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constructing philosophy: argument
hypothesis statement that may or may not be proven. uses exemplary situation to model abstract idea.
constructing philosophy: premises
true or false statements that set the boundaries in which the thought experiment can occur. guidelines by which the ___ can be judged as true or not.
constructing philosophy: conclusion
makes a judgement whether the ___ is true or not based on the logical rules of the ___, extrapolating from the situation to the broader concept.
ADD DIAGRAM Classic Determinism
for every instant of time, there is a proposition that expresses the state of the world at that instance:
P0 (circumstances at my birth) → progressed by L laws of physics → P1 (circumstances in this instant)
therefore: (P0 + L) = P1
philosophy terms: proposition
the meaning expressed by a sentence- bypasses linguistic conventions and differences in word meaning/definition across translations
Justification of Classic Determinism
If P1 = (P0 + L), the only way to render P1 false (ie not do what I did in this instant) is to:
a) Render P0 false → but we can’t go back and change the past
b) render L false → but that would require breaking the laws of physics
→ therefore, all actions are equally determined
→ if you know the past and the laws, you can know the future
philosophy terms: vindicate
to justify or prove the correctness or validity of a belief, argument, or action, often after it has been questioned or criticised
Implications of New Determinism
you do what you do because of the way you are
to be responsible for actions, you must be responsible for your personality
if you can’t be responsible for personality, you can’t be responsible for actions
to be responsible for actions, you must have created your whole personality yourself → to be causa sui
causa sui
“to be the cause of oneself” (Latin) → to evade determinism, you must have “caused” your own existence in a godlike fashion
ADD DIAGRAM New Determinism
when considering responsibility for actions, it is important to judge reasons.
however, R reasons come from personality Ps, which if you trace far enough back, was predetermined by environment, how you were raised etc
therefore, determinism is correct
(P0 + L) → Ps → R → P1
Why do we care about determinism?
To measure responsibility for actions and therefore their just reward/punishment, we must evaluate whether you were responsible for your actions or if they were predetermined.
If not, things get sketchy quickly with religion concerning ultimate eternal reward/punishment in Heaven, Hell (especially if God caused your actions… and then punished them?) → religion can’t save you from this one!
New Determinist Theorists
Galen Strawson
Classic Determinist Theorists
Peter van Inwagen
Determinism Basic Argument
Nothing can be causa sui
To be ultimately morally responsible for one’s actions, one would need to be causa sui to some extent
Therefore, no one can be ultimately morally responsible
ADD DIAGRAM Compatibilism
Determinism and Free Will ARE Compatible.
It is easiest to reject Step 2 of the Basic Argument by redefining “morally responsible”
→ you can be responsible for your actions, given that they were not caused by a set of constraints (constraints are irrelevant to your personality)
→ total responsibility isn’t relevant to society’s justice, but lesser responsibility is
Libertarianism
Determinism and Free Will ARE NOT Compatible.
This diverts from Hard Determinism by reinterpreting Step 3 and saying that we may become causa sui to some extent
→ To be responsible for ourselves, we must be responsible for Self Forming Actions
Self Forming Actions
A pillar of Libertarianism that suggests certain causal decisions are integral to forming our personality, eg prioritising family over friends, the choice to use drugs for the first time
Libertarian Theorists
Kane
“Picture of the Self” rejection of the Basic Argument
Determinism is IRRELEVANT to Free Will, which is determined by the Self
Accepts that we can’t be held responsible for our character, BUT rejects Step 2 and asserts that a higher Self controls our actions
→ Self is separate from CPM (Character, Personality, Motivations = Determined). Self is causa sui
→ Our character is not free, our actions are
This effectively resolves nothing but adds a quasi-religious layer to human experience.
Compatibilist theorists
WT Stace
philosophy terms: intuitive definitions
we should consider philosophy in the context of how the word is usually interpreted/how the concept manifests in society and legality- otherwise its irrelevant
what do we even need to intuitively define moral responsibility?
for one to be self consciously aware that they are an agent making choices in a moment of action
→ how/whether those choices are free is irrelevant
→ some may argue that no free will = no moral responsibility
philosophy terms: agent
something with sufficient will to choose a path of action (whether that is the only path is kinda irrelevant)
Compatibilist definition of Free Acts
immediate causes are psychological states in the agent
Compatibilist definition of Unfree Acts
immediate causes are states of affairs external to the agent
philosophy terms: deductive argument
premises entail conclusion: if premises are right, conclusion must be right
valid does not equal true argument
philosophy terms: inductive argument
premises support conclusion: premises are true but conclusion could still be wrong
valid does not equal true argument
PAP: Principle of Alternate Possibilities
If I couldn’t have done otherwise than I did, then my actions were not free.
→ an a priori statement
→ this invokes Constraints to measure responsibility
a priori
“so obvious that it proves itself; no need for evidence” (Latin)
NEC: Necessity
I couldn’t have done otherwise than I did.
→ If I had tried to do otherwise, I would not have succeeded.
→ If I could have done otherwise (ie “if some internal thing under my control had been different”), I would have done otherwise.
→ therefore, I was always fated to do this action, and I am not responsible
Fatalism
thing x is going to happen no matter what else I do.
→ NEC confuses [this] and Determinism
→ tension between knowing someone will do something based on character, but they still could have done otherwise eg forget wallet
Proving Compatibilism by disproving PAP
Frankfurt:
PAP only works in situations in which the reason you did the action was the same as the reason preventing you from doing otherwise
PAP cant work if the reason you did it (Cause) and the reason you couldn’t have done otherwise (Constraint) are different
common understandings of responsibility pin it on the Cause, not Constraint → PAP is false
To judge character, we judge motivations, not situations
causal determinants
factors that directly or indirectly influence an outcome, where one factor causes a change in another
Existentialism: Impulsive free will
Fyodor Dostoyevsky
→ People often take the worse road for no other reason than because they want to.
