Philosophy Terms and claims (Lectures24-38)

(L24) Singer’s Conclusion

I should live a life where I donate a significant amount of my income to those in need

(L24) Effective altruism

the approach to charitable giving inspired by Singer’s essay
(Or: the view that says Singer’s conclusion is true)

(L24) The knowledge question

How can we know which charity is best to give to?

(L24) We can answer the knowledge question

We can be confident that some charities are trustworthy (by looking at charity evaluators) even if we cannot be 100% sure.

(L24) We should change the way we give depending on the circumstances

The amount of good we are able to do changes depending on the circumstances

(L25) Moral duty

A truth saying what you are morally obligated to do

(L25) Moral wrong

A violation of a moral duty

(L25) Positive and negative moral duties

Duties saying what you should do and duties say what you shouldn’t do

(L25) Personal code

Rules that applies to the person who accepts them alone

(L25) Moral realism

There are objective moral truths

(L25) Moral relativism

All moral truths are subjective

(L25) The argument from scientism

Only scientific facts are objective

(L25) The argument from tolerance

Moral realism is false because it entails a judgmental attitude towards others moral beliefs

(L25) The argument from disagreement

Moral realism is false because equally informed individuals who have discussed their different moral views disagree OR Moral realism is false because there are epistemic peer disagreements about morality.

(L25) The argument from scientism is self-undermining

Scientism is not itself a scientific truth

(L25) The argument from tolerance is unsound

Moral realism does not entail a judgmental attitude towards those who have different evidence from us

(L25) The argument from disagreement is unsound

It implies relativism about truth

(L26) The utilitarian definition of happiness

The feeling of pleasure and the absence of feelings of pain

(L26) Maximizing

Doing what brings about the best possible outcome

(L26) Overall happiness

The total pleasure over a person’s whole life

(L26) Aggregate happiness

The total happiness of all lives in the universe

(L26) Utilitarianism

The sole ultimate moral duty says that you should maximize aggregate happiness.

(L26) We should choose a moderate long-lasting pleasure over an intense short-term pleasure

The moderate pleasure brings more overall happiness in the long run.

(L27) The unqualified duty of beneficence

You should maximize aggregate happiness

(L27) One ultimate moral duty

All the other moral duties derive from that one

(L27) The calculation objection

Utilitarianism is false because it is impossible to calculate the consequences of all our actions

(L27) Premise (2) of the utilitarian argument against killing is true

The typical value of a life is positive

(L27) Premise (1) of the utilitarian argument for EA is true

It assumes utilitarianism/the unqualified duty of beneficence

(L27) Premise (2) of the utilitarian argument for EA is true

Giving to the Against Malaria Foundation is saving a life, which adds more to aggregate happiness than enjoying luxuries

(L27) Calculating the consequences of all actions does not maximize

It leads to us having to perform an infinite number of calculations.

(L27) We can know which of our actions are likely to produce the best consequences without maximizing

Commonsense morality is a guide to maximizing.

(L28) First claim about the transplant case

It is morally wrong to kill the one to save the five because it violates the duty against killing.

(L28) Second claim about the transplant case

On utilitarianism, it is morally obligatory to kill the one to save the five.

(L28) What the two claims show

Utilitarianism is false because the unqualified duty of beneficence and the duty against killing conflict with each other

(L28) Deontology

There are moral duties that conflict with the unqualified duty of beneficence

(L28) Qualification/exception to a moral duty

An unless clause that is added to a moral duty

(L28) The qualified duty of beneficence

You should maximize aggregate happiness, unless doing so violates some other moral duty.

(L28) Not all deontologists accept the qualified duty of beneficence

Some believe that all of our moral duties are negative moral duties.c

(L28) Premise (1) of the deontological argument for EA is true

Follows from the qualified duty of beneficence

(L28) Premise (2) of the deontological argument for EA is true

Giving is the best choice in utilitarian terms and giving one is not killing, stealing, lying, breaking promises, and so on

(L29) Three claims about Eleanor

First, Eleanor acts like a utilitarian by taking the job.
Second, Eleanor does not violate any moral duty by taking the job
Third, Eleanor does violate a personal commitment by taking the job

(L29) Personal commitment

A personal code

(L29) Morally permissible

An action that doesn’t violate any moral duty

(L29) The agent-centered duty of beneficence

You should maximize overall aggregate happiness unless doing so violates some other moral duty OR violates a personal commitment

(L29) Agent-centered ethics

A kind of deontology that claims our personal projects, commitments, and values have bearing on the moral duties

(L29) Arthur is not off the hook

He has a bad personal commitment

(L30) The main question in the case of Aspen, Blake, and Cara

Did Aspen and Blake do something wrong by causing Cara to become deaf?

(L30) The general duty against harm

You should not perform an action which would make a person worse off

(L30) The cause/remove discrepancy

Installing a reverse cochlear implant is wrong while installing a cochlear implant is permissible

(L30) In the transplant case, killing the 1 violates the general duty against harm

The 1 person is made worse off by losing his 4,000 happiness points.

