inconsistency of nature of god

existence of both natural and moral evil points to an inconsistency in the nature of God

• as a benevolent being, God would wish to avoid, prevent or undo evil. This is part of the definition of "benevolence", "morally good" or "loving". If a person has no wish to stop evil or end suffering, we would normally not call them "good". 

• As an omnipotent being, God has the power to do whatever he wishes. Nothing can prevent an omnipotent being from carrying out his wishes, so if he wished to prevent evil or end suffering, he would. 

mackie’s inconsistent triad

• God is omnipotent (all-powerful) 

• God is omnibenevolent (morally perfect) 

• Evil exists 

• Mackie argues that these propositions are inconsistent; if two are true, the third must be false. 

plantiga’s free will defence+ mackie

• A common solution to the Logical Problem of Evil is that many kinds of evil are not the result of God’s actions, but of the free actions of human beings. This is the "Freewill Defence" proposed by Alvin Plantinga. 

• Mackie asks how can this count as a solution to the problem of evil, given that God created the freewilled creatures?  

• The theist's reply is that it is better that God made us with freewill and not as robots or automata who are kind or brave in a machine-like way.  

• An all-powerful, good God would make a world in which human beings have freewill and can choose kindness over cruelty. 

• Mackie’s questions why God didn't create us so that we ALWAYS chose good over evil of our own freewill.  

• It's possible to be freewilled and yet choose good actions instead of evil ones - we all do that sometimes, perhaps most of the time - so why not create beings who ALWAYS do this? 

compatibilism

• Mackie's position is known as COMPATIBILISM - the idea that human freewill is compatible with (can exist alongside) a God who determines in advance that we always do the right thing. 

• Mackie introduces "two different senses of 'freedom'" which he thinks religious people confuse with each other: 

1. Free behaviour might be random behaviour, which isn't caused by anything at all 

2. Free behaviour might come from a person's character, so long as nothing interferes with it  

• If freedom means 'random behaviour', then God isn't responsible for the evil things we freely do. But Mackie argues that this sort of freedom can't really be a free "will" because it's not intentional. 

paradox of omnipotence

• The Paradox of Omnipotence is whether an omnipotent being (God) could create something that he cannot control. 

• If he can, then there is something outside of his control, so he's not omnipotent 

• If he can't, then there's something he cannot do, so he's not omnipotent 

• God ends up being non-omnipotent whichever answer you choose.  

• If God creates freewilled creatures and promises to respect their choices, then he stops being omnipotent because there's stuff he can't do. If he goes back on his promise, he was never omnipotent in the first place, because his creatures no longer have their freewill. 

mackie’s types of omnipotence

• first-order omnipotence being unlimited power to act 

• second-order omnipotence being unlimited power to determine what powers other things should have.  

• Mackie argues that if a God had second order omnipotence he could create something which had the power to act independently of his own power, therefore he would not have first-order omnipotence.