IB History - Cold War, superpower tensions and rivalries

0.0(0)
studied byStudied by 1 person
learnLearn
examPractice Test
spaced repetitionSpaced Repetition
heart puzzleMatch
flashcardsFlashcards
Card Sorting

1/124

encourage image

There's no tags or description

Looks like no tags are added yet.

Study Analytics
Name
Mastery
Learn
Test
Matching
Spaced

No study sessions yet.

125 Terms

1
New cards

Tehran Conference

1943 - winning allies, US not yet opened Second Front. Confirm need for Germany's unconditional surrender. Stalin demand Polish security, US propose new international organisation

2
New cards

Yalta Conference

1945 - discuss Europe's post-war structure. Divide Germany in 4, 4Ds. Stalin agree to free elections in the East

3
New cards

Changes between Yalta and Potsdam

Roosevelt > Truman (who disliked Stalin)

Churchill > Atlee

US test atomic bomb

4
New cards

Potsdam Conference

1945 - finalise 4 zones, more tension and disagreement. Truman disagree with Stalin's idea of free elections

5
New cards

Percentage Agreement

1944 - Churchill & Stalin divide spheres of influence in percentages, disliked by Truman

6
New cards

Red Army Occupations

1945-1947, creation of satellite states. Red Army freed Eastern European countries from Germany and established Moscow-controlled governments, using salami tactics. Argued to be for buffer zone and safety

7
New cards

Salami Tactics

Starting with coalition government and continued 'slicing off' of parties until only Communism was left. Elections pro-communist and opposition eliminated.

8
New cards

Domino Theory

US fear of the fall of one country to Communism leading to more countries falling for Communism.

9
New cards

Greece & Turkey post-WWII

Unstable governments. Anti-nationalist and anti-imperialist rebellions sparked, which US and Britain believed to be Moscow-controlled. Churchill was also offended at the disregard of the Percentage Agreement.

10
New cards

Iran, 1946

Tehran agreement was to withdraw troops from Iran, yet Stalin left 30.000 in Iran, encouraging Communism. Proved quick breach in wartime agreements.

11
New cards

Kennan's Long Telegram

1946 - US diplomate George Kennan sending telegram to the US from Moscow, discussing the nature of Soviet conduct and foreign policy. Argue that USSR hostility comes from fear and the wish to spread Stalinism

12
New cards

Effects of Kennan's Long Telegram

- US hardened attitudes

- Key in developing containment policy in case of fight to death between democracy and Communism

- Proven to US when Stalin kept troops in Iran

13
New cards

Iron Curtain Speech

1946 - Churchill referred to Soviet methods in Eastern Europe (Salami Tactics), criticizing Stalin's 'free' elections and warning for USSR expansion.

14
New cards

Effects of Iron Curtain Speech

- Stalin accused Churchill of warmongering

- Stalin withdraw from International Monetary Fund

- Stalin developed anti-Western propaganda and a new 5-year strengthening plan

- Truman denied involvement in speech but benefited from US fear of Communism

15
New cards

Truman Doctrine

1947 - Truman's speech to the US Congress, stating the US should help countries under Communist threat.

Direct response to instability in Greece and Turkey

End to isolationism, believed the containment of Communism would help Europe recover

16
New cards

Marshall Plan

1947 - Aid to European countries supplied with American goods, resulting in increased influence.

Any country could join, given they opened their economic records, which was a clear method to keep the USSR out

17
New cards

Effects of Marshall Plan

- USSR rejected and criticized the Marshall Plan

- Accusations of 'dollar imperialism', uniting countries against Communism, political and tactical weapon

18
New cards

Cominform/COMECON

1947/1949 - Instruments to increase control over Communist parties in countries, direct response to Marshall Plan

COMECON directly linked satellites to Moscow

Seen as breaching of agreements and expansion

19
New cards

Czech Coup

1948 - Red Army took long to apply Salami Tactics in Czechoslovakia, so forced non-Communist politicians to resign, impose Communist-led government

Foreign Minister found dead, which Truman viewed as a coup, he exploited this by pushing the Marshall Plan

20
New cards

Berlin Blockade

1948 - with Berlin in the Soviet German zone, West relied on free access to the city for links.

→USSR started with restricted Western transport, then fully blocked Berlin off after the West imposed a new currency.

→ Goal: Western withdrawal from Berlin by letting people starve.

