2019.

Ethnicity and voting in the 1997 GE:

• 32% tory from white voters and 18% from BME voters

• 43% labour from white voters and 70% from BME voters

• 18% lib dem from white voters and 9% from BME voters

Ethnicity and voting in the 2017 GE:

• 45% tory from white voters and 19% from BME voters

• 39% labour from white voters and 73% from BME voters

• 8% lib dem from white voters and 6% from BME voters

Ethnicity and voting in the 2019 GE:

• 48% tory from white voters and 20% from BME voters

• 29% labour from white voters and 64% from BME voters

• 12% lib dem from white voters and 12% from BME voters

Ethnicity and voting in the 2024 GE:

• 26% tory from white voters and 17% from BME voters

• 33% labour from white voters and 46% from BME voters

• 13% lib dem from white voters and 8% from BME voters

The pattern of the Conservatives picking up only around 20% of BME votes seems well established. Even in 2024, when the White vote share dropped 22%, the BME vote share dropped by only 3%. We can be sure Labour will have a big lead in the BME vote for the foreseeable  future. Labour consistently picked up 65-70% of the BME vote and seemed established until 2024. Now it is difficult to be so certain. Some question …

whether as succeeding generations become further integrated into British society, this will continue - since Labour is seen as pro-immigration and better on welfare which some recent immigrants may benefit from - which may be of lesser interest to fourth and fifth generation BME voters. 

Ethnicity based voting might be offset by the continuing number of migrants arriving in the UK - eg. from June 2021 - June 2023, 2.3 million migrants arrived in the UK (and net migration was 1.3m). In 2023 this reached a record high of …

1.2m (with net migration of 728,000). Of course some of these migrants will continue to be from Europe and other countries which would not make them a visible ethnic minority, and therefore not BME.

Traditionally, class and education have had a direct correlation - the higher the class, the better the education level. This was so much the case, that education was not seen as a separate analytical category until the last decade. However …

as education has improved throughout the country, the two factors have become more distinct, with the D and E class voters having the same access to standard education as all other classes. Author and Journalist David Goodhart suggested in ‘The British Dream’ that the less educated ‘somewheres’ are rooted to their communities through lack of opportunity, whilst better educated ‘anywheres’ have educational qualifications to take advantage of globalisation.

The 2017 election found people with degrees more likely to vote Labour than Conservative, and with increased access to universities since the 2000s, this is expected to potentially bleed through generationally.

• Labour won 48% of the votes of people with a degree or higher, compared to 33% Conservative.

• Conservatives won 53% to 35% Labour amongst those educated only up to GCSE level. 

In both the 2019 and 2024 elections there is a very clear correlation between the level of education and voting choice. The better educated you are …

the more likely you are to vote Labour. The less well educated you are, the more you are likely to vote Conservative, to a degree.

Of people with degree level education …

• In 2024 42% voted labour and 18% conservative

• In 2019 43% voted labour and 29% conservative

Of people with A-level education …

• In 2024 32% voted labour and 26% conservative

• In 2019 31% voted labour and 48% conservative

Of people with just GCSE level education …

• In 2024 28% voted labour and 31% conservative

• In 2019 25% voted labour and 58% conservative

For Reform, 8% of degree holders voted for the Party, whereas 23% of the GCSE educated-only voted for them. It would be easy to make patronising judgements on this data - but …

it shows how many sections of society feel marginalised and left behind, and therefore turn to extremism such as Reform or Trump in America. 

Education levels are a massive divide in UK politics. The fact Labour’s worst result in 2019 since 1935 still saw them win the Degree educated voters is notable. Equally, in the Conservatives worst result since they formed in 1834 in 2024 they still won the GCSE-only education level. The largest demographic in the UK is those educated to GCSE-only level. However …

as increasingly more degree educated people come through the British education system, this could boost Labour. This said, political parties are not fixed, and they still swing their policies to capture support from other demographics as circumstances demand. We have already seen that whilst Labour was the party of the working class from 1930-1980, then increasingly the Conservatives have challenged this, and are now arguably the party most supported by the working class.

