SECTION 2: END OF WORLD WAR II & EMERGENCE OF U.S. GLOBAL POWER

HOW DID WWII END AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM? (3 reasons)

(1.) Global economic/political conditions of 1945-47

(2.) Role of American leaders in abandoning isolationism

(3.) Rise of an ideological challenge from the USSR

GLOBAL ECONOMIC/POLITICAL CONDITIONS of why US ENDED AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM

Europe was broke and broken; America was rich and strong — so the U.S. HAD to lead, whether it wanted to or not.

Role of American political leaders to abandon isolationism

(1.) Roosevelt’s Plan

(2.) Yalta Conference and Yalta Axioms

(3.) Bretton Woods System

ROOSEVELT'S PLAN (VERY IMPORTANT — memorize this)

(1.) Total defeat & disarmament of Japan/Germany (pacifist constitutions imposed on both).

(2.) Commitment to prevent future depressions + support self-determination.

(3.) Global collective security with active U.S. involvement.

(4.) "Allies in war must be allies in peace" — wartime partners can't just walk away afterward.

YALTA CONFERENCE (Feb 1945) / "YALTA AXIOMS"

Meeting of President FDR, Churchill, Stalin. President FDR made CONCESSIONS to the USSR (territory, influence in Eastern Europe) because he believed a stable postwar world required taking the interests of major powers into account.

BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM (1944) — THREE MAJOR INSTITUTIONS

(1.) INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) — manages international currency exchange rates/stability.

(2.) WORLD BANK (International Bank for Reconstruction & Development / IBRD) — funds reconstruction and development.

(3.) GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT) — later became the WTO — facilitates open/free trade.

How did Truman differ from Roosevelt in foreign policy?

Truman initially followed FDR's cooperative approach, but by 1946 grew alarmed — the USSR wasn't honoring Yalta agreements and was undermining Eastern European governments. FDR thought "we can work with Stalin." Truman (via Kennan) concluded "we can't trust Stalin — we must contain him."

GEORGE KENNAN'S "LONG TELEGRAM" (Feb 1946) & the "RIGA AXIOMS"

Kennan argued Soviet behavior was driven by IDEOLOGY (Marxism, hostility to capitalism), not just normal power politics, and that the USSR sought to undermine Western interests everywhere.

YALTA AXIOMS vs. RIGA AXIOMS — how they show the FDR/Truman difference

(1.) YALTA AXIOMS (Roosevelt's view): Peace is possible through COOPERATION and compromise with the Soviets — big powers can work together.

(2.) RIGA AXIOMS (the view that shaped Truman): The Soviets are ideologically driven and inherently expansionist/hostile — cooperation is naive; the U.S. must instead CONTAIN them.

TRUMAN DOCTRINE

"America must help free peoples maintain their free institutions… against aggressive movements that seek to impose totalitarian regimes" — first applied to Greece and Turkey.

CONTAINMENT

Strategy (coined by George Kennan, 1947) to PREVENT the spread of communism/Soviet influence, rather than roll it back or ignore it.

What were the TOOLS OF CONTAINMENT?

REGIONAL SECURITY PACTS, ECONOMIC & MILITARY ASSISTANCE (MARSHALL PLAN), NSC-68.

REGIONAL SECURITY PACTS

military/political alliances. Example: NATO (1949) — ARTICLE 5 says an attack on one member is an attack on all; also Rio Pact (1947), ANZUS (1951), SEATO, and bilateral deals with Philippines/Japan/Taiwan/South Korea.

MARSHALL PLAN (1948-52)

~$17 billion to rebuild Western Europe so poverty wouldn't push countries toward communism. Also the Point Four Program and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.

NSC-68 (a top-secret 1950 policy report)

(1.) DEFENSE: Massive build-up of U.S./allied military spending & strength.

(2.) INTERNAL SECURITY: Guard against communist "sabotage, subversion, espionage" at home — this fed McCarthyism (Sen. Joseph McCarthy's hunt for communists/sympathizers).

Korea (The First Major Test of Containment), what were its implications?

(1.) Sharp increase in U.S. defense spending + militarized NATO.

(2.) Belief that the U.S. must keep large standing armies ready at all times.

(3.) Confirmed (in American eyes) that a "Sino-Soviet bloc" pushing communism was real.

(4.) Gave real-world credibility to the scary global picture painted in NSC-68 — this is the moment containment became FULLY operational policy (not just words).

What were the FOUR CHALLENGES TO THE COLD WAR CONSENSUS?

THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT, DISUNITY IN THE EAST AND WEST, BRIDGES ACROSS EAST AND WEST, THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM).

THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

China and the USSR were NOT a unified communist bloc after all. Mutual mistrust, historical rivalries, and disagreements (e.g., the USSR refused to help China build nuclear weapons; Mao rejected "peaceful coexistence" with the West that Khrushchev pursued).

DISUNITY IN THE EAST AND WEST

Communism wasn't fully unified in the East (1953 uprising in East Germany; 1956 Hungarian revolt), and the West wasn't fully unified either (French President Charles de Gaulle pursued a more independent foreign policy, refused to join the integrated nuclear force with the U.S./UK/Germany, and vetoed the UK's bid to join the European Common Market).

BRIDGES ACROSS EAST AND WEST

de Gaulle also built ties WITH Eastern Europe (social/cultural/economic contacts, visits) to promote political accommodation instead of pure confrontation.

THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM)

newly independent post-WWII states refused to pick a side (US or USSR). Founded by India's PM Nehru; the 1955 Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states and the 1951 Belgrade Conference (leaders like Tito of Yugoslavia, Nehru of India, Sukarno of Indonesia) showed a "third way" outside the two blocs.