Trial in Due Course

Dokie v DPP

Dokie challenged an immigration offence that required a person to provide a "satisfactory explanation" for failing to produce documents. The Court struck the provision down because "satisfactory" was a subjective standard. A person could not know in advance what explanation would be accepted.

McNamee v DPP

McNamee challenged a temporary release condition requiring him to be of "good behaviour". The Court held that the phrase had a recognised legal meaning, namely not committing criminal offences, and therefore was sufficiently certain.

AG v O’Brien

The Gardaí searched the accused's house under a warrant containing the wrong address. The Supreme Court developed the original exclusionary rule. Evidence obtained in breach of constitutional rights would only be excluded where there was:

1. a conscious and deliberate breach,

2. a causal link between the breach and the evidence,

3. no extraordinary excusing circumstances.

The evidence was admitted because the mistake on the warrant was accidental.

DPP v JC

This is the current law and replaced the strict Kenny rule.

If the constitutional breach is deliberate and conscious, the evidence is excluded unless extraordinary excusing circumstances exist.

If the breach is not deliberate and conscious, there is a presumption of exclusion. However, the prosecution may have the evidence admitted if it can show the breach resulted from genuine inadvertence.

Inadvertence does not include:

• recklessness,

• gross negligence.

DPP v Shaw

The accused was unlawfully detained while Gardaí were trying to locate a kidnapped woman believed to be in grave danger. During the detention he made admissions. The Supreme Court admitted the evidence because the Gardaí were acting to protect the victim's right to life. This is the classic example of extraordinary excusing circumstances.

People v Healy

The accused was detained and questioned without proper access to legal advice. The Supreme Court held that a detained suspect has a constitutional right of reasonable access to a solicitor and, where necessary, legal aid.

DPP v Gormley and White

The Supreme Court held that a suspect cannot be questioned until they have had a reasonable opportunity to consult a solicitor. However, Gardaí do not need to wait for a solicitor before taking forensic samples because the suspect is legally obliged to provide them.

DPP v Doyle

The accused argued that his solicitor should have been physically present during questioning. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that there is no constitutional right to have a solicitor present during Garda interviews. Access to legal advice before questioning is sufficient.

State (Healy) v Donoghue

Legal aid is constitutional right where:

·       accused cannot afford representation,

·       charges sufficiently serious.

Braddish v DPP

The accused was charged with robbery and CCTV footage of the incident existed but was not preserved by the Gardaí. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution has a duty to seek out and preserve all relevant evidence, including evidence that may assist the defence as well as the prosecution. Because the CCTV could have been important to the defence, the trial was prohibited.

Ludlow v DPP

This concerned a fatal road traffic accident. The defence argued that the truck tyres, which were central to the prosecution case, had not been preserved. The Supreme Court prohibited the trial and restated the key principles governing missing evidence.

The prosecution must preserve and disclose evidence that is relevant to guilt or innocence, but the duty is a practical one and does not require disproportionate use of resources. The ultimate question is always whether the loss of the evidence creates a real risk of an unfair trial.

Wall v DPP

The Supreme Court held that the key question is no longer simply whether evidence has been lost. Instead, the court must ask:

Can any potential unfairness be cured by rulings, directions or other measures at trial?

If the answer is yes, the trial should proceed. If the unfairness is unavoidable, prohibition may be granted. The Court emphasised that the trial judge is usually in the best position to assess the impact of missing evidence.

D v DPP

The accused argued that prejudicial newspaper coverage made a fair trial impossible. The Supreme Court held that the test is:

Is there a real or serious risk of an unfair trial?

The retrial was allowed because the Court believed judicial directions could cure any prejudice.

Z v DPP

The accused was prosecuted in connection with the X Case and argued that massive media coverage made a fair trial impossible. The Supreme Court refused to prohibit the trial, showing its confidence that juries will follow judicial directions.

Rattigan

The accused, charged in a gangland murder case, sought to prohibit his trial because of extensive adverse media coverage. The Supreme Court refused the application and confirmed that publicity alone will rarely justify prohibition. The key question remains whether any prejudice can be cured by appropriate warnings and directions to the jury.

State (O’Connell) v Fawsitt

The leading delay case. The Supreme Court held that four factors must be considered:

1.     Length of the delay.

2.     Reason for the delay.

3.     Whether the accused asserted their rights.

4.     Prejudice suffered by the accused.

The most important factor is usually prejudice.

McFarlane

The Supreme Court clarified the modern approach to delay.

Actual prejudice (for example, missing witnesses or unavailable evidence) will justify prohibition.

Even without actual prejudice, the court may recognise presumed prejudice where the delay is:

·       blameworthy,

·       unexplained,

·       excessive.

DPP v CC

The leading modern authority.

The Supreme Court held that delay issues should normally be dealt with by the trial judge. The key question is:

Has the accused lost a realistic opportunity of pursuing an obviously useful defence because of the delay?

Heaney v Ireland

Constitutional right to silence. Not absolute. Restriction upheld.

Rock v Ireland

Inferences may be drawn from silence where statute permits. Cannot convict solely on inference evidence.

Hardy v Ireland

Reverse evidential burdens can be constitutional.

Damache v DPP

Search warrant issued by investigating superintendent. Not independent. Section unconstitutional.

Person issuing warrant must be independent.

DPP v Kenny

The Gardaí searched a house using a warrant later found to be invalid. Even though they acted in good faith, the Supreme Court adopted a stricter rule. The focus was on whether the act causing the breach was deliberate and conscious, not on whether Gardaí knew they were breaching constitutional rights. Because the search itself was deliberate, the evidence was excluded.