Metaphysics of Mind

To understand the nature of the human mind, what is Introspection?

Introspection is the examination and analysis of one's mental processes

To understand the nature of the human mind, what are the general things we can observe about the mind?

We can observe our beliefs about things.

The fact that it processes sensory data (smell, sight, sound, touch and taste)

The fact that it has thoughts, ideas, memories and mental states

- The fact that introspection and self-awareness is involved. The mind can think about itself

- The fact that we have consciousness and have conscious awareness of things

- The fact that we have what is called Qualia where we have a subjective, first person experiences of things like colour, smell etc

- The fact that we have what is called Incorrigibility where we cannot be in error of our direct thinking experience.

- The fact that we have first person access and privacy to our own experiences and thought but other have to analyse our behaviour to catch a clue

- The fact that we have a stream of consciousness meaning that the mind operates in a temporal, sequential manner, moving from one thought or perception to the next

- The fact that we have a sense of self/ego

- And lastly, that the mind has an element of mystery. We can see that merely from its operations, we do not know the nature of what the mind is.​

To understand the nature of the human mind, what is the meaning of Consciousness?

It is a being's awareness of its own existence & mind and the world.

To understand the nature of the human mind, what is the meaning of the Mind?

It is the element of a person that allows them to be aware of themselves and their world. Also to think and to experience.

To understand the nature of the human mind, what is meaning of the term Mental States?

It is anything episode or single event of (which we are conscious of) that is happening in our mind.

For example,
Having a thought,

Reflecting on an idea,

Experiencing a sense perception like taste, smell hearing, touching,

Experiencing an emotion and

Remembering a memory.

To understand the nature of the mind, what is meant when we have a First Person Access to our minds?

The meaning behind the term First Person Access is when we have first person access to our minds meaning that we have direct knowing of our own thoughts, experiences and mental states.

Another way of putting it is that we have privileged access to our thoughts, experiences and mental states in a way that is not pubically accessible to others.

With this understanding, philosophers like Plato and Descartes have argued that the person's self/ego is their mind. While their body is simply a vehicle or a tool used by the mind.

To understand the nature of the human mind, what do we mean by Incorrigibility?

Incorrigibility itself means something that cannot be corrected.

So a basic understanding of Incorrigibility is that it is one of our mental states.

And the 'Incorrigibility' of our mental states means that we cannot be in error about our thinking

For example if you are thinking about a chair, then you are in fact thinking about a chair, you cannot be in error about it. This is closely connected to our "First Person private Access"

To understand the nature of the human mind, what do we mean by Intentionality?

Intentionality is a mental state that is about something. It has representational content meaning that that particular mental state represents something. They represent something to us in our minds e.g beliefs, emotions, thoughts, desires etc. They are intentional mental states. Intentional states can include perceptions, thoughts, beliefs, memories, emotions and desires. And because mental states are about something they can usually be expressed as a propositions. E.g. my desire for Jollof rice can be expressed in propositions like Bisola desires jollof, I want Jollof rice. They have directedness as
they refer to or point to something. Therefore some mental states have intentional properties aka intentional content; they have intentionality.

To understand the nature of the human mind, we need to explore if mental states have intentionality (Can we think about a mental state that is not about something?)

Phenomenologists and existentialist like Husserl, Heidegger and Marion claim that all thought, and consciousness itself, is intentional. Meaning that the thought or consciousness is always directed towards something. We can never catch ourselves having pure thought or pure consciousness, we are always thinking about or are conscious of something. And consciousness itself is intentional in the illustration of an arrow always pointing to a real, external world. Therefore according to them, mental states have intentionality.

The reason they believe this is because it solves that problem of the external world and solipsism. How can we prove that anything exists beyond our minds? They claim that we can simply assume that the existence of external world is a starting point. And since cautiousness is also always directed towards something else, so something else can be assumed to exist. If consciousness itself is intentional, it also means that we always exist in relation to the world and that we are not isolated beings existing in a vacuum.

Explain intentionality using the example of rain.

With the example of a rain, you could have a thought that it is raining outside; your thought would be the pure mental state, and the rain would be the representational content of what you are conscious of in that moment. Therefore, that mental state has intentionality.

Define Intentionality (3 marks) [Example Answer]

Intentionality refers to the way at least some mental states have intentional properties: they are about, refer to, or are directed toward something. Usually,this allows them to be expressed as a propositional content.

What are the two main problems that the philosophy of the mind addresses?

The soft problem and the hard problem

According to Chalmers what is the hard problem and the soft problem

The soft problem is how science describe the functioning of the mind. How certain parts of the brain relates to consciousness. This is an objective point of view.

The hard problem describes what it feels like from the first-person point of view. The first-person private access you have to your feeling, consciousness and awareness.

What are the 2 key properties of mind in trying to solve the hard problem?

1. Intentionality
2. Qualia

What is Qualia according to Nagel and Chalmers?

Many mental states have a specific feel ot experiential quality to them, and according to Nagel and Chalmers, quality is defined as those properties that characterise conscious states according to what it is like to have them. Qualia is what it's like to have that mental states; the feeling pain or emotion behind them. e.g what it is like to smell coffee.

We refer to this feel of the mental states as phenomenal property.

Define Qualia in official terms

Qualia are the intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspective accessible in some mental states.

State the 4 essential features of Qualia.

1. Qualia are phenomenal properties
2. Qualia are intrinsic properties
3. Qualia are non-intentional
4. Qualia are introspective accessible

What does it mean when we say that Qualia are phenomenal properties?