→ US fear Domino Theory, supply food & coal by planes

21
New cards

Berlin Blockade airlift

→ Blockade became useless with air supply, lifted by Stalin

22
New cards

Berlin Blockade result

Continued division of Germany

Set-up of FDR & GDR

Creation of NATO

USA became involved politically and militarily

23
New cards

NATO establishment

1949 - Article 51, using force for self-defense

→ Militarization of the Cold War

→ Stronger Western ties against the USSR

→ West Germany joined in 1955

→ Soviet response: Western Defense Treaty, prove division

24
New cards

Japan in the Cold War

→ Occupied by US post-1945

→ MacArthur's initial goal was to keep Japan weak and pacifist, demilitarization and breakup of powerful elite families

→ 1950 need for strong ally, create military & economic stability, wiping out internal Communism and permit self defense force

25
New cards

China in the Cold War

→ Civil War, Chiang Kai-Shek vs. Mao Zedong

→ Communist victory

→ Proclaimed PRC in 1949

26
New cards

Results of Chinese Civil War

→ Activate US fear of Domino Theory in Asia

→ US refused to recognize PRC, Taiwan in UN

27
New cards

Korea in the Cold War

1950-53

→ 38th parallel division, North (Communist, Kim Il Sung) and South (democracy, Synghman Rhee), supposed to be temporary but tension

→ Constant clashes on border, North invade South in 1950: Truman viewed as monolithic

→ US help South, MacArthur policy of 'rollback' into North

→ 1953 armistice

28
New cards

Effects of the Korean War

→ US containment policy extended to Asia

→ Expansion of US army

→ Globalisation of the Cold War

→ Communism contained but not 'rolled back', Korea remain divided

→ Chinese hostility to West, isolation policy

→ USSR motivated to expand armament

→ Ending removed source of tension, path to thaw

29
New cards

Taiwan in the Cold War

→ Became involved with US Seventh Fleet to resist Communism in Taiwan

→ Allow Chiang-Kai-Shek to attack China, Formosa Resolution allow Eisenhower to defend (brinkmaship)

30
New cards

Formosa Resolution

1955 - establish US commitment to defend Taiwan against PRC, provide power to intervene in case of attack, inspired by bombs in Quemoy and Matsu of PLA

31
New cards

Vietnam in the Cold War

Vietminh (under Ho Chi Minh), anti-Western, nationalist and pro-independent movement

→ France lose war against Vietminh in 1954

1956 - Ho Chi Minh control North, US-backed Ngo Dinh Diem control South

→ Diem ruthless, anti-Buddhist dictator, refused 1956 elections

→ Southern Vietcong: military opposition, supported by North Vietnam and Southern population

→ Armistice in 1973 yet North take initiative 1975

32
New cards

Results of Vietnam

Domino effect for Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia

High casualties, failure of containment

33
New cards

Effect of events in Europe

1945-50

34
New cards

Effect of events in Asia

1950>

35
New cards

Geneva Summit

1955

Symbolic, first meeting of governments since 1945 - Eisenhower and Khrushev

Little achievement with disagreement and tensions

36
New cards

Eisenhower

1953-1961 US president

- Military background, unlikely to be soft on Communism

- Roll-back of freeing countries under Communist control

- New Look and brinkmanship

37
New cards

New Look

Eisenhower policy

Prevent Communist growth, believe it'll collapse without expansion

- Alliances to encircle USSR, military to protect vulnerable areas and assist opposition

38
New cards

Brinkmanship

Eisenhower policy

Threats of massive retaliation for containment, going to brink of war to intimidate aggressor

39
New cards

Khrushev

1953-1964 USSR leader

- Peaceful coexistence, move from Leninism

- Believe capitalism would inevitably die out due to its nature of weakness

40
New cards

Peaceful coexistence

Khrushev policy

- War isn't inevitable, need to accept existence of other superpower and exist in peace

41
New cards

Causes of the Thaw

1953-1957

- Leadership changes, new ideas

- Other world leaders e.g. Churchill support communication

- Economic factors - USSR low living standards and high military spending, US better but still high spending

- End of Korean War (1953) remove source of tension

42
New cards

End of the Thaw

- 1956 de-Stalinization speech ruining Geneva Spirit, US fear of Soviet control -> Eisenhower Doctrine 1957

- Technology race with start of Sputnik, 1957

- 1958 Khrushev ultimatum for US withdrawal from Berlin

- 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis prove end of thaw

43
New cards

Eisenhower Doctrine

1957

- Middle-Eastern countries could request economic/military US aid in case of armed aggression

