Divine Command Theory – Objections & Replies (Lecture Review)

Flashcards covering key objections to Divine Command Theory, the major replies offered, and why each reply faces serious challenges.

What does Objection #4 to Divine Command Theory (DCT) claim about God's power over morality?

That God could command any action whatsoever—e.g., rape, murder, or genocide—and instantly make it morally right or wrong.

Why is rape, murder, and genocide being possibly 'morally right' under DCT considered problematic?

Because most people believe these acts are intrinsically immoral and could never be made morally right by any command, even God’s.

First reply to Objection #4: Why, according to some, would God NOT command rape, murder, or genocide?

Because God has previously commanded against such acts (e.g., Exodus 20:13, 'Thou shalt not kill').

What is the key weakness in the first reply ("God has already commanded otherwise")?

Scripture contains many past divine commands that believers no longer think apply (e.g., executing children who strike parents), so it’s unclear why the anti-murder command still binds while others don’t.

Give one Old Testament example of a command most believers think no longer applies.

Exodus 21:15 – 'Whoever strikes father or mother shall surely be put to death.'

Why does citing superseded commands create a problem for the first reply to Objection #4?

Because if God can revoke earlier commands, He could also revoke the anti-murder command; therefore prior commands give no guarantee He won’t command atrocities in the future.

Second reply to Objection #4: What trait of God is appealed to?

God’s perfect moral goodness.

How does Objection 2a challenge the claim that God’s 'perfect moral goodness' prevents immoral commands?

Within DCT, ‘moral goodness’ seems to mean only that God perfectly obeys His own commands, whatever they are, which makes the notion of goodness hollow.

How does Objection 2b use a Euthyphro-style dilemma for divine traits?

It asks whether traits like love and justice are good because God has them, or God is good because He has them. Either morality is independent of God or goodness becomes arbitrary.

What consequence follows if traits are good only because God possesses them (Objection 2b)?

In a godless world love, justice, and generosity would have no moral value, which seems implausible.

Third reply to Objection #4: What does it claim about rape, murder, and genocide?

That these acts are morally wrong, therefore God would not command them.

Why does the third reply effectively abandon Divine Command Theory?

Because it treats moral wrongness as existing independently of God’s commands, contradicting the core of DCT.

Summative point of Objections 2–4 according to the lecture?

Given DCT, there is no moral reason for God not to command rape, murder, or genocide, which is itself objectionable.

What psychological motive did the lecturer attribute to the first two replies?

They help Divine Command theorists 'sleep at night' by granting the objection yet assuring themselves God wouldn’t issue horrific commands.

In DCT, what change is required for a formerly moral command (e.g., executing a disobedient child) to become immoral today?

God must issue a new, superseding command reversing the original order.

Why does the ability to supersede commands raise further doubts about DCT’s moral stability?

If God can revoke past commands, nothing prevents Him from revoking current prohibitions, making morality unstable and potentially arbitrary.

How does the Noah’s Ark narrative illustrate Objection 2a’s concern?

God commands and carries out a global genocide yet, under DCT, remains perfectly morally good simply by obeying His own command.

What is meant by saying God 'perfectly exemplifies' good-making traits?

He not only possesses traits like love and justice but manifests them flawlessly at all times.

How does West Morrison summarize the dilemma about divine traits and moral value?

Either goodness of traits is independent of God (making God unnecessary for morality) or their goodness depends on God (making morality arbitrary if God didn’t exist).

If morality is created solely by divine commands, what status do actions have before God commands about them?

They are morally neutral—neither right nor wrong—until God issues a command.

What does the lecture conclude about defending DCT against Objection #4?

All three standard replies fail: one is undermined by obsolete commands, one by hollow or arbitrary goodness, and the third abandons DCT entirely.