Game Theory in International Security Practice Flashcards

Fill-in-the-blank practice flashcards covering game theory in security, including costly war mechanisms, signaling, deterrence, arming, alliances, war termination, mediation, and international hierarchy.

Wolford ($2022$) states that game theory's formal approach clarifies ________, exposes flawed arguments, and guides empirical research.

causal mechanisms

Fearon ($1995$) posits that because war is ________, a negotiated settlement could have produced a better outcome for both sides.

ex-post inefficient

Kirshner ($2000$) argued that if actors with identical information reach different conclusions, ________ loses its explanatory power as a cause of war.

private information

According to Meirowitz & Sartori ($2008$), ________ is a more fundamental cause of war than private information because states generate strategic uncertainty through rational arming incentives.

rational self-interest

Lindsey ($2019$) showed that in ________ naval battles, observable capabilities fail to predict battle outcomes when both sides voluntarily choose to fight.

Age of Sail

Powell ($2006$) argues that ________ are the more fundamental mechanism for war, unifying several explanations under a single underlying logic.

commitment problems

Schram ($2021$) suggests that declining states may use low-level ________ designed to slow a rising power's growth instead of resorting to preventive war.

hassling operations

In the costly peace mechanism, Wolford ($2024$) notes that the sum of war payoff exceeds ________.

$$1$$

Debs & Goemans ($2010$) state that the cost of peace for autocrats is their own ________.

political survival

Fearon ($1997$) defines ________ as a signaling method where the cost is paid ex post only if the leader backs down.

tying hands

Sartori ($2002$) challenges audience-cost theory by focusing on ________, suggesting diplomacy can work regardless of regime type through future reputation.

reputation based cheap talk

Fearon ($2002$) explains that cases escalating to a threat are a sample of highly motivated challengers due to the ________.

selection effect

The ________ trade-off involves states deciding how to allocate finite resources between domestic social needs and military power.

‐Guns-versus- Butter‐

Coe & Vaynman ($2020$) identify a fundamental ________ trade-off as the primary obstacle to arms control.

transparency-security

Leeds ($2003$) argues that the influence of military alliances depends on the ________ within the treaty.

specific content and premises

Siverson & Starr ($1990$) argue that the diffusion of war is driven by the interaction of ________ and willingness.

opportunity

Powell ($2004$) asserts that uncertainty regarding the ________ requires actual battles to resolve information asymmetries.

distribution of power

Kydd ($2003$) states that ________ must be biased toward the party they are advising in order to be credible.

mediators

Lake ($1996$) describes international relations as falling along a continuum from ________ to hierarchy.

anarchy

McDonald ($2015$) argues that the ________ is actually driven by great power settlements after major wars rather than institutional features.

democratic peace

Fazal ($2013$) observes that the decline of formal ________ since $1950$ is a strategic response to the rising costs and liability risks of modern laws of war.

peace treaties

According to Irajpanah & Schultz ($2021$), ________ claims have substituted for formal war declarations in the post-$1945$ era.

UN Article $51$ self-defense

Johns ($2012$) argues that ________ benefit weak states most because outcomes do not hinge on military strength.

international courts

Wolford ($2019$) argues that ________ enable effective balance-of-power coordination because they allow third parties to distinguish aggressive from restrained belligerents.

neutrality regimes