Administrative Law - Cases

Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 (HL) FACTS

Egyptian government took property and there was a treaty which said that C should get compensation. The Tribunal held that they should not get compensation, which was outside of the proper area. However, there was an ouster clause saying that no determination shall be called into question.

Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 (HL) POINT OF LAW

You can judicially review despite an ouster clause where there is an error of law which means the administrative body was acting beyond their powers.

R. v. Lord Chancellor ex parte Page [1993] AC 682 FACTS

By the applicant's contract, his (a lecturer at Uni of Hull) contract could be terminated by either party with 3 months' notice, subject to the uni's statutes. The statutes said that he had to retire at 67, and he could not otherwise be let go without 'good cause'. He was made redundant with 3 months' notice but not with good cause. He petitioned the visitor of the uni for a declaration that the dismissal was contrary to the statutes and thus ultra vires and invalid, and it was rejected. The applicant sought judicial review of the decision.

R. v. Lord Chancellor ex parte Page [1993] AC 682 POINT OF LAW

Applied the principle from Anisminic to university visitors: if a decision is not ultra vires, it cannot be subject to judicial review. This is because the domestic law of the uni is within their jurisdiction. More likely: there is a single category of errors of law, all of which render a decision ultra vires and jurisdictional.

R. v. Monopolies and Mergers Commission ex parte South Yorkshire Transport Ltd.

[1993] 1 WLR 23 HL FACTS

C1 provided public transport services in S Yorks and was owned by C2. When C1 acquired a number of S Yorks bus companies, the Secretary of State under s64 Fair Trading Act 1973 referred the matter to D Commission, which could investigate the matter if the area concerned was a 'substantial part of the UK'. They considered that 'substantial' meant 'something real or important as distinct from something merely nominal'. As a result, they advised the Sec of State that C1 be requried to divest itself of the acquisitions. Cs argued that the requirement that teh matter concerned a 'substantial part' of the UK was a jurisdictional precondition, and that the Commission erred in its interpretation of the Act in this respect.

R. v. Monopolies and Mergers Commission ex parte South Yorkshire Transport Ltd.

[1993] 1 WLR 23 HL POINT OF LAW

Even where a question relates to jurisdiction, if the statutory language involves a broad, evaluative judgment, the court will not intervene simply because it would have reached a different conclusion. Judicial review for error of law will only succeed if the decision is irrational or based on a clear misdirection of law.

R (Cart) v The Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28 FACTS

Key issue was whether the Upper Tribunal is susceptible to judicial review and, if so, on what grounds. Pertinent aspect of that issue is whether, when a question of law falls to be determined by the Upper Tribunal, it is to be considered a jurisdictional question of law, such that any error can be corrected in the event of a disagreement with a reviewing court.

R (Cart) v The Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28 POINT OF LAW

UK admin law has moved away from the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional when looking at whether the courts can review decisions for error of law. The Upper Tribunal, despite being a 'superior court of record' like the High Court, can be subject to judicial review, subject to restrictions that it should only be available where an important point of practice or principle is raised or there is some other compelling reason for the court to hear the case (the second-appeals criteria). Parliament can exclude judicial review, but only with clear and explicit words.

R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22 FACTS

C complained to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal that GCHQ had been conducting unlawful computer hacking. The tribunal held that s5(2) of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 allowed the Sec of State the issue warrants authorising such activity. Without a right to appeal, Cs brought a claim for judicial review of their decision.

R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22 POINT OF LAW

Judicial review can only be excluded by clear and explicit terms, even for tribunals which are on par with the EWHC. Clauses purporting wholly to exclude the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court to review a decision of an inferior court or tribunal may be ineffectual.

*E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49, [2004] QB 1044 FACTS

Issue of whether the Immigration Appeal Tribunal could take into account new evidence from after the appellants' hearings but before the Tribunal had promulgated its decisions. The Tribunal refused to do so.

*E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49, [2004] QB 1044 POINT OF LAW

A mistake in finding facts may make a decision illegal if (1) an administrator (or an administrative tribunal) makes a mistake about the existence or non-existence of a fact, including a mistake about the availability of evidence to support a finding of fact; (2) the fact, or the evidence, is 'uncontentious and objectively verifiable'; (3) neither the appellant nor his advisors were responsible for the mistake; and (4) the mistake played a material (but not necessarily decisive) part in the reasoning leading to the making of the decision or rule.