- Commitment to single out Soviet threat

- Broaden tensions

44
New cards

Sputnik launch

1957

45
New cards

Shotdown U-2 plane

1960

- Cancel planned meeting of Khrushev and Eisenhower

46
New cards

Khrushev Berlin ultimatum

1958, US to leave Berlin, existence of 2 Germanys, threaten to take West Berlin

- Clever diplomacy of US recognition of East Berlin

- Outrage of West caused tension, ultimatum dropped

- Calm by 1959 (Geneva, no agreement), arrange to meet but cancelled by U-2 plane

- Ulbricht pressure Khrushev with increased and continued emigration

47
New cards

Hungarian Uprising

1962

- Hungarian revolt inspired by Polish success and de-Stalinization speech

- Crushed by USSR, establishing Communist Party as only legal party in Hungary

48
New cards

Results of Hungarian Uprising

- Conflict USSR foreign policy - need to keep US in check but keep peaceful coexistence

- Show that Communism is imposed, not desired

- US contain Communism, yet no rollback

- Contribute to end of the Thaw

49
New cards

Suez Crisis

1956

- Nasser propose nationalizing Suez Canal, scaring Britain and France

- US refuse arms supplies, Nasser turn to Warsaw Pact countries

- Israel attack Egypt with support from Britain and France

50
New cards

Results of Suez Crisis

- UN involvement

- USSR threaten Britain & France

- US threaten stopping supplies to Britain & France

→ Defeat of Britain and France

→ Damaged Western relations

→ Confirm Soviet support for Egypt while US wanted to limit Soviet expansion

51
New cards

East vs. West Germany

- West Berlin stronger democracy, economy & industry with Marshall Aid support while East Berlin lacking, forced collectivization, hardship & Stalinist regime

- Neither side wanted to unite with differences

52
New cards

Berlin Crisis, origins

- Eastern escapes, especially young & skilled people

- Ulbricht pressure Khrushev to end emigration

53
New cards

Berlin Crisis

1960-1961

- Khrushev reissue ultimatum in Vienna 1961 to exploit Kennedy's inexperience, yet he didn't back down

- Khrushev cave to Ulbricht, set up wall

54
New cards

Berlin Crisis, effects

- Khrushev prove issues of Communism, yet gain control

- Ulbrich consolidate Communism in GDR

- Settle German question and remove key issue

- Symbolize division & Iron Curtain

55
New cards

Cuban Missile Crisis, origins

1959 - Castro request US financial aid for reforms, including nationalization of US economic interests

- Turn to USSR, challenging US

- US embargo on all Cuban exports, train Cuban exiles to overthrow Castro

56
New cards

Cuban Missile Crisis

1962

- Khrushev put IRBMs in Cuba to protect Cuba and threaten US

- Reflect US actions in Turkey & gain propaganda advantage after humiliation of Berlin Wall

- Didn't affect balance of nuclear power yet gave the USSR first-strike capability and US perceived a balance change

57
New cards

Cuban Missile Crisis, results

- USSR army angry at withdrawal and military cuts

- Castro angry at lack of consulting, Khrushev had to rebuild actions to prevent Sino-Cuban alliance. Cuba determined to become independent

- US prestige & focus on military strength

- USSR humiliation yet socialist Cuba without military threat, contribute to Khrushev's fall

- China see lack of revolutionary influence in USSR policy, deteriorate relations

- Test-ban Treaty 1964, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 1968 (yet didn't prevent arms race)

58
New cards

Zubok on Khrushev in Cuba

Realist manner of Stalin: walking over those who helped his designs when they were in the way of retreat, as Khrushev did with Castro

59
New cards

Kennedy's conflict in Cuba

- Must keep prestige

- Threat in sphere of influence

- Can't undergo more humiliation after the Bay of Pigs

- Upcoming elections

Khrushev sent telegram - he would remove missiles if US wouldn't invade, then demanded Turkish missile removal. First deal was agreed to, leading to success

60
New cards

Orthodox view on Kennedy's response in Cuba

- Successful brinkmanship for peace

- Pressured Soviet Union while staying calm, didn't use military and preserved power balance

R. Kennedy, E. Neustadt

61
New cards

Revisionist view on Kennedy's response in Cuba

- Unnecessary escalation to level of crisis

- Missiles were no real threat, through the blockade & publication he escalated the crisis

