Stafford Final-Holding and Significance

Dickerson v United States

2000

Holding: 7-2, reversed, the Court held the decision reached in Miranda could not be overruled through either Congressional nor lower court decisions. It was firmly rooted in the Constitution and any decision against it would therefore be unconstitutional. The Court held that Miranda warnings had now become the norm in the criminal justice system and as a result, the Court specified an exact approach for how the warnings should be given. This was especially relevant in the delivery of confession by a suspect. The Court held a suspect must know his rights and knowingly waive them before a confession can be considered admissible in court. The dissent argued Miranda did not have a constitutional basis and that the majority opinion ignored the will of the people expressed through elected legislators.

Significance: The Court held the precedent set by Miranda v. Arizona was a constitutional rule and therefore, could not be overturned by legislation. This case provides an example of strict adherence to stare decisis and the Court's decision to protect previous rulings from infringements.

Florida v Bostick

MAJORITY opinion:

police encounter on a bus does not automatically constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, as long as the police do not use coercion or force and the individual feels free to refuse the officers’ requests.

4th Amendment only restricts "unreasonable" searches and seizures. "Unreasonable" when a person does not feel free to leave.
Relied on: Terry v. Ohio (1968). Police questioning does not constitute a seizure.

DISSENTING opinon:
Arbitrary and intimidating search will harm marginalized communities. Bostick not free to leave because of police tactics.

V. Significance: This case established that the location of questioning and presence of weapons without threat to use them cannot be considered coercion, nor a violation of the reasonable person test. The Court also established that probable cause, nor reasonable suspicion need be established for a law enforcement officer to approach a citizen.

Virginia v. Moore

2008

IV. Holding: 9-0, reversed, the Court held unanimously the search did not violate Moore's rights enumerated under the 4th amendment. The Court held the presence of probable cause allowed the arresting officer to perform a search of the accused to ensure the safety of the officer and protect evidence. The opinion said states may write stricter search and seizure laws, but the 4th amendment provided a minimum protection.

V. Significance: This case established the precedent for search and seizures upon arrest. If the arresting officer can argue the search and seizure was done under the pretense of probable cause then the evidence may be admissible in Court according the 4th amendment. It also established the 4th amendment as the minimum protection afforded to US citizens.

Miranda v Arizona

1966

IV. Holding: 5-4, reversed and remanded, the Court held that the prosecution may not use statements given during custodial interrogation of the defendant unless safeguards against self incrimination are used. In Miranda's case, based on the information given by law enforcement officers during the trial, safeguards were not used and therefore, his statement was inadmissible. Custodial interrogation was defined as a means of questioning in which law enforcement has taken a suspect into custody or otherwise deprived his or her "freedom of action". Prior to questioning, a person must be warned they have the right to remain silent, any statement he does make can be used against him as evidence, and that he has the right to the presence of any attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive these rights if he chooses to do so, so long as the waiver is made "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently". At any point in the questioning, the suspect can request the presence of an attorney and questioning may not proceed until that attorney is present. The Court ruled that in all of the cases encompassed within Miranda, the defendant was questioned in a manner that separated them from the outside world without a full warning of his or her rights. In three of the cases, the defendant also signed statements that were also admitted in their respective trials. A 1961 Commission on Civil Rights suggested many law enforcement officers made use of physical methods to force confessions. The Court posited the Fifth Amendment serves to protect a citizen from self incrimination both in and out of a courtroom setting and in order to fully utilize these rights he or she must first be informed of them. The Court also specifically explained that the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can be used as evidence in order to make a suspect aware of the consequences of speaking while in custody. The presence of an attorney was added to make coercion or false representation of the suspect less likely. The dissent argued this had no constitutional basis and that this would impair the police's ability to question suspects successfully.

V. Significance: Miranda established one of the most well-know portions of the criminal justice system. Miranda warnings ensure that defendants are in full knowledge of their rights as enumerated by the Fifth Amendment and they can only be waived knowingly. The Court held that these protections are fundamental to our Constitution.

