ISMs Exam

W. E. B. Du Bois

"The African Roots of War"

1. Black Internationalist Scholar

2. The exploitation of Africa's goods, labor, and people is one of the main causes of war, racism, and international conflict

(+ Peace and democracy will liberate Black individuals)

3. Home rule and realist power gains disproportionately impact racial minorities --> link between capital, liberalism and resources

J. David Singer

"The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations"

1. Explaining the proper levels of analysis

2. Both systemic level and sub-state levels of analysis are important for IR, but you must commit to a path when theorizing

(+ Systemic level produces a more comprehensive and total picture of IR than does the national or sub-systemic level, but it is less predictive)

3. Gives way to second and third image development, ways of analysis w/ other scholars; separate from WALTZ, who thinks that 1st image is also important

Stephen Van Evera

"Hypotheses, Laws, and Theories: A User's Guide"

1. Theorist

2. Theories should have explanatory and predictive power and should be parsimonious, clearly framed, and falsifiable

(+ Independent, dependent variables for theories)

3. Reality is knowable and achievable through rational explanations --> Must make judgements about what is important and compelling

Amitav Acharya

"Towards a Global International Relations?"

1. Global IR Theory

2. IR must be specifically and explicitly grounded in the international and not just Western school of thought

(+ IR started because of major Western powers around the Cold War period)

3. IR is inherently for and by white male Westerners in the current status-quo, leaving out important non-Western voices

John J. Mearsheimer (2001)

"Anarchy and the Struggle for Power"

1. Structural Realist

2. States act in their own interests to protect power and establish security --> bleak, competitive, unjust world that anarchy pushes to violence

(+ regional hegemony & NATO's ineffectiveness in WWII, reflecting a bipolar balance and not an international order of institutions)

3. There is no "international 911"; states engage in self-help practices to protect themselves

Helen Milner

"The assumption of anarchy in IR theory: A critique"

1. Anarchy critique

2. Strategic interdependence is just as important as anarchy, which is overemphasized

(+ All states are different and have domestic and international needs, which affects methods of obtaining and maintaining power)

3. Radical separation of domestic and international politics & the focus on anarchy is reductionist and promotes warped conclusions

Thucydides

"The Peloponnesian War"

1. Classical Realist

2. Strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must

(+ Athens vs. Sparta, Melians appealed to everyone and everything but Athens destroyed them anyways)

3. Right is only a discussion among equals; small states are at the mercy of big states power and have limited sovereignty

Hans J. Morgenthau

"Six Principles of Political Realism"

1. Classical realist

2. 6 principles of IPOL:

(1)Politics is governed by objective laws rooted in human nature

(2) The interests of individuals and states are defined in terms of power. Power is an end in and of itself

(3) Power is a universal and objective concept

(4) Universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states

(5) The moral aspirations of a particular nation are not universal

(6) Politics is an autonomous realm with a distinct dynamic governed by power

(+ Melian dialogue as an example of these principles)

3. World is inherently conflictual & grounded in human nature

Diana Thorburn

"Feminism Meets International Relations"

1. Feminist

2. Women are treated differently in IR; when in systems of power, the dynamics change

(+ International women's organizations and feminism groups have been a part of the growth of the international nongovernment sector)

3. Lack of women perspectives in IR; these perspectives are not new but rapidly growing, different, and must be considered

Robert Jervis

"Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma"

1. Structural realist

2. Anarchy, security dilemma, and desire to control land/resources beyond a state's territory hinder cooperation

(+ self-help system, stag hunt/prisoners dilemma)

Russia/Ukraine in the current system

3. States can use offense/defense differentiation as well as information sharing to mitigate conflict

Kenneth N. Waltz

"The Anarchic Structure of World Politics"

1. Structural Realist

2. Anarchy leads to survival being state's priority

(+ Prisoners Dilemma; bipolarity and balancing leads to the best solution because powers can challenge each other with the least case of war vs. other systems)

3. There are three characteristics of all systems (see flashcard); some promote more stability than others

John J. Mearsheimer (1994)

