Metaphysics of Mind Glossary Final

Ability knowledge

Knowledge of how to do something: the ability to perform some physical and/or mental activity (e.g. knowing how to drive or do mental arithmetic). Knowing 'how' to do something, e.g. knowing how to imagine the colour red.

Ability knowledge (response to the ‘knowledge/Mary’ argument)

An objection to Jackson’s ‘knowledge/Mary argument’ for property dualism (and against reductive physicalism). It agrees that Mary learns something new but rejects the claim that what she acquires is propositional knowledge (‘knowledge that’) of anything non physical. When Mary sees colour for the first time, she has learned how to do certain things, such as acquired the ability to identify, discriminate between, and remember colours. Acquiring ability knowledge (‘know how’) is consistent with physicalism, and so the ‘knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism fails.

Acquaintance knowledge

Knowledge 'of' something, e.g. knowledge of the colour red.

Actual world

The world (as in the totality of existence) as it really is. This world is often contrasted with worlds that are merely possible (logically or metaphysically).

Analogy

A comparison drawn between one thing (or set of things) and another thing (or set of things), whereby similarities are identified for the purposes of clarification or explanation.

Analogy (argument from/responding to issues for dualism)

A first person response to the ‘problem of other minds’ facing dualism. Based on the certainty of one's own mind and the causal connection between one's mental states and behavioural states, one infers that others also have minds because their behavioural states are similar when subject to similar stimulus. One intuition underpinning the argument is the notion that ‘like effects have like causes’. Mill's argument states that we can use the behaviour of other people based on certain stimuli to infer that they have minds because they behave as I do, and I have a mind.

Asymmetry (issues for behaviourism)

An objection to behaviourist claims that language about mental states can be reduced to language about behaviour or behavioural dispositions. It questions how having a mental state could consist of being in a behavioural state or disposition when introspective access to one's own mental states seems direct and certain, whereas knowledge of others' mental states based on behaviour is indirect, inferred, and fallible. This asymmetry can be raised as an issue for other physicalist theories of mind.

Behaviourism (hard)

The view (associated with Hempel) that all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning (i.e. analytically reduced) to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states (movements or behaviours).

Behaviourism (philosophical)

A family of (physicalist) theories claiming that language about the mind (or mental states) can be analysed in terms of language about behaviour (and/or behavioural dispositions). Mental concepts acquire their meaning by virtue of their reference to (or relationship with) behaviour.

Behaviourism (soft)

The view (associated with Ryle) that propositions about mental states are (or can be translated/reduced to) propositions about behavioural dispositions that use ordinary language.

Best hypothesis (responding to issues for dualism)

An inductive (or abductive) response to the ‘problem of other minds’ facing dualism, which is an objective/third-person response. The core idea of this response is that, when considering the behaviour we observe in other human beings (and perhaps non-human animals), the most convincing explanation for that behaviour is the existence of minds in those beings

Brain states

Physiological states and processes of the brain (e.g. patterns of neural activity). Some physicalist theories, like mind brain type identity theory, argue for an ontological reduction of mental states to brain states.

Category mistake

An error that arises when we place concepts or properties in the wrong logical category (e.g. if we were to claim that ‘the triangle is bitter’, we would be placing a geometric concept in a sensory category to which it does not belong). Treating a concept as belonging to a logical category that it doesn't belong to, e.g. the foreigner looking for ‘team spirit’ on a cricket pitch.

Category mistake (Ryle/issues for dualism)

An error that occurs when concepts or properties are placed in the wrong logical category. For example, saying "the triangle is bitter" is a category mistake because a geometric concept is put into a sensory category to which it doesn't belong. Ryle argued that an error arises when we treat mental states as belonging to ‘the mind’ as if this were ‘a thing’ which exists in the same way that physical objects or living bodies exist, albeit constituted by a non-physical substance. Instead, for Ryle, the mind is fundamentally a way of describing how we act in the world, rather than an independent entity separate from the body and its behaviour

Causal role functionalism

The version of functionalism that interprets the function of mental states in terms the role they play in a network of causes and effects. A mental state can be 'realised' by any state that plays that causal role. Mental states are functional states, which is the relationship between an input and an output that explains the causal role between the two.

China thought experiment (issues for functionalism)

Block proposes a hypothetical scenario whereby the population of China, using two way radios, duplicates the functions of the brain. Block argues that (machine) functionalism is committed to saying such a system would have mental states (e.g. qualia), and if we reject this: for example, because we think it is radically counterintuitive, we should reject machine functionalism. It is a thought experiment by Block, presented as an objection to functionalism. If the population of China, using radios, duplicated the functioning of your brain, would this create conscious experiences (just as your brain does)? If not, functionalism (about consciousness) is false.

