CRIM CASES (LAWS201)

Fagan v Commissioner of Metropolitan Police

AR and MR must be contemporaneous. The mens rea can be superimposed on the existing act; only as long as the act is of continuing nature.

R v Miller

Where the defendant causes a dangerous situation and subsequently becomes aware of it, D has a duty to take action to rectify the danger. Failure/omission to do so, may result in liability.

R v Larsonneur

Established that a person can be found guilty of a "state of affairs" crime even if their presence in a prohibited location is entirely involuntary.

R v Winzar

Established that for certain "state of affairs" crimes, a defendant can be convicted even if they did not voluntarily create the situation.

Kilbride v Lake

A person cannot be held criminally liable for an act or omission unless it was within their conduct, knowledge, or control.

R v Woollin

A jury may infer intention where:

death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention); 

And the defendant appreciated that this was the case.

A substantial risk is not enough to establish intention, as this amounts to recklessness, not intention.

R v Piri

The English cases on intention (e.g. Nedrick and Woollin) are primarily relevant only to s 167(a) of the Crimes Act, not to the broader statutory definition of murder in New Zealand.

R v Wentworth

For the purposes of s 66(1)(b), "purpose" is satisfied by intention, which includes both direct intention and foreseen incidental (oblique) consequences.

Police v K

Intention requires deliberate conduct with knowledge of the consequence, not proof of motive.

R v Crooks

Knowledge includes subjective belief, and deliberate wilful blindness can be evidence of that knowledge.

R v G

Recklessness is subjective—the defendant must actually foresee the risk and unjustifiably take it.

R v Harney

Recklessness under s 167(b) is subjective—D must foresee the risk and deliberately continue despite it.

R v Tipple

Recklessness is generally subjective—the defendant must foresee and unjustifiably take the risk, unless a statute provides otherwise.

R v Heihei

Recklessness requires actual, conscious appreciation of the risk—not merely that the defendant should have known it existed.

R v Hay

No recklessness where D genuinely believes their precautions have removed the risk.

R v Cameron

If a statute is silent on mens rea, recklessness will usually be implied rather than knowledge.

Woolmington v DPP

The prosecution must prove every element of the offence beyond reasonable doubt; the defendant does not have to prove accident.

R v Strawbridge

Where mens rea is silent, actus reus creates a rebuttable presumption of mens rea, but the Crown must still disprove reasonable doubt.

Police v Creedon

 In regulatory offences, liability turns on absence of fault (objective avoidability), not strict liability or subjective mistake.

MOT v Burnetts Motors Ltd

 introduces (via Canada) the three-tier classification of offences: mens rea, strict liability with due diligence, and absolute liability.

Civil Aviation Dept v Mackenzie

formally adopts the Sault Ste Marie three-tier system for NZ: mens rea, strict liability with due diligence, and absolute liability.

Millar v MOT

confirms the Mackenzie three-tier system and provides the general approach for classifying offences.

Jackson v Attorney-General

practical application of Millar: offence classified as strict liability after applying step-by-step factors; D must prove absence of fault.

Stevenson v R

presumption of full mens rea rebutted by statutory wording, history, and purpose, leading to strict liability.

Turner v South Taranaki District Council

“allowing” implies knowledge (full mens rea), but pure ownership offences may impose liability regardless of fault.

Progressive Enterprises Ltd v Commerce Commission

clear statutory requirement of intention means class 1 full mens rea, regardless of consumer protection context.

AHI Operations Ltd v Department of Labour

step 2 precedent can justify class 3 absolute liability even where offence looks like a public welfare offence.

IRD v Thomas

absolute liability justified to prevent taxpayers avoiding responsibility by blaming accountants and undermining tax enforcement.

Borrow v Van Den Beld and Boyes v New Zealand Customs

customs offences are class 3 absolute liability; knowledge of importation is enough, but not knowledge of the item’s legal nature.

New Zealand Customs Service v DHL International (NZ) Ltd

courts may either follow pre-Mackenzie customs precedent or apply Millar afresh; here, fresh analysis led to strict liability.

Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries v Prangley

fisheries strict liability requires real-time reasonable care; high grading is not due diligence.

Pyramid Trucking Ltd v Police

due diligence requires “all reasonable steps,” not merely some reasonable precautions.

R v Cave

misunderstood the legal meaning of "road" → mistake of law, not fact → no defence.

Keung v Police

D drove before his suspension ended → assistant miscounted the days → mistake was about the facts, not the law → honest mistake of fact was a defence in this class 1 offence.

Booth v MOT

D thought disqualification started when his licence was taken → actually started when the judge imposed it → Court wrongly treated this as a defence → later cases say it's a mistake of law, so no defence.

R v Jorgensen

6 requirements: mistake of law + considered legality + appropriate official + reasonable advice + wrong advice + reliance.

Tipple v Police

OIE not recognised as a defence in NZ → discharge without conviction instead.

Crafar v Waikato Regional Council

Confirms Tipple: OIE not a defence in NZ → at most supports a discharge without conviction if all requirements are met.

Parkes v R

→ Private lawyer ≠ appropriate official.

→ OIE requires advice from the government body administering or enforcing the law.

R v Murphy

Attempted murder requires proof of a specific intent to kill.

R v Mohan

Attempt liability requires proof of intention; nothing less is sufficient.

R v L

For attempt, intention is required for the act, but not for surrounding circumstances (e.g. absence of reasonable belief in consent).

Campbell and Bradley v Ward

Under the equivocality test, attempt requires acts that clearly demonstrate a specific criminal intent on their own.

Wylie

An attempt is established where the defendant has taken a real and practical step beyond mere preparation toward committing the offence.

