ART 3

What does Article 3 of the RPC define, and what are felonies also called?

Article 3 defines felonies (delitos) as acts and omissions punishable by law.

By what two means are felonies committed under Art. 3?

By means of deceit (dolo) or by means of fault (culpa).

When is there "deceit" (dolo) under Art. 3, and when is there "fault" (culpa)?

• There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent;

• there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

What are the three elements of a felony in general?

(1) There must be an act or omission;

(2) the act or omission must be punishable by the RPC;

(3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of dolo or culpa.

What is meant by "act" under Art. 3?

• Any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external world;

• it need not actually be produced, as the possibility of its production is sufficient, and it must be one defined as (or an overt act of) a felony under the RPC.

Why is a mere criminal thought or intention not punishable?

• Because only external acts are punished;

• internal acts are beyond the sphere of penal law, no matter how immoral or improper the thought may be.

What is meant by "omission" under Art. 3?

Inaction — the failure to perform a positive duty which one is bound by law to do; there must be a law requiring the performance of the act.

Give an example of a felony committed by omission.

Anyone who fails to render assistance to a person he finds wounded or in danger of dying in an uninhabited place is liable for abandonment of persons in danger (Art. 275, par. 1).

Is failing to report to authorities a crime one has witnessed a felony?

No, because there is no law that punishes a person who fails to report a crime he witnessed, so the omission is not punishable.

BAR: While armed with a pistol, A tells a couple he is going to burn down their house. The couple leaves to report to authorities. B, who was present and heard the threat, says nothing, does not warn anyone, and does not give the alarm when A sets the house on fire. Is B criminally liable?

• No.

• Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence, and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, is not punishable (People vs. Silvestre and Atienza).

What legal maxim underlies the requirement that a felony be "punishable by law"?

"Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege" — there is no crime where there is no law punishing it.

Under the RPC, does "punished by law" mean punished by the RPC or by a special law?

• It means punished by the Revised Penal Code;

• Violations of special statutes are called "crimes" or "offenses," not "felonies."

How does Art. 3 classify felonies according to the means by which they are committed?

Into :

(1) intentional felonies, and

(2) culpable felonies.

Distinguish intentional felonies from culpable felonies.

• In intentional felonies, the act/omission is malicious and performed with deliberate intent;

• in culpable felonies, the act/omission is not malicious, and the injury is unintentional, being merely the incident of another act performed without malice.

Why is "deceit" not the precise translation of "dolo" under Art. 3?

Because dolo is equivalent to malice — the intent to do injury to another — not mere deceit.

Give three examples of crimes in the RPC that may be committed through negligence (culpa).

Malversation through negligence (Art. 217),

evasion through negligence (Art. 224), and

acts by imprudence or negligence under Art. 365.

Name crimes that CANNOT be committed through imprudence or negligence. (MTRM)

Murder,

treason,

robbery, and

malicious mischief.

Distinguish imprudence from negligence.

• Imprudence indicates a deficiency of action (failure to take necessary precaution, usually involving lack of skill);

• negligence indicates a deficiency of perception (failure to pay attention/use due diligence, usually involving lack of foresight).

BAR: A physically ties a girl, wraps her feet in petroleum-soaked rags, and sets them on fire while attempting, in good faith, to cure her of an ulcer, causing her injury. Is A criminally liable?

Yes, for physical injuries through imprudence. Although there was no intent to cause evil, only to provide a remedy, A is liable for a culpable felony because the act was performed without the necessary care (U.S. vs. Divino).

Why does the RPC punish acts of negligence (culpa)?

• Because a man must use common sense and due reflection in his acts and is responsible for results anyone might foresee.

• Otherwise, the rights and property of others would be exposed to danger (U.S. vs. Maleza).

Are acts committed by means of dolo or by means of culpa both required to be voluntary?

• Yes

• in intentional felonies, the deliberate intent must necessarily be voluntary

• in culpable felonies, the imprudence/negligence consists in voluntarily, though without malice, doing or failing to do an act.

BAR: A hunter, seeing what he believes to be a deer's eyes at night, shoots and kills what turns out to be his companion. Is he criminally liable?

Yes, for homicide through reckless imprudence.

He performed a voluntary act in discharging his gun; though there was no malice, he failed to exercise the diligence necessary to avoid an undesirable accident (People vs. Ramirez).

BAR: A truck driver strikes and kills a girl crossing the street during torrential rain, without intent to cause injury, but without taking precaution to avoid it. Is he criminally liable?