Qualia are phenomenal properties because they are what it's like to have certain mental states e.g the specific quality of perceiving the color red

What does it mean when we say Qualia are intrinsic properties?

Qualia are intrinsic properties because they are essential/fundamental to the mental state. They are an intrinsic property of what it is like. If you change the qualia, the mental state is a different experience.

For example, smelling a coffee as opposed to smelling a pizza. Each has its own 'what it is like' that is essential to it.

What does it mean when we say Qualia are non-intentional?

It means that although an experience of an object may produce a mental states that include qualia. Qualia itself is non-intentional. Meaning that experiencing a taste or smell is just what it is.

What does it mean when we say that Qualia is introspectively accessible?

It means that we can make ourselves aware of them by reflecting on a mental state. We can be aware of them, think of them, remember them. You also cannot be in error about them; they are also private and possibly unanalysable.

What are some more facts about Qualia?

It is private and possibly unanalysable meaning that they are difficult to describe using language. For example, we might be able to get some way to describing a pain (a sharp pain, a dull pain), but how could we describe pain to someone who has never experienced any pain at all?

What are the two main groups of the theories of the mind?

Dualist: The idea that the nature of the mind requires two levels of explanation - two types of substance; mind and body

Monist: The idea that the nature of mind requires only one level of explanation (e.g. the physical material of the brain, the functions of the brain.
​

What is the basic definition of Dualism?

Dualism is the idea that minds exists and they are not identical to bodies or part of bodies like the brain. The mind is separate from the body

The position that dualism is innate and quasi universal is proposed by which philosopher? And can you expatiate on what this means?

It is said that most people, most cultures adhere to the idea that the mind and body is separate. which makes it nearly universal. There is also a belief that humans even have a soul. Bjorklund and Bering conducted a research that led them to conclude the dualism is an innate idea

Their research involved showing a puppet show to children telling a story of a crocodile eating a mouse. Then they followed on to ask a series of question involving biological, psychobiological, perceptual, desire, emotional and epistemic aspects relating to the mouse's death to children ages (5 -19).

Biological questions like: Will he ever eat food again?

76% of 5yr olds (kindergarten children) said no, 100% of elementary school children [11]and adults [19] said no.
Suggesting that as you grow older it is almost certain that you are aware that the mind and body are separate things, when the biological body dies it dies. However, what about the mind?

Psychobiological questions like: Is he thirsty?
44% of kindergarten school children said no, 94% elementary school children said no and 100% of adults said no. Here it shows that younger children find it harder to let go of the fact that the mind is an entity in its self or agree that it is conjoined to the body. With children it is innate at first coming Whereas adults found it easier as they learnt that once the body dies, the feeling of thirst dies-which I suppose you could say it is learnt.

Perceptual questions like: Can he see where he is? 53% of kindergarten children said no, 77% of elementary children said no, and 87% of adults said no.

Desire questions like: Does he still wish he didn't have a brother: 60% of kindergarten children said no, 60% of elementary children said no and 50% of adults said no.
Down to a deeper level of if we are aware that our minds are a thing itself, hal

How can we evaluate the innateness of dualistic belief?

On average, children are generally aware of the nature of death by age 7, so it is not merely ignorance of what death is that they belief that mind and body are separate.

The findings show that: Children begin with a strong belief in survival beyond physical death that gradually declines. Children begin to lose the belief in physical survival, but retain a stronger belief in emotional and mental survival for longer. Therefore, children believe in the existence of the mind independently of the body.

Bloom, Bering and Bjorklund conclude that belief in mind-body dualism is innate to the structure of the mind, and it is a way we naturally process our experience.

Again, this implies that dualism is true because it suggests an intuitive, natural and innate fit between dualism and our experience of the world. And it is false as it arises from a lack of knowledge about the real world.

What is Descartes background and why is this important for the context of Dualism?

Descartes is a French enlightenment philosopher(1596 - 1650), one of the founders of modern philosophy who developed substance dualism, but before that he engaged in what we call the Cartesian Doubt and Certainty; which was where he doubt the physical world, sensory and empirical knowledge because he think that we could possibly be dreaming until we wake up and realise that all those data are not true. So he went on to methodological scepticism doubting everything to know what we can be sure of. And then he found out that the only thing he can be certain about is the fact that he is a thinking being. The fact that he is thinking, and has incorrigibility about it as well as first-person access to his mind. And even if we are dreaming, there is still thinking involved. Therefore he developed the position of substance dualism.

"Of what can I be certain? What can I know with certitude? Nothing based on empirical data.
Only that I exist."

"What Am I?
A thinking thing - a mind (as distinct from the body)."
'I am thinking, therefore I exist.'

Let's clarify what we mean by substance first, What is a substance?

Substances are independent identities of different objects. And any thing that can exist logically independently of anything else is a substance.
A substance has properties, but is not itself a
property. For example, a rock, a tree (and we can separate this into separate substances like leaves, bark, wood), a table (and we can separate this out into other
substances: nails, planks of wood, legs, etc.), an
elephant, a body, a mind are examples of a substance.

A Property (noun): an attribute or characteristic that is
logically dependent on the existence of a substance.
Properties are things like size, shape, colour (green,
brown), weight, texture, etc. These only exist as part
of something else. E.g. a tree can be green, but green
cannot exist independently of objects like trees.

What are two types of substances?

Res Cogitans (Mental substances)

with properties of intangibility, lacking spacial dimensions, including intentionality, qualia, consciousness, formless and incorrigibility.