Gregg V Georgia

1976

IV. Holding: 7-2, affirmed, the Court held that the Death Penalty does not invariably violate the 8th Amendment to the US Constitution, as had been determined by previous Courts. The Court has historically chosen to interpret the 8thAmendment in a dynamic and fluid manner, rather than as a static concept. The opinion makes clear that the penalty cannot be carried out in a way that can be deemed "excessive" or in abstraction. In other words, it cannot inflict unnecessary and wanton pain and it cannot be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. The Court also stated that public opinion seems to agree with the morality and utility of capital punishment based on the reception of the Furman v. Georgia decision. Following this decision, 35 states enacted new statues that provide for the death penalty for some crimes. The death penalty was decided to have two valid social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders. The Court also stated its satisfaction with the decision reached in Furman in which capital punishment suspects undergo bifurcated trials. The dissenting opinion argued the death penalty is immoral and therefore, is cruel and unusual punishment.

V. Significance: Previous to Gregg, the Court had only examined the constitutionality of actual methods of administering the Death Penalty under the "cruel and unusual punishment" test. The constitutionality of the death sentence itself was not at issue until Gregg, which determined that the Death Penalty violates neither the 8th nor the 14th amendments. The Court also upheld the decision reached in Furman for the usage of the same jury for the guilt and sentencing stages of the trial.

Payne v Tennessee

1991

IV. Holding: 6-3, affirmed, the Court held that victim impact statements can be used to guide the jury in its decision. The Court reasoned that it is ideal to conduct a broad investigation and thus allow a wide range of evidence to be a factor in the jury's decision. Unless the evidence prejudices the defendant, the Court felt that it is better not to place unnecessary restrictions on evidence. Payne reverse decisions in Booth and Gathers, however it did discuss the concern that the admission of victim impact statements invites a jury to decide what worth a victim had within their community and sentence based on this, rather than the actual crime committed. In Booth and Gathers, it was determine that only evidence relating to blameworthiness could be admitted in court. However, the Court reasoned that victim impact statements

V. Significance: The court held that the use of victim impact statements is evidence and relevant to a juries decisions in cases concerning the death penalty. Thus, it should be treated in a manner equal to other evidence. The court also reasoned that Payne's main argument, imploring the rule of stare decisis was not a matter of law or principle but meant as a guide to future decisions and that Court could overrule itself when it felt it was necessary as a matter of law.

Gideon v Wainwright

1963

IV. Holding: 9-0, reversed and remanded, the Court held unanimously the 6th amendment's right to counsel clause is fundamentally important to a fair trial and applies to the states via the 14th amendment. The Court expressly overruled Betts v. Brady, stating Betts was a case, which had ignored previous precedent and did not adequately represent the opinion of the Courts preceding or following it. The opinion included information from the decision in Powell v Alabama to overrule the language utilized in Betts. The Court also included a consideration of the sum of money used by the state to prosecute felony suspects. Only wealthy suspects, they reasoned, could afford to hire counsel to combat these attorneys. The Court reasoned the state should be responsible for funding the pursuit of justice from both sides of the case. The opinion also expressly stated the Constitution does make a distinction between capital and non-capital crimes so to provide only defendants accused of capital crimes with attorneys, which was the law in Florida at the time, would deprive defendants accused of non- capital crimes due process under the law.

V. Significance: In this case, the Court held that the appointment of counsel to an indigent defendant is a "fundamental right, essential to a fair trial", with that the Court began to consider just how far the 14th amendments power of extending the original bill of rights should go. It looked towards past decisions where the Court had held that the 5th and 8th amendments are extended to the states through the 14th amendment. However, the court also considered its decision in Palko v Connecticut (1937) where it ruled that the 5th amendment did NOT extend to the states through the 14th amendment. With this in mind and through a unanimous decision, the Court held a stern stance on the due process clause, which led to the further decisions on due process such as Miranda v Arizona (1966).

Mapp v Ohio

1961

IV. Holding: 6-3, reversed and remanded, the Court extended the federal exclusionary rule to the states, citing the due process clause of the 14th amendment. This allowed any evidence resulting from an illegal search and seizure was inadmissible at trial. In addition, the Court expressly overruled Wolf v Colorado, establishing the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. This provided that police officers would not necessarily adhere to a good faith doctrine and would instead violate a suspect's right in obtaining evidence. The Court also held the fourth and fifth amendment are closely related and there should not be an illegal search of a citizen's home or privacies because they amount to self-incrimination. The dissent argued the majority made in a mistake in overruling Wolf because it had more constitutional basis than the decision the Court was attempting to implement. The dissent also insisted innocent people had nothing to fear from a search and seizure and create a stumbling block for officers investigating crimes.

