Neuroethics exam 1

Substance Dualism

The mind and brain are two distinct kinds of substances. The mind is non-physical (or spiritual) while the brain is physical. Thus, the soul (mind/self) could survive the destruction of the body, and matter cannot be conscious.

Physicalism

Everything about the mind can ultimately be explained in terms of physical processes in the brain.

Reasons Levy rejected Dualism

1) Cognitive Science - Mind is dependent upon matter.

2) Evolutionary Biology - Earlier primates which we evolved from did not have souls.

3) Disorders of the mind and brain damage - Functional neuroanatomy and how lesions lead to malfunctions.

Extended Mind Thesis

The idea that cognitive processes extend beyond the brain into the body and even the environment.

Otto and Inga Example

• Otto: Uses a notebook to store information (external memory), illustrating that cognitive processes can “extend” outside the brain.

• Inga: Relies solely on her biological memory, suggesting a more traditional, brain-bound view of cognition.

Presumption against direct means

There is an initial, often morally loaded, assumption that bypassing a person’s deliberative capacities is problematic.

4 In-principle arguments against direct manipulation; Levy’s Responses

1. Argument from authenticity

   1. Direct manipulations of the mind are antithetical to authenticity because they change or conceal who the person was.

   2. “To be authentic is to find one’s way of life and one’s values within; it is to make one’s entire life an expression of who one truly is…”

2. Argument from self-knowledge and personal growth

   1. Traditional means of changing the mind are preferable because only they “have the power to aim at truth and therefore icnrease our self-knowledge”

   2. DMs are mechanical manipulations of the brain and of the mind through the brain as they bypass our rational capacities

3. Argument from mechanization of the self

   1. In using DM, we treat ourselves as machines rather than as free, responsible and rational agents.

   2. “The self is, or has as an essential component, the capacity to respond to reasons”

4. Argument from the treatment of symptoms rather than causes

   1. Direct manipulation just addresses the symptoms of a problem, rather than getting to the root causes

   2. Does not address the setting and circumstances that may have caused the symptoms

Argument from the treatment of symptoms rather than causes

1. Direct manipulation just addresses the symptoms of a problem, rather than getting to the root causes

2. Does not address the setting and circumstances that may have caused the symptoms

Argument from mechanization of the self

1. In using DM, we treat ourselves as machines rather than as free, responsible and rational agents.

2. “The self is, or has as an essential component, the capacity to respond to reasons”

Argument from self-knowledge and personal growth

1. Traditional means of changing the mind are preferable because only they “have the power to aim at truth and therefore increase our self-knowledge”

2. DMs are mechanical manipulations of the brain and of the mind through the brain as they bypass our rational capacities

Argument from authenticity

1. Direct manipulations of the mind are antithetical to authenticity because they change or conceal who the person was.

2. “To be authentic is to find one’s way of life and one’s values within; it is to make one’s entire life an expression of who one truly is…”

Informed consent

A process where a person is fully informed about the risks, benefits, and alternatives of an intervention and then voluntarily agrees to it.

Assent

A form of agreement used when individuals (often minors or those lacking full decision-making capacity) can’t legally give informed consent but can still express willingness to participate.

Decision-making capacity

Person’s ability to understand information, process it, and communicate their preferences.

Personal identity theories discussed

1. Psychological continuity - John Locke

   1. Psychological connectedness between past and present forms of self

   2. Continuity maintained by beliefs, memories, and desires

2. Utilitarian view - Hume, Bentham

   1. We are pleasure-seeking creatures who seek to maximize pleasure and pain

   2. A core “personal identity” isn’t as important to who we are as creatures

3. Situated-embodied-agent

   1. Human is an embodied agent embedded in his bodily form as well as in history, culture, and in relation to each other.

   2. Too narrow to just reduce the human being to a more psychological phenomena that is the sum of their connected mental states

4. Baylis’ definition

   1. Personal identity is constituted through personal relationships and public interactions

   2. It is deeply immersed in the political, social, and cultural embeddedness of a person

5. Narrative identity - Glannon

   1. The integrity and continuity of the characteristics and experiences that make up the distinctive autobiography of a person