Res Extensa (Physical substances)

with properties of size, colour, shape, weight, texture and location

What then is a human person composed of?

A human person is composed of two substances: Their body is one type of substance: res extensa. And their mind is a different type substance: res cogitans. This means that the mind and body are thus two distinct objects, each having their own constitutive structure and set of properties.

What is then the definition of substance dualism?

Substance dualism is the idea that the human body is composed of the body and the mind which are two substances each having its own constitutive structure
and set of properties.

Although the mind and body make up the full person what is the core of the person (their ego, soul, or self) identified with according to Descartes?

The core of a person is identified with their mind alone.
The seat of personal identity (what makes me the same person over time) is also the mind.

What is this in support of?

Life after death in a very direct way: there is no reason how the death of my physical body should end the existence of my mind, which could survive in an afterlife; since this is the core of my identity, everything essentially 'me' would also survive with it.

While mind and body are two distinct substances, Descartes claims that they interact causally, What is this called and how does this happen?

It is called Casual Interactionism and it the idea that the mind and body although different interacts with each other in casual ways: the
Mind causes things to happen in the body.
Body causes things to happen in the mind.
It is a two-way causal interaction.

What are the 2 arguments Descartes presents for Substance Dualism?

1. Indivisibility Argument
2. Conceivability Argument

What is the Indivisibility Argument?

It is based on the fact that res extensa (Physical) objects are divisible: they can be broken up into separate pieces. Like we can smash rocks into smaller and smaller separate pieces all the way down to the sub atomic level, we can parts of our bodies off, dissect our brain and this is connected with them being extended objects. They exist in locations and can be split into separate spatial locations. And a property of all res extensa object like the body is that they are divisible. But with the mind, it is indivisible.

Descartes claims that you cannot break the mind up (our consciousness even) You could think that it is possible to break up the mind into parts in terms of memories, perception, reasoning, but Descartes argues that those are properties of the mind, not parts. Because when we break physical objects up, we cannot smash their properties off. For example break a big chair into green, heavy and rough. But rather, we smash their material into smaller parts. In the same way, we cannot smash the mind up into its separate properties, neither can we smash it into its separate properties.

We can't separate parts of the mind into separate locations: we cannot conceive of what it would be like for our memories to exist in one place. e.g my thinking about pizza in another, and my feeling angry in another location. It is laughable so therefore, minds (res cogitans substances) are indivisible. Minds are single, indivisible objects.

Therefore, the mind and bodies are distinct. This is further supported through the Leibniz's law that they are distinct.

How can the Indivisibility argument be supported?

Through Leibniz's Law: The identity of indiscernibles

What is Leibniz's Law?

It is the idea that if two things share all the same
properties then they must be the same thing. but
If two things have different properties, (even if it is just one different property), they cannot be the same thing.


In order words, if mind and body have all of the same
properties, they must be the same thing, if mind and body have any different property, they must be different things.

What did Descartes conclude the indivisibility argument as?

My mind and body have different properties as we have explored that the mind is indivisible and the body is divisible additionally with the Leibniz's law therefore, my mind is not my body. Minds and bodies are distinct things.

Evaluating the Indivisibility argument: How do we evaluate premise 1 that all physical things are divisible. What is a response to this?

The challenge lies if we can show that some physical things are indivisible/ not divisible (meaning that there are some physical things we cannot break into parts) because if there is, then it means that the mind could be indivisible but still physical. Following the 1st Leibniz law.

There are many physical activities that cannot be broken up e.g. running, music, singing; there are many physical properties that cannot be broken up: being cold, being wet, being red. And just because we cannot smash these things into smaller parts doesn't mean they are a non-physical substance. They are indivisible because they are not physical objects; they are physical activities.

Ryle argues that we need to see the mind the same way: the mind is not an object with properties, but a physical activity that the physical body does in the same way the body can run or be hot.

(Not in support of dualism)

Evaluating the Indivisibility argument: How do we evaluate premise 2 that the mental is indivisible?

If we can show the mental is divisible, then it is not different from the physical. Hofstadter argues that the mind is divisible. This is because there are micro-processes in the mind that we can become aware of (including many we don't have any first person or incorrigible access to) and we can become aware of them through experiments like the x and dot experiment.
The sense of unified consciousness is built up from 'layers of substratum' composed by such processes, and experiments like that shows that the mind is divisible into
distinct processes.

Another point to show that the mental is divisible is that some conditions split mental functioning and awareness through dissociative identity disorders; a mental state of disconnection from what is going on around you. Normally, this day-dreamy state doesn't last very long, and most people can snap out of it, but for some people, dissociation is more pervasive, and can't be turned off easily. Dissociative disorders are a group disorders that cause an impaired awareness of your own actions, thoughts, physical sensations, and even identity, which is a sense of who you are. This goes to show that the mental is divisible, and then it is not different from the physical.

Next is the split brain: splitting brain hemispheres splits mental functioning and awareness.

Evaluating the Indivisibility argument: What is Merleau-Ponty view against Premise 2 arguing that we have distinct mental faculties?

Merleau-Ponty argues that we have distinct mental faculties after working with a person who suffered from brain damage, Johann Schneider. Schneider could not point to his nose when asked to do so, but could grab his nose when asked. This suggested that there are two separate mental faculties: abstract movements which is the pointing and concrete movements which is grasping.
This for Merleau-Ponty proves that the mind is divisible.

Evaluating the Indivisibility argument: What is Hume's bundle of perceptions' criticism of premise 2?