"The False Promise of International Institutions"

1. Structural Realist

2. Institutions have little independent influence

(+ NATO was a reflection of bipolar balance in Europe and became useless after the collapse of the Soviet Union -- NATO itself did not prevent WWIII during the Cold War)

3. Relative gains and concerns about cheating limit institutions and states from fully participating in the organization

Robert O. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin

"The Promise of Institutionalist Theory"

1. Liberal Institutionalists

2. The U.S. may lack the ability and inclination to make and sustain strong, liberal ties, but cooperation would be possible because of the institutions the U.S. created

(+ Mutuality of interests in NATO)

3. Institutions are the iterated games in IR with information sharing under Stag Hunt; liberal scholars may have to tighten definition of what composes an institution to escape criticism

John M. Owen

"How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace"

1. Liberalism

2. Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) explains foundational relationships in IR and their causes

(+ how liberals define 'democracy' plays a part in war, like England to the U.S. during the Civil War)

the 4 examples of war in article!

3. Liberal ideas cause democracies to go to war against themselves — explains war among illiberal states

Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder

"Democratization and the Danger of War"

1. Liberal scholars

2. Democratizing states are more likely to go to war than those not going through regime changes

(+ Russia's poorly developed, partially democratic system has led to many regional instabilities)

3. DPT may be true, but only for established democracies --> democratizing is dangerous!

Martha Finnemore

"National Interests in International Society"

1. Constructivist (3rd Image Theory)

2. Identity, interests, and preferences are frequently derived from international forces --> by the norms of behavior embedded in international society

(+ socialization: interests, norms, perceptions)

3. Divergence from pure realism; international institutions help states form interests

Srdjan Vucetic

"A Racialized Peace? How Britain and the US Made Their Relationship Special"

1. Constructivist

2. US/UK peace was based on shared identities

(+ nations peace was racialized on Anglo-Saxan grounds)

3. Shared identities promote cooperation; can be more powerful than other forms of classification

Graham T. Allison

"Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis"

1. Second-image theorist

2. Citizens must understand the actions of their government in light of bureaucratic council and decision-makers

(+ Kennedy's cabinet provided him recommendations based off their own experience, and eventually endorsed their stances, for the blockage for the Cuban Missile Crisis instead of drone striking the area)

3. Spawns the three rational actors model (see flashcard); foreign policy makers previous understanding of crises deemed 'incomplete' in his eyes without these models

Jack Snyder

"The Cult of the Offensive in 1914"

1. Liberal scholar --> Second Image Theorist here

2. Offense of military in 1914 was based on state preferences, even if defense was a better policy decision

(+ Russia's military changed from 1910 to 1912 due to personality differences in leaders over Russia's strength in their territorial advancement/imperial policy goals)

3. Military decision makers will tend to overestimate the feasibility of an operational plan if a realistic assessment would forsake fundamental beliefs and values

Khong

"Analogical Reasoning in Foreign Affairs: Two Views"

1. Analogical explanation framework

2. Analogies are cognitive devices that 'help' policymakers perform six diagnostic tasks central to political decision-making (see flashcard)

(+ US invoking Pearl Harbor with Cuba; Chinese equating Tiananmen square with the Cultural Revolution)

3. Whether policymakers use analogies as a way of processing information psychologically or a prescriptive tool that actually matches the policy they invoke needs to be studied

Jack S. Levy

"Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for International Conflict"

1. Prospect Theorist -- 1st Image Theory

2. How people frame a problem around a reference point has a critical influence on their choices and that people tend to overweight losses with respect to comparable gains, to be risk-averse with respect to gains and risk-acceptant with respect to losses, and to respond to probabilities in a non-linear manner

(+ US decision to attempt a hostage rescue mission in Iran in 1979 combined perceived external decline and internal insecurity)

3. Prospect theory offers no theory of framing; analyzes specific individuals; must be situated within larger foreign policy and strategic analysis for a more accurate explanation

Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack

"Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In"

