Bangladesh historiography
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60 Terms
Kabeer - the Islamic tradition in Bengal
‘Bengal has always existed as a distinct cultural formation within the Indian subcontinent’
First settled by migrants from South-east Asia - brought their own beliefs and way of life
Viewed as an inferior caste in the Brahmin system - consequently supported ‘every majo anti-Brahminical devotional movement that emerged in the region - Buddhism, Vaishnavism and finally Islam’
Especially the egalitarian principles, although they were not realised in practice
‘A caste-like division emerged within the Muslim community between the ashraf, those of noble or foreign extraction, and the ailaf, indigenous converts of lowly origins’
Bengali Muslims became part of the Islamic umma - followed the Sufis rather than the distant urban ulema
Villages of Bengal had syncretic Hindu and Muslim traditions - very hard to seperate this essentially agararian culture - Bengal beliefs, shared by Hindu and Muslim peasant alike
Kabeer - the Islamic elite in Bengal
They resisted assimilation into indigenous Bengali culture and sought to distance themselves from Hindus and Muslism - adhered to orthodox Islamic practices and spoke only Persian, Arabic and later Urdu
Elite were the main supporters for a separate Muslim homeland
Representative of Bengal in the Muslim League
Political leadership of Bangladesh
‘Although it claimed to speak for all Bengali Muslims, it spoke in languages which were not understood by the majority of their ‘imagined’ constituency, it looked to West Asia for its cultural references and regarded local custom and beliefs as irremediably Hinduized’
Kabeer on Pakistani state elites
Dominated by a ‘primarily Punjabi military bureaucratic oligarchy whose policies towards the east wing reduced it to the status of a colony and sowed the seeds of the country’s subsequent disintegration’
Economic and political discrimination
State cultural discrimination especially marked alienation
Assault on Bengali culture
Racialised undertones - smaller and darker
‘Co-religionists’ as relatively recent conversion
‘The cultural and linguistic affinity between the Hindus and Muslims of Bengal was also profoundly threatening to a state which had only Islam to hold together its fragmented and divided people’
Targeted the Bengali language
‘Primary vehicle for the specific identity and seperate culture of the Bengali people’
1948 - Urdu declared the official language of Pakistan
Kabeer on the language movement
Resistance movement launched against those who supported middle-class Bengali sentiments
‘The language movement resulted in the death of six student protestors and the overwhelming defeat of the Muslim League in the 1954 provincial elections’
Victors - United Front
Led by the Bengali nationalist Muslim Awami League, later becoming the Awami League
Became the voice of the disenfranchised middle classes of East Bengal
1956 constitution - declared Pakistan as an Islamic Republic and gave Bengali equal status with Urdu as a state language
Struggle over language continued - struggle over power
E.g under Ayub’s regime there was a Bureau for National Reconstruction to ‘purge the Bengali language of Sanskrit/ Hindu elements and purify it with Arabic, Persian and Urdu’
Circulation of Bengali literature resistricted
Tagore songs banned from state controlled radio and TV
Grants offered to those ‘artists and literati who were prepared to work for national integration’
‘A policy of assimilation through miscegenation made its first appearance in the system of financial incentives for inter-wing marriages’
Kabeer on Bengali women and the Pakistani state
Although Islam was given a promiment place in state discourse, in practice the Pakistani leadrship was more pragmatic - didn’t enforce orthodox behaviour upon Bengali women
Attacks on Bengali culture were driven by the desire to purge ‘Hindu’ elements rather than pursuing Islamisation necessarily
Yet, the dress and behaviour of Bengali women was politicised and gained symbolic value
Every-day middle class life was politicised