Hume thinks that through introspection you will discover that there is just a series of thoughts, feelings, memories, and perceptions. Of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time
without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.' The mind is thus divisible into these separate parts, and 'All these are different, and
distinguishable, and separable from each other...and may exist separately'.

In reality, 'mind' is just a bundle of these perceptions.

Are Hofstadter, Merleau-Ponty, and Hume's examples really evidence of mental divisibility? What is a dualist response to this?

Goetz from the view of a naturalist argue that the brain/neural sub-processes identified, makes the unity and indivisibility of consciousness even more a mystery for materialists. Because how does all the fragmented neural firing, processes all integrate into a single, seamless experience of mental life continuing over time?
This is also known as the binding problem, and sometimes added to the 'hard problem of consciousness' What binds together all the distinct processes into a single stream of consciousness? Is the question we are trying to solve.

Goetz then concludes that consciousness must be a 'top down' process that is added to rather than emerging from the sub-processes.

What is Descartes second argument for Substance Dualism?

The Conceivability Argument

What is the Conceivability Argument based on?

It is based on what can be thought of: what is possible and what can be conceived.

What are the 4 types of possibility?

Actual possibility: They are things that actually exists in the world; they are things that are actual i.e. exist or can be obtained in the actual world. They must be physically and logically possible, otherwise, they couldn't exist.

Physically possibly things: They are things that could
exist because they are both physically possible by the laws of physics and logically possible as well. Also actual as well because you could have decided to stay in bed this morning, but you didn't.

Logically possible things: They are things that are possible, and if not also physically possible because we
would need different physical laws, but they are
still logically possible. This is because there is nothing
self-contradictory about them.

Logically impossible things: They are things that are inconceivable; things that could never be possible because they are self-contradictory. e.g a four-sided triangle. We cannot even imagine what it would be like for them to be the case. If something is logica

What is Descartes' Conceivability Argument for Dualism? What is its premise based on?

Premise 1: Anything I can conceive of clearly and distinctly is metaphysically possible. So if we can conceptualise something clearly/coherently and separately then it is metaphysically possible.

Premise 2: If I can clearly and distinctly conceive of the essential natures of two things separately, it must be metaphysically possible to separate them.

Premise 3: I have a clear and distinct idea of my mind as a thinking thing that is not extended in space.
Premise 4: I have a clear and distinct idea of my body as a non-thinking thing that is extended in space.

Therefore the conclusion is that: It must be metaphysically possible for mind and body to be
separated, meaning they are two separate substances (as one is not a property of the other; and does not depend on the other for its existence).

We can imagine mind and body being separate, so they must be separate.

Is Descartes' Conceivability Argument for Dualism nonsense?

A criticism of this by Arnauld is that we can conceive of all kinds of things as existing like dragons, unicorns, a world containing a better guitar player than Ritchie Blackmore; I may believe that I've seen a dragon in the sky one night, but it doesn't mean these things are actual: I am simply mistaken.

I might think it is logically possible that Pythagoras' Theorem can work differently, but this is simply because I don't really understand it. Despite what I think, it is in fact logically impossible for Pythagoras' Theorem to work differently (the same as we can't have a triangle with 5 sides).

What is the variation of of Arnauld's criticism called?

The Masked Man Fallacy - it is used to attack both of Descartes' arguments for dualism.

What is the Masked Man Fallacy argument based on?

With the premise that first: you conceive of Batman as a caped crusader, and secondly you conceive of Bruce Wayne as a billionaire who is not a caped crusader. Then you draw the conclusion that Batman is not Bruce Wayne by Leibniz's law. The premise is true and you do conceive them in that way and Leibniz's law is also analytically true, but the problem with this is that both arguments relies on what Descartes thinks about his mind & body. He thinks about them separately; so he thinks that one has one set of property all the other has another set of properties. And that is the mistake that he makes, his arguments rely on intentional states.

It is only on this basis that he relies on the Leibniz's law to show that they are separate meaning that if we can think of them as having different properties and existing separately then they cannot be the same thing. However, Leibniz's Law only applies to state of affairs and properties and it does not apply to intentional states. So for example, I might like you one day and hate you the next but that doesn't make you two different people because my intentional state about you do not become a part of you.

What is a permise that dispects the Masked Man Fallacy arguments

Premise 1: I am aware that I have a cold.
Premise 2: I am aware that germs exist
Conclusion: Therefore my cold cannot depend upon the existence of germs and might exist without them.

This is an example of the Masked Man Fallacy and what is the fault with Descartes arguments so far.

What is Descartes' Response to Arnauld et Al?

Descartes argues that his argument is valid because he has a clear and district idea about his mind & body and it is incorrigible - he cannot be in error about them the way a person could be in error about Batman & Pythagoras Theorem because of lack of understanding. That is not his case. He has a clear and distinct idea in his mind—he knows what they are.

What he argues is that we cannot conceive of properties existing completely independently of all substances. Therefore, the mind cannot be a property. You cannot conceive of the weight, texture or dimensions of a table independently of all tables and physical substances. Therefore, if we think the mind & body is separate then they are. Hume and Kant point out that we must be able to conceive of what the experience would be like for it to be metaphysically possible. Otherwise, it is inconceivable.

What are some further critcisms of Descartes' Conceivability Argument?

What is only physically or metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world: Because it is metaphysically possible that Germany won WWII or that I could fly by flapping my arms, but these things are not true in the actual world.
And in the same way, it might be that minds could exist separately (e.g. on silicone chips), but in this actual world, they only exist as brains.

