Glossary TAP

belief condition

S knows that p only if S believes that p; belief is a necessary condition of knowledge.

Brain In a Vat

skeptical alternative that you do not know that you have hands, because it's possible that all you're not a person of flesh and bones, but rather a Brain In a Vat that is stimulated in such way as to have all your experiences.

Cartesian skepticism

defining skeptical problems by means of skeptical alternatives.

causal analysis

S knows that p if and only if (1) S believes that p, (2) p is true, and (3) the fact that p is causally connected in an appropriate way with S’s belief that p.

closure

if S knows that p, and that p rules out q, then S knows that q is ruled out.

contextualism

view that if a skeptical alternative q is contextually salient, S doesn't know that p.

defeater

true proposition q, such that if S were justified in believing that q, then S would not be justified in believing that p.

epistemic luck

it’s accidental, coincidental, or fortuitous that S has a true belief that p.

epistemic subject

person or group which believes or knows that p; traditionally represented by S.

epistemology

domain of theoretical philosophy that deals with the kinds, analysis, possibility, structure, value, sources, domains and dimensions of knowledge.

Gettier problem

the traditional analysis of knowledge in terms of justified true belief is lacking because there are cases in which a justified belief is accidentally, coincidentally or fortuitously true.

justification condition

S knows that p only if S’s belief that p is justified; justification is a necessary condition of knowledge.

no defeaters analysis

S knows that p if and only if (1) S believes that p, (2) p is true, (3) p is justified for S, and (4) there is no true proposition q, such that if S were justified in believing that q, then S would not be justified in believing that p.

no false lemmas analysis

S knows that p if and only if (1) S believes that p, (2) p is true, (3) p is justified for S, and (4) S’s ground for believing that p does not include any false proposition q.

relativism about truth

view that there are no absolute truths; view that truth is always relative to a believer or group of believers.

relevant alternatives approach

view that S can know that p only if S can rule out any alternative explanation q that is relevant in the context; skeptical alternatives are never contextually relevant.

sensitivity condition

S knows that p only if (if p were not true, S wouldn't believe that p).

skeptical alternative

q is a conceivable and thereby logically possible alternative explanation to p, which is incompatible with p, and cannot be ruled out.

traditional analysis

tripartite analysis; S knows that p if and only if (1) S believes that p, (2) p is true, and (3) p is justified for S; belief, truth and justification are individually necessary and jointly sufficient of knowledge.

truth condition

S knows that p only if p is true; S knows that p only if p; truth is a necessary condition of knowledge.

Agrippa's trilemma

the justification of beliefs in terms of other beliefs is impossible because the three horns (1) infinitism, (2) foundationalism and (3) circular justification (or coherentism) should be rejected.

animal knowledge

Sosa's externalist conception of knowledge in terms of apt beliefs.

apt

in the case of animal knowledge, beliefs are not 'justified' according to Sosa, but rather 'apt' in the sense that they have more often than not instrumental value.

basic beliefs

beliefs that do not require further justification, because they are infallible.

coherentism

a belief is justified holistically because it is part of a web of beliefs that is coherent.

externalism

justification doesn't require access.

foundherentism

Susan Haack's combination of foundationalism and coherentism, avoiding their respective problems.

foundationalism

knowledge in general and science in particular rests on a solid foundation of (infallible) basic beliefs.

holistic justification

justification of a belief by its coherence with and within a web of beliefs.

infinitism

justification can, at least in theory, go on ad infinitum, so that the need for further justification diminishes and eventually disappears.

instrumental value

value as a means to realize another goal.

internalism

justification requires access.

intrinsic value

value regardless of usefulness.

isolation problem

coherent web of beliefs can get completely detached from reality, think e.g. of conspiracy theories.

linear justification

inferring the justification of a belief from one or more other beliefs.

myth of the given

Sellar's objection to foundationalism that, on the one hand, sensory experiences as such are infallible, but that they cannot offer linear justification, and that on the other hand, perceptual beliefs—i.e., interpreted sensory experiences—can offer linear justification, but are not infallible.

new demon problem

thought experiment showing that the reliability of the belief formation is not a necessary condition of its justification.

reflective knowledge

Sosa's internalist conception of knowledge.

regress argument

argument that an infinite regress is impossible.

reliabilism

true beliefs are justified if they are formed in a truth-conducive (and hence) reliable way.

truth-conduciveness

resulting more often in truths than in falsehoods.

a priori knowledge

knowledge that is not acquired through research of the world, e.g., knowing that all circles are round.

abduction

a type of reasoning where a possible explanation is derived, ideally the best possible explanation.

aesthetic knowledge

examples or aspects concerning beauty that can be rationally decided.

analogy argument

according to John Stuart Mill and Bertrand Russell, the problem of "other minds" can be solved based on the analogy between, on the one hand, our own behavior and associated mental states, and, on the other hand, the behavior of others.

deduction

a type of reasoning where, if the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true.

direct realism

Thomas Reid's approach that we do not perceive images of the outside world, but the outside world itself.

empirical knowledge

a posteriori knowledge acquired through research of the world through experience, e.g., knowing that all American presidents (so far) are men.

folk psychology

fallible attribution of mental states to others through abduction.