Right to sing songs of Tagore, to wear bindis, practice of Bengali muddle classes of training their daughters in their arts and allowing them to perform in public
While these acts had previously been common, they were now viewed as ‘Hindu aberrations’
Schendel on the post-colonial difficulties of Pakistan
Pakistan was a distinct state
Religion used for the first time to cement a national identity
Administering two territories which were separated by each other by about 1500km of Indian terrain
Most Pakistani citizens lived in East Pakistan
Pakistan did not inherit any central state institutions
India inherited most of the armed forces, civil bureaucracy and resources and industries, as wlell as major port cities
Pakistan inherited mainly raw-material producing regions
‘No other postcolonial state combined the loss of its administrative hub, the need to govern two unconnected territories and the ambition to found a national identity on a religious one’
These post-colonial uncertainties ‘fuelled the desire for a strong, centralised state’
Schendel on the challenge of creating unity between Pakistani citizens - language
Immediate question of what language shoud be used for state Business
November 1947 - The Pakistan Educational Conference proposed Urdi
Opposed by representatives from East Pakistan
‘A few months later an East Pakistan member of the Constituent Assembly tabled an amendment to allow the Bengali language to be used in the Assembly alongside Urdu’
Rebutted by the Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan
Argued that Pakistan was based on Muslim unity, the language had to be Urdu
In fact, Bengali was the principal language spoken by 56% of the Pakistani population
‘The language issue stood for a more general cultural and political divide’ - needed a clear demarcation from Northern India
‘The Bengalis had dreamed of a land free from the economic domination of Hindus and they imagined a leading role for themselves as representatives of the majority of Pakistani citizens’
Schendel - North Indian Muslim politics
North Indian Muslim politics - viewed themselves as the ‘natural leaders of Pakistan’
Endorsed by the Muhajirs
Urdu speaking intellectuals and trading elites
Had the majority of administrative and executive power
Mostly settled in West, but some 100,000 in East
Muslims from Punjab
Overrepresented in the military
‘Manned the state administration and controlled valuable irrigated land’
‘The Punjabis progressively outflanked the Muhajirs to become the hegemonic power in Pakistan’
1959 - transfer of capital from Karachi, Muhajir city, to Rawalpindi, a Punjabi garrison town, and in 1969 to Islamabad
Schendel on how the language issue became the focus of contention
Bengali elite disagreed
They were viewed as socially inferior in West Pakistan and less Muslim as they had diffeent cultural practices
Must shed their Bengaliness to compensate
‘The language issue became the focal point of this conflict because imposing Urdu was part of a mission to ‘Islamise’ East Pakistan. Many in West Pakistan knew very little about the Bengali language’
Notions of purification and purging from Sanksrit - associations with Hinduism
Formation of the first Language Action Committee in December 1947 -by students in East Pakistan
Schnendel - Jinnah’s uncompromising attitude
March 1948 - general strikes in East Pakistan, leaders arrested and injured
Jinnah was uncompromising in his attitude towards there being one state language, which would be Urdu
Created disillusionment throughout East Pakistan
‘This was not just a matter of regional pride, cultural identity and democratic principles but also a reflection of frustrated career ambitions’
Jobs in the state bureaucracy - excluded almost all locals in East Pakistan
Schendel - How the language movement created the Bengali-speaking student agitator
Students played a key role in creating popular resistance
1952 - the language movement had declined since 1948, but when the new PM Nazimuddin came to Dhaka
Said that people of East Pakistan could determine the provincial language but only Urdu would remain the state language
Student slogan ‘We Demand Bengali as a national language!’