*R (A) v Croydon LBC [2009] UKSC 8; [2009] 1 WLR 2557 FACTS

Cs contended that D local authorities were obliged by s20(1) of the Children Act 1989 to provide them with accommodation. Ds, however, formed the view that neither claimant was a child.

*R (A) v Croydon LBC [2009] UKSC 8; [2009] 1 WLR 2557 POINT OF LAW

Where there is a question of objective fact, rather than one which requires a value judgment, it is within the competency of the court to decide, as it is a jurisdictional or precedent fact.

Edwards v. Bairstow [1956] AC 14 HL POINT OF LAW

When there is some differing of opinion, and different authorities could have reached different results acting rationally, the court is only entitled to substitute its own judgment if the decision is so aberrant that it cannot be classed as rational.

Moyna v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2003] UKHL 44, [2003] 1 WLR 1929 POINT OF LAW

The difference between questions of fact and questions of law can be more clearly expressed as a distinction between what should be decided by appellate courts and what should not. This means there are things that seem like questions of fact that are complicated enough that judges should decide them and are thus questions of law, and questions of law that are simple or mundane enough that it would be silly to make appellate courts keep deciding them.

*Jones v First Tier Tribunal [2013] UKSC 19 FACTS

A lorry swerved to avoid a suicide attempt and hit C's vehicle, causing severe injuries. C was denied compensation because it wasn't a crime of violence, and the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal failed. C applied for judicial review of the decision.

*Jones v First Tier Tribunal [2013] UKSC 19 POINT OF LAW

The law/fact distinction is not purely objective, but must take account of factors of "expediency" or "policy". This means that where Parliament has established a specialist appellate tribunal, its expertise should be used to direct the development of law and practice in its field. The deference of the reviewing court to the UT in light of its experience may be heightened by the reviewing court's characterising a given matter as a question of fact (so as to shield it from the rigours of error-of-law review) even if the same matter would be characterised by the UT as a question of law.

R (Oceana) v Upper Tribunal [2023] EWHC 791 (Admin), [2023] ACD 72 FACTS

The court was asked to determine whether the High Court had jurisdiction to jear a claimant's judicial review claim of the Upper Tribunal's refusal to grant her permission to appeal.

R (Oceana) v Upper Tribunal [2023] EWHC 791 (Admin), [2023] ACD 72 POINT OF LAW

The courts always have to be authoritative interpreters of Parliament's intention, even ouster clauses. This means that they can be effective if they are explicit and clear.

R (LA (Albania)) v Upper Tribunal [2023] EWCA Civ 1337, [2024] 1 WLR 1673 FACTS

C, an Albanian national, entered the UK and sought asylum. The Sec of Saate refused. The FTT dismissed the appeal and the Upper Tribunal refused to grant C permission to appeal. Since there was no right of appeal from the Upper tribunal's refusal of permission, C applied for judicial review of the refusal instead. Teh judge refused permission to apply because of s11A of the TCEA 2007. On C's application for permission to appeal against the judge's decision:

R (LA (Albania)) v Upper Tribunal [2023] EWCA Civ 1337, [2024] 1 WLR 1673 POINT OF LAW

Affirmed Oceana: it is possible for Parliament to exclude the possibility of judicial review, if it is clear enough. For example, s11A of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.

* Carltona v Commrs of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560 FACTS

Regulation 51(1) of the Defence (General) Regulations 1939 provided that a competent authority, it it appeared to that authority necessary or expedient to do so, might requisition land. An assistant secretary of the Ministry of Works and Planning,, which was the relevant department, signed a requisitioning notice. This was challenged by the proprietor of the land on the ground inter alia that the Commrs of Works, wrongly assumed by the proprietor to be the competent authority, had not themselves personally brough their minds to bear on the exercise of the power.

* Carltona v Commrs of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560 POINT OF LAW

A Minister can delegate their powers to any official within the relevant department.

