IF- Yom Kippur War, Iranian Revolution & Kargil War

What happended during the Yom Kippur War?

• Israeli PM Golda Meir warned by Mossad on early morning of 6 October 1973 (Jewish holiday)

• Hours later Egypt & Syria attacked Israel: crossing ceasefire lines into Sinai and Golan Heights → strategic surprise

• Perception of existential threat for Israel: 2800 Israeli casualties

• IDF gained military victory after 19 days of fighting; but: huge trauma

• Response to Six Days War (1967): swift Israeli victory over Egypt & Syria (surprise attack) → Israeli occupation of territories (Golan Heights, West Bank, Sinai, parts of Gaza); part of Arab-Israeli conflict

Was the Yom Kippur an IF?

• False alarm in May 1973 by Ashraf Marwan: Israel raised state-of-readiness (costly); war didn’t happen (military exercise)

• Deception by Egypt & missed signals re. Syria (troop movements; cancelled leaves; mobilisation of reserves) → threat not identified

• Warnings in September not heeded (e.g. by King Hussein of Jordan to Golda Meir)

• Israeli defence intelligence (IDI) judged chance of war very low (even 1 week before); but sent some reinforcement to Golan Heights

• Claims that Mossad knew about imminent attack a week before; but again misled by Egypt; Mossad chief Zvi Zamir convinced late on 5 Oct.

Was the Yom Kippur an IF? (pt 2.)

• Mounting evidence on 4-5 Oct

• Israeli defence minister did not trust Mossad’s source

• Israel prepared only on morning of 6 Oct: decision against preemptive strike; US and Soviet negotiations to try and avert war

• Consequences of Israeli hubris, not taking Arab plans to avenge 1967 defeat sufficiently seriously; little international pressure on Israel to renegotiate borders

• Israeli IC didn’t consider Egypt and Syria capable of attack

• Bar Lev Line (along eastern flank of Suez Canal) considered impenetrable by Israel but overrun by Egypt in under two hours

Was Yom Kippur a policy failure?

• 1970: Meir rejected defence minister Moshe Dayan’s proposition to pull back 20 miles from Suez canal to enable reopening & demotivate Egypt to go to war

• Claims that Meir could have avoided the war had she not rebuffed Egyptian

• President Anwar Sadat’s overtures for peace: unwillingness to restore pre-1967 borders; no reconciliatory gesture

• Overconfidence that Israel’s geopolitical situation had never been better

• Although Meir had the power to do so, she didn’t mobilise IDF early

• Meir didn’t challenge her generals’ assessment

• On morning of 6 Oct, defence minister Moshe Dayan still argued that war was unlikely, while IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar asked for full-scale mobilisation and preemtive strike against Syria.

Findings of Agranat Commission (1974-75)

• Meir cleared of direct responsibility for failure; her decision (no preemptive strike but full mobilisation) was judged as wise

• IDI failed to provide early warning

• Wrong assumption that Egypt would only attack if its air power matched those of the Israeli Air Force

• Complacency & dismissal/ignorance of evidence on Egypt’s war preparations by IDI leaders (e.g. on 1 and 3 October)

• Lack of civilian control of Israeli Defence Forces

• Insufficient analysis: only relying on military intelligence

→ Sharp public debate until today: report too uncritical of political leadership, esp. defence minister

Later analysis (Uri Bar- Joseph, 2005)

• Failure of strategic intelligence analysis & early warning; but intelligence system did not fail as a whole: Mossad provided high- quality warnings

• Context of intelligence failure: public atmosphere of self-assurance and complacence →failing to recognise deterioration of Israel’s deterrence

• Contributing to failure: cover & deception; cry wolf syndrome (1971,1972, spring 1973); compartmentisation; overconfidence in quality of intelligence sources; fear of destabilising status quo; various bureaucratic obstacles; groupthink in IDI; individual psychological shortcomings (confirmation bias, cognitive dissonance, heuristic judgements)

What is the main cause of failure according to Uri Bar-Joseph?

Failure of two individuals (pp. 248-251):

• Eli Zeira, director of Israel’s military intelligence: overstepped his responsibility, ignored & failed to collect intelligence and lied to his superiors (IDF Chief of Staff + Defence Minister), thus distorting their intelligence picture.

• Yona Bandman, chief estimator of Egyptian affairs: ignoring assessments by other analysts, silencing opposition to his estimates; fixated on notion that Egypt was incapable of launching war; highly authoritative style

What lessons can we learn from the Yom Kippur War?

• Improving analysis & early warning

•  Avoid overreliance on raw information (narrow perspective)

• Focus on change & anomalies (rather than continuity and confirmation) → “cornerstone of strategic early warning” (p. 989)

•  Diversify/improve methods for intelligence analysis: towards abductive reasoning (best available & most likely explanation)

• Estimates must include assessments of both capabilities & intentions

• Encourage contrarian thinking

• Diversify sources of early warning; include broader perspectives

→ Study of lessons to be learnt from Yom Kippur was missing until July 2023.

Key developments Iran 1978-1979

• Growing opposition to Pahlavi dynasty, specifically over Shah’s efforts to modernise Iran (Khomeini had opposed → exile 1964)

•  Begin of anti-government demonstrations in October 1977: ideological tensions between Pahlavi and Khomeini supporters grew (Cold War context & trend towards Islamism)

• Campaign of civil resistance spread across country from August 1978

• Country paralysed

• 16 January 1979: Pahlavi went into exile

• 1 February 1979: Khomeini returned, assumed power 10 days later, Pahlavi supporters silenced; replacing pro-Western secular monarchy with anti-Western authoritarian Islamic republic

• Nov 1979–Jan 1981: Iranian hostage crisis (53 US citizens); downfall of Carter.