You could say that the mind and body are separate but critics argue that minds without body is inconceivable. There has to be an interlink somewhere. Hume and Kant points out that we must be able to conceive of what the experience would be like for it to be metaphysically possible. Otherwise, it is inconceivable to believe it.

What is then the core of Descartes' arguments consolidating the range of arguments for dualism?

In general Descartes argument is on the basis that:

1. The mind must exist to account for various aspects of human existence.

2. The Mind and Body have distinct properties so by Leibniz's law they cannot be the same thing. Mind must exist as a separate substance to the body.

What are some supplementary arguments for dualism?

Descartes' Incorrigibility Argument and Argument from Doubt

Swinburne Personal Identity Argument for Dualism

What is Descartes' Incorrigibility Argument and Argument from Doubt?

It outlines through the following three premises that:

1. I have first person access to my mind and
mental events are incorrigible meaning that I cannot be in error about them.

2. I have only public access to the body and bodily
events, and corrigible.

3. Conclusion: Therefore, mind and body are distinct
substances in reverence to Leibniz's Law.

What is the Personal Identity Argument for Dualism by Swinburne?

The Personal Identity Argument for Dualism by Swinburne refers to the conditions under which a person can be said to be the same person over time. How can we tell that something is the same over time, we ned continuity of our identity over time.

With a thought experiment imagining that your arm is transplanted onto a new body. Which one then are you? The body that received your arm, or your body, with
your missing arm?

Swinburne claims that the matter of your body can change or be lost (an arm cut off, etc.) or transplanted (you receive a heart transplant), but your identity remains the same: you are still the same person.

But if you imagine that your brain is transplanted into a new body. Which is you? The new body with the brain, or the old body? In this case it can be said that Identity is in some way connected to your brain: it travels with it.

If you then Imagine that we extracted your memories, thoughts, and personality; everything Descartes associates with your consciousness, into a new body and left your brain in the old body. Which one is you, the new body with your consciousness or the old body with your brain? In this case Swinburne shows that personal identity
inheres in the mind and consciousness - not in anything
physical. There is no physical part of you that we could
identify as 'you' in the way we do with consciousness.

In the case of physical objects, if its physical parts change, it seems it becomes a different thing at a certain point. But Swinburne concluded that personal identity inheres in the mind and consciousness - not anything in the physical as there is no physical part of you that we can identify as you in the same way we do with consciousness.

In short, personal identity resides in the mind,
not in any part of the physical body, and In order for personal identity to exist, we must h

What is a criticism of Swinburne's Personal Identity Argument.?

Personal identity is just a social construct. Because how can we identify people as the same if it is a private, occult phenomenon.

What is Folk Psychology and how is it a support for Dualism according to Goetz?

Folk Psychology correlates our experiences with the fact that dualism is true. It is the the idea that we have an intuitive experience of our minds and the world around us. It implies that this suggests that we have a separate mental reality from our body. It is shown in the way we use language and how we talk about ideas, internal beliefs and our thoughts as though we have a separate reality different from out body. For example if you ask Why did Loiusa dod this? You are told that it is because she believes X, not the fact that it is because a neuron fired in her brain. Her belief helps us to understand her actions. So there is a distinct thought life vs bodily life. Therefore, we can conclude that our minds are separate from our bodies.

What are some strengths of Folk Psychology?

- It draws knowledge out of our experience and correlates it to the facts that we have a thought life and a bodily life. And through our general and historical experience we can imply that our minds and body are separate.

- It fairly straight-forward and simplistic.

- It is empirical

- It proves dualism based on the reality of our minds and our minds are incorrigible meaning our minds cannot be in error.

What are some weaknesses of Folk Psychology?

- Just because we have intuitions that our minds are separate to the body does not mean that they are not inter-connected in some way.

- It focuses on our experience and implies that our intuitions are always true.

- There could be other explanation of why we have those intuitions.

What is Kant's Argument from Free Will about and how is it a support for Dualism?

Part of the appeal of dualism in Descartes' time was that science was beginning to explain the world as a pure machine, through mechanistic causal laws. And this seem to leave no room for free will. As a non-physical entity, not subject to the deterministic laws of the physical world, the mind seems like the perfect place where free will could be located.

Kant argues that the moral duty is an absolutely certain law for humans. For example there are moral duties we must perform. The element of ought implies that If one ought to do one's moral duty, one must be capable of doing one's moral duty. And if a person does not have free will, that person is not capable of doing their moral duty (which must be freely chosen)

We see that a purely physical entity does not have free will. Therefore, humans are not purely physical entities. Therefore, our mind and body are separate.

What is The Binding Problem and the Unity of consciousness about and how is it a support for Dualism?

We might be sympathetic to Hume's Bundle of Perception theory because it explain why consciousness is always intentional. But what links perceptions together? Because if Hume was right they we would expect our experience to be chaotic & fragmented, but it isn't even as he observed. We experience a continual flow from a single, unifying perspective. There must be something like the mind that does this.

Because how does the fragmented neural firing all integrate into a single, seamless experience of my mental life continuing over time? How does the brain bind all these different stimuli into a single unified experience of an object? This is sometimes added to the hard problem of consciousness and termed the binding problem: what binds together all the distinct processes into a single stream of consciousness.

Goetz then concludes that consciousness must be a 'top down' process that is added to rather than emerging from the sub-processes. This suggests that the mind and body are separate.

What is the Qualia and the Phenomenological Problem about and how is it a support for Dualism?

When you remember a beautiful sunset, you could give an entirely objective, physical description of everything taking place in your brain during this perception; there would be correlation between the mental states and brain activity. But none of this would tell me anything about the qualia: what it is subjectively like to have the experience.