1. First image theorists

2. Individuals can make decisions absent the support of the state, challenge norms, and can completely control an empire (13 hypothesis)

(+ Hitler, Napoleon, Saddam Hussein and Mussolini as examples of leaders that 1st image must explain)

3. Individuals have a distinct place in politics, which theorists must reckon with; models are better with more accuracy than a generic, catch-all model

Kenneth Waltz

- Structural realist

- Anarchy leads to survival being states' priority-

- Bipolarity is the best system: balances state's oppressive/ultimate power, must compete for hegemony, decisions are more calculated so war is not as present

- Prisoner's Dilemma

- 3 characteristics of all systems (see flashcard)

G. John Ikenberry

Three post-WWII options for the United States:

1. U.S. uses influence and power to build a network of systems for domination

2. U.S. uses systems to create rules and norms for the liberal order

3. U.S. abandon system entirely

- The US chose the option of creating liberal norms

Kant

- Democratic Peace Theorist

- Believer in monadic DPT, in which democracies don't go to war, period, with each other (later discredited)

Alexander Wendt

- Cited saying "Anarchy is what states make of it"

- Self-help is only one possibility under anarchy

- Identity is the basis of interests

- Self-help is a self-fulfilling prophecy

- Self-help and power politics do not follow logically or casually from anarchy

Irving Janis

GROUPTHINK: key policy decisions are made by small groups, where a high degree of cohesion within that group produces a psychological drive for consensus

Theory

A general statement that explains cause and effect

Dependent Variable

The outcome factor; the variable that may change in response to manipulations of the independent variable.

Independent Variable

The experimental factor that is manipulated; the variable whose effect is being studied.

Hypothesis

A testable prediction, often implied by a theory

How do we evaluate theories?

- Make judgements about what is important + compelling

- The scientific method to delineate theories

- Reality is knowable and achievable through rational explanations

- Historical data and not experiments to test

What are good theories?

- You can tell what's being evaluated

- Clearly framed ---> parsimonious

- They should explain a lot about the world

- Theories should be relevant to current geopolitical events

- Should be falsifiable

- Have to be empirically valid

- Qualitative, quantitative, and formal model training

Waltz Image Theories

First image: War is caused by human nature; looks at individuals

Second Image: War is caused by internal state affairs; looks at states and state formation

Third Image: War is caused by the interaction of states; looks at the international system

First Image Theories

psychological biases: in the face of new information, existing beliefs are often deterrents to accepting it. also, info from different cultural backgrounds is often misinterpreted. leaders tend to think that their own messages are clearer than they actually are. sometimes we assume decision makers are rational and cold and calculating. we see other leaders as way more hostile than they are. and a lack of empathy about how one's own actions are interpreted

misuse of historical analogies: analogies are attractive because of their descriptive property, normative dimension, prescriptive component, and predictive property

prospect theory: if we frame something as a gain, we act differently than if we were to frame it as a loss. people are risk-averse in the domain of gains and risk acceptance in the domain of losses

great man theories: critically important people who determine the course of history. initial hypotheses on how individuals may affect international politics.

UN Charter Article 2 (1)

Organization based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members

UN Charter Article 2 (4)

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

Anarchy

The idea that the world, international system as a whole lacks, is absent of any supreme authority or sovereign

Thirty Years War

(1618-1648 CE) War within the Holy Roman Empire between German Protestants and their allies (Sweden, Denmark, France) and the emperor and his ally, Spain; ended in 1648 after great destruction with Treaty of Westphalia.

Treaty of Westphalia

Ended Thirty Years War in 1648; granted right to individual rulers within the Holy Roman Empire to choose their own religion-either Protestant or Catholic; enshrined the notion of state sovereignty and promoted the idea of the state maintaining a monopoly on the legitimate use or force within its borders; established a core group of European States

First Era of Statehood

1648-1789

- Principle of sovereignty, territorial integrity

- Borders matter -> to transgress a border is to transgress international law

Second Era of Statehood

1789-1815

- Birth of nationalism, the belief that a group of people with some shared identity, culture, history, etc should have its own state

-Napoleon ensuring that everyone in France was a "Frenchman/woman" and not from their city, etc

- Pioneered linking an idea with an order of government

Third Era of Statehood

1815-1914

- Leaders worried about nationalism from Napoleon

- Established relative peace with Congress on Vienna

- Established a state forum to quell their goals and conflict

- Globalization, a profound era of growth

- Had incentive not to go to war -> fighting colonialism and imperialism

Is the Westphalian system eroding?