Hume's reductionism

requires that a testimony ultimately be reducible to observations.

idealism

an approach that our sensory experiences form an endpoint; we can never get beyond them.

indirect realism

John Locke's approach that we have good reasons to assume that the outside world exists because that assumption provides the best explanation for the stability of our experiences.

induction

a type of reasoning where the probability of the conclusion is increased.

introspective knowledge

knowledge that arises from an examination of one's own mental states.

logical and mathematical knowledge

the logical and mathematical principles that, according to the monist, provide the correct description or, according to the pluralist, are suitable for different purposes.

moral knowledge

examples or aspects concerning the good that can be rationally decided.

phenomenalism

an approach that only the 'inner world'—in the sense of our sensory experiences—truly exists.

problem of "other minds"

the question of whether we can (certainly) know if others have consciousness and what mental states they have.

Reid's credulism

we can, in principle, rely on testimonies, unless we have good reasons to distrust a particular witness or testimony.

religious knowledge

examples or aspects concerning God or gods that can be rationally decided.

scientific knowledge

empirical knowledge.

testimonial knowledge

knowledge 'by hearsay', e.g., through books, videos, media, and the internet.

transcendental idealism

Kant's approach that, at the basis of our experiences, there must be an outside world, but we can never know whether, to what extent, and in what respects that outside world corresponds with our experiences.

analytic epistemology

largely normative perspectives on knowledge, justification, reliability, etc.

evolutionary epistemology

the evolutionary development of the biological basis of knowledge in general and modern science in particular can be explained in terms of processes of 'blind variation and selective retention'.

experimental epistemology

in line with social psychology, identifying and explaining differences between groups in terms of attributing knowledge, justification, reliability, etc.

feminist epistemology

instead of the 'gender biases' that have crept into traditional epistemology, feminist values—such as empirical adequacy, ontological heterogeneity, applicability to current needs, and distribution of power—should be incorporated into research.

naturalistic epistemology

as argued by Quine, epistemology is absorbed into psychology, where traditional, normative, analytic epistemology can still contribute to the 'technology of truth-finding' through a kind of 'engineering'.

social epistemology

broadens the scope of traditional, analytic epistemology by recognizing the importance of vital information from others, whether through testimony or disagreement, and also tackling new subjects such as the assessment of experts based on their track record.

Eliminativism about color

colors are experiences in our minds that we project onto the world.

Euthyphro dilemma

is the pious loved by the Gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the Gods?

Dispositionalism about color

colors are secondary qualities.

Global antirealism

view that we cannot make sense of the idea that there exists a mind-independent world.

Global realism

view that there exists a mind-independent world.

Global response-dependence

view that we can speculate about, but never know what is and what isn’t out there.

Local antirealism

view that a kind of entities doesn’t exist in the mind-independent world.

Local realism

view that a kinds of entities exists in the mind-independent world.

Metameric stimuli

physically different stimuli that produce the same color experience in human observers, because they stimulate the three types of cones in our eyes in the same ratio.

Primary qualities

properties whose existence doesn’t depend on perception.

Primitivism about color

color exist in the mind-independent world, but cannot be reduced to physical properties.

Reflectance physicalism about color

a color corresponds to the percentage of incident light that an object reflects per wavelength.

Response-dependence

x is R if and only if x produces response R in observers O in circumstances C.

Secondary qualities

powers or dispositions object have by virtue of their primary qualities to affect our senses in peculiar ways.

Wavelength physicalism about color

a color corresponds with the wavelength composition of the light that an object reflects.

Aristotelian universals

mind-independent, immanent universals.

Bare particulars

naked substrata, entities that do not have any properties whatsoever.

Bradley’s regress

if instantiation is a relation, then in case a particular instantiates a universal, there must also be a relation between the particular and the instantiation relations, and another relation between the universal and the instantiation relation, and so on, ad infinitum.

Bundle theories

an object is nothing more or less than a bundle of properties, with properties conceived of as either universals or tropes.

Class nominalism

if two or more particulars have the same property, it’s because they are members of the same class or set of particulars.

Cognitive binding problem

question how our minds integrate or reassemble disparate experiential inputs into a unified experience as of a discrete object.

Compresence

simultaneous presence together of properties or experienced qualities.

Conceptualism about universals

view that universals exist as mind-dependent entities.

Facts

states of affairs, universals and thin particulars bonded together.

Factualism

the world is a world of states of affairs or facts.

Immanent

located in space and time.

Instantiation

the relation between a property and the object having the property.

Instantiation regress

since realists explain commonalities of properties and relations in terms of universals, two instances of instantiation share a universal Instantiation, and so on, ad infinitum.

Metaphysical binding problem

The question of how an object in the mind-independent world integrates or assembles its properties.

Metaphysical problem of universals

problem of the one over the many.

Naked substrata

bare particulars, entities that do not have any properties whatsoever.