There is an explanatory gap between objective, physical descriptions and subjective mental states like qualia. This is what Searle calls this the phenomenological problem.

No description of the third-person, objective, physiological facts would convey the subjective, first-person character of the pain, simply because the first-person features are different from the third-person features.'

What is the problem of interaction and 'the ghost in the machine about and how is it a criticism of Dualism?

Elizabeth presents that given that the soul of the human being is only a thinking substance the question is how can it affect the body in order to bring voluntary actions? Because how a thing move depends solely on 1. how much it is pushed, 2. The manner in which it is pushed and 3.that pushes it and the first two of those requires contact between the two things and the third thing requires that the casually acting can be extended.

What is Descartes Response to Elizabeth on this?

He responds by saying that Elizabeth has confused the way physical objects interact with how mind and body must interact. Only physical substances require touch,
friction, force, etc. to move.

He admits that the problem is that mind and body, even though currently existing in a union, are governed by different laws, so how they interact is mysterious to us.

His solution is a bit unclear, but Elisabeth suggests he must be proposing that the interaction is a third substance, as it must be something that follows its own
laws and so is able to interact between the separate substances of mind and body.

Descartes seems to agree by admitting that it is something that is 'basic' (i.e. not a property). But he also points out that the pineal gland acts as an interface
between mind and body. And other philosophers like Broad defend Descartes by claiming that there is no reason to assume two substances have to share similar properties to interact. The same way a draught shares no properties with the flu, but it can play a causal role in causing one to develop the flu.

The interaction problem led to other forms of substance dualism. What is this Argument called?

Non-interactionist substance dualism and Epiphenomenalism

What is the argument that 'The Universe/Physical World is Causally Enclosed' about and how does it go against dualism?

Through science we see the principle of the conservation of energy that states that the amount of energy in
the universe must remain constant.

The amount of energy in the universe cannot be created or destroyed, only transformed, and this is one of the fundamental laws in physics.

If the mind is non-physical yet causing bodily events, it would be continually adding to the amount of energy in the universe.

If the mind is physical and causing bodily events, it retains the same amount of energy in the universe: we even know that the brain needs glucose as a type of
fuel, and without it, individuals experience impaired cognitive functioning.

The idea of mind as physical, rather than a distinct mental substance, is thus the best explanation of what we observe.

What is the argument of The Ignorance of Folk Psychology and how is it a criticism of Dualism?

The universality is grounded in ignorance and wishful thinking. It is based on ignorance about how the brain actually works

What is the argument of the correlation and dependence of mind on brain about and how is it a criticism of Dualism?

Through brain decoding if we can easily identify thoughts through brain scan then it shows that there is a strong correlation between the mind and the body. The correlation of mental states are physically observable in brain activity. We has increasingly detailed observations of the dependencies between brain structure and mental phenomena according to Churchland.

Therefore the theory that the mind and body are separate is not necessarily true.

What is the argument of Wittgenstein's beetle in the box (aka. The epistemological problem of other minds) about and how is it a criticism of Dualism?

It is the theory that's at birth everyone is giving their own box and brought up being told that there is a bit in the box no one is ever allowed to look inside anyone else's box but they often talk about their own Beatles and assume that everyone else understand or that what the comparing is alike however for all they know they might be nothing in the other person's box and it could be completely different for everyone since no one ever sees the other beetle to know if there is a shared reality they're all talking about so there is no reference for the word and this analogy is comparable to the mind. How do we understand the objectiveness of mental states?

The problem with this is that when I see other people I can quickly draw conclusions about their mental states. If they are bored, sad, happy or angry we can see their reactions and compare it to how we react when we feel those things.

If the mind is completely non-physical, how could we so easily arrive at such conclusions?

Wittgenstein also assumes that we have no point of reference.

Language has trained us to think that the statements I am feeling pain or I feel so in love refer to some internal states but it doesn't it refers to the we we as physical creatures behave. (crying, holding hands etc)

What is the argument for evolutionary accounts of human origins about and how is it a criticism of Dualism?

There is an explanatory gap.

It looks at the evolutionary process and the physical process at which humans develop physical variation and wonders how a physical process could bring about a non-physical mind.

How does a physical process produce a method for school thing like the mind how does it produce consciousness like a child goes through the stages of brain development and maturity

if it is correct that we originate from this type of process that is physical then it seems like there is no room for a non-physical substance or properties to emerge into it the theoretical account of ourselves.

how come our minds and body and body are separate and where does the mind emerge from something with completely different qualities from the physical process

it questions that can a metaphysical thing that is intangible emerge from a physical body and if so what is the explanation of this and is it possible that it is just our brains as a mature that use consciousness qualia and all other properties?

Strength:
- it takes the factual knowledge gathered according to science and analyzes how something like the mind as we have described it to be measures up with the process with which we develop

- it is skeptical about the fundamental process of how humans develop and how it is coherent with the idea that our minds and body are separate how does a mind develop and if it is separate in which round does it come about because it shouldn't be able to derive from a physical process if it is indeed metaphysical

Weaknesses:
- it does not acknowledge that the mind and body can be separagin itself because they have different properties according to The Leibniz's law alone and the law is grounded on Logic and reason on that is basis alone it is sufficient enough and it is coherent.

- Mind and Body can simply be separates because the

What is the argument of Category mistakes about and how is it a criticism of Dualism?

Ryle builds on Wittgenstein's point to explain a similar error in dualism. With the university problem and category mistakes

What do Monists claim about the mind and body?