→ the process is more rewarding than the goodness of the outcome- keeps us going
Audrey Hepburn in “Roman Holiday” Film
→ compatibilism = acting in accordance with your desires
→ sometimes your desire is to be as free as possible and ignore your desires
Sartre
→ compatibilism isn’t free because choices between desires can’t also be based on desires
→ freedom to choose own desires causa sui is most important
philosophy terms: Theory
an account of the way things are which is used to make predictions/give explanations
philosophy terms: Counterexample
case in which a theory gives an explanation/makes a prediction that intuitively seems wrong
philosophy terms: Error Theory
a theory that explains why your opponent gave a wrong/counterintuitive example
→ take apart opponent’s theory > defend your own
you can recover from this by:
redefining concepts or making it more specific
create new theory using feedback
bite the bullet and stick to theory
problems with compatibilism
some actions that stem from your desires aren’t free, such as addiction or psychological concerns, or even societal conditioning (you want to be a housewife cause you have been taught to want that)
→ Frankfurt proposes a difference between first and second order desires
first order desires
I want x, I believe x
→ the concept is the object of my desire
→ not the source of free actions according to Frankfurt
second order desires
I want to want x, I want to believe x
→ my own belief is the object of my desire
→ the source of free actions according to Frankfurt
Social Determinism
you had no other option but to take that action because of the circumstances inherent in your social standing/groups of which you are a member
eg you are in jail because you had no option but to commit crime, and no money for a good lawyer
Socially Determinist Theorists
Clarence Darrow
Normative ethics
the branch of moral philosophy, or ethics, concerned with criteria of what is morally right and wrong
Consequentialism
Deontology
Virtue Ethics
(Act) Consequentialism
The morality of an action is determined solely by its consequences or outcomes.
Actions are judged as right or wrong based on whether they produce good results or avoid bad ones.
→ must produce more good than any other action
→ what is right is understood in terms of what is good
→ implies that there are NO options or constraints
Deontology
Core Idea:
The morality of an action is determined by whether it follows certain rules, duties, or principles, regardless of its consequences.
Focus:
Actions are inherently right or wrong, and certain actions are always permissible or forbidden, regardless of the outcome.
Virtue Ethics
Core Idea:
The morality of an action is determined by the character and virtues of the person performing it, rather than by the action itself or its consequences.
Focus:
Emphasis on developing good character traits or virtues, such as honesty, courage, kindness, and justice.
Act Utilitarianism
a form of consequentialism that focuses on maximising overall net wellbeing (good) with your actions.
→ action x must produce MORE good than ANY OTHER option → this world must have more net wellbeing than any other parallel world
agent-relative options/perogatives
certain actions are morally right even if other actions could cause more overall net good
→ conflict between good = right
agent-relative constraints
certain actions are morally wrong even though they cause the most overall wellbeing out of any available action
Commonsense Morality
Shelly Kagan:
act consequentialism doesn’t work, because clearly options and constraints exist.
therefore, we must find another style of normative ethics
TM Scanlon’s Contractualism
what ultimately makes actions right or wrong is that they are a) permitted, b) forbidden, or c) required under the “guidance” of a set of principles.
These principles must not be able to be rejected by anyone “similarly motivated” (aka in the same situation, they would take the same action because they interpreted the principles in the same way you did)
we agree under a social “contract” to all adhere to the same principles
A form of Kantian Contractualism (undertaken with the goal of upholding the collective interest/good through mutual respect)
Hobbesian Contractualism
what ultimately makes actions right or wrong is that they are justifiable to the other party
given that we have both entered into a mutually beneficial, self interested agreement,
and that we entered with the knowledge it would benefit us
no collective good
morality under Scanlon’s contractualism
morality = respecting others
respecting others = treating them as rational agents who have the ability to also make choices and adhere to this social contract of principles, recognise reasons for doing so
treating them as rational agents = ensuring that your actions are unobjectionable to them, given their understanding of the common moral principles
reasonable rejectability
if the other person’s (proposed) action doesn’t align with the principles because for certain reasons on your behalf:
personal reasons > impersonal reasons
“this item is important to people” > “this item is objectively expensive”
individual rejections > group rejections
you cant add reasons across people: ie “my small reason + your small reason < one person’s big reason”
David Lewis’s interpretation of PAP
alternate worlds theory:
there are many alternate worlds, the more similar it is to our own, the closer it is physically
create counterfactuals which allow the alternate worlds to show what would have happened if something was different
counterfactuals
conditional sentences which discuss what would have been true under different circumstances,
→ e.g. "If Peter believed in ghosts, he would be afraid to be here."
the subjunctive tense helps to express this.
in the context of determinism: “if circumstances were different, I would have acted differently”
Elizabeth Ashford’s Objection to TM Scanlon’s Contractualism
contractualism’s whole aim is to validate the role that options and constraints play in common morality → create a less demanding alternative to Act Utilitarianism
but, contractualism is just as demanding, because
principle of aid: even if you do your share, you must still justify why not to the others you couldn’t save
stringent principle: you are now obligated to pick up the slack when others don’t help with humanitarian concerns (unfairness isn’t objection)
in emergencies: failing to help > harming another person
how to decide when its either your life or theirs aka equal rejections?
you would find it hard to justify not doing these actions, even if they seem extreme
minimising prohibitions
Jeffrey Brand-Ballard: “less harm per harm”
where taking an action that causes big harm > not taking said action, leading to more harm
→ trolley problem, Saw franchise
→ being an antihero > being a bystander
limiting legal restrictions and regulations to the extent possible, prioritising individual freedom and autonomy
this facilitates negative utilitarianism, which suggests that societal harm should be minimised