In general, the older the age demographic, the more likely voters will support Conservatives. The reason for this may be because older people are usually better-off and or more fearful of change and therefore value the stability typically offered by the Conservatives. 

• Older voters show much higher levels of turnout and political parties have tended to develop manifestos that reflect this.

• Younger people seek change and ‘progress’, hence a stronger liking for Labour, particularly in the 18-24 demographic. Younger voters have also tended to be less partisan or loyal to a party overall. 

In 2017, age was deemed to be the most significant long term factor divide in 2017. The election saw a significant rise in both youth voting overall, and strong age-based votes of the young for Labour. This was dubbed the ‘Youthquake’, which closer analysis has proved to be a bit of a myth.

• The 18-24 turnout did rise 12 points from 43% to 54%, whilst every demographic above 35 had a fall in turnout.

• Nevertheless, compared to the 54% 18-34 year olds turnout, 71% of 65+ continued to turnout.

• This increase in young people participation fell back to 47% in 2019, suggesting this increase in youth participation is more likely a one-off, than a trend. 

In 2019 age was the greatest long term factor divide by a significant degree. 

• The age the average person changed to voting Conservative over Labour was 39. 

• In 2017, this age was 47, so a significant fall of 8 years, perhaps suggesting that voters are becoming more Conservative, or most likely due to the swing voters who fall in these age ranges who were put off by Jeremy Corbyn's leadership as a ‘return to socialism’.

The YouGov 2024 report stated “Age was a key dividing line in the last few elections, and the same is true for 2024, with younger voters being more likely to vote Labour and older voters more likely to vote for the Conservatives”. 

• In each age range below 50, between 41-46% voted Labour. This fell to 34% of 50-59 year olds, 28% of 60-69 year olds and 20% of 70+ year olds.

• For conservatives unsurprisingly the reverse was true, winning just 8% of 18-30 year olds , 12% of those in their 30s, 17% of those in their 40s, 24% of those in their 50s, 33% of those in their 60s and 46% of 70+.this dat supports the trend of the previous two elections, that the older the voter, the more likely they are to vote Conservative. Again however, how much we can learn about long term trends is impacted by the unprecedented scale of the Conservatives 2024 defeat. 

• Lib Dem vote share is higher amongst the young - but only varies 5% between the 18-24 years olds compared to the 70+.The Greens however are much stronger with the younger vote - 16% in the 18-24 compared to 4% in 60-69 year olds. Reform’s lowest share is 9% of 18-24 year olds, and highest at 19% of 50-59 year olds.

In the 1979 GE …

• 42% of 18-24 year olds voted conservative and 41% labour.

• 43% of 25-34 year olds voted conservative and 38% labour.

• 46% of 35-54 year olds voted conservative and 35% labour.

• 47% of 55+ year olds voted conservative and 38% labour.

In the 1997 GE …

• 27% of 18-24 year olds voted conservative and 49% labour.

• 28% of 25-34 year olds voted conservative and 49% labour.

• 28% of 35-44 year olds voted conservative and 48% labour.

• 31% of 45-54 year olds voted conservative and 41% labour.

• 36% of 65+ year olds voted conservative and 41% labour.

In the 2017 GE …

• 27% of 18-24 year olds voted conservative and 62% labour.

• 27% of 25-34 year olds voted conservative and 56% labour.

• 33% of 35-44 year olds voted conservative and 49% labour.

• 43% of 45-54 year olds voted conservative and 40% labour.

• 61% of 65+ year olds voted conservative and 25% labour.

In the 2024 GE …

• 5% of 18-24 year olds voted conservative and 41% labour.

• 10% of 25-34 year olds voted conservative and 47% labour.

• 17% of 35-44 year olds voted conservative and 41% labour.

• 22% of 45-54 year olds voted conservative and 26% labour.

• 43% of 65+ year olds voted conservative and 23% labour.

