Market Structure IV: Oligopoly

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28 Terms

1

what is an oligopoly?

a market dominated by a few large firms

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2

what are the four main assumptions of an oligopoly?

  1. barriers to entry

  2. high conc ratio

  3. differentiated goods

  4. firms are highly independent

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3

what is interdependence?

  • each firm must take account of its rivals’ behaviour + reactions

  • i.e. must act strategically

    • either cooperatively/ non-cooperatively

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real life oligopoly examples:

  • TESCO dominates UK petrol market, followed by BP, Shell, ESSO

  • Cineworld dominates UK cinema market, followed by Odeon and Vue

  • William Hill dominates UK betting market, followed by bet365, Ladbrokes and Paddypower

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Non-Cooperative Strategy I: The Kinked Demand Curve Model

The oligopolist thinks:

  • If I increase my price, my competitors will leave their own price unchanged, in order to take some of my market share

But:

  • If I decrease my price, my competitors will follow suit in order to preserve their own market shares

  • So the oligopolist believes his competitors will:

    • 'Match price reductions but ignore price increases'

  • This gives rise to a kinked demand curve

    • MR has a discontinuity at the kink...

    • ...because MR has twice the gradient of AR

Hence Q* is seen to be the profit-maximising level of output under a wide range of cost conditions from MC1 to MC2

So the firm will leave price and output unchanged, even when costs do change

This causes sticky prices...

  • (Paul Sweezy, 1939; Hall & Hitch, 1939)

    So the oligopolist might compete on non-price factors instead...

<p><span>The oligopolist thinks:</span></p><ul><li><p><span>If I </span><strong><u><span>increase</span></u></strong><span> my price, my competitors will leave their own price </span><strong><u><span>unchanged</span></u></strong><span>, in order to take some of my market share</span></p></li></ul><p><span>But:</span></p><ul><li><p><span>If I </span><strong><u><span>decrease</span></u></strong><span> my price, my competitors will </span><strong><u><span>follow suit</span></u></strong><span> in order to preserve their own market shares</span></p><p></p></li><li><p><span>So the oligopolist believes his competitors will:</span></p><ul><li><p><span>'Match price reductions but ignore price increases'</span></p></li></ul><p></p></li><li><p><span>This gives rise to a </span><strong><span>kinked demand curve</span></strong></p><ul><li><p><span>MR has a discontinuity at the kink...</span></p></li><li><p><span>...because MR has twice the gradient of AR</span></p></li></ul></li></ul><p></p><p><span>Hence Q* is seen to be the profit-maximising level of output under a wide range of cost conditions from MC1 to MC2</span></p><p><span>So the firm will leave price and output unchanged, even when costs </span><strong><u><span>do</span></u></strong><span> change</span></p><p><span>This causes </span><strong><u><span>sticky prices</span></u></strong><span>...</span></p><ul><li><p><span>(Paul Sweezy, 1939; Hall &amp; Hitch, 1939)</span></p><p><span>So the oligopolist might compete on </span><strong><u><span>non-price factors</span></u></strong><span> instead...</span></p></li></ul>
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6

analysis of the KDC model

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criticisms of the KDC model

  • The KDC model does not explain how the original price, p*, was determined

    • i.e. it tells us prices will be rigid, but not whether they are likely to be high or low to begin with

  • in practice, many oligopolists do change prices (e.g. Tesco price check) so the KDC model would seem to be outdated

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8

what is game theory?

a method of modelling the strategic interaction between firms in an oligopoly when the firms have incomplete information about the others’ intentions

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what is a dominant strategy?

a strategy which always produces the kremlin for the firm, no matter which strategy is chosen by its rivals

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10

what is nash equilibrium?

where each player’s chosen strategy maximises the pay-offs, given the other player’s choice, so that no player has an incentive to change its strategy

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11

what is a payoff matrix?

a grid that illustrates the possible outcomes of two players’ actions

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12

what is a zero sum game?

where a gain by one player is matched by a loss by another player

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13

rock paper scissors - random strategy

In this game matter what both players choose, at least one of them can always improve their payoff by switching to a different choice.