Yes, for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Acts executed negligently are still voluntary, although done without malice, since the driver was not compelled or prevented from taking the necessary precaution (People vs. Lopez).

Enumerate the three requisites of dolo or malice. (FII)

(1) Freedom while doing the act or omitting to do it;

(2) intelligence while doing the act or omitting to do it;

(3) intent while doing the act or omitting to do it.

Why is a person who acts without freedom not criminally liable as the actor of a felony?

• Because he is no longer a human being acting but a mere tool, with liability comparable to that of the knife that wounds or the torch that sets fire — hence one who acts under irresistible force or uncontrollable fear is exempt (Art. 12, pars. 5 and 6).

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Why do the imbecile, the insane, and children under nine incur no criminal liability under Art. 3's requisites?

Because they act without intelligence, the power necessary to determine the morality of human acts (Art. 12, pars. 1, 2, 3).

How is criminal intent typically shown or proven?

• Intent is a mental process, but its existence is shown by the overt acts of the person;

• it is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act.

BAR: The accused is found in possession of another's watch, which he concealed and denied having, without satisfactory explanation. May intent to gain be inferred?

• Yes.

• Intent, though a mental state, is shown by overt acts, and unexplained concealment and denial of possession support an inference of intent to gain (Soriano vs. People; see also People vs. Sia Teb Ban).

Under what maxim does criminal intent arise from the commission of an unlawful act, and how may this presumption be overcome?

"Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea"

• an act does not make one guilty unless the mind is also guilty;

• the presumption of criminal intent may be rebutted by proof that the act was not unlawful or that there was no criminal intent.

BAR: A justice of the peace, believing in good faith that he was acting correctly, orders sums deposited in his court attached and delivered to plaintiffs in satisfaction of judgment. He is charged with malversation. Is he liable?

No. Since his underlying act was not unlawful and was done in good faith under the honest belief he was acting judiciously, no presumption of criminal intent arises — a crime is not committed if the mind of the actor is innocent (U.S. vs. Catolico).

BAR: A minor, honestly believing she had already reached the age of majority based on what her parents told her since childhood, contracts marriage without parental consent. Is she criminally liable?

No. The presumption of criminal intent was rebutted by her honest, good-faith belief; there being no intent to commit the crime due to an excusable mistake of fact, she is not criminally liable (U.S. vs. Peñalosa).

BAR: While asleep, A suddenly gets up, leaves his room with a bolo, and wounds his wife who tries to stop him. Is A criminally liable?

No. Since A acted in his sleep, his acts were not voluntary and he had no criminal intent (People vs. Taneo).

BAR: A military officer, acting in good faith on the order of a superior officer in a guerrilla unit which turns out to be illegal, has a person tried and executed for treason. Is the officer criminally liable for murder?

No. Since he obeyed the order in good faith, without awareness of its illegality and without fault or negligence, criminal intent was not established, as a crime requires criminal intent or negligence equivalent thereto (People vs. Beronilla).

Distinguish "ignorantia legis non excusat" from "ignorantia facti excusat."

• Ignorance of the law excuses no one (ignorantia legis non excusat),

• ignorance or mistake of fact relieves the accused of criminal liability (ignorantia facti excusat).

Enumerate the three requisites for mistake of fact to be a valid defense.

(1) The act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be;

(2) the intention of the accused in performing the act must be lawful;

(3) the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused.

BAR: Fearing an intruder, A locks his door with a chair against it, is later awakened by someone forcing the door open, warns "if you enter I will kill you," and upon being struck by the falling chair and believing he is being attacked, stabs and kills the person, who turns out to be his roommate. Is A criminally liable?

No. This is an innocent mistake of fact without fault or carelessness — had the facts been as A honestly and reasonably believed (an intruder attacking him), the killing would have been justified as self-defense under Art. 11, so A is acquitted (U.S. vs. Ah Chong).

BAR: Acting on orders to capture a wanted criminal "dead or alive," police officers see a man sleeping with his back to the door in the suspect's house and, without verifying his identity, immediately shoot and kill him. He turns out to be an innocent man. Are the officers criminally liable?

• Yes, for murder.

• They had ample time and opportunity to ascertain the sleeping man's identity without hazard to themselves and were not pressed to act immediately.

• So, their mistake was due to fault and carelessness and mistake of fact does not apply, even if the officers believed him to be the wanted criminal (People vs. Oanis).