Turnout tends to be higher for older age groups:

• In 2024 18-24s = 37% and 65+ = 73%

• In 2017 18-24s = 54% and 65+ = 71%

• In 2015 18-24s = 43% and 65+ = 78%

There is a clear and undeniable trend of a significant gap between how younger and older voters tend to back eg. The Conservatives won in the 55-64 and 65+ age ranges in every election from 1974-2019, other than 1997. But trends are occasionally erratic eg. in 1979 or 1992, the percentage of 18-24 year olds voting Conservative or Labour was broadly the same. 

• Even if we know the young vote one way, and older people another, the 35-55 groups have all swung considerably in recent elections. The 25-44 group has ranged from a 13% Labour lead to a drawn (except for 2024 which was a landslide Labour victory and 24% Labour lead)

• The 45-54 age range has twice been a 2% lead for the Conservatives in 2017, but then followed by an 18% lead for the Conservatives in 2019, and then a 14% lead of Labour in 2024. 

Since 1979, there has been a much clearer regional divide in voting. Margaret Thatcher's government in the 1980s led to a big decline for the Conservatives in Scotland and Wales. The term ‘North-South divide’ was first used in the 1980s to reflect …

 that outside London, the Conservatives won in nearly all places south of the Bristol - the Wash line, whilst Labour dominated north of it. Economic decline of the North and Midlands played a part in division.

The North-South divide remains both a too simplistic definition, but equally a useful starting point:

• Clear richer/poorer divide and rural/urban divides

• Conservatives are stronger in wealthier areas (south, south east, east, rural areas, small towns, shire counties) 

• Labour are stronger in poorer areas (Lancashire/York, North East, Scotland (historically before the SNP), Wales and London)

In Scotland, Labour have traditionally dominated eg. Labour won the most Scottish seats in every GE between 1995-2010 and 66% or more seats between 1987 to 2010.

• Devolution since 1997 helped nationalist parties to secure greater representation.

• In 2001-2010 GE in Scotland, Labour dominated. But following the close, but unsuccessful Scottish IndyRef in 2014, and several years of successful SNP  scottish governments in Holyrood, the SNP caused a ‘political earthquake’ by all but wiping Labour out in Scotland in 2015. 

• Labour has been massively squeezed in Scotland by the rise of the left-wing SNP, which has captured the Labour vote by offering ‘socialism with a Scottish face’. Hard to see how Labour win back power in Westminster, without improving their performance in Scotland.

In the 1997 GE …

• In the North there were 17 tory seats, 139 labour and 5 other.

• In the Midlands there were 61 tory seats, 95 labour and 3 other.

• In London there were 11 tory seats, 57 labour and 7 other.

• In the South there were 76 tory seats, 37 labour and 21 other.

• In Wales there were 0 tory seats, 34 labour and 6 other.

• In Scotland there were 0 tory seats, 56 labour and 16 other.

In the 2017 GE …

• In the North there were 40 tory seats, 117 labour and 1 other.

• In the Midlands there were 116 tory seats, 46 labour and 1 other.

• In London there were 21 tory seats, 49 labour and 3 other.

• In the South there were 119 tory seats, 15 labour and 4 other.

• In Wales there were 8 tory seats, 28 labour and 4 other.

• In Scotland there were 13 tory seats, 7 labour and 39 other.

In the 2024 GE …

• In the North there were 13 tory seats, 134 labour and 7 other.

• In the Midlands there were 53 tory seats, 84 labour and 28 other.

• In London there were 9 tory seats, 59 labour and 7 other.

• In the South there were 41 tory seats, 60 labour and 48 other.

• In Wales there were 0 tory seats, 27 labour and 5 other.

• In Scotland there were 5 tory seats, 37 labour and 15 other.

In 2019 Labour lost between 5.8% to 12.8% of votes in every region in the UK - the biggest falls being in the North-East (12.8%) and Yorkshire and Humberside (10.1%). The Conservatives …

gained votes between 1.3% and 3.9% in every region except Scotland where they lost up to 3.5% and small insignificant falls in safe seats in London and the South East between -1.1% and -0.6%. Conservatives won 25 seats from Labour in the North overall

2019 was seen by some as a key moment when the Conservatives broke through into traditional heartlands in the North. Then 2024 was seemingly remarkable gains by Labour in the South, whilst all the Conservative gains were reversed.The reality seems to be that the results have been …

so diverse, it is hard to see any long term patterns here … except for the fact the regional situation is more unpredictable than the past. Nevertheless the South and East will nevertheless remain core Conservative heartlands, and Labour will dominate in the North. The Lib Dems heartland lies in the South West.