* R v Adams [2020] UKSC 19 FACTS

In 1973, D was detained with an interim custody order made under 4(1) of the Detention of Terrorists (NI) Order 1972, on the grounds that he was suspected of being involved in terrorist activity. The order was signed by a Minister of State in the NI office and not personally by the Sec of State. On 2 occasions D attempted to escape custody and convicted of attempting to escape from lawful custody. Over 40 years later, D appealed on the ground that the order had not been personally signed by the sec of state. The NICA dismissed the appeal because of the Carltona principle, that when a statute placed a duty on a minister it could generally be exercised by a member of his department for whom he accepted responsibility.

* R v Adams [2020] UKSC 19 POINT OF LAW

Even if there is a presumption that the Carltona principle applies, it can be displaced by statute. Relevant factors for determining this include the significance of the consequences and the burden on the Minister.

*British Oxygen v. Minister of Technology [1971] AC 610 FACTS

S1(1) of the Industrial Development Act 1966 provided that the Board of Trade 'may make to any person carrying on a business in Great Britain a grant towards approved capital expenditure incurred by that person in providing new machinery or plant'. The Board had a policy of denying grants for anything under £25 so rejected an application for a grant in respect of gas cylinders costing just under £20 each, of which C had bought £4m worth in the 3 years following the entry into force of the Act. In proceedings, the court was required inter alia to determine whether the Board had properly exercised its discretion.

*British Oxygen v. Minister of Technology [1971] AC 610 POINT OF LAW

A person or agency exercising discretion as to how to use a statutory power may devise a policy to guide him in its use. He may formulate a policy or make a limiting rule as to the future exercise of his discretion, if he thinks that good administration requires it, provided he listens to any applicant who has something new to say.

R (Corner House Research) v Director of Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 60 FACTS

Director of the Serious Fraud Office decided to stop a criminal investigation into allegations of bribery against a major British company in light of a threat by the Saudi Arabian government that it would cease co-operation with the UK on counter-terrorism matters. D was advised that if carried out, this threat would pub British lives at risk.

R (Corner House Research) v Director of Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 60 POINT OF LAW

Whether an external factor can be taken into account when a minister exercises their discretion depends on the public interest (as in what is in their best interest).

*R. (Sandiford) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2014] UKSC 44 FACTS

Challenge to a government decision not to pay the legal fees of a British national seeking to overturn their death sentence in Indonesia.

*R. (Sandiford) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2014] UKSC 44 POINT OF LAW

Judicial review for illegality due to fettering of discretion does not apply to common law/prerogative powers. This means they can be subject to a blanket exclusion policy.

* R (A) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 37 FACTS

C, a convicted child sex offender, brought a claim for judicial review of the Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme Guidance, by which outlined a co-ordinated approach which police forces could adopt when members of the public requested information about whether persons who had contact with children had any convictions for sex offences involving children. C claimed that the Guidance did not go far enough in guiding about when a police force had to seek representations from the subject of the request when the request was made, so the Guidance was unlawful because it gave rise to an unacceptable risk of unfairness as a matter of common law and it did not meet the standards of clarity, predictability, and accessibility in 8(2) ECHR.

* R (A) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 37 POINT OF LAW

Policies can be unlawful in 3 situations: the guidance included a positive incorrect statement of the law; the authority breached their duty to provide accurate legal advice; the authority promulgated a policy purporting to give a full account of the legal position but failed to do that.

R (BF (Eritrea)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 38 FACTS

C claimed asylum as an unaccompanied child but was assessed to be over 18 based on physical appearance. This was later reversed, and C challenged the policy.

R (BF (Eritrea)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 38 POINT OF LAW

A person promulgating policy guidance had a duty not to direct recipients to breach legal duties, but there was no general duty to promulgate a policy removing the risk of possible misapplication of the law by those subject to a legal duty.

R (Bracking) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2013] EWCA Civ 1345 POINT OF LAW

The public sector equality duty requires active, personal, and rigorous consideration of equality impacts by the actual decision maker, which must happen before the decision is made. It must be specific, documented, and conscientious.

R (Hurley and Moore) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills [2012] EWHC 201 (Admin) POINT OF LAW

Due regard requires the court to ensure that there has been a proper and conscientious focus on the statutory criteria, but if that's done the court can't interfere just because it would have weighted it differently. There is a duty to take steps to gather information so that the equality requirement can be met.

