OCR Ethics: meta-ethics

naturalism

naturalism

a moral realist idea that moral truths can be discovered through observation of the natural world

intuitionism

moral truths cannot be discovered- they are self-evident through our intuition

emotivists

non-cognitivist theory; moral statements are simply emotional responses (‘boo’/‘hurray!’) and thus, moral truths don’t exist

which two views see moral statements as meaningful and true or false

intuitionism and naturalism

F.H Bradley - naturalism

we can understand our moral duties by understanding our place in society

• ex: a teacher, mum, doctor, etc have certain roles/moral duties

our duty is universal, concrete and realises the whole person- morality is based upon our position in society

Bentham and Mill - utilitarian naturalism

you can discover right/wrong by observing what actions lead to pleasure/pain (telos)

• Mill argues that this proof is the ‘only proof’

Aquinas - theological naturalism

links goodness to divine will- morals are based on Gods-will (ex: adultery = wrong)

Hume’s objection to naturalism

is-ought problem:

• ‘is’ = factual (smith murdered jones)

• ‘ought’ = subjective value judgements(smith shouldn’t have murdered jones)

can’t jump from is-ought without justification

evaluation of naturalism

• is-ought problem

• the idea that there is a purpose to life is challenged by evolutionists who view the world as a result of random chance

• Moore: guilty of the naturalistic fallacy

criticise Hume

• Phillipa Foot: we know if someone is trustworthy if they keep promises so some things are moral absolutes

• Churchland: Hume only challenged deductive reasoning- Bentham/Mill use inductive.

Moore - intuitionism

analogy of the colour yellow

• if we were asked to define yellow, we would find it difficult, however we can recognise it- same with goodness (we know via intuition)

Nietzsche ‘ethical colour blindness’

just as a colour blind person might view red as blue, someone might view something as right, and another person may view it as wrong- ethics are subjective

evaluation of intuitionism

• addresses the is-ought problem/naturalistic fallacy whilst maintaining that morals are objective

• widespread agreement on intuition (ex: majority agree rape = wrong)

• People have different intuitions- suggest not objective/moral facts

• - Pritchard: moral intuitions differ because some people are more enlightened (patronising)

Hume - inspired emotivism

emotivist accept Humes conclusion that moral statements (ought statements) are sentiments.

the verification principle - emotivists

statements are only meaningful if:

1. they are analytic (true by defintion- ex: all bachelors are men)

2. they are synthetic (verified by senses- ex: it is raining outside)

A.J Ayer

• moral statements are neither analytic nor synthetic so they are factually meaningless

• ethical statements are emotional responses, so they equate to bad = boo, good = hurray

morals are entirely subjective.

evaluate emotivism

• reconcile the is-ought gap/naturalistic fallacy by not claiming objectivity

• reduces morals to emotions- many people believe when they are saying ‘rape is wrong’ what they are saying has factual significance

• trivialises ethics: suggests morality is personal preference, so statements like ‘killing is wrong’ are the same as ‘i dont like red sweets’

C.L Stevenson - emotivism

emotivism was criticised for lacking standards

this is reconciled by suggesting that emotions point to a subjective agreement- they cannot be absolute as morals change, but they can have meaning

R.M Hare: prescriptivism

when we make moral statements, we are not only expressing our own feelings, but prescribing them to others

• ‘I don’t like x, so if you like x you are wrong’

J.L Mackie: Error theory

when we speak about moral judgements as facts, we are making an error