- Only cared about prestige

L.F. Stone, K. Hagman

62
New cards

New interpretations on Kennedy's response in Cuba

- Statesman, willing to compromise

- Tape recordings of ExComm show will to trade Turkey

63
New cards

J. L. Gaddis, Cuban Missile Crisis

Khrushev acted out of fear for another invasion

64
New cards

Bay of Pigs, results

- US humiliation

- Cuba grow closer to USSR, Castro declare self Marxist-Leninist

- Gave USSR material to criticize US

- Revive fear of US imperialism

- US attempts to reverse effects (e.g. Operation Mongoose, murder plots) failed

65
New cards

Bay of Pigs

1961

- Cuban exiles to overthrow Castro

- CIA underestimate popularity of Castro, no domestic uprising

- Flawed plans, little communication or air cover

66
New cards

Czechoslovakia in Détente

- Long-time wish for freedom and reforms

- Newly elected Dubcek supported by USSR, 'socialism with human face': wanted liberal reforms, trade with West yet loyal to USSR

- Warsaw Pact nations concerned with Dubcek, fear other nations wanting freedoms & destroying Soviet rule

67
New cards

Prague Spring

1968

- Warsaw Pact nations invade Prague, take control

- Dubcek forced to repeal reforms

- Condemned by US, cancellation of Brezhnev/Johnson meeting yet too occupied with Vietnam to take action while UN solutions could be blocked by USSR veto

- Red Army realize lies of leaders and gain empathy for victims, USSR almost lose control

- Husak 1969 conform to USSR yet need Red Army presence, to which Brezhnev agreed

68
New cards

Détente

1964-1979

69
New cards

Brezhnev Doctrine

1968

- Determination to keep Communist regimes whatever it takes

- Excuse for Afghanistan invasion

- Cement Sino-Soviet split, PRC fear USSR turning against them

- US first halt disarmament talks, then see defensive nature of doctrine

70
New cards

Reasons for détente

- Mutual Assured Destruction

- Cuba proved lack of will to use nuclear arms

- Nuclear equality (1949) and parity (1969), need communication for peace

- USSR stagnating economy, need to increase consumer goods & gain Western technology, deteriorating PRC relations imposed danger of isolation

- Nixon consider realpolitik and need to end Vietnam War, us Communist peace to pressure North Vietnam + free arms resources

- PRC need US relations to prevent isolation, US need PRC to restore foreign policy fluidity & move away from Vietnam focus, leverage in Soviet negotiations

- East/West Germany were unstable, new West Germany chancellor Willy Brandt policy of Ostpolitik to recognize borders & better relations

71
New cards

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

1968

No sharing of nuclear weaponry, keep nuclear weapons contained

72
New cards

SALT I progression

- Hindered by Czech invasion & US domestic politics

Start in 1970, implemented in 1972

73
New cards

SALT I Treaties

ABM Treaty, limit ABM sites & numbers, emphasize MAD and deter war

Interim Treaty, limit ICBMs and SLBMs

Basic Principles Agreement, rules for conduct of war and nuclear arms development

- Work together for peaceful coexistence

74
New cards

Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War

1973

Follow-up on SALT I

- In case of conflict, superpowers consult each other to avoid threats

75
New cards

J. Mason on SALT I

'Process of institutionalized armscontrol showed parity and reduced tensions', displayed by visits of leaders

- Nixon to Moscow in 1972 & 1974, Brezhnev to Washington in 1973

76
New cards

SALT II

Start in 1974, signed in 1979

- Slow progress, public belief of USSR benefits

- Ban new tests, limit numbers

- Never ratified by US Senate yet honored until 1986 under Reagan

77
New cards

START

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, start in 1982

- Limitation of warheads

- In favor of US

- Slow progress while continued weapon development

Signed in 1991, complicated by USSR collapse

78
New cards

Moscow Treaty

USSR, Poland & FDR, 1970

Recognizing borders of Poland and East/West Germany

79
New cards

Final Quadripartite Protocol

France, Britain, US & USSR, 1972

Maintenance of status quo in Berlin, confirming Western legal basis for access routes to city meaning security

80
New cards

Basic Treaty

FDR & GDR, 1972

Accept existence of 2 Germanys, increase trade links

81
New cards

Effects of German agreements in 1970-1972

- Reduced European tension

- US criticism for legal recognition to USSR control over Eastern Europe & formalizing Cold War divisions

- France supported Ostpolitik & left NATO in 1966, meaning US couldn't afford to alienate Germany and accepted Brandt's policy

82
New cards

Middle East in détente

- USSR support Arab hostility, Egypt & Syria against 'capitalist state' of Israel