Surprise about Iranian revolution:

• Revolutionary sentiment (anti-Westernisation and anti-secularisation); popularity not anticipated

• “Untypical” unrest

• Unarmed demonstrations against regime with well-equipped army

• High-speed profound change

→Fall of Shah considered impossible until it seemed inevitable.

Why was the Iranian Revolution an IF?

• Lack of attention to Shah’s political mistakes

• Failure to see Khomeini’s charisma & ability to mobilise masses

• Mistaken belief that Shah’s regime was secure and stable in 1978

• Intelligence reports on protests existed but did not stress severity: failure at the reporting stage

• U.S. National Security Archive with declassified document

Jervis: Iran IF:

• Intelligence judgements were based mostly on their inherent plausibility

• Alternative judgements not seriously considered

• Analysts didn’t understand nature of opposition, esp. religious dimension: considered anachronistic

• False expectation that Shah would crack down protests (at odds with U.S. advice)

• Analysts didn’t challenge their contextual framework

Connelly, 2021: Iran IF

• CIA analysts in Iran lagging behind: could have stressed revolutionary/religious nature of situation and pressed for response by their superiors

• Lack of timely and accurate assessment of seriousness of crisis & range of possible outcomes

• Senior U.S. policymakers were paying less attention to Iran during crucial period; slow reaction once high-level warnings came in

• Overall unawareness by policymakers of key aspects of situation; lack of preparedness

• Lack of understanding of why Shah did not respond more forcefully to protests (intelligence producers and policymakers

What is known as the “world’s highest war”?

• Kargil War → between India and Pakistan, May-June 1999.

  • In the Himalayas.

Did India expect the Kargil war? What did Pakistan gain from it?

• Total surprise for India → last official Pakistan nuclear tests before became official nuclear power.

• Pakistan gained next to nothing from starting war → huge costs overall & high risk.

What happened during the Kargil War?

• February: Pakistan infiltrated (5000 people) and occupied Indian military posts (300) that had been vacated during winter months.

  • total surprise → secretly ordered by Pakistan general ( PM claimed unawareness)

  • authorities had been warned by few sightings but scale was surprise.

• Escalation in May 1999:

  • India reclaimed most positions after major offensive.

  • Pakistan did not expect retaliation due to new nuclear capabilities.

• 3 months of war

  • Conventional war between nuclear-armed states → triggered much international attention.

  • Withdrew in July 1999 → embarrassment for Pakistan.

    • catalyst for military coup in Pakistan (Pervez Musharraf)

Kargil War: Commission of inquiry

• Government established committee after the war

• Wide access to classified documents and officials; fact-finding missions; external experts closely involved.

• December 1999 report

• Total surprise due to failure in national security system

• Fragmentation of Indian intelligence agencies

• Lapses in baseline intelligence collection

• Lack of convincing warnings; Pakistani intrusion was considered unsustainable due to lack of supportive infrastructure & militarily irrational

According to the committee report was the Kargil war an avoidable failure?

• policy of Siachenisation:

  • Had they managed to fortify area along the 168 stretch of mountains.

    • but this would be a waste of strategic military strength and effort and would not have been cost effective.

Whose failure was the Kargil War?

• inaccurate assessment by Research & Analysis Wing = ruled out the possibility of war with Pakistan.

• Failure by intelligence agencies to detect that Pakistan was buying large quantities of winter fighting equipment from international weapons market.

Kargil War: intelligence failure (July 2024 report)

• one of biggest IF in recent times → strategic and tactical surprise.

  • Intelligence Bureau reported on preparations for Pakistani special operation in Kargil in June and October 1998 but failed to follow up: neither Army nor other agency reacted

  • R&AW had intelligence on Pakistani infiltration plans in December 1998 but failed to act on. 

• Failure of military intelligence to detect movement at control line despite scattered reports from shepards…

• None of the intel agencies alerted PM.

  • critical gaps in coordination (intelligence, army and government).

• Failure of imagination: was not considered plausible.

Kargil War Academic discussion: (Dheeraj Chaya, 2022)

• understand Kargil War in context of India’s intelligence culture → cognitive bias, dismissal of relevant information & failure to share information.

• “the 1999 surprise was multi-factorial emerging out of both intelligence and policy failures, wherein the latter significantly induced as well as accentuated the former”

• “India’s overall approach to national security has not allowed its (intelligence) agencies to operate like their Western counterparts”

• Indian intelligence was ‘documentation oriented, not result oriented.

Was the Kargil War failure inevitable?

• Pakistan’s powerful military had tried on at least two previous

• occasions (1947 and 1965) to infiltrate Indian-administered Kashmir to start a rebellion; denied each time its direct involvement

• Using cover of local Kashmiri rebels fighting Indian rule was not new

• Due to Pakistan’s nuclear test, Pakistan’s military leadership thought that India’s response would be muted

• Pakistan’s generals: no interest in Lahore Agrement

• Pakistan exploited India’s weaknesses on LOC (unheld areas)

→Flawed threat assessment could have been avoided by India.