Circularity (issues for behaviourism)

Philosophical behaviourists face an issue defining mental states in terms of behavioural states due to an alleged circularity in their analysis. The behaviourist attempts to reduce claims about mental states to claims about behaviour or behavioural dispositions, but an exhaustive analysis will always include references to (and therefore come back round to) mental states.

Conceivability (argument for substance dualism)

A deductive argument for the conclusion that minds are not identical to (physical) bodies or parts of (physical) bodies, but are distinct (mental) substances. For Descartes, conceivability entails possibility. It is conceivable that the mind can exist without the body and the body without the mind because he has a ‘clear and distinct idea’ of their different essential natures… Therefore, it is possible that the mind can exist without the body. If it is possible that the mind can exist without the body (if ‘God could make it so’) then they must be distinct substances.

Conceivable

Something is conceivable as far as it can be thought of without contradiction or incoherence. It is often associated with logical possibility. Capable of being imagined or grasped mentally without incoherence or contradiction.

Conceptual interaction problem (Elisabeth Princess of Bohemia/issues for dualism)

An objection to interactionist dualism (the position that there is two way causal interaction between the mind and body). Elisabeth argues, against Descartes’ substance dualism, that the mind and body cannot interact in the way he suggested because causation is conceptually constituted by contact between extended (physical) bodies, and Descartes denies that the mind is extended or a (physical) body.

Consciousness

The subjective phenomenon of awareness of the world and/or of one's mental states. We often use this word in place of ‘mind’ in modern philosophy.

Disposition

How something or someone will or is likely to behave under certain circumstances: what it or they would do, could do, or are liable to do, in particular situations or under particular conditions, including conditions that they are not in at the moment.

Disposition (behavioural)

Dispositions refer to how a being (someone or something) would behave or react under certain circumstances: the full range of what a being will do, could do, or is likely to do given some set of (hypothetical) conditions (e.g. coffee tends to dissolve when mixed with water, and babies tend to cry when they are hungry).

Divisibility argument

An argument (by Descartes) for substance dualism. Because bodies (characterised by extension) are divisible, and minds (characterised by thought) are not divisible, minds cannot be identical with bodies or parts of bodies: they do not have the same essential characteristics. Therefore, mind and body are distinct substances. Descartes' argument that bodies are divisible into spatial parts, but minds have no such parts. Therefore, the mind is a distinct substance from the body.

Dualism (epiphenomenalist)

A version of dualism (the view that the mind (or mental states) and body (or physical states) are ontologically distinct substances or properties) which holds that mental states have no physical effects. On this view, mental states and events are epiphenomena: causally impotent byproducts caused by physical processes

Dualism (interactionist)

A version of dualism (the view that the mind (or mental states) and body (or physical states) are ontologically distinct substances or properties) which holds that there is (two way) causal interaction between mental and physical states (substances or properties): mental events affect physical events, and physical events affect mental events (e.g. desires can cause bodily movements, and bodily impacts can cause pain). The theory that mental and physical events can cause one another even though the mind and body are distinct substances (interactionist substance dualism)

Dualism (property)

A version of dualism which claims that while there are only physical substances (e.g. bodies) there are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties, and are therefore ontologically distinct. The theory that there is only one kind of substance, physical substance, but two ontologically basic kinds of property: mental properties and physical properties.

Dualism (substance)

A version of dualism in which minds are not identical to bodies or parts of bodies. Minds (or mental states) and bodies (or physical states) constitute distinct substances: they are ontologically independent and bear different properties. For Descartes, the essence of mind is (active) thought (or intellect), while the essence of body is (passive) unthinking extension.

Easy problem of consciousness

The problem of analysing and explaining the functions of consciousness, e.g. the facts that we can consciously control our behaviour, report on our mental states, and focus our attention. According to some philosophers, it is 'easy' to provide a successful analysis in physical and/or functional terms.

Eliminative materialism

A physicalist theory which holds that some or all common sense (‘folk psychological’) mental states (e.g. intentional states such as ‘beliefs’) do not exist and our common sense understanding of them is radically mistaken. The theory that there are no mental properties, so our mental concepts are mistaken and should be eliminated, as they don't refer to anything that exists.

Empirical interaction problem (issues for dualism)

An objection to interactionist dualism, which argues that the dualist claim that the nonphysical mind (or mental states) causes changes to the body (or physical states) is contradicted by empirical evidence/scientific theory (e.g. the Newtonian law concerning the conservation of energy).

Folk psychology

The ordinary (common sense) understanding of the mind, which presumes the existence of ‘internal’ mental states which people use to explain and predict behaviour. According to the eliminative materialist critique, folk psychology is a pre scientific theory of mind which will be superseded by a mature neuroscience. A theory regarding the prediction and explanation of people's behaviour by reference to intentional mental states (beliefs and desires).