If one of them wins the game, the loser can improve their payoff by switching.

If it's a tie, either player can improve their payoff by switching to a different choice.

<p>In this game matter what both players choose, at least one of them can always improve their payoff by switching to a different choice. </p><p>If one of them wins the game, the loser can improve their payoff by switching. </p><p>If it's a tie, either player can improve their payoff by switching to a different choice.</p>
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use of game theory in analysing oligopolies

  • game theory examples revolve around the pay-offs that come from making different decisions.

  • this illustrates why firms are likely to compete if they cannot be sure that their competitor will consistently collude (& lack of communication). Even though this will not maximise returns.

  • illustration of interdependent decision making e.g. marketing, pricing or R&D

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criticisms of game theory

  • assumption that firms are perfectly rational may be unrealistic

    • may work well as a mathematical model, but not based on behavioural evidence…and human behaviour – even that of a CEO – can be irrational as opposed to being precisely calculated

  • even when a game is played for multiple rounds and the players have established a ‘Nash equilibrium’, preferences can still change over time

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first mover (change your strategy) advantage

  • gain customers

  • develop brand loyalty

  • no switching costs – costs incurred by late entrants to entice customers to switch

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first mover (change your strategy first) disadvantage

  • free rider effects (R&D, marketing and awareness)

  • high marketing costs to raise awareness

  • second mover advantage

  • high financial uncertainty

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examples of first mover advantage

AWS has become the biggest technology infrastructure provider in the world — and it is also the fastest growing and most profitable part of Amazon

<p>AWS has become the biggest technology infrastructure provider in the world — and it is also the fastest growing and most profitable part of Amazon</p>
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19

what are the types of cooperative strategies?

  • cartel

  • collusion

  • tacit collusion

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20

what is a cartel?

an agreement between so or more firms to fix price and/or output

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21

what is collusion?

a secret agreement between firms in a cartel to fix prices and/or output

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22

what is tacit collusion?

where firms refrain from price competition, but without any communication or formal agreement

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23

the intention of coordinating price and output is to:

  • mimic the benefits of being a monopoly, hence maximising joint profits

Oligopolists will raise their prices simultaneously, each firm moving along a continuously inelastic AR curve

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24

why are cartels inherently unstable and rarely last for long?

  1. Cheating

    • Each firm now knows the other one will price high, so…

    • Each firm thinks it can selfishly maximise its own profit by slightly undercutting its rivals and pricing low

    • this situation does not last long because….

  2. Illegality

    • Fines of up to 10% turnover

    • Leniency – heightens the instability

    • Jail sentences of up to 5 year

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types of collusion

  • overt collusion

  • tacit collusion

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overt collusion

  • e.g. that is spoken, open or traceable

    • Pricing agreements

    • Output quotes / market share

    • Information sharing such as technical data

    • Agreed limits to marketing expenditure

    • Joint R&D projects

https://www.tutor2u.net/economics/reference/oligopoly-collusion

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tacit collusion

occurs where firms undertake actions that are likely to minimise a competitive response, without explicit communication and normally through repeated observations of behaviour e.g. price leadership of BA

  • AKA Price Leadership

    • one dominant firm in the industry takes the lead in setting price…

    • …the others simply follow suit

      Major mortgage lenders

      Petrol stations

    • not illegal as firms aren’t actively conspiring

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common features of oligopoly

  • price rigidity

    • (to avoid price wars)

  • dominant strategy of low price and high output

  • non-price competition

    • (advertising and brand loyalty, sales promos, R&D, etc, to acquire new customers but without undermining revenues)

  • temptation to collude and form a cartel

    • (though these are naturally unstable and are made even more wobbly by illegality and ‘leniency’ rules)

continuously inelastic → rigid prices

leniency → more likely for behaviour to carry on.

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