V. Significance: The Court recognized the possibility of a guilty criminal being set free on the basis of a law enforcement officers' mistake. However, it also ruled this was necessary in order to maintain the integrity of the criminal justice system. The Court also ruled that evidence resulting from an illegal search and seizure was inadmissible in Court, thereby extending the exclusionary rule to the states. The Court would later be forced to rule on similar cases because they had not adequately defined the standards for what was considered an illegal search and seizure, ie the plain view doctrine.

Brown v Board of Education

1954

IV. Holding: 9-0, reversed and remanded, the Court unanimously decided segregated facilities were inherently unequal and constituted a violation of the "equal protection clause" of the 14th amendment. This decision expressly overruled Plessy v Ferguson. The Court recognized the fundamental important of public education, stating it was a right that the State was obligated to provide. Furthermore, this education must be provided on an equal basis to students of all races. Forcing students to go to schools based on race provided them a "badge of inferiority" regardless of whether the infrastructure and learning materials of the schools were materially equal.

V. Significance: By ruling separate but equal facilities in education were unconstitutional, the Court effectively ruled all segregated facilities were unequal. This was a major milestone for the American Civil Rights movement and legally made segregation illegal. It created the necessary legal precedent to end segregation in all spheres of public life.

Brown v Board II

1955

IV. Holding: 9-0, reversed and remanded, the Court reversed the decision of lower courts to allow states and cities to extend the period for implementation of the Brown (1) decision. The opinion included that there could not be one method of successful implementation due to the varying circumstances surrounding the desegregation of so many facilities. However, the decision also placed the responsibility of integration on local court systems and that they were to use the Brown(I) decision as set of guidelines to complete integration. Racial segregation was to be completed with "all deliberate speed" and the extensions requested by lower courts were denied and reversed.

V. Significance: The Court upheld the Brown (I) decision despite significant resistance from many states and cities. It also devised a plan for a massive overhaul of the American way of life. In addition, the decision heavily relied on the actions of lower Courts and threw into relief the issue of the self-executing paradox.

Hopwood V Texas

1996

IV. Holding: The Fifth Circuit Court held race cannot be used as a factor for collegiate admissions. Using race as a factor in admissions in an effort to achieve a diverse student body was an improper methodology. The University of Texas then appealed to US Supreme Court, but writ of certiorari was denied.

V. Significance: The Hopwood decision became judicial precedent in the Fifth Circuit's jurisdiction and as a result, refused to allow race to be utilized as an admission factor. After seven years as precedent, this case was finally overturned by the 2003 Gratz v Bollinger decision.

Grutter v Bollinger

2003

IV. Holding: 5-4, affirmed, the Court held racial preferences in school admissions did not inherently violate the equal protection clause nor the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court held the University of Michigan's admissions policy was narrowly tailored and therefore constitutional under the Bakke precedent. The Court agreed the diversity is a key concept in law school admissions and that race was a valid aspect of the admissions process. The dissent argued the system used race as a predominant factor in admissions and the process was not narrowly tailored enough to satisfy Bakke's qualifications.

V. Significance: The Court determined that because there was no specified quota system or a percentage of seats reserved for minority systems, there was no violation of the 14th amendment. The Court ruled that as long as the use of race was narrowly tailored, it was permissible.

McCleskey v Kemp

1987

IV. Holding: 9-0, affirmed, The Court held McCleskey could not prove intentional discrimination and therefore, the imposition of the death penalty was not done in a discriminatory way. They argued instead that McCleskey had been found guilty and sentenced to death by a unique jury, thus limiting the potential for discrimination. As a result, there was no constitutional violation. Additionally, there was no chance for the State to rebut the Baldus study. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell, refused to apply the statistical study in this case given the unique circumstances and nature of decisions that juries face in capital punishment cases. He also suggested the data presented by McCleskey be given to legislative bodies, rather than the Courts.