Dhaka University strike
Meeting by a number of organisations - called a general strike, demonstrations imposed throughout East Pakistan on 21 February 1952
Government banned demonstrations, but students persevered
Marched across Dhaka University
Protests were repressed violently by armed police, injuring many and killing 5 people
183 ‘over the next few days more demonstrations, killing and arrests occured, and a memorial was hastily erected on the spot where the first killings had taken place’
Memorial eventulaly replaced by a concrete monument the Martyrs Memorial/ Shohid Minar
Memorial eventulaly replaced by a concrete monument the Martyrs Memorial/ Shohid Minar
Focal point of national identity politics
Martyrs memorials in every delta town
Importance of the events of 1952
Revealed brutal state leadership - marked a ‘sharp psychological rupture’
The uncertain dream of Pakistan was shattered
New search or ‘a secular alternative to the communial idiom of Pakistan politics and for an autonomy that the delta had last experienced in pre-Mughal times’
Raghavan - Ayub Khan
He had seized power in a coup d’etat, ‘dispensed with Pakistan’s parliamentary democracy and introduced a presidential system based on indirect elections’
15 ‘the uprising that shook the regime of Ayub Khan was, of course, fired by the specific social, economic and political context of Pakistan’
But also inseperable from the global revolts
He was the first native Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, serving from 1951 to 1958.
Khan's presidency started in 1958 when he overthrew President Iskander Mirza in a coup d'état, and ended in 1969 when he resigned amid mass protests and strikes across the country.
Raghavan - the globality of 1968, 1968 in Pakistan
Influenced by locality yet several conjunctions
‘More than twenty countries across the globe pulsed with protests. North America and Western Europe, China and Eastern Europe, East and West Asia, Africa and Latin America - none were immune to the contagion of youthful dissidence’
Historiography has focused on Western Europe and United States, obscuring the importance of the year in Pakistan
‘This is especially regrettable because the uprising in Pakistan was arguably the most successful of all the revolts in that monumentous year’
Currents of globalisation, decolonisation and the Cold War
Student movements emerged from the expansion of higher education
E.g Dhaka University
Economic dimension to events of 1968
Sixties boom - Pakistan had significant economic growth
But had mostly benefitted the small private sector, creating a wide disapority
Only 22 families owned or controlled 66% of the country’s industrial wealth and 87% of banking and insurance - became a slogan of the student movement
Raghavan - political culture of 1968
Counter-culture
Rock and roll ‘was an important vector for the global diffusion, including to Pakistan, of the spirit of the Sixties’
Revolt against the Cold War and ‘the stultifying structures it imposed’
Opposition to the Vietnam war
Opposed to Pakistan’s entanglement in the Cold War alliances
Political culture and language influenced by global upheavals
The idea of the revolutionary Left - influence of Marx, Lenin and Mao
Due to new technology - newspapers had covered the protests
1968 was the year that television came to Pakistan
18 ‘though television, like print and radio, was subject to censorship, Pakistanis congregating before their neighbourhood television sets were exposed to news and images of the global uprisings’
Raghavan - Connections with the British student movement
Direct connection to British student movement through Tariq Ali
Organised protests against the Ayub regime - had been sent to Oxford and was later elected president of the Oxford Union in 1965
Became active in a Trotskyist splinter-group that was in the thick of the protests against the Vietnam War
By 1968, he had become the face of the protesting youth in Britain
‘Source of inspiration and assistance’
Still differences between Western and Pakistani student movements
Objectives - Western protests may have used the political language of the revolutionary left but were directed towards statist decision making and were inherentenly libertarian rather than aimed at ‘deposing the stat and effecting a fundamental transformation of the state’ as in Pakistan
Raghavan - The Uprising & Mass Mobilization (Nov–Dec 1968)
The Spark (7 Nov 1968): Protests erupted after Gordon College students in Rawalpindi were targeted with regular contraband smuggling charges, triggering a strike joined by neighboring colleges that escalated into an armed police clash and a student death.
West Wing Contagion: Within days, campuses and towns across West Pakistan were ablaze with student protests.
East-West Convergence (Dec 1968): East Pakistani students joined the movement, defying a government curfew in Dhaka to stage a massive general strike that resulted in multiple arrests and casualties when police opened fire.
Cross-Class Alliance: The movement expanded as workers, vendors, and peasants joined the students, who used family networks and their skill in harnessing local grievances for larger causes to mobilize the countryside.