Function

A mapping from each of the possible inputs to some state to its output. The description of a state's function describes what that state does.

Functional duplicate

Two systems are functional duplicates of each other if their states play the same functional roles: one system is a functional duplicate of another (or functionally isomorphic) if the functional relations are identical (i.e. the causal interactions between environmental inputs, behavioural outputs, and internal states are the same).

Functionalism

The theory that all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised: the same mental state (e.g. pain) can be instantiated in systems with very different constitutions. For a functionalist, to be in a certain mental state is to be in a state that plays a given causal role: causal interactions between environmental inputs, behavioural outputs, and internal states.

Hard problem of consciousness

The problem of analysing and explaining the phenomenal properties of consciousness, what it is like to undergo conscious experiences. According to some philosophers, it is 'hard' to provide a successful analysis in physical and/or functional terms.

Leibniz’s Law of identity

Leibniz's principle that if two things are identical (i.e. are just one thing), then they share all their properties and so are indiscernible, i.e. you cannot have numerical identity without qualitative identity.

Intentional properties (i.e. intentionality)

Features of some (or all) mental states whereby they are ‘directed’ at (or ‘about’) something (e.g. the belief that France is a republic is about France, and the desire to visit Australia is directed at Australia). The property of mental states whereby they are 'directed' towards an 'object', that is they are 'about' something (beliefs and desires).

Introspectively accessible

Mental states are introspectively accessible when we have direct, first person awareness of them (a form of ‘internal observation’).

Inverted qualia (issues for functionalism)

A thought experiment designed to challenge functionalism. The qualia of two subjects’ mental states (‘what it is like’ for them to be in those states) are inverted, or systematically different, despite the subjects being functionally indistinguishable. Given this (conceivable) difference in qualia between functionally indistinguishable beings, it is argued that functionalism cannot account for all mental states by identifying them with (or reducing them to) functional states.

Knowledge argument

Jackson's argument for property dualism, presenting the thought experiment of Mary, a neuroscientist who has lived her entire life in a black and white room, but who knows all the physical information there is to know about colour. When she first leaves the room and comes to see something red for the first time, does she learn something new? If so, a purely physical account of the world is insufficient to explain everything, and so there must be some non physical (mental) properties

Logically possible

Something (e.g. a claim or some imaginary scenario) is logically possible if it can be thought of without contradiction or incoherence.

Machine state functionalism

Any creature has a mind if it can be regarded as a Turing machine, whose operation can be fully specified by a set of instructions (a “machine table” or program). Machine tables explain mental states as functional machine states where for every state the being is in, you could calculate the machine state it would move into depending on the input given.

Masked Man fallacy

A fallacious form of argument that uses what one believes about an object to infer whether or not the object is identical with something else… This is a fallacy, because one's beliefs may be mistaken.

Materialism

The theory that the only substance is matter (or physical substance). Everything that exists, including the mind, depends on matter (physical substance) to exist.

Mental properties

The characteristic features or attributes of the mind such as qualia (or phenomenal properties) and intentionality (or intentional / representational properties).

Mental states

Psychological states (e.g. cognitive, perceptual, affective, memory). Mental phenomena that can endure over time, such as beliefs and desires. Philosophers often define mental states in terms of their phenomenal and/or intentional properties. The term is often used more broadly to cover mental phenomena in general (states, processes and events).

Metaphysically possible

Something (e.g. a claim or some imaginary scenario) is metaphysically possible if there is at least one possible world in which it is true (e.g. a world without sentient life). This is sometimes distinguished from logical possibility.

Mind brain type identity theory

A reductive, physicalist (or materialist) theory, which claims that types of mental states are ontologically (but not analytically) identical to types of brain (or neural) states. All mental states are identical to brain states (‘ontological’ reduction) although ‘mental state’ and ‘brain state’ are not synonymous (so not an ‘analytic’ reduction).

Multiple realisability (issues for behaviourism)

The claim that the same mental state can be expressed in a variety of behaviours (possibly an infinite number), which challenges the view that that mental states are reducible to specific behaviours or behavioural dispositions.

Multiple realisability (issues for mind brain type identity theory)

The claim that the same mental state can be instantiated by different physical processes (possibly an infinite number), which challenges the view that types of mental state are identical to types of brain state.

Natural selection/evolution

Natural selection is one of the mechanisms which drives biological evolution (as proposed by Darwin). Nature ‘selects’ organisms that are best adapted to their environment because they are more likely to survive, breed, and pass on the same characteristics that proved beneficial to their survival. This process… causes species to develop and diverge over time.

New knowledge/old fact response (‘knowledge/Mary’ argument)

A response to the ‘knowledge/Mary’ argument… which grants that Mary acquires new (propositional) knowledge when she sees colour for the first time, but claims she does not acquire knowledge of a new non-physical fact, only a different way of knowing the same physical fact

Ontologically 'distinct'

Two things are ontologically distinct if they are not the same thing, neither is able to be reduced to the other, and the existence of one is not determined by the existence of the other.