V. Significance: This case provides one of the most significant rulings on the death penalty, as it affirms the death penalty is not inherently discriminatory. It also introduced the idea of the individual and specific circumstances of capital punishment cases that would later be utilized in cases like Gregg v. Georgia and Furman v Georgia.

Milliken v Bradley

1973

IV. Holding: 5-4, reversed and remanded, the Court held without compelling evidence of discrimination within a school district, it could not be forced to comply with the plan. The Court in 53 out of 85 districts, there was no discrimination present. The ruling by the Circuit Court would cause an "undue burden" on the school districts where no discrimination was proved to be present. The dissent argued although there was not racial segregation in the 53 districts, the circuit courts plan was a good method of integration given the slow sand difficult steps it had taken to address Brown (I).

V. Significance: The Court ruled that rampant segregation in one school district could not be used to impose desegregation methods on surrounding school districts. Pursuant to Brown (II), the Court held that integration methods should be based on each individual districts plans and not affected by the integration plans of other districts.

Plessy v Ferguson

1896

IV. Holding: 7-1, affirmed, the Court affirmed Plessy's conviction in the lower court and ruled "separate, but equal" facilities did not constitute a violation of either the 13th or 14th amendments. It asserted statutes in the Act were intended to treat the races equally and that in no way do separate railcars imply inferiority of one race over another. The Court referenced Roberts v Bostons where a law separating school children based on race was ruled constitutional. The Court left that distinction to the states ruling that some states use the "one drop rule", meaning that even one drop of black ancestry makes you black while other use subjective characteristics and the predominance of "black" characteristics to determine someone's race. The dissent argued that there was a need for a colorblind constitution and that the enactment of any legislation that made distinctions between the races was inherently unconstitutional.

V. Significance: The Court ruled social equality between the black and white races could not come from legislation, but rather a social process the Court could not participate in. The Court also legitimized the separate but equal doctrine, which effectively upheld the segregation of the two races.

Regents of the University of California v Bakke

1978

IV. Holding: 5-4, affirmed in part and reversed in part, there was no singular majority opinion in this decision, however several points were agreed upon. The Court ruled that previous decisions upheld preferential classification based on race, however any racial quota system supported by a public institution was a violation of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. Therefore, quota systems specifically were declared unconstitutional. The Court claimed the State does have a compelling interest to create a class that is diverse, thereby eliminating anti-minority discrimination. However, this could not be ensured through the implementation of quota systems because it had the potential to create disadvantages for other racial groups. However, the Court did allow race to be used in systems where it was a factor considered in an individual students admission. Race or ethnic background could be considered in attempting to create a diverse class, much like work experience or leadership potential. The dissent, who concurred in part, argued certain minority groups have been historically disadvantaged and that quota system is a means to eliminate these disadvantages.

V. Significance: The Court allowed for race to be a factor in admissions decisions, assuming it was not a quota system. By narrowly tailoring the system by which race could be used, the Court hoped to prevent creating systemic disadvantages or advantage for certain racial groups. This system also allowed race in admissions to be constitutionally permissible under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protections Clause of the 14th Amendment.

Gratz v Bollinger

2003

IV. Holding: 6-3, reversed and remanded, the Court held the University of Michigan's admissions decisions were not narrowly tailored under Bakke, and therefore violated the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. The Court reasoned that while diversity in the student body constituted a compelling state interest, the policies in place did not consider a student's individual contribution to diversity but rather just assigned a predetermined number of points to certain minorities. The Court references the decision in Bakke which allowed for the use of race as an admissions factor but noted that if race was to be used that it had to be based on the individual and not a race in general. The Court asserted that by assigning a trivial number of points to each minority applicant, many would essentially become auto-admits and the background and extenuating circumstances of a student with similar scores but was not a minority would not even be considered. The dissent argued that the races and ethnic groups that the University of Michigan was giving special privilege to were minority groups that had been historically been disadvantaged and that this method of affirmative action was necessary to remove the stain of racial segregation that tainted this country's history.

V. Significance: The Court reaffirmed the opinion issued in Bakke and asserted that in order for race to be utilized n the admissions process, it must be done so under narrowly tailored. It should not create an opportunity for sweeping admissions of certain racial groups. The University of Michigan's process did not adhere to this, but it could be allowed to use race as a factor in admissions as it created a compelling stat interest.