(L30) Torture is a kind of harm

It adds pain points to your overall happiness

(L31) The bad difference view

Having a disability makes you worse off

(L31) The mere difference view

Having a disability is, in itself, neutral

(L31) Well-being

How good/bad a person is over the course of their life

(L31) Hedonism

A person’s well-being ultimately depends on how much pleasure and pain they have

(L31) Two claims about the deceived businessperson

On hedonism, Jimmy’s life is equally good regardless of whether his family really loves him.
Jimmy’s desires are frustrated because his family doesn’t really love him

(L31) The desire-satisfaction theory

a person’s well-being ultimately depends on the amount of desire-satisfaction and desire- frustration they have

(L31) The mere difference view is consistent with the fact that disabled people actually live worse-off lives

The features of our society that make their lives worse off are not due to having a disability itself (they are due to things like negligence and discrimination)

(L32) The argument from imagination for the bad difference view

When we imagine being deaf, we can see that deafness involves the loss of goods that one can only have by hearing

(L32) The argument from testimony for the mere difference view

Since disabled persons report that their well-being is neutral, we should believe that what they say is true

(L32) Transition costs

Pains or frustrations that come with the experience of transitioning from being hearing to being deaf (non-disabled to disabled)

(L32) The change view

Installing a cochlear implant and a reverse cochlear implant are both permissible.

(L32) The no change view

Installing a cochlear implant and a reverse cochlear implant are both wrong.

(L32) The non-interference principle

you should not change aspects of a person that are central to their self-identity without their consent

(L32) The argument from imagination fails

Imagination is not a good guide to figuring out the quality of a person’s life when that person is radically different from you.

(L32) The cause-remove discrepancy is false

Both removing and causing a disability change aspects of a person that are central to their self- identity without their consent

(L33) We cannot be certain of animal pain

Pain responses do not entail feelings of pain.

(L33) Animals probably feel pain

They have brains and act like they feel pain

(L33) Animals probably have desires

Animals have brains and act like they have desires

(L33) The Cartesian view of animals

Animals do not have conscious mental states such as desires or pain

(L33) Factory farming

The practice of raising animals for the purposes of food which results in an enormous amount of animal pain and frustration

(L34) Consequentialism

The sole ultimate moral duty says to maximize aggregate well-being

(L34) Preference utilitarianism

Consequentialism + the desire satisfaction theory

(L34) Three alternatives to factory farming

the vegan alternative
The vegetarian alternative
The beneficent omnivore alternative

(L34) Beneficent omnivore alternative

We raise and kill animals for the purposes of eating them without having them suffer

(L34) The inefficacy objection

The consequentialist argument doesn’t show any individual should change their diet since no individual change in diet will eliminate factory farming

(L34) On consequentialism, human lives and animals lives do not necessarily have equal value

The life of a human on average contains more well-being than the life of an animal.

(L34) Switching to the vegan alternative is a more efficient way of producing food (according to Singer)

The cost of producing feed for animals is less than the cost of producing plant food for humans

(L34) Premise (2) of the consequentialist argument is true

The amount of pain/frustration due to factory farming is enormous and can be reduced by replacing factory farming with one of the three alternatives.

(L35) The transitivity of causation

If A causes B and B causes C, then A causes C

(L35) The difference-making objection

There are no duties against causing pain/frustration when your causal involvement makes no difference to anything’s well-being

(L35) Claim 1 about the assassin case

Louis killed the pizza store owner by firing his rifle.

(L35) Claim 2 about the assassin case

Had Louis not fired his rifle, the pizza store owner would be just as poorly off.

(L35) The causal involvement argument is valid

It has this form:
(1) A
(2) B
(3) If A and B, then C
Therefore,
(4) C

(L35) Premise (1) of the causal involvement argument is true

It assumes the transitivity of causation

(L35) Premise (2) is true in contexts where one buys turkey solely for the pleasure of eating it

The pleasure of eating turkey is not an overriding good

(L35) Premise (3) of the causal involvement argument is true

There are duties against causing pain/frustration

(L36) Virtue

A disposition to act and feel in ways that make one a good person

(L36) The Stoic view of virtue

A virtue is a disposition to act in accordance nature

(L36) Indifferents

Things that are neither good nor bad

(L36) Anger

An emotion leading one to take vengeance for a wrong

(L36) Seneca’s thesis

The virtuous person does not experience anger

(L36) Three movements of anger

Initial impulse, judgment, expression

(L36) Acting in accordance with nature means acting rationally

What is natural for humans is their rationality

(L36) External goods are indifferents

Only things we can control by reason are good or bad

(L37) Two responses to anger

Prevention of the initial impulse, avoiding judgment

(L37) Retributivism

Wrongdoers deserve to be punished because of their past wrongs

(L37) Instrumental rationality

The kind of rationality involved in choosing the means to one’s ends

(L37) Anger is contrary to nature

The desire for payback is retributive

(L37) It is wrong to demand retributive punishment

We cannot change the past