- Scholars say the borders were drawn illegitimately out of the idea for colonial expansion

- Presence of failed states: states have grey spaces of control, contestation of area, lock of government to provide for its citizens

- Powerful actors can challenge the authority of other states

- Innovations in communication and technology contribute to this system

- Supranational organizations can challenge the idea of the nation-state

Structural Realism

The international system that determines the level of power within each state. State power is determined by the prospect of the balance of power within the international system. Sometimes the balance of power within the international system motivates states to pursue aggressive policies; sometimes it stifles them

- third image

- relative power

- security dilemma

- zero sum power

- states goal is survival; power is a means

Critiques of structural realism

- States are only worried about themselves in the self-help security dilemma system; can't fully trust each other

- Zero-Sum theory: states don't want o use their relative power

- Fosters the security dilemma

- Even without a world gov, according to liberal institutionalists, we can foster cooperation and stability

Classical Realism

The belief that it is fundamentally the nature of people and the state to act in a way that places interests over ideologies. The drive for power and the will to dominate are held to be fundamental aspects of human nature.

- first image

- absolute power

- power as an ends

Hard power

The reliance on economic and military strength to solve international problems.

Soft power

The reliance on diplomacy and negotiation to solve international problems.

Peloponnesian War

(431-404 BCE) The war between Athens and Sparta that in which Sparta won, but left Greece as a whole weak and ready to fall to its neighbors to the north.

Melian Dialogue

A dialogue between the Melians and the Athenians, quoted in Thucydides' Peloponnesian War, in which the latter refused to accept the Melian wish to remain neutral in the conflict with Sparta, eventually besieging and massacring them.

" For you know as well as we do, that right — as the world goes — is in question only between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must"

- cooperation is impossible

- conflict is inevitable

- only between great powers is diplomacy possible

- the guiding principle of realists

The implications of anarchy

1. survival = the goal of states

2. international politics is a self-help system

3. relative power, not absolute power, matters

4. states can never be certain of each others' intentions

Security dilemma

A dilemma that arises when efforts that states make to defend themselves cause other states to feel less secure. This dilemma can lead to arms races and war due to fear of being attacked.

- uncertainty about others' actions in anarchy is the primary impediment to cooperation

- when one state arms themselves, other states feel less secure as a result

- Russia/Ukraine is good example of this in action

Waltz's 3 principles of political structure, applied to domestic and international contexts

1. Ordering principle: hierarchy vs. anarchy

2. Character of the units (functional differentiation: differentiated or undifferentiated; how power functions and is structured within the state)

3. Distribution of capabilities (multipolarity, bipolarity, and unipolarity; the international system is anarchic, undifferentiated, and could be any of the polarities)

Polarities

1. Unipolarity: one state with power

- Under this system, balances will form, and state will try to challenge the singular absolute power; but the greater the gap, the greater the peace

2. Bipolarity: two great powers, vying for dominance

- The most stable system because there is only one actor for the other to keep an eye on; great powers are reduced or eliminated; the Cold War is an example of this in practice

3. Multipolarity: three or more great powers

- The least stable system; states are all flying for power; systems have too much power and create shifting loyalties and higher actors, leading to more conflict among actors

Security Dilemma

A dilemma that arises when efforts that states make to defend themselves cause other states to feel less secure. This dilemma can lead to arms races and war due to fear of being attacked.