- Israel undefeated with US assistance & strong economy

→ US believe US engagement rather than SU disengagement would bring peace

- Sadat (Egypt) dismiss USSR advisors to engage West, attack Israel with Syria in 1973

- US send navy & issue no-tolerance on USSR involvement, who weren't willing to help

- Syria withdraw without support

83
New cards

Middle East influence on détente

- Communication line of Brezhnev & Nixon, help in Berlin & prevent escalation/more conflict

- Sadat move from USSR to US with 1974-1975 agreements

- 1979 Peace Agreement Israel & Egypt

84
New cards

Détente, PRC & US agreements

1971, PRC replace Taiwan in UN

- US lift trade/travel restrictions and allow sporting events, e.g. table tennis team

- Nixon first US president to visit China

- Result of deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations, US leverage in USSR arms agreements

'Triangular diplomacy'

85
New cards

Ping-pong diplomacy

Exchange of table tennis players between US and PRC in early 1970s

- Thaw in Sino-American relations, paved the way to a visit to Beijing by Nixon

86
New cards

Helsinki Accords

1975

1. Security basket, accepting post-war frontiers & Ostpolitik

2. Co-operation basket, closer ties in science, economy & culture

3. Human rights basket, respect right & freedom

87
New cards

Issues of Helsinki Accords

- Third basket only accepted by USSR to gain 1 & 2

- USSR heavy immigrant taxes showing breach, aimed at Jews (anti-Semitism)

- No means of enforcement, only agree to adopt terms

88
New cards

Détente pressures

- US feel agreements benefit Soviets, ICBM strategic superiority

- Middle East & Africa saw continued USSR expansion, e.g. Popular Movement for Liberation in Angola, believe USSR informed on Egypt attack on Israel, support Ethiopia against Somalia 1977

- USSR not honoring 3rd basket, US response of Trade Reform Act/linkage of trading conditions resented by USSR

89
New cards

J. Fitzgerald on détente pressures

Factors of pressures led to late 70s 'complexities and contradictions of détente' becoming 'explosive'

90
New cards

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, reasons

1979

- Brezhnev Doctrine reason to invade; not sphere of influence but USSR fear for security

- Fear defeat of Revolution would lead to Afghanistan becoming Shah's Iran

- Believe victory of counter-revolution would result in bloodbath by religious fanatics & allow US military involvement

- Claim USSR would cease to be a great power if it stopped taking unpopular, but necessary decisions

- Moderate response to Czech invasion 1968

- Détente was having difficulties, little concerns with impact

91
New cards

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

1979

- People's Democratic Party seize power in 1978, pro-Soviet and Moscow financial aid

→ New policies of land reform & women's rights, restricted by internal factions & Muslim groups

- Hafizullah Amin coup 1979, take power

→ Instability by anti-Muslim policies, Mujahedin declare jihad on Amin's supporters

→ Amin depend on USSR aid, relations strained so turn to CIA → rumors of recruition

- USSR military intervention → replace Amin with pro-Soviet Babrak Kamal

92
New cards

US response to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

- See as Soviet expansionism

- Carter declare threat to world peace, refuse SALT II signing

- Stop electronic exports & US athletes in 1980 Moscow Olympics

- Carter Doctrine

- 1981 → Reagan, more aggresive, increase aid & arms to Mujahedin & Afghan allies

93
New cards

Carter Doctrine

1980

- Pledge US intervention in Soviet threat on Persian Gulf + arms to Mujahedin

94
New cards

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, rightwing American view on impact

Marxist-Leninist expansionism responsible for breakdown of détente

95
New cards

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, post-revisionist view on impact

USSR acted defensively to avoid threat to security in sphere of influence

US cynicism & policy/leader changes renewed tension by taking advantage of an unstable situation

96
New cards

Did détente fail? Mid-70s view

No - it reduced tension and threat of nuclear war

97
New cards

Did détente fail? Post-revisionist view

Necessary strategy to deal with international situation and manage competition while avoiding hostilities

- Bowker & Williams

98
New cards

Did détente fail? J. L. Gaddis, post-revisionist

Calling it a failure is misunderstanding of goal of détente - it turned a dangerous situation into a predictable system. Its goals were not to end the arms race or reform Soviet human rights policies

99
New cards

Did détente fail? Rightwing American view

Weak policy allowing USSR strengthening and gains in Western technology at the expense of US interests

Détente extended time of Soviet Union, its collapse is a result of hardline policies that were lacking during détente.

100
New cards

Did détente fail? R. Pipes, rightwing American

Nothing more than a trick on Soviet part