Wilcox

Conduct is not an attempt where the defendant is only preparing to reach the point at which the offence would begin.

R v Harpur

Attempt is established by a holistic, common-sense assessment of whether the defendant’s conduct, viewed with their intent, has crossed from preparation into implementation—even if completion is impossible.

Johnston v R

Whether conduct amounts to an attempt must be assessed with the evidence of intent; strong intent can make otherwise preparatory acts sufficiently proximate.

Taia v New Zealand Police

Where conduct is equally consistent with innocent and criminal intent, it will not amount to a sufficiently proximate attempt.

Drewery v Police

A person can be liable for attempt if they have done all acts required of them toward the offence, even if further steps remain for others.

R v Burrett, Payne, & Phillpott

Under the (then-binding) Wilcox approach, conduct that is still preparatory and leaves substantial steps before execution is not sufficiently proximate for attempt.

R v Donnelly

There is no liability for attempt where completion of the offence is legally impossible, even if the defendant intends and attempts it.

Nicolls v R

Where the full offence is impossible due to the facts (not the law), a defendant may still be liable for attempt if they intended the offence and were sufficiently proximate.

R v Barlow

An attempt is established where the defendant has gone beyond preparation to a proximate step toward the offence, even if completion is impossible due to insufficient means.

R v Jay

Attempt liability arises where the defendant intends to commit an offence and failure is due only to a factual mistake (e.g. the goods are not what they believe), not a legal bar.

R v Gemmell

Conspiracy requires an agreement between two or more people to commit a specific offence, together with an intention to carry that agreement into effect; it is distinct from party liability under s 66(2).

R v Lang

A mere agreement between a buyer and seller for a one-off drug transaction does not amount to a conspiracy to supply drugs.

R v Johnson

Conspiracy is complete once a concluded agreement is reached, but it is also a continuing offence that lasts while the agreement remains in existence.

R v Sew Hoy

Factual impossibility is not a defence to conspiracy where the conspirators intended to commit the offence and agreed on a course of conduct to achieve it.

R v Smith

A defendant remains liable if their act is still an operating and substantial cause of death, even where another cause (such as negligent medical treatment) also contributes.

R v Kirikiri

A defendant causes death if their conduct remains an operating and substantial cause of death, even where medical treatment contributes, unless the treatment is so overwhelming it renders the original injury merely part of the history.

R v McKinnon

A defendant is causally responsible for death if their act remains an operating and substantial cause of death at the time of death, even if another immediate cause (such as asphyxiation) contributes.

R v Lewis

A defendant is liable for homicide where their conduct alone would have caused death, or where their conduct combined with another’s conduct to cause death, even if neither act alone was independently fatal.

R v Blaue

A defendant remains liable for homicide where their act is an operating and substantial cause of death, and the victim’s refusal of medical treatment (even on religious grounds) does not break the chain of causation.

R v Renata

A defendant is liable for homicide where their unlawful assault causes or accelerates death, even if the victim’s pre-existing condition means death occurs in an unexpected way.

R v Hallett

→ Natural event only breaks causation if extraordinary → ordinary environmental forces do not interrupt chain.

R v Pagett

→ Third-party self-defence/official response does NOT break causation if triggered by D → must be independent, voluntary act to break chain.

R v Kennedy

→ Free, voluntary and informed self-injection by V breaks causation; supplier not liable for death.

R v Tema

→ No break in chain where D actively assists V’s drug consumption; Kennedy only applies to truly independent self-administration.

R v Leaitua

→ Voluntary and informed self-swallowing breaks chain of causation; supplier not liable unless they control the ingestion process.

R v Tomars

V’s fear-driven response will not break causation if it is a natural and reasonably foreseeable consequence of D’s conduct.

R v Kuka

Omissions can cause death where there is a legal duty and, but for the omission, the victim would or probably would not have died.

R v Myatt

Manslaughter requires an objectively dangerous unlawful act or a dangerous omission involving a legal duty, plus a substantial and operative causal link to death.

R v Hawkins

Unlawful act manslaughter fails if the unlawful element is not the actual cause of death (death must flow from the unlawfulness itself, not just the surrounding conduct).

R v Lee

Courts assess dangerousness across the whole course of conduct, not isolated acts.

R v Powell

Unlawful act manslaughter = ordinary negligence standard; s 150A “major departure” is confined to duty-based offences.

R v Taylor

Failure of a person with s 151 duty to provide basic care can found manslaughter if it is a substantial and operative cause of death.

R v Scott

s 152 duty includes protecting children from foreseeable environmental dangers; failure may be manslaughter if it is a major departure causing death.

R v Hamer

s 150A requires an objective “major departure” from reasonable care; personal characteristics usually irrelevant, but professional knowledge may heighten the standard.

Perry v R

Core issue is whether fear → foreseeable response → death link is established.

The key control mechanism is objective foreseeability of V’s reaction, not subjective assessment of reasonableness.

R v Harney

s 167(b) = subjective recklessness + intentional infliction of bodily harm

Key threshold: D must actually foresee death as likely and proceed anyway

Jury can infer intent/recklessness from:

• weapon used

• victim’s warnings

• opportunity to stop

Shadrock v R

Section 167(d) requires that the “unlawful object” be a crime, and the fatal act must be sufficiently proximate to and in furtherance of that crime so as to form part of its continuing execution.

R v Piri

Piri shows that for s 167(d) murder, “likely to cause death” means a real or substantial risk that death might well occur from deliberately dangerous conduct undertaken to achieve an unlawful object.

Kumar v R CRNZ; Kumar v R SCNZ

Confirms that murder can be proved where separate acts form one continuous transaction driven by a sustained intent to kill, even if the fatal act occurs later in time.