R (Sheakh) v Lambeth LBC [2022] EWCA Civ 457 POINT OF LAW

The "due regard" duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 is context-sensitive: its intensity varies with the facts and stage of the decision-making process. Where a decision is early, experimental, time-limited, and part of an evolving policy framework (such as in a public emergency), the standard for compliance may be less demanding. Courts should not apply an overly strict standard in such contexts, especially where equality impacts will be assessed further down the line and there is clear evidence that the duty was considered, even without a completed equality impact assessment at the time.

*Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture [1968] AC 997 FACTS

The way milk marketing worked was that each region sold their milk to the Board at prices which varied depending on the transport costs for that region. The SE region wanted their rate varied due to changing costs, but they couldn't get a majority for their proposals. The Minister refused to appoint a new committee, so they applied for a mandatory order directing him to refer the complaint to a committee of investigation or to deal with it according to law, ie on relevant considerations only, on the exclusion of other considerations.

*Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture [1968] AC 997 POINT OF LAW

Ministers given discretion must exercise it in line with the overall aim of the Act.

Wheeler. v. Leicester CC [1985] AC 1054 FACTS

Rugby club used a council ground. 3 of the players went on tour to ZA. The council suspended the use of the pitch for 6-12 months, a decision which was brought for judicial review.

Wheeler. v. Leicester CC [1985] AC 1054 POINT OF LAW

Use of a public power to punish acts of private individuals that are otherwise reasonable and lawful will be quashed for improper purposes.

R. v. Lewisham LBC ex parte Shell [1988] 1 All ER 938 FACTS

The council of an inner London broough some 18% of the population of which were black decided, as part of its duty under s71 of the Race Relations Act 1976 to promote good race relations within the borough, to adopt a policy of boycotting Shell's products subject to alternative products being available on reasonable terms (Shell was part of a multinational conglomerate that had subsidiaries operating in ZA). The council also sought to persuade other authorities to do the same. Shell sought a declaration that the decision was unlawful, contending that, rather than being motivated by a desire to improve race relations within the borough, the council's dominant purpose was to penalise them for their trading links w ZA and to induce the group to change its policy.

R. v. Lewisham LBC ex parte Shell [1988] 1 All ER 938 POINT OF LAW

A decision will be ultra vires if a substantial influence is outside of the scope conferred by statute, even if that is not the only reason for the decision, unless the same decision would have been made without considering the unlawful considerations.

Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67 FACTS

In the mid 1980s, Westminster CC adopted a policy of selling council houses in marginal wards to tenants in the hope that that would make them vote Tory. This was audited by an auditor who gave a public press conference beforehand that was argued to render the audit unlawful for bias.

Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67 POINT OF LAW

The test for whether a decision is void for bias is whether the fair-minded observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased. Powers conferred on a public authority may only be exercised for the purpose for which those powers were conferred and not otherwise. Article 6(1) ECHR is made of several separate rights; a complaint that one of them was breached cannot be answered by showing that the others were not.

*R (Palestine Solidarity Campaign Ltd) v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government [2020] UKSC 16; [2020] 1 WLR 1774 FACTS

The Sec of State issued guidance saying that when considering the investment strategies of their pension schemes, local authorities were not allowed to use pension policies to pursue boycotts, divestment and sanctions against foreign nations and UK defence industries, except when in line with official govt sanctions; and nor could they pursue policies contrary to UK foreign or defence policy. This was challenged on the grounds that they were irrelevant considerations.

*R (Palestine Solidarity Campaign Ltd) v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government [2020] UKSC 16; [2020] 1 WLR 1774 POINT OF LAW

Confirmed and applied the Padfield principle: an unfettered statutory power could only be exercised to "promote the policy and objectives of the Act".

Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside MBC [1977] AC 1014 POINT OF LAW

To be 'unreasonable,' a decision by a public authority must be such that no sensible authority acting with due appreciation of its responsibilities would have decided to adopt. It is for the court to determine whether he had directed himself properly and had taken into consideration the matters which he ought to have considered and excluded from his consideration irrelevant matters.

Tesco Stores Ltd. v. Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 W.L.R. 759 FACTS

Tesco applied for planning permission to build a new supermarket but was beaten by another supermarket chain. They sought judicial review, contending that the Sec of State had unlawfully failed to take into account its offer, in return for planning permission, to fund the construction of a new road to alleviate congestion in the town.