   2. Psychological continuity accomodates some changes in one’s mental states

   3. Accommodates changes in the integrated set of experiences and memories that form one’s identity (role of memory and body in identity)

Narrative identity - Glannon

1. The integrity and continuity of the characteristics and experiences that make up the distinctive autobiography of a person

2. Psychological continuity accomodates some changes in one’s mental states

3. Accommodates changes in the integrated set of experiences and memories that form one’s identity (role of memory and body in identity)

Baylis’ definition

1. Personal identity is constituted through personal relationships and public interactions

2. It is deeply immersed in the political, social, and cultural embeddedness of a person

Situated-embodied-agent

1. Human is an embodied agent embedded in his bodily form as well as in history, culture, and in relation to each other.

2. Too narrow to just reduce the human being to a more psychological phenomena that is the sum of their connected mental states

Utilitarian view - Hume, Bentham

1. We are pleasure-seeking creatures who seek to maximize pleasure and pain

2. A core “personal identity” isn’t as important to who we are as creatures

Psychological continuity - John Locke

1. Psychological connectedness between past and present forms of self

2. Continuity maintained by beliefs, memories, and desires

Glannon Case Study

Background: Patient received DBS for advanced Parkinson’s. Decided to use DBS to control Parkinsonian tremors, though DBS caused a manic state of mind and now he lived in psychiatric ward.

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Autonomy: right of a person to make their own decisions, right to self-determination, freedom to act as one wishes

2 essential conditions of autonomy:

Liberty: independence from controlling influences, both external and internal

Agency: the capacity for intentional action

Recall: Identity - we associate improvements as identity-preserving and mental deterioration as more identity-breaking

Treatment/Enhancement distinction

“We are okay with direct manipulation if its used in the form of treatment of the mind, but not enhancement of the mind.”

Disease/Non-Disease States:

• Treatment: cure/prevent disease

• Enhancement: not aimed at cure/prevent disease

• Levy rejection:

  • “Disease,” “normal,” and “health” are vague terms

  • We do not want to “fix” disabilities (fix environment = no longer a disability)

Normal (species-typical) Functioning:

• Treatment: restore person to normal functioning

• Enhancement: raise above natural baseline level of functioning

• Levy rejection:

  • reject genetic determinism (requires us to identify a natural baseline from which disease or disability is a departure)

  • reject interactionism (cannot assign tendency of a gene to lead to a certain phenotype outside a controlled environment - no biological baseline)

Levy’s rejection of authenticity

1. authencitity does not only mean living aligned with a self that has never been manipulated by DM

   1. We develop context-dependently

2. If someone changes in a way they determine they want to change, that cannot be inauthentic

3. A cognitive change through DM can enable someone to feel more like themselves and/or more able to complete the cognitive tasks that they want to live out their values

Levy’s rejection of self-growth and self-knowledge

1. pain offers an opportunity for growth, but the rational decision to treat it does not make it immoral - self-growth may be better without the pain

2. People should choose for themselves their values and priorities in life

3. Thus, DM may be more effective than IM like psychotherapy when it comes to self-knowledge

Levy’s rejection of mechanization of the self

1. Some IMs mechanize the self in the same way that new DMs do.

2. It is wrong to manipulate someone’s mind without their knowing (like lobotomy for social control instead of as a cure)

Levy’s rejection of treatment of symptoms not causes

1. IMs like psychotherapy treat symptoms, not causes

2. Sometimes we only know the symptoms, not the causes

3. Though DMs can be abused, they may appropriately target symptoms or even causes directly

4. DM may be closer to treating cause rather than a symptom

Peril of cognitive enhancement

1. Cognitive enhancement WILL continue. However, a minority of morally corrupt people can use it for bad. We must use cognitive enhancement in accordance with the demands of morality.

2. Cognitive enhancement: enhancing processes of the mind or body.

3. Moral enhancement: improving our moral character, making us better at doing right rather than wrong using various mechanisms like genetic and biomedical means

4. Challenges of moral enhancement: genetics & definition of morality (differentiation of right from wrong)