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Costa v. ENEL
establishes the supremacy of EU law over conflicting national law
the court ruled that by creating a new legal order, Member States definitively limited their sovereign rights
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft
EU law takes precedence over all levels of domestic law, including national constitutional law & entrenched fundamental rights
Simmenthal
a national court must immediately set aside conflicting domestic law on its own authority
it cannot wait for a higher national court or legislature to repeal it first
Van Gend & Loos
establishes direct effect
for a provision to be directly effective, it must be unconditional & sufficiently precise to create an enforceable right
Defrenne v. SABENA
confirms that Treaty provisions specifically Art. 157 TFEU on equal pay, have horizontal direct effect
they can be enforced by an individual against a private party
Publico Ministero v. Ratti
a directive can only have direct effect after its transportation deadline has expired
The Estoppel Logic: a state cannot rely on its own failure to pass a law to block an individual’s rights
Marshall v. Southampton Health Authority
directives never have horizontal direct effect
they cannot, by themselves, impose obligations on a private individual or corporation
they can only be enforced vertically against the State or an emanation (bodies treated as an extension of the government) of the State
Foster v. British Gas
formulates the tripartite test for an ‘emanation of the State’ (to enforce a Directive vertically)
provides a public service
under the control of the state
possesses special ‘extraordinary’ powers beyond normal private rules
CIA Security & Unilever
the ‘incidental effect’ exception
a Directive can apply ‘incidentally’ in a private dispute if a party relies on a national rule that the state failed to notify to the Commission in breach of an EU procedural directive
the national rule is rendered inapplicable
Marleasing
establishes Indirect Effect (the doctrine of consistent internpretation)
national courts must interpret domestic law ‘as far as possible’ in light of the wording & purpose of an EU directive
Adeneler
the duty of a national court to interpret domestic law in conformity with a Directive arises only after the transportation deadline of that Directive has expired
Inter-Environnement Wallonie (IEW)
during the transposition period (before the deadline), Member States must completely refrain from taking any measures liable seriously to comprise the result prescribed by the Directive
Mangold & Kücükdeveci
a national court must set aside domestic law that conflicts with a General Principle of EU law (eg non-discrimination) even before the transposition period of a Directive giving expression to that principle has expired
Francovich
establishes the principle of State Liability
foundation: Article 4(3) TEU (loyal cooperation) & the principle of effet util
Member States must compensate individuals for harms caused by breaches of EU law or failure to implement an EU Directive
Brasserie du Pêcheur / Factortame III
expands State Liability to any breach of EU law by a Member State
establishes the 3 cumulative conditions for damages
the rule breached must be intended to confer (grant) rights on individuals
the breach must be sufficiently serious
there must be a direct causal link between the breach and the damage
Dillenkofer
synthesises (combos) Francovich & Brasserie
a complete, blank failure to transpose a Directive within the prescribed deadline automatically & unconditionally constitutes a ‘sufficiently serious breach’
Köbler
State liability can be triggered by a breach of EU law committed by a national court of last instance (supreme court), but only in exceptional cases where the court manifestly ignored prevailing EU law or CJEU case law
Plaumann v. Commission
the definitive, ultra-strict test for ‘individual concern’ under Article 263(4) TFEU
an applicant is individually concerned if the measure affects them by reasons of attributes peculiar to them or by circumstances differentiating them from all other persons (a closed category)
economic loss alone does not suffice
Inuit
defines ‘regulatory act’ under the 3rd limb of Article 263(4) TFEU
it means all acts of general application EXCEPT legislative acts (acts passed via ordinary / special legislative procedures)
if an act is legislative, the applicant must prove Plaumann individual concern
Dorsch Consult
lists the cumulative criteria to determine if a body is a ‘court or tribunal’ under Article 267 TFEU
established by law
permanent
compulsory jurisdiction
adversarial procedure (flexible)
applies rules of law
is independent
Broekmeulen
a private professional or appeals committee (eg a medical registration board) qualifies as a ‘court or tribunal’ if:
it operates with official public involvement
it acts under statutory authority, and
its decisions are final & legally binding
Foglia v. Novello
the CJEU will declare a preliminary reference inadmissible if it discovers that the case is a fictitious or engineered lawsuit manufactured by the parties solely to get an abstract legal ruling
Foto-Frost
lower national courts have the discretion to interpret EU law, but they have no power to declare an EU measure void
CILFIT
Case 283/81
defines 3 exceptions where a court of last instance is exempt from its strict duty to refer a question to the CJEU
the question is structurally irrelevant to the case outcome
the point is an acte eclaire: the CJEU has already decided the exact or a materially identical point
the point is an acte clair: the correct application is so obvious it leaves no room for reasonable doubt across all language versions
Geddo
defines a Quantitative Restriction (QR) as any measure which amounts to a total or partial restraint of imports, exports, or goods in transit (eg outright bans, quotas)
Dassonville
defines a Measure Having Equivalent Effect (MEQR): ‘all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-community trade’
Cassis de Dijon
introduces 2 critical doctrines for indistinctly applicable measures
mutual recognition: a product lawfully produced & marketed in one Member State must be generally admitted to all others
mandatory requirements: trade barriers are allowed if necessary to satisfy overriding public interest (fiscal supervision, public health, consumer protection)
Keck and Mithouard
draws a hard line between
product rules: design, size, composition → always caught by Article 34
selling arrangements: when, where, how items are sold / advertised → not caught by article 34, provided they apply to all traders in law & fact equally
Commission v. Italy (Trailers) / Mickelsson & Roos
refines Keck
introduces the comprehensive ‘market access test’
any national rule that prevents or greatly restricts the use of a product, effectively preventing its access to the domestic market, falls under Article 34 TFEU (even if it’s a selling arrangement or a use tool)
Levin / Kempf
defines a worker under Article 45 TFEU
the work must be genuine & effective, not purely nominal or minimal
part-time work or work where the person earns less than subsistence level (& needs private / public top-ups) still qualifies
Antonissen
first-time job seekers have a right to move & reside in another member state to look for work
they can’t be deported if they provide clear evidence that they are continuing to seek work & have a genuine chance of being engaged
Angonese
Article 45 TFEU (free movement of workers) has horizontal direct effect
it applies directly to private employers (eg a private bank or private sports cub), prohibiting them from imposing discriminatory nationality quotas
Gebhard
governs freedom of establishment (Article 49 TFEU)
it sets out the 4-prong test for when a national restriction on a fundamental market freedom is legally permissible
it must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner
it must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest
it must be suitable for securing the objective
it must not go beyond what is necessary (proportionate)
Grzelczyk
declares that union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality
Kraaijeveld / Commission v. Ireland (EIA Context)
Member States’ discretion under Annex II of the EIA Directive to set thresholds is not absolute
if a state sets thresholds so high that whole classes of projects with significant impacts escape assessment entirely, it exceeds its limits
Wells (EIA Context)
an individual can rely directly on the procedural rules of the EIA Directive against a sate entity to halt / review a project that was granted development consent without a mandatory environmental assessment
Bund Naturschutz (Trianel)
under the EIA Directive’s access to justice provisions, environmental NGOs must be given standing to challenge decisions before national courts
they can rely on EU environmental rules that protect the environment as such, rather than having to prove a violation of their own individual private rights
Waddenzee
interprets Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive
national authorities can only grant development consent to a project if they are completely certain (no reasonable scientific doubt remains) that it will not adversely affect the integrity of a Special Area of Conservation (SAC)
ClientEarth (Air Quality Context)
the air quality Directive (2008/50/EC) imposes an obligation of result regarding limit values
if a Member State exceeds pollution limits, the mere fact that it has established an air quality plan does not mean it has fulfilled its treaty obligations
individuals can compel national courts to order the state to take effective corrective action