Monists claim that the mind and body are a single thing.

They are a contrast to dualism they are the opposite of Dualism.

What do Materialist/Physicalists claim about the body?

They claim that the mind and body are the same substance matter. Whatever the mind is, it is not separate from the material, physical body.

The sense of mind, consciousness and personhood are all a product of the embodied behavioural activities of how our body works.

The two separate languages we use for mind and body are just two different ways of describing the same thing.

What is one example of materialist/physicalist theories that aim to provide an explanation of how the mind and body relates?

Behaviourism

What are the two types of Behaviourism?

1. Hard Behaviourism by Hempel
2. Soft Behaviourism by Ryle
​

What do behaviourist reject concerning dualism? Why do they disagree with dualism?

They all reject dualism because it claims that we have an internal mental theatre—a mind that is like a separate box containing its own mental states. They argue that dualism makes the mistake of seeing the mind like a thing. Like a private, mysterious, occult (hidden), supernatural entity. A substance or
object with properties.

They argue that the mind is not a noun but a verb. Behaviourists argue that talk about the mind is a way of describing observable behaviour.

What is Behaviourism?

It is the idea that the talk about the mind is actually a talk about observable behaviour. When we say the word mind, we are actually referring to what people say and do. This way of referring to the mind. This solves the Wittgenstein's problem of other minds. For example, happiness is not an internal mental state but a type of behaviour. All there is the observable actions.

What is analytical reduction?

Analytical reduction is when we translate one way of describing something into another way without any loss of meaning. For example, saying I am drinking H2O is also the same thing as saying I am drinking water, and saying I am a female is also the same thing as saying I am a girl. It is another way of translating without any loss of the meanings.

Water can be analytically reduced to the formula H2O.

How can be apply analytical reduction to the mind according to Behaviourists?

Analytical reduction is what we need to do with the language we use for the mind. We need to talk about the mind and translated it into something else. Dualists make the mistake of taking the two ways we talk about the mind as meaning different things. But the mind(mental states) is just one way of describing the body in terms of behaviour. For example we need to analytically reduce the statement: I am happy into statement about behaviour such as I am smiling, laughing, jumping and celebrating. Your happiness is just your behaviour. The mind is just a way of describing your behaviour.

And for behaviourism the analytical reduction is that statements about the mind actually mean the same thing as statements about behaviour. Again for example: If I say 'I am happy', I am actually referring to my behaviour, not some hidden mental state.

According to Hempel what is hard behaviourism?

It is a type of behaviourism that says all propositions about mental states can be reduced (without loss of meaning) to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movements.

Hempel was a logical positivists is logical positivism about?

Logical Positivism is a philosophical movement in the early mid twentieth century that aimed to provide a scientific basis for philosophy. It was the British version of the German Vienna circle. It emphasised the empirical sciences and argued that any statements that did not refer to the measurable empirical world is meaningless(such as theology and metaphysics) Instead we should be interested in the physical, real world.
They proposed a rule to test whether statements are meaningful or meaningless called verification principle.

What is the test of verification principle?

It is a test or a principle that says that for propositions to be meaningful it must be either verifiable or true by definition It must be synthetic statements or analytic statement (Hume's Fork - statement about fact) Synthetic statements are statements about the empirical world that can be verified thorough our senses. It can be true or false - they do not have to be true to be meaningful e.g it is raining outside can be verified by seeing it. There is coffee in this room can be verified by smelling it. Whereas analytical statements are statements about the logical relationship between a concept or an idea. it can be determined by definition e.g mathematical claims(2+2=4) or Bachelor is an unmarried man, it is true by definition. However, statements do not have to be true to be analytic. These are the only types of statements that are meaningful, anything that does not fall under this category is meaningless.

Therefore, a statement is meaningful if we can verify it by checking it with our senses in the empirical world to prove it or disprove it. If we cannot, then it is meaningless. For Ayer this is important because to be factually meaningful, a statement
must make some claim about what reality is like: we have to know what it would look like if it were true or false. Otherwise, we would be simply reporting subjective feelings and not anything factual.

What does the verification principle imply about dualism?

Dualist statements about the mind dualistic are not empirically verifiable or analytic, they are meaningless. If 'mind' does not refer to an empirical object at all then, the very word is meaningless. We have to be able to translate/analytically reduce them into empirically verifiable terms. A theory of mind has to refer to empirically observable phenomena. And that observable phenomena for Hempel is behaviour.

According to Hempel what is the empirically observable phenomena we need to translate/analytically reduce the talk about the mind into?

For Hempel, the empirically observable phenomena we need to translate talk about the mind into is
behaviour.

What is Hempel's example of how we can analytically reduce mental states or statements about the mind into behaviour(test sentences)?

The example of Paul having a toothache. The mental state is the pain of a toothache and to analytically reduce this into the
language of empirically observable behaviour., we can say:

Paul cries; Paul says "I have a toothache"; Paul does now chew on the left side; Paul jumps up and down screaming; Some measurable processes take place in Paul's nervous system (e.g.
heightened blood pressure, C-fibres transmit a signal, endorphins are released).
And theses are also called test sentences which is the physical behaviour we look for/observe to test that someone is
as they are described (e.g. we 'test' that they are in pain by
looking whether they are behaving in that manner).

What is the analytic reduction of hard behaviourism?

Mental states reduced into physical behaviour/physical movement of the organism. Additionally, talk about physical movements are rendered in the language of physics.

List the four criticisms of hard behaviourism?