- uncertainty about others' actions in anarchy is the primary impediment to cooperation

- when one state arms themselves, other states feel less secure as a result

- zero-sum game where the gain of one state's relative power and security threatens another

- Russia/Ukraine is good example of this in action

Stag Hunt

A game that is a metaphor for problems of coordination. It resembles the problem of setting international standards. The primary barrier to cooperation is a lack of trust. Best outcome is for both to cooperate and the worst is to cooperate while the other defects.

Prisonner's Dilemma

- a paradox in decision analysis in which two individuals acting in their own self-interests do not produce the optimal outcome

- best strategy for individual is to defect

Mearsheimer: tragedy of great power politics is that even though a state may want to cooperate, they can't.

This model better reflects IR because states CANNOT COMMUNICATE with each other easily and with clear communication; states always want power and they hate being taken advantage of

Conditions for mitigating anarchy

1. Offense/Defense Differentiation

- Distinguishing policy weapons and literal arms can show what states goals are; defensive weapons keeps other actors out while weapons that make conquest easer, like long range, reveals more intentions

2. Offense/Defense Dominance

- Looking so see when offense or defense has the advantage; conquest is easy in an offensive war but conquest is less likely when the defensive is dominant; islands have defensive advantage; central Europe has offensive advantage

3. Iterated Games

- Prisonner's Dilemma turns to Stag Hunt as the game is played many times

- Sharing information and diplomacy among states can mitigate the lack of a central authority who can keep actors accountable

Institution

Persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations

Liberal Institutionalism

A version of liberalism that stresses the positive role of international organizations and institutions in promoting cooperation and peace.

- third image

- shares assumptions of structural realism: centrality of states, importance of anarchy, pervasive uncertainty, obstacle to cooperation is fear of cheating

- Solution to prisoners dilemma and solution to obstacle to cooperation is INFORMATION

- Creates issue linkages

- Reduces uncertainty

- Institutions provide that information and reduce incentives to cheat

- Sets standards of behavior for each state

- Lengthen the shadow of the future: cooperate today, because you will be able to see tomorrow (like roommates!)

Main claim: Institutions mitigate uncertainty, and uncertainty pervades world politics

Realist critiques of liberal institutionalism

- When institutions fail to serve state interests, nothing happens

- When the tenets conflict, states will leave and go another way

- Institutions have no independent, causal impact on state behavior

- Most basic motivation of states is survival (states FEAR each other, states want to SURVIVE, states want to MAXIMIZE relative power)

- Cooperation inhibited because of concerns about relative gains, fear of exploitation

Classical realist critiques of liberal institutionalism

- Institutions are dangerous

- Faith in institutions is done so at a risk to states

- E.H. Carr said the states that had faith in the League of Nations had catastrophic consequences -> trust could resemble the end

Liberalism

- second image

- democratic peace

- liberal ideas cause liberal democracies to tend away from war with one another and toward war with illiberal states

- liberal states must perceive the other state to be a liberal democracy

epiphenominalism

institutions only matter at the margins, so there's no independent impact of these institutions on states

Democratic Peace Theory (DPT)

a theory which posits that democracies are hesitant to engage in armed conflict with other identified democracies

MONADIC: democracies don't go to war with each other, period (discredited)

DIADIC: pair of states -> peaceful in relations with other democracies

LIBERAL: state places a high premium on individual rights and freedoms

DEMOCRACY: state that has popular enfranchisement

Logics underpinning DPT

1. Structural/institutional

- Attributed the democratic peace to institutional constraints within democracies

2. Normative

- Attributes the democratic peace to norms of peace to norms of compromise; the bar the use of force against states that espouse similar principles

Liberal ideas can split into institutions or ideology --> free debate or no wars ---> constraints on gov --> democratic peace

- Perception is the missing factor in this model

Critiques of DPT

- Institutional arrangements so good, then why do democracies go to war at all?

- Public opinion isn't always against war (Iraq, for example in the US)

- People define states as democracies when they want them to

- War is statistically an outlier; not significant enough for analysis

Solutions to the dangers of democratization

- Elites given the 'golden parachute' --> they will be safe and secure in the new regime and avoid consequences of their actions

- Fundamental problems with forced-paced democratizations; should not be pushed in a time frame, etc

- Some states might not be better under democracy (Iraq)

Constructivism

an extension of symbolic interaction theory which proposes that reality is what humans cognitively construct it to be

- third image

- the goals of states are variable and socially constructed. interests are defined by ideas as much as material power.