Regions remain very easy to categorise in general terms - unless there is a Labour landslide as in 1997 or 2024, or a Conservative breakthrough as in 2019. The south remains overwhelmingly Conservative, roughly 10-1 advantages in seats gained in 2015-19. Whilst the Midlands and East have…

a commanding Conservative advantage, with roughly 3.5-1 advantages in the seats gained between 2015-19. These two areas make up 301 seats of the 650 available, giving the Conservatives a significant starting advantage seemingly. 

In Scotland, the SNP has so dominated that neither party receives many seats. This lack of seats isn’t a concern to the Conservatives, compared to labour who have traditionally needed many of the 59 seats there to form an overall UK government. In the other 3 areas …

Labour has the advantage, but to a lesser degree than the Conservatives enjoy in their regions.In the North, Labour has a 3-1 lead, but that was reduced to 1.5-1 in 2019. In London, Labour have a 2.5-1 lead, and in Wales around a 2-1 lead, but these area make up only 113 seats. 2024 rewrote all of these figures, but this being a trend is very unlikely, and are only a distortion due to the landslide anomaly of Labour in 2024. This doesn’t necessarily make elections predictable. Regions do have an impact on making elections more predictable due to long term factors, but it is very far from anything like a complete story on understanding the UK GE results.

The figures of gender-determined votes have changed post-WW2, with Labour traditionally associated to male-dominated trade unions leading to more male voters and inflation hitting family finances, providing …

the conservatives appeal to housewife voters. Thatcher's role as the first female PM also had this acting as an appeal to female voters and policy on gender equality.

Women are seen to be more Conservative on average up until 1997. The 1974 and 1979 results showed this, for example a +12% lead for the Conservatives in 1979 amongst females, compared to +3% for males. The 1992 elections also showed the gap between female and males voting for the Conservatives - 10% for females and 4% for males. Labour under Tony Blair then made…

 a breakthrough by attracting more women's vote - with 44% of females in 1997 voting Labour, compared to 45% of males. Since this time, gender has been seen as playing a weak role in predicting voter behaviour. Between 2015 and 2019, both men and women were thought to be more likely to vote Conservative, but to different degrees. On average males were 9% more likely to vote Conservative, but females 5% more, turning the idea of women as the more Conservative voters on its head. 

The lack of difference between gender voting seems to have fed into the party’s lack of women-only policies.For example, none of the main political parties made gender-specific pledges as key parts of their manifesto in 2017. The newly founded Women's Equality Party only got 3500 votes across the entire UK - finishing therefore 21st and behind the Christian Alliance Party, BNP and Monster Raving Loony Party. However, …

 some bigger differences emerge in certain demographics eg. 18-24 year olds, 28% of men voted conservative and 46% labour, compared to 15% of women voting conservative and 65% choosing Labour. Some argue female voters are more flexible or undecided and therefore open to persuasion during campaigns.2024 may have bucked the recent trend, with more women voting Conservative (26%) than Labour (23%). One difference has been a significant rise in the number of female MPs since 1997: 23 in 1983, 120 in 1997, 208 in 2017, 220 in 2019 and 330 in 2024.

In the 1979 GE …

• 43% of men voted conservative compared to 40% labour

• 47% of women voted conservative compared to 35% labour

In the 1997 GE …

• 31% of men voted conservative compared to 45% labour

• 32% of women voted conservative compared to 44% labour

In the 2017 GE …

• 44% of men voted conservative compared to 40% labour

• 43% of women voted conservative compared to 42% labour

In the 2024 GE …

• 23% of men voted conservative compared to 34% labour

• 26% of women voted conservative compared to 35% labour

The short term reasons for voting behaviour can be remembered as LICPIG …

leaders of the party, image of the party, campaign techniques, policies and manifestos, inspires tactical voting and turnout, governing competency.