Romer v Evans

1996

IV. Holding: 6-3, affirmed, the Court held Colorado's amendment 2 violated the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. While the proposed statues would make all sexual orientations equal under the law, it would prevent homosexuals from securing protection against injuries committed against them as a result of their sexual orientation. The Court held while overruling the Colorado amendment does make homosexuals and heterosexuals unequal under the law, it does not violate the equal protection clause because it does not create a burden on nor specifically target a certain group of people. The Court also concluded the Amendment 2 was being proposed to replace a law that did not provide homosexuals with any special favor or privilege. The dissent argued there is no constitutional precedent for a law seeking to create consequences for discrimination against homosexuals. The state of Colorado was simply making all citizens equal with the imposition of the Amendment, which ended the preferential treatment of homosexuals in that state.

V. Significance: The Court established laws may be upheld despite the appearance of preferential treatment of one group, assuming it does not create disadvantage for another. The Court claimed that simply because a law advocates equality does not keep it from violating the Equal Protection clause. The law must be shown to advance a legitimate interest of a particular group.

Webster v Reproductive Health Services

1989

IV. Holding: 5-4, reversed, the Court held none of the provisions of the statutes struck down in the lower courts were unconstitutional. The Court held the "point of viability" is where human life must be protected by the state. Thus, the state could require a test to determine the viability of a fetus. The Court did not overrule the Roe v Wade decision, claiming the circumstances of that decision differed because it had attempted to outlaw all abortions- both public and private. The due process clause protecting personal privacy does not require the state to become involved in the business of providing abortions, thus it was well within the right of the state to restrict funds for abortion. The dissent argued the establishment of the beginning of life as the moment of fertilization, as this was not a secular definition and violates the decision reached in Wallace v Jeffree.

V. Significance: The Court upheld substantial abortion requirements and established it was not a women's right to demand an abortion funded by the state. The state also had the power to impose viability requirements in private abortion clinics to uphold state interest in protecting life.

Cruzan v Missouri

1990

IV. Holding: 5-4, affirmed, the Court held white a person can refuse lifesaving treatment pursuant to the liberty clause in the 14th amendment, that right cannot be extended to a patients family member. They asserted is it within the states interest to protect life and the rights of the individual from family members who may have an ulterior motive for removing life support. The Court ruled Missouri's requirement for presentation of clear and convincing evidence was constitutional and was a necessary protection. The dissent argued that medical science had discovered a point in which a person remains technically alive but has no chance of recovering brain function. In these cases, they argued, there is no compelling state interest in keeping a patient alive because they are no longer the person they once were and cannot return to that state.

V. Significance: The Court made a distinction between evidence suggesting a patient would want to be taken off of life support and "clear and convincing" evidence a patient wanted to be remove. This effectively increased the burden of proof for family members to end life support for those people rendered medically incompetent.

Griswold v Connecticut

1965

IV. Holding: 7-2, reversed, the Court held Connecticut statutes were unconstitutional on the same grounds as the decision reached in NAACP v Alabama in which the Court ruled lists of members could be kept private and inquiries about them could be refused. The Court utilized this same logic to determine that only through a violation of privacy could the police determine which women were receiving advice on contraception. This would violate their 14th amendment right to privacy and was therefore, unconstitutional. The Court also created the language revolving around the "zone of privacy" created by a combination of a number of amendments. Through the regulation of advice on contraceptive options, the state of Connective was infringing upon the rights of married people. The Court also determined because Buxton and Griswold had been arrested and coveted under thee statute, they had standing to sue the state of Connecticut. The concurring opinion argued slightly with the logic concerning the 14th amendment, stating the right to liberty is what establishes the fundamental right to privacy. The dissent argued that no constitutional basis for a right to privacy exists.

V. Significance: The court utilized the 9th and 4th amendment to establish the right to privacy for a married person. This same combination would once again become relevant in both Roe v Wade and Lawrence v Texas. This decision fundamentally laid the foundation for the realm of personal privacy rights that would later be extended beyond married people to everyone.