- the conduct of international politics is determined largely by ideas, norms, identities, and discourse, and can therefore be cooperative or competitive. though discourse, international politics can be transformed into a more cooperative culture.

- conflict is caused by conflicting identities and norms that promote conflict. therefore, states should work to reconstruct the culture of anarchy that dominates in international politics through discourse, behavior, and institutions

Critiques of constructivism

- States break away from norms all of the time: unrealistic about the possibility of escaping insecurity

- Institutions have no causal impact on state behavior

- Constructivism is a metatheory rather than a singular theory

- Why haven't we made the effort already to change?

Two logics of IR theory

1. Logic of consequence

- Make decisions because of material consequences

2. Logic of appropriateness

- Make decisions because of beliefs about appropriate behavior

Constructivist critiques of realism and liberal institutionalism

- Structural realists don't make change, according to Wendt --> theory of change is not applicable in their static system

- Liberal institutionalist haven't gone far enough in developing a system of rationally better outcomes --> institutions are more than power, but an identity changer

- States are locked into the system because it's what is believes

Broad research areas for constructivists

1. Legitimacy

2. Identity

3. Discourse

4. Transformation

First wave of scholarship: defend the basic concept that norms matter

Second wave of scholarship: specific why, when, and which norms matter; causes of war

Rational Actor Model I

- Dominant model

- States serve as a BLACK BOX: the actor is the GOVERNMENT, foreign policy action is the realization of some PURPOSE, foreign policy action chosen as a calculated SOLUTION to a strategic PROBLEM

Critiques: Productive short-hand, but long-hand, the knowledge and unitary of actors is not always static; massively oversimplifies how foreign policy is made

Rational Actor Model II (Organizational Process)

- Governments are not individuals, but a constellation of ORGANIZATIONS

- They have unique operating procedures, rules, and cultures

- Organization becomes resistant to change with their own CULTURE and PERSONALITY

- Commitment to organization makes it DIFFICULT to BREAK AWAY

Rational Actor Model III (Bureaucratic Politics)

- Events in foreign affairs are the result of a BARGAINING GAME played by players in the national government

- Bureaucratic COMPETITION: "where you stand depends on where you sit"

- Examines INTERNAL FIGHTS between leading actors

- Actors have PREFERENCES but also get them from internal state orgs

Organizational Pathologies

1. Non-evaluation

- Cannot evaluate your own organization

2. Non-strategy

- Avoid clarity on goals to avoid public criticism

3. Value infusion

- Getting everyone to uncritically buy into the values of the institution

Pathologies shown in the U.S. military, with uniforms and buzz cuts: it promotes a singular image where diversion is not possible

Organizational Pathologies in Practice

- actors don't act quickly, won't recognize mistakes, and won't try to correct themselves or notice suspicion

- nation-states are not closely evaluated, won't reveal their strategy and have no one to tell them to, and infuse patriotism

- militaries are large, cohesive orgs famous for SOPs. they don't evaluate and treat all wars as the same. they keep their strategy classified

Organizational Culture

- the set of values, ideas, attitudes, and norms of behavior that is learned and shared among the members of an organization

- a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and the human relations within an organization

- the personality of an organization

- internal state fights !?

Standard Operating Procedures

Better known as SOPs, these procedures are used by bureaucrats to bring uniformity to complex organizations. Uniformity improves fairness and makes personnel interchangeable.

to reduce uncertainty, an organization will have an SOP for specific things. it's good because it assures consistency within large organizations, but bad because once created, it's very difficult to break

Bureaucratic Competition

orgs within a state fight with one anotheroften they fight for money and power, "where you stand depends on where you sit," and bureaucracies simplify at a high price

Prospect Theory

people choose to take on risk when evaluating potential losses and avoid risks when evaluating potential gains

- losses have greater impact on people than gains do

- how people frame a problem around a reference point has a critical influence on their choices

- ppl are willing to take big risks to avoid small losses but not to make similar gains

Rational Choice Theory

A popular theory in political science to explain the actions of voters as well as politicians. It assumes that individuals act in their own best interest, carefully weighing the costs and benefits of possible alternatives.