*Bromley LBC v. GLC [1983] 1 AC 768 FACTS

The GLC, in line with a manifesto pledge, levied a 6.1p in the point rate on all London boroughs to fund the London Transport Executive.

*Bromley LBC v. GLC [1983] 1 AC 768 POINT OF LAW

Manifesto pledges cannot be treated as binding. The interests of the affected public must be considered.

Tesco Stores Ltd. v. Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 W.L.R. 759 POINT OF LAW

If the authority has regard to all material considerations and does not lapse into Wednesbury irrationality, it can give the considerations whatever weight they think fit or no weight at all. The weight is not a matter for the courts.

R v Home Secretary, ex p Venables and Thompson [1998] AC 40 POINT OF LAW

Public authorities may not consider public opinion when making a decision.

*R (on the application of Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51 POINT OF LAW

Emphasized that common law rights are very important and discretion mustn't restrict them.

* R (Miller) v Prime Minister No 2, Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland [2019] UKSC 41; [2020] AC 373 FACTS

The PM prorogued Parliament for 5 weeks, which was an unusually long time and was right when the EU agreement was happening.

* R (Miller) v Prime Minister No 2, Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland [2019] UKSC 41; [2020] AC 373 POINT O' LAW

Fundamental common law constitutional principles must be obeyed when exercising discretion. This includes Parliamentary sovereignty and Parliamentary scrutiny.

*Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA) FACTS

The CA was asked to declare ultra vires the defendant local authority's decision that C should be allowed to open its cinema on Sundays only on the condition that unider-15s would not be allowed in. D had imposed the condition pursuant to its statutory power under s1(1) of the Sunday Entertainments Act 1932, which allowed local authorities to permit Sunday opening of cinemas 'subject to such conditions as the authority think fit to impose'.

*Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA) POINT OF LAW

The court must investigate whether the local authority has taken into account matters which they ought not to take into account, or conversely, have refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matters which they ought to take into account. Once that it decided, and it is held that the local authority acted within the four corners of the matters which they ought to consider, they have nevertheless come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it.

*R. v. Chief Constable of Sussex, ex parte International Trader's Ferry Ltd [1999] 2 AC 418, [1999] 1 All ER 129 POINT OF LAW

The Wednesbury formulation is tautologous and needlessly complex. Instead, the formulation should be: whether the decision in question was one a reasonable authority could reach. The converse is 'conduct which no sensible authority acting with due appreciation of its responsibilities would have decided to adopt.'

*Kennedy v Charity Commissioners [2014] UKSC 20 POINT OF LAW

The intensity of judicial review in administrative law varies according to context, rather than applying a single rigid standard like the traditional Wednesbury unreasonableness test. Courts adopt a more flexible and calibrated approach, applying low-intensity review in cases involving political judgment, and higher-intensity scrutiny where fundamental rights are at stake.

R (Law Society) v Lord Chancellor [2019] 1 WLR 1649 (Divisional Court) POINT OF LAW

"Another, simpler formulation of the [Wednesbury] test which avoids tautology is whether the decision is outside the range of reasonable decisions open to the decision-maker"

Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Johnson [2020] EWCA Civ 778 FACTS

Bank holidays and weekends mean that sometimes one will be paid twice in one month and not paid at all in another. These monthly fluctuations in income meant that the amount of universal credit received fluctuated greatly. This was challenged as irrational by some universal credit recipients because they couldn't budget for the fluctuations, and in the months where they got a lot less, they ended up incurring more fees such as overdraft fees. The Sec of State said that it was necessary to be an automated process.

Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Johnson [2020] EWCA Civ 778 POINT OF LAW

When considering whether a decision was rational, relevant factors include: the disadvantages of not fixing an issue and of fixing it, whether a solution would be consistent with the nature of the overall regime, and whether the it was possible to say that no reasonable [decision-maker] would have struck the balance in the way that the [decision-maker] had done.

R v Home Secretary, ex p Daly [2001] UKHL 26 FACTS

Policy which allowed prisoners' legal correspondence to be searched without the prisoners present was questioned as unlawful.

R v Home Secretary, ex p Daly [2001] UKHL 26 POINT OF LAW

This is the first unequivocal adoption of the proportionality test in an HR case at apex court level in the UK. The right-infringing means used to achieve an objective must be proportional to the legitimate public objectives which they aim to achieve.