Mass Demonstration (25 Dec 1968): A rally of 10,000 students was joined by 20,000 workers demanding Ayub Khan’s resignation and the creation of a "people’s government"
Raghavan - The Student Action Committee & The 11-Point Program (Jan 1969)
Institutionalizing the Revolt (Jan 1969): Drawing on a long-standing tradition of student activism in Bengal, Eastern student groups formed the Student Action Committee (SAC), establishing links with the Awami League and the East Pakistan Communist Party.
The Eleven-Point Program: The SAC drafted a radical manifesto covering education reforms, federalism for East Pakistan, economic restructuring, repealing emergency laws, releasing jailed activists, and a foreign policy shift to end Cold War alliances in favor of non-alignment.
Demands Day (17 Jan 1969): The SAC united with other student factions to launch a coordinated national strike, paralyzing major cities across both wings, including Dhaka, Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Karachi.
Raghavan - Party Politics & Leadership Dynamics
The Leadership Vacuum: With Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Awami League) and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (PPP) both imprisoned by the regime, their respective parties were left rudderless.
The DAC Failure: Early in January 1969, an alliance of eight other parties formed the Democratic Action Committee (DAC); its incoherent demands and dithering contrasted unfavorably with the Bengali students' highly popular Eleven-Point Program.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Role: Educated at Berkeley and Oxford, Bhutto founded the PPP after a fallout with Ayub Khan; his fiery opposition made him a hero to West Pakistani student protestors before his swift arrest.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Strategy: While the Awami League maintained a strict oppositional role throughout Ayub's regime, Mujib initially hoped to preserve Pakistan's unity under a federal structure, aiming for national leadership by leveraging the Bengalis' electoral majority.
Raghavan - The Fall of Ayub Khan & The Six-Point Shift
Regime Capitulation: Unremitting pressure from the protestors forced Ayub Khan to realize that to preserve his presidential system, he would have to relinquish personal power; he announced he would not contest the next election.
The Six-Point Lock-In: Concurrently released from prison, Mujib found his bargaining position tightly circumscribed by the radicalized Bengali masses. Consequently, the Awami League's Six Points became the absolute minimum acceptable outcome for the Bengalis, rather than a maximum opening bid subject to dilution during negotiations
Raghavan - Pakistani military leadership
They viewed Ayub as aggratving the popular unrest
24 ‘The military had yet again to demonstrate that it was the sole anchor against extremism and anarchy’
‘By the third week of February 1969, the army leadership began to take the first steps toward desposing the field marshal’
The military desired to impose martial law - Yahya Khan appointed himself president and chief martial law administrator
26 ‘From the outset, Yahya publicly insisted that he was interested only in ensuring the establishment of a new constitution and a smooth transition to an elected civilian government’
Didn’t mean he was committed to the transfer of power - understood that ‘direct military rule could not be ensured in perpetuity’
He met with party leaders
Agreed on a Westminister parliamentary system, a federal system and an Islamic state
But vast differences about the extent of federalism
Said that Maximum Autonomy would be provided as far as possible
Raghavan on the General Election Landscape 1970
Democratic Scale: 25 political parties (17 from the East, 8 from the West) and 1,570 candidates campaigned for six months to vie for the 300 national parliamentary seats.
The Regional Fracture: Not a single political party proved capable of mobilizing voters across both wings of the country. Attempts to forge pan-Pakistan coalitions collapsed rapidly; parties focused strictly on their own regional "parishes," turning the political lines dividing East and West into "barbed-wire fences".
West Wing Dynamics: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People's Party (PPP) dominated by successfully harnessing the radical, left-leaning currents of the 1968–1969 student movement.
East Wing Dynamics: While East Pakistan featured numerous factions—including the National Awami Party (NAP), which was inspired by the Chinese path to socialism and decades of peasant activism—the Awami League emerged as the absolute dominant force.
Historiographical Clarification: The Awami League’s untrammeled dominance cannot be attributed simply to the weakness or structural failures of the left-wing parties, as some historians have incorrectly asserted.
