* Unlike American contract law, the CISG contains no statute of frauds or parol evidence rule (written contracts cannot be contradicted by other types of evidence); therefore, oral statements between the parties may be used to prove a contract and the terms of the contract.
* The CISG Article 8 adopts both the subjective (actual intent) and objective (manifestations of intent) approaches to contract interpretation. Contracts are to be interpreted based upon evidence of the parties’ actual subjective intent. If this is not possible, contracts are to be interpreted using the reasonable person standard (objective intent), that is, what would a reasonable third party witnessing the parties’ actions and words interpret the contract to mean?
* In this case, the written contract’s standard terms included a disclaimer of the implied warranties found in CISG Article 35 (implied warranty of merchantability or ordinary purpose and implied warranty for a particular purpose), however, the buyer argued that the disclaimer of warranties was not part of the contract because the parties had orally agreed that the standard terms did not apply.
* The common law’s parol evidence rule would bar the use of the evidence of the oral statements to contradict the written contract, while the CISG has no such rule and the evidence of the oral agreement would be admitted into evidence. However, the standard terms also included a merger clause, which is a contract form of the parol evidence rule that prohibits the consideration of extrinsic evidence (oral representations that the standard terms would not apply) if it contradicts the written contract (including the standard terms).
* If the court determines the parties had subjectively agreed that the standard terms would not apply despite the objective fact that they were included in the contract, then the disclaimer would not exist and the buyer would be able to proceed with its claims of breach of the implied warranties of CISG Article 35. If the court finds that the standard terms did apply under the reasonable person standard, then the disclaimer would be effective and the merger clause would prevent the buyer from presenting evidence of the oral agreement. But, the court states a second issue if the standard terms apply, and even though the merger clause was part of the standard terms, the court would still have to determine if the parties actually intended the merger clause to prevent the admission of extrinsic evidence that shows their true intent. The court sent the case back to the lower court to determine the parties’ subjective intent relating to the enforceability of the standard terms and, secondly, the enforceability of the merger clause within the standard terms.