- expected utility logic

- realist

- preferences are consistent

Sovereignty

Ability of a state to govern its territory free from control of its internal affairs by other states.

External: Independence from outside authorities

Internal: Supreme authority within one's territory

Dominance of the nation-state

the key way that we identify/organize ourselves. it's the highest form of political organization, the state remains sovereign, and all states are equal in principle

Challenges to the nation-state

1. westphalian norms have been eroded. some borders illegitimate (ex: all of africa), conflicting norms persist (ex: sovereigntty vs. self-determination), and some states fail.

2. other actors have risen, primarily non-state actors. terrorist groups, multinational coroporations, and empowered individuals are now important to international politics.

3. information technology has become a lot more important, meaning that governments no longer have monopolies on info

4. nation states remain relevant though because states still make the laws that others follow and leaders have power

Power

behavioral definition: power is the ability to coerce others to do what they otherwise would not do

resource definition: power is measured through concrete things like GDP, population, coal and steel production, etc.

Cuban Missle Crisis

The Soviet Union was secretly building nuclear missile launch sites in Cuba, which could have been used for a sneak-attack on the U.S. The U.S. blockaded Cuba until the U.S.S.R. agreed to dismantle the missile silos.

The 1962 confrontation between US and the Soviet Union over Soviet missiles in Cuba.

6 options for action:

- Do nothing (makes US appear weak)

- Diplomatic Pressure

- Secret approach to Castro (Castro does not like the US after Bay of Pigs, won't work)

- Invasion

- Airstrike

- Blockade (chosen, makes Khrushchev make the first move)

Russia/Ukraine Conflict

the ethnic distinctions between Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Russians are somewhat blurred. Ukraine used to be a part of Russia until the fall of the Soviet Union. Ukraine is split due to some people in the East identifying themselves as Russian.

- security dilemma playing out

- over 100k troops bordering Ukraine

- Putin says troops were deployed in self-defense after NATO deployed troops closer to Russia Dec. 2021

- Ukraine wants to join NATO, Russia does not want Ukraine to join NATO

Deterrence Model

Threats and build up of strength is the best way to avoid further conflict (arms race, MAD).

- Problems arise when an aggressor believes that the status quo powers are weak in capability or resolve

- Conflict occurs because aggressors underestimate the resolve of status-quo powers

- CHICKEN!

Chicken Model

Two cars heading straight for one another — best payoff is you not being the 'chicken'

- Like Prisonner's Dilemma

- You get war because the weaker state does not back down

- This represents nuclear arms and mutually assured destruction

- There is no dominant outcome in chicken

Munich Conference

1938 conference at which European leaders attempted to appease Hitler by turning over the Sudetenland to him in exchange for promise that Germany would not expand Germany's territory any further.

- This tells policy makers not to make concessions or appeasement with a dictator.

- Danger of analogy applies intervention and war as policy recommendations

- Salient analogy, but dangerous if used incorrectly

Loss Aversion

we emphasize losses more than gains

Great Man Theory

a theory of leadership that explained leadership by examining the traits and characteristics of individuals considered to be historically great leaders

- Examples: Hitler, Osama Bin Laden, Saddam Hussain, Mussolini, Mao Zedong, etc

Critiques of first image theorizing

- Reductionist in explaining

- Too messy/complicated to make a theory

- The specific leader of a state does not matter — they all want power

- Lacks parsimony

- Are they even theories/causal methods at play?

AE (Analogical Explanation) framework

(1) helps define the nature of the situation confronting the policymaker

(2) help asses the stakes

(3) provides prescriptions

(4) predicts their chances of success

(5) evaluating their moral rightness

(6) warning about dangers associated with the options