Ordinary language (behaviourism/Ryle)

Language that is in common (or everyday) usage. For Ryle, ordinary language about mental states can be translated (without loss of meaning) to ordinary language about behaviour or behavioural disputations.

Perfect actors (issues for behaviourism)

It is conceivable that a perfect actor would be able to simulate any mental state… such that there would be no observable difference between someone actually in that mental state… and the perfect actor. This obvious difference… undermines the behaviourists’ claim that language about mental states can be reduced, without loss of meaning, to language about behaviour (or behavioural dispositions).

Phenomenal consciousness

A form of consciousness with a subjective experiential quality, as involved in perception, sensation, and emotion. 'What it is like' to experience such mental phenomena.

Phenomenal properties

The experiential properties (or features) of some (if not all) conscious mental states. For many philosophers, phenomenal properties are synonymous with ‘qualia’. Properties of an experience that give it its distinctive experiential quality, and which are apprehended in phenomenal consciousness.

Philosophical zombie

Hypothetical creatures who are exact physical (and so behavioural) duplicates of human beings but lack consciousness (or qualia). An exact physical duplicate of a person, existing in another possible world, but without any phenomenal consciousness.

Philosophical zombie (Chalmers/property dualism)

An argument by Chalmers for property dualism (and against reductive physicalism) which proposes that it is conceivable, and therefore possible, that there are beings who are physically (and so behaviourally) identical to human beings but lack conscious mental states (or qualia). Because this is possible, conscious states (qualia) are not physical: they are non physical properties of the mind.

Physical properties

The characteristic features or attributes of physical (or material) phenomena: the properties discovered by and referred to in the natural sciences (e.g. the positive or negative charge of subatomic physical particles).

Physicalism

The theory that everything that exists is physical (or material) or it is reducible to the physical (or material). In the philosophy of mind, this refers to a family of positions which reject the existence of non physical mental substances or properties. A modern form of materialism, which claims that everything that exists is physical, or depends upon something that is physical. More precisely, the theory that everything that is ontologically basic is physical… and every physical event has a sufficient physical cause.

Problem of (causal) interaction

The problem of explaining how mental states or substance can interact causally with physical states or substance. In particular, mental causation (the causation of physical events by mental events) is thought to contradict the completeness of physics.

Problem of other minds

The problem of other minds is an issue for dualism. The problem that arises is epistemological: to explain how we could know, or even have good reason to believe, that other minds exist, given that we have direct access only to our own minds… whereas our conclusions about others’ minds… are merely inferred from their behaviour. The question of how we can know that there are minds other than our own, given that our experience of other minds (if they exist) is through behaviour.

Qualia

Intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible. Qualia capture 'what it is like' to undergo a mental state, such as the taste of coffee or the experience of seeing red

Reducible

A phenomenon or property is reducible to another if the first can be completely explained in terms of, or identified with, the second (which is considered more ontologically basic).

Reduction (analytical)

To claim that a certain language (or a way of speaking) about a phenomenon can be analytically reduced is to say that it can be translated (without loss of meaning) into some other language (or way of speaking). In the philosophy of mind this refers to the claim that language… about mental states can be reduced, without loss of meaning, to language about some other states (e.g. behavioural or functional).

Reduction (ontological)

To claim that some phenomenon X is ontologically reducible to some phenomenon Y is just to say that they are in fact the same type/kind of phenomenon. In a physicalist philosophy of mind like mind brain type identity theory, the argument is made that types of mental states are identical to types of brain state… and is therefore reducible to what is true of physical states and their properties. An ontological reduction claims that the things in one domain are identical with some of the things in another domain.

Self refuting

A claim or theory is said to be self refuting if in the very act of making a claim or proposing a theory one (implicitly) demonstrates why it must be false.

Spatial location problem

The objection to identity theory that mental states do not have a spatial location, yet identity theory entails that they do, because they are identical to physical states.

Super Spartans (issues for behaviourism)

Super Spartans feature in a thought experiment created by Putnam. They are a hypothetical people who feel pain… but they are able and willing to suppress all pain behaviour. The conceivability (and presumed possibility) of such a people is used by Putnam to challenge the claims of behaviourism… Given that there is never any behavioural evidence of pain among the Super Spartans, despite the fact they are sometimes in the mental state of pain, there is no possibility of reducing (without loss of meaning) all language about their mental states to language about their behaviour or behavioural dispositions.

Supervenience

A relation of dependence between facts or properties of one kind (x) and facts or properties of another kind (y), such that x supervenes on y if and only if there can be no change in x without a change in y.