Roe v Wade

1973

IV. Holding: 7-2, reversed and remanded, the Court ruled the vague and broad nature of the Texas abortion statutes were unconstitutional under the 9th and 14th Amendments. The opinion stated while the State has a compelling interest in protecting life by keeping the fetus alive, this interest only outweigh the interest of the mother in the final trimmest of the pregnancy. A woman could not terminate her pregnancy at any time, but with state regulations in place. The language in Griswold recognized a woman's right to privacy, including the right ot have an abortion. The dissent argued criminalization of abortion has a deep historical basis in the United States and most states had statutes preventing it. Additionally, the right to privacy doctrine had no true constitutional basis and therefore, could not be used to overrule the statutes.

V. Significance: The Court divided a woman's pregnancy into 3 trimesters and ruled states could make laws according to the trimester of pregnancy. These statutes could then limit that the woman was restricted to certain qualification or even ban abortion entirely. The first trimester could have no restrictions, the second trimester could have restrictions by the states, and in the 3rd trimester the states could ban abortion entirely due to compelling state interest. This ruling caused a fundamental change in the abortion laws of 46 states and further established the zone of privacy set forth in Griswold.

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey

1992

IV. Holding: 5-4, affirmed in part and reversed in part, the Court held all provisions of the Pennsylvania statute were constitutional except for those portions requiring notification of the husband. The Court established the undue burden test to evaluate the constitutionality of the Act. The test determined if any new abortion restrictions caused a heavy burden on a woman attempting to obtain an abortion. The Court reaffirmed the decision reached in Roe, stating that while states cannot prohibit abortion in the first trimester, they can impose regulations and restrictions that do not produce an undue burden on the woman. Only the notification to notify one's husband failed this test, thus the Court ruled it unconstitutional. The compelling state interest in this case was to ensure a woman was making an educated choice in obtaining an abortion. The dissent argued the husband notification requirement met the standard set by the Danforth precedent and it was in the interest of a woman's health.

V. Significance: The Court strengthened the decision made in Roe and refused to overturn it. This case focused on not if a woman could obtain an abortion, but what the limitations to her access should be. The Court also created the undue burden test for determining the permissibility of abortion requirements set by the states after the first trimester.

Romer v Evans

Holding: 6-3, affirmed, the Court held Colorado's amendment 2 violated the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. While the proposed statues would make all sexual orientations equal under the law, it would prevent homosexuals from securing protection against injuries committed against them as a result of their sexual orientation. The Court held while overruling the Colorado amendment does make homosexuals and heterosexuals unequal under the law, it does not violate the equal protection clause because it does not create a burden on nor specifically target a certain group of people. The Court also concluded the Amendment 2 was being proposed to replace a law that did not provide homosexuals with any special favor or privilege. The dissent argued there is no constitutional precedent for a law seeking to create consequences for discrimination against homosexuals. The state of Colorado was simply making all citizens equal with the imposition of the Amendment, which ended the preferential treatment of homosexuals in that state.
V. Significance: The Court established laws may be upheld despite the appearance of preferential treatment of one group, assuming it does not create disadvantage for another. The Court claimed that simply because a law advocates equality does not keep it from violating the Equal Protection clause. The law must be shown to advance a legitimate interest of a particular group.

Wolf v. Colorado (1949)

The Supreme Court ruled that while the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, the exclusionary rule—which prevents illegally obtained evidence from being used in court—does not apply to state courts under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This meant that states were not required to exclude illegally obtained evidence from criminal trials which in Weeks v. United States (1914) established the exclusionary rule at the federal level.

weakened protections for defendants, Overruled by Mapp v. Ohio (1961) which applied the exclusionary rule to the states, example of selective incorporatikon

Roper v. Simmons (2005)

imposing the death penalty on individuals who were under 18 years old at the time of their crime violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The Court reasoned that evolving standards of decency in the U.S. and international consensus against juvenile executions made such punishment unconstitutional. Extended the "Evolving Standards of Decency" Doctrine – The Court built on its reasoning from Atkins v. Virginia (2002), which banned the execution of individuals with intellectual disabilities, affirming that punishments must align with society’s evolving moral standards.

Overturned Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) – In Stanford, the Court upheld the death penalty for 16- and 17-year-olds. Roper reversed this, signaling a shift in how the Court viewed juvenile culpability.