Critical Reasoning 2.2 – Intension and Extension of Terms

Vocabulary flashcards covering the major terms, theories, and distinctions discussed in the lecture on intension and extension in critical reasoning.

Intension (Connotation)

The set of attributes or qualities a term implies or calls to mind.

Extension (Denotation)

The actual objects or members that a term applies to.

Term (logic)

Any word or arrangement of words capable of serving as the subject of a statement.

Proper Name

A term that uniquely identifies a single individual (e.g., “George Washington”).

Common Name

A term that applies to each member of a class (e.g., “cat,” “planet”).

Descriptive Phrase

An arrangement of words functioning as a term by describing its referent (e.g., “the tallest building in Seoul”).

Use–Mention Distinction

Difference between using a word in discourse and merely referring to the word itself in quotation.

Objective Approach (to connotation)

View that a term connotes whatever attributes an object must have to be denoted by the term.

Subjective Approach (to connotation)

View that a term connotes the attributes speakers associate with it in their minds.

Conventional Connotation

The standard set of attributes competent speakers usually associate with a term, excluding personal idiosyncrasies.

Empty Extension

The null class; occurs when a term denotes no actual members (e.g., “unicorn”).

Increasing Intension

Ordering of terms in which each successive term adds attributes, becoming more specific.

Decreasing Intension

Ordering of terms in which each successive term removes attributes, becoming more general.

Increasing Extension

Ordering of terms in which each successive term denotes a larger class with more members.

Decreasing Extension

Ordering of terms in which each successive term denotes a smaller class with fewer members.

Descriptivism

Theory that the reference of a proper name is fixed by descriptive content speakers associate with it.

Causal–Historical Theory (of names)

View that a name’s reference is fixed at an initial baptism and preserved through a causal chain of communication.

Twin Earth Thought Experiment

Putnam’s scenario contrasting Earth’s H₂O with Twin-Earth’s XYZ to show meaning depends partly on external facts.

Externalism (“Meaning ain’t in the head”)

Claim that linguistic meaning is partly determined by factors outside a speaker’s mental state.

Soundness

Property of a deductive argument that is both valid and has all true premises.

Cogency

Property of an inductive argument that is strong and has all true premises.

Bayes’ Theorem

Formula for updating the probability of a hypothesis given evidence: P(A|B) = P(B|A) × P(A) / P(B).

Probability of a Conjunction

Rule that P(h₁ & h₂) = P(h₁) × P(h₂|h₁), the chance both events occur equals the probability of the first times the conditional probability of the second.

Non-Syntactic Argument

A string of words violating grammar and therefore failing to form a meaningful statement.

Vagueness

Quality of a term whose boundaries of application are indeterminate.

Ambiguity

Situation in which a word or phrase has more than one distinct meaning.

Equivocation

Fallacy that exploits ambiguity by shifting a term’s meaning within an argument.

Status-Function

Social power or role conferred on persons or things by collective acceptance, often invoked through language.

Linguistic Violence

Harm produced through speech acts, especially derogatory terms that shape social reality and license oppressive actions.

Essentialism Condition (language games)

Treating group categories as fixed natural kinds, thereby entrenching social divisions.

Social Embeddedness Condition

Degree to which a term’s use is woven into social practices and power structures, enhancing its normative force.

Genocidal Language Games

Use of deeply derogatory terms to license and promote acts of mass violence, as in the Rwandan genocide.

Reference

The object or class in the world that a term picks out.

Modal Objection to Descriptivism

Kripke’s argument that names rigidly refer across possible worlds, unlike definite descriptions.