Miss Behavin' Ltd v Belfast City Council [2007] UKHL 19, [2007] 1 WLR 1420 FACTS

Challenge on freedom of speech grounds to a council's refusal to grant a licence permitting a sex shop to operate.

Miss Behavin' Ltd v Belfast City Council [2007] UKHL 19, [2007] 1 WLR 1420 POINT OF LAW

An authority or official's expertise in matters of discretion is only to be deferred to if they actually use it. If not, the court must strike the balance itself.

* Bank Mellat v Her Majesty's Treasury [2013] UKSC 39 POINT OF LAW

The proportionality test considers whether the objective is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a fundamental right, whether the measure is rationally connected to that objective, whether a less intrusive measure could have been used, and whether, having regard to these matters and to the severity of the consequences, a fair balance has been struck between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community.

* R (Begum) v Denbigh High School Governors [2006] UKHL 15, [2007] 1 AC 100 FACTS

C was a Muslim who was banned from her school after wearing a jilbab to school as it violated school uniform policy. The school had an option to wear a shalwar kameez, and C had been doing that, but she later decided to wear a jilbab as it represented a stricter adherence to her faith. She applied for judicial review of the decision not to let her remain at the school under the HRA.

* R (Begum) v Denbigh High School Governors [2006] UKHL 15, [2007] 1 AC 100 POINT OF LAW

When a public authority's decision is challenged under the HRA, the courts must conduct a proportionality review that is more intense than Wednesbury. This does not amount to a full merits review, but the court must examine the practical outcome, not just whether the process was procedurally proper.

Pham v Home Secretary [2015] UKSC 19 POINT OF LAW

There may be an implied requirement of proportionality when dealing with signifiant interferences with rights.

* Keyu v Foreign Secretary [2015] UKSC 69 POINT OF LAW

Scepticism of the move from rationality to proportionality as it would involve the courts considering the merits of the decision.

Browne v Parole Board [2018] EWCA Civ 2024 POINT OF LAW

Dismissed proportionality as a standard of review in favour of rationality for an assessment of risk.

Cooper. v. Board of Works for the Wandsworth District (1863) 14 CB (NS) 180 FACTS

C had started to build a house without giving the required notice to D. D demolished the partially built house without providing a hearing to C. C sued D for trespass, arguing that a right to such a hearing ought to be implied into the relevant statutory power.

Cooper. v. Board of Works for the Wandsworth District (1863) 14 CB (NS) 180 POINT OF LAW

There is a right to be heard, which may be dependent on the seriousness of the consequences.

* Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] AC 40 FACTS

C chief constable of Brighton won 2 court cases in which the judge criticised his leadership. He was then fired summarily by the committee, submitted notice of appeal, and was fired again after the committee had heard representations from his solicitor. He sought a declaration that the purported termination of appointment was unlawful.

*Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] AC 40 POINT OF LAW

The principles of natural justice and the right to a fair hearing do not just apply to public bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

*Osborn v Parole Board [2013] UKSC 6 POINT OF LAW

A hearing should be granted whenever fairness requires it in the light of the facts of the case and the importance of what is at stake. How much of a difference a hearing is likely to make is not a relevant factor to be considered.

R. (Moseley) v Haringey LBC [2014] UKSC 56 POINT OF LAW

There is a duty to consult. But while Lord Wilson (with whom Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore agreed) thought that it came from the common law requirement of procedural fairness, Lord Reed thought it was a statutory duty only.

*R (Begum) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 7 POINT OF LAW

Fairness and natural justice do not require a right to an appeal.

R (Pathan) v Home Secretary [2020] UKSC 41 FACTS

The applicant was on a conditional visa in the UK because of a sponsorship certificate from his employer. The employer was investigated, and the certificate was invalidated, but the applicant was not told until he applied for renewal. He claimed that he should have been told.

R (Pathan) v Home Secretary [2020] UKSC 41 POINT OF LAW

Procedural fairness requires that an affected individual be informed promptly of a decision that impacts their legal position, but it does not extend to creating new substantive rights or benefits beyond those conferred by statute.