Distinguish the Ah Chong case from the Oanis case regarding the defense of mistake of fact.

• In Ah Chong, the accused had no time to make further inquiry and was pressed by circumstances to act immediately, so the mistake was innocent;

• in Oanis, the accused had ample time to verify the victim's identity without hazard but failed to do so, making the mistake one of fault and carelessness.

BAR: A intends to shoot and kill B but, in the dark, mistakenly shoots and kills C, his own brother, instead. May A invoke mistake of fact as a defense?

• No.

• Mistake of fact does not apply to error in personae (mistake in identity of the victim) where the act and intention of the accused were themselves unlawful.

• A intended to kill someone unlawfully, so he is criminally liable (aberratio/error in personae distinguished from mistake of fact).

BAR: A resists arrest believing the arresting person is a bandit, but submits immediately once informed the person is a police officer. Is A guilty of resistance to an agent of authority?

No, because of mistake of fact — A had no intent to resist a lawful agent of authority once he learned the true facts (U.S. vs. Bautista).

BAR: A policeman, informed that convicts had escaped, sees an unknown man ascending the stairs of a house at night carrying a bolo and calling out, and without further inquiry from persons present who could identify the man, shoots and kills him. The victim turns out to be the homeowner's nephew. Is the policeman criminally liable?

Yes, for homicide through reckless negligence. Since the man calling out indicated he was known to the household, the accused should have inquired from those present before shooting; his failure to do so was negligence, so mistake of fact is not a valid defense to a culpable felony charge (People vs. De Fernando).

Why is mistake of fact not available as a defense to a culpable (negligence-based) felony?

Because mistake of fact negates criminal intent, which is not the element at issue in culpable felonies — there, imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill replaces intent.

Distinguish general intent from specific intent, with examples.

• General intent is the voluntariness required in all felonies committed by dolo;

• specific intent is a particular intent required for certain crimes, such as intent to gain in robbery/theft, intent to kill in frustrated/attempted homicide, and intent of lewd designs in forcible abduction.

In felonies committed by means of culpa, what replaces the requisite of criminal intent? (INFS)

Imprudence,

negligence,

lack of foresight, or

lack of skill

Enumerate the three requisites for an act or omission in a culpable felony to be considered voluntary.

(1) Freedom while doing/omitting the act;

(2) intelligence while doing/omitting the act;

(3) the offender is imprudent, negligent, or lacks foresight or skill while doing/omitting the act.

BAR: Intending to kill only the President, the accused hurls a hand grenade toward him, aware that people surrounding the President will also likely be hit, and other persons besides the President are killed or injured. Is the accused liable only for reckless imprudence as to the persons he did not specifically intend to kill?

• No.

• Since he acted with malice in throwing the grenade with intent to kill, he is liable for all consequences of his wrongful act under Art. 4, even those not specifically intended, because a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with reckless imprudence (People vs. Guillen).

Why is mistake in the identity of the intended victim (error in personae) not considered reckless imprudence?

• Because a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence

• Where the unlawful act is willfully done, a mistake in identity does not convert it into a culpable felony (People vs. Guillen).

BAR: While hunting deer at night, Catangay's already-cocked and aimed gun accidentally discharges after he stumbles, killing his companion Ramos. Is Catangay criminally liable?

No. He had no criminal intent and was not negligent — the discharge was a mere accident without fault, so he is exempt from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 4 (U.S. vs. Catangay).

Why must the underlying act be lawful for the "accident" exemption to apply, even where a gun accidentally discharges?

Because if the act itself is unlawful — e.g., discharging a firearm in a public place under Art. 155 — then any resulting injury makes the actor criminally liable, unlike aiming a gun while lawfully hunting.

What is the third class of crimes, aside from intentional and culpable felonies under the RPC?

Crimes defined and penalized by special laws, including those punished by municipal or city ordinances.

Is criminal intent generally required for crimes punished by special laws?

• No, as a rule;

• it is sufficient that the offender had intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law (i.e., the prohibited act was done freely and consciously).

Distinguish "intent to commit the crime" from "intent to perpetrate the act" as used for special laws.

• Intent to commit the crime — requires criminal intent (needed in mala in se);

• intent to perpetrate the act — merely requires the prohibited act be done freely and consciously (sufficient in mala prohibita/special laws).

BAR: A carries his licensed revolver on his person and, while responding to a friend calling him, walks inside the fence of a polling place on election day, without intending to intimidate any voter. Is he liable for violating the Election Law prohibiting firearms at polling places?