1. There are irreducible aspects of mental states
2. Physical behaviour that could signal several mental states
3. Behaviour is merely focused on observable facts.
4. The Actor objection

What is the objection on the fact that there are irreducible aspects of mental states?

If you analytically reduce the mental state of happiness to happy behaviour test sentences like smiling, you have potentially missed out the qualia of happiness or pleasure itself. It also makes the category mistake of assuming that the physical behaviours of happiness consist of what qualia feel like.

What is the objection on the fact that physical behaviour could signal different mental states?

Through the Jess example of waving her hands up with different scenarios:
1. Jess is stood on the street near a bus stop and a bus is approaching.
2. There is a taxi driving by
3. Jess' friend has just walked around the corner
and waved to her.
4. The sun is shining very brightly in Jess' face.
5. And a child has just thrown a football at Jess' head.

All of these scenario could signal different mental states as she could be waving to stop the bus, catch the taxi, waving to her friend, shielding her face from the sun and trying to protect herself from the ball hitting her face.

Therefore, observable behaviour is not always reflective of the mental state of the person. We often need to know the intentionality of the mental state. We need to know what the mental state is about or what it is directed towards. This objection is founded on the fact that to explain behaviour, we have to know the mental states and we have refer back to it. There is no way to identify mental states in behaviour alone.

What is the objection on the fact that behaviourism is focused merely on observable facts?

Imagining that one expresses the public desire for losing weight and exhibit the test sentences by telling friends and doing exercise, but secretly they have the desire for cake.

What problem this suggest for behaviourism is that it relies solely on observable outer behaviour, and in this scenario you would conclude that the public desire reflects the mental states of the person rather that the secret internal mental state of wanting a cake. Therefore we can say that have a mental state with no accompanying behaviour.

What is the objection on the Actor objection and why is this a criticism of hard behaviourism?

Using the example of a deceptive lover:
Fred treats Jane with love: he buys her gifts, takes her
on dates, says "I love you", comforts her when she is
sick. She then dies unexpectedly. Afterwards, Fred is
seen crying often and a week later, he kills himself.
Behaviourists would say this behaviour translates the
mental state 'love' for Jane. However, unknown to everyone other than himself. Fred hated Jane ( which was his mental state) and was perfectly manipulating her in the hopes (mental state) of gaining her wealth. After her death, he discovered she had no money left and was so disappointed (mental state) that
he killed himself.

This shows that behaviours sometimes do not manifest the mental state of deception and it is possible for someone to deliberately mask their mental state and not manifest it into behaviour. Therefore the ability to feign mental states in behaviour shows that behaviour is not identical to the mental states.

What is the objection on the perfect Actor objection : the idea that and why is this a criticism of hard behaviourism?

Using the criminally insane example, we see that a convicted criminal pretends to be insane to be transferred to a secure mental health facility. He behaves erratically, talks gibberish, and says, 'giant clowns are chasing me everywhere I go.' He is such a good actor that he is even able to fool and pass a lie-detector test. His behaviour equates to the mental state Hempel calls 'mental confusion', but this is a pretence.

And we might justifiably ask whether he is really insane or just pretending. But the fact that we can ask whether he is just pretending even though all his behaviour suggests
insanity shows that there must be a difference between behaviour and mental states. If they were the same thing, this would not be a meaningful question.

This example shows that one may feign mental
states one does not have. However, Hempel's response to this is that if there was no observable behaviour that he was sane , then he won't be sane.

Why does Ryle the pioneer of soft behaviourism reject hard behaviourism?

He rejects hard behaviourism because it is too simplistic and naïve in reducing mental states to currently occurring behaviour. Because by doing this, hard behaviourism is unable to deal with times our external behaviour doesn't reflect or match our real intentions (like when we are pretending or not manifesting a mental state).

Instead, he proposes a modified version of behaviourism meant to avoid these problems and this is called soft behaviourism.

According to Ryle, how does hard behaviourism makes the category mistake?

With the category mistake, Jack made a category mistake as he has confused the category of the word 'university' with
the category of objects (buildings, classrooms, offices). When in fact, the word 'university' is of a different category: it is an abstract term that refers to the set of objects.

Ryle thinks dualists make the same mistake because 'mind' refers to a set of behaviours, not to a single distinct entity or object.

What is Ryle's soft behaviourism about?

As presented by Ryle, talk about mental states can reduced to what a person is doing--their actual behaviour or what a person would do, or is disposed to do also know as their behavioural disposition.

What is a behavioural disposition/dispositional property?

A behavioural disposition is the tendency or proneness to act or react a certain way under certain conditions.

For example: Jenny desires a drink of water, the mental state is the desire for water. And the behavioural disposition would be: If offered a glass of water, Jenny will take it. If Jenny has a glass of water, she will drink it. If Jenny is at home, she will go to the kitchen and pour a glass of water. If Jenny is offered glass of Coca Cola or water, she will choose water. Using hypothetical propositions like 'if then' statements.

What do Ryle claim about Dispositions?

Ryle claims that dispositions are not 'inside the mind.' And they are not hidden, internal mental states or 'ghostly processes'. They are behaviour patterns through which we can infer how a person will behave in certain conditions, and they are part of the way the physical organism behaves and is likely to behave.

And an analogy that depicts this is the example that water has the dispositional property of boiling at 100C. But this dispositional property is not distinct from the water - because it is the nature of the water itself to have this dispositional property.

Such follows with the dispositional properties of humans.
The property is not an internal mental state, it is just our tendency to behave certain ways.