Raghavan - Mujib’s balancing act
The Autonomy vs. Independence Dilemma: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman initially wished to avoid a total breach with West Pakistan, hoping for a federal structure. However, student groups and younger Awami League cadres were far more radical, vocal, and impatient with concessionary politics, actively pushing for outright independence.
Polarization & Hardening: Mujib's political stance systematically hardened as the national climate polarized. His singular campaign trip to West Pakistan failed completely, and he was deeply incensed by the martial law regime's covert attempts to block industrialist funding to the Awami League and engineer internal party defections.
Raghavan - Environmental catalusts
The July Floods: Catastrophic flooding inundated 11 districts in East Pakistan, forcing the military regime to postpone the general elections to December 7—a delay Mujib viewed with intense disquiet and suspicion.
The November Bhola Cyclone: A devastating cyclone and subsequent tidal bore struck coastal Bengal, killing hundreds of thousands of people.
The Political Fallout: Mujib issued a tough, measured statement describing the destruction as a "holocaust" and explicitly condemning the central government's slow relief response as "criminal negligence".
The Colonial Realization: Mujib declared that the disaster brought into sharp focus a fundamental structural truth that every Bengali "felt in his bones": that East Pakistan had long been treated by the West as nothing more than "a colony and a market".
Raghavan - Electoral result
The Fragmented Verdict Illusion: The military junta intentionally ran the elections expecting a fractured, splintered verdict among the 25 competing parties.
The 120-Day Constitutional Trap: They believed a divided National Assembly would find the mandatory 120-day deadline for drafting a new constitution impossible to meet, thereby forcing a collapse of the assembly and triggering fresh elections.
Perpetuating Martial Law: A member of the martial law administration recalled that the junta hoped this deadlocked process "would go on indefinitely, allowing martial law to remain in force". Alternatively, they calculated it would force weak civilian politicians to bargain away their power and accept future military tutelage.
The Awami League Disruption: This strategy completely collapsed because the Awami League achieved an overwhelming landslide victory based on the unyielding platform of their Six-Point Program.
The Irreconcilable Standoff: Three months after the election, the military launched a massive, violent crackdown on the Awami League and its supporters.
The Zero-Sum Dynamic: On the surface, the crisis escalated because the military was fundamentally unwilling to concede to Bengali decentralization, while Mujib—highly constrained by his radicalized student base—was entirely unable to dilute the Six Points, even if he wanted to.
Raghavan - Bhutto, the Pakistan’s People Party
Anti-Democratic Philosophy: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto believed Pakistan was structurally unready for parliamentary democracy, arguing that the military remained a necessary institution to govern the state.
Strategic Consonance: Bhutto’s views perfectly aligned with the military leadership’s desires to preserve their veto power over any future constitutional dispensation, and he actively fed "fertile suggestions" to the generals along these lines.
Stoking Regime Paranoia: Motivated by a personal belief that he was destined to lead Pakistan immediately, Bhutto played an insidious role in stoking the junta’s deep-seated fears about Mujib’s Six Points, using the military's patronage to bypass his lack of an electoral majority in the East.
Bengali Insecurity: Bhutto’s obstructionism deeply disconcerted the Awami League; despite winning an absolute national majority, the Bengalis feared the West Pakistani ruling elites would violently block the convening of the National Assembly.
Unilateral Constitutional Drafting: In response to this perceived threat, the Awami League began independently drafting a national constitution derived strictly and uncompromisingly from the Six Points.
Yahya’s Fact-Finding Mission (12 Jan 1971): General Yahya Khan arrived in Dhaka on a critical mission to test the rigidity of Mujib’s stance on the Six Points and, more subtly, to sound out his intentions regarding the composition and form of the future civilian government.
Raghavan - The January 1971 Dhaka Impasse & Bhutto’s Two-Pronged Strategy
The