• Yes.

• The Election Law is a statutory (special law) provision where intent to violate is immaterial; since he carried the firearm inside the polling place fence willfully, he committed the prohibited act, regardless of his lack of intent to intimidate (People vs. Bayona).

BAR: A merely passes along a public road within fifty meters of a polling place on election day while carrying a firearm, without entering the polling place. Is he liable under the same election firearms prohibition?

• No, because he had no intent to perpetrate the act prohibited (entering/carrying within the polling place premises);

• merely passing along a public road does not fall within the law's contemplation (People vs. Bayona).

BAR: An employee, acting as agent for a store owner, sells coffee adulterated with peanuts and other substances in the ordinary course of business, without guilty knowledge of the adulteration. Is a conviction under the Pure Food and Drugs Act sustainable?

• Yes.

• In crimes punished by special laws for reasons of public policy, the act alone, irrespective of motive or guilty knowledge, constitutes the offense;

• the legislature may validly make certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer (U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng, et al.).

Are good faith and absence of criminal intent valid defenses in crimes punished by special laws, such as illegal possession of firearms?

Generally no — mere unlicensed possession is sufficient to sustain conviction, since the offense is malum prohibitum, and good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses (People vs. Orquijo).

Give an example where absence of intent WAS considered a valid defense despite unlicensed firearm possession being generally malum prohibitum.

Where PC soldiers were collecting loose firearms and the accused surrendered an unlicensed firearm he acquired only to turn it over to the collection drive, the doctrine of immateriality of animus possidendi was relaxed in his favor (People vs. Landicho).

Distinguish crimes mala in se from crimes mala prohibita.

• Mala in se crimes are wrongful by their nature (e.g., theft, rape, homicide) and require criminal intent;

• mala prohibita crimes are wrong merely because prohibited by statute (e.g., illegal possession of firearms), and the only inquiry is whether the law was violated.

Are all crimes in the Revised Penal Code necessarily mala in se, and are all special-law crimes necessarily mala prohibita?

• Not strictly.

• acts that are inherently immoral are mala in se even if punished by special law (e.g., possession/use of opium, malversation, brigandage, libel, which were originally penalized by special laws),

• while mala prohibita generally refers to acts made criminal by special laws.

BAR: Election inspectors and poll clerks, tasked with transferring voters' names to a newly created precinct's list, omit several voters' names in good faith, causing those voters to be disenfranchised. They are charged with violating the Revised Election Code, a special law. Is good faith a valid defense?

• No.

• Although the offense is technically punished by a special law (making it seem malum prohibitum), the act is inherently wrong (mala in se) because it disenfranchises voters and violates fundamental rights;

• hence, it must be shown that the act was committed with malice, and good faith negates the required malice (People vs. Sunico, et al.).

Distinguish motive from intent.

• Motive is the moving power which impels one to act for a definite result;

• intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect that result.

Is motive an essential element of a crime that must be proven for conviction?

No. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and need not be proved for purposes of conviction (People vs. Aposaga).

Does the apparent lack of a motive mean there was no motive at all?

• No — the apparent lack of a motive does not necessarily mean there is none;

• it may simply be unknown to us, hidden in the depths of one's conscience (People vs. Taneo).

Can a good motive prevent an act from being a crime?

• No.

• One may be convicted whether the motive is good, bad, or unproven.

• As in mercy killing, where the motive may be good but the act is nevertheless punished by law.

When is motive relevant and important to establish?

1. When the identity of the person accused is in dispute or doubtful,

2. motive becomes very relevant;

3. it is also important in weighing two antagonistic theories or versions of a killing, or

4. where evidence is merely circumstantial or the identification is unreliable.

When is proof of motive unnecessary?

1. When the commission of the crime has been proven and the identification of the accused is positive and convincing, or

2. where the accused himself admits the killing

How is motive generally proved?

By the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, which may indicate the motive (Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez).

Is proof of motive alone sufficient to support a conviction?

No. The existence of a motive, though an important consideration, is not sufficient proof of guilt; mere proof of motive, no matter how strong, cannot support conviction absent reliable evidence identifying the accused as the malefactor.

Can lack of motive aid in establishing the innocence of the accused?

Yes. Lack of motive may be used as further basis for acquittal, especially where the prosecution's evidence is otherwise weak, contrary to common experience, or incredible.