D4 v Home Secretary [2022] EWCA Civ 33 FACTS

The Sec made an order depriving C of citizenship. He didn't know where she was and her last known address was not used, so he submitted notice to her Home Office file.

D4 v Home Secretary [2022] EWCA Civ 33 POINT OF LAW

"Notice" means that it has been received. But that is not a universal rule. Also, receipt does not mean full knowledge. At most, the recipient should have an opportunity to inform themself about the contents of the notice.

* R (Roberts) v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 45, [2005] 2 AC 738 FACTS

C, a life sentence prisoner, was eligible for release on licence but was accused of drug dealing and infractions of prison discipline. His case was reviewed and it was held that telling him the evidence against him risked the informant. Accordingly, the evidence should only be put to a special advocate. This was challenged as being against art 5.4 ECHR.

* R (Roberts) v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 45, [2005] 2 AC 738 POINT OF LAW

2 principles which should be applied to the use of specially-appointed advocates: First, they should only be appointed to assist the prisoner by providing a degree of protection that would otherwise be unavailable; and second, their role should be tailored so that their use is no more than that which is necessary to mitigate the adverse position of the prisoner.

Home Secretary v MB [2007] UKHL 46, [2008] 1 AC 440 Baroness Hale POINT OF LAW

Doing justice means not only arriving at a just result but arriving at it in a just manner. In the case of closed material proceedings, this means that they should only happen when strictly necessary.

Home Secretary v AF (No 3) [2009] UKHL 28 POINT OF LAW

Requirement of Audi Alteram Partem means that there must be sufficient disclosure to allow the challenge to be met.

* R. v. Gough [1993] AC 646 POINT OF LAW

The test for bias should be: having ascertained the relevant circumstances, the court should ask itself whether, having regard to those circumstances, there was a real danger of bias on the part of the relevant member of the tribunal in question, in the sense that he might unfairly regard (or have unfairly regarded) with favour, or disfavour, the case of a party to the issue under consideration by him.

*Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 POINT OF LAW

A moderation of the test from Gough should be approved: "The court must first ascertain all the circumstances which have a bearing on the suggestion that the judge was biased. It must then ask whether those circumstances would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased." [102]

* R (The Good Law Project) v Minister for the Cabinet Office [2022] EWCA Civ 21 FACTS

At the height of the pandemic, a minister awarded a 6-month contract to a company headed by his pal. This was challenged on the ground, inter alia, of bias.

* R (The Good Law Project) v Minister for the Cabinet Office [2022] EWCA Civ 21 POINT OF LAW

With regard to questions of apparent bias, the fair-minded and informed observer is someone who reserves judgment until both sides of the argument are apparent, is not unduly sensitive or suspicious, and is not to be confused with the person raising the complaint. The principles can be applied to extrajudicial decisions, but only if they are sufficiently adjudicative.

R v Amber Valley District Council, ex p Jackson [1985] 1 WLR 298 FACTS

Planning decision. Before the decision was made, representations against the grant of permission were made to the district council by the applicant, a member of a local pressure group opposed to the development. The local group of the political party which had a majority on the council resolved to support the development. The applicant applied for a stay because of bias.

R v Amber Valley District Council, ex p Jackson [1985] 1 WLR 298 POINT OF LAW

The principles of natural justice apply to planning decisions, so decision-makers have an obligation to act fairly and consider relevant and timely representations.

R (Lewis) v Redcar and Cleveland [2008] EWCA Civ 746 POINT OF LAW

Councillors who have a personal interest, as defined in the authorities, must not participate in council decisions.

Broadview Energy v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2016] EWCA Civ 562 FACTS

C sought permission to construct a wind farm. It was allowed, challenged, recovered by D sec of state, recommended to be allowed, delegated, and denied. There was lots of lobbying. It was held in the EWHC that it was fine; lobbying as part and parcel of the representative role of the MP.

Broadview Energy v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2016] EWCA Civ 562 POINT OF LAW

The principles of natural justice are not disregarded when a Minister is lobbied by an MP, provided a fair-minded and informed observer would not think that there was bias.

R (Alconbury) v Secretary of State for the Environment [2001] UKHL 23, [2003] 2 AC 295 FACTS

Question of whether the Secretary of State counted as an 'independant and impartial tribunal' for the purposes of art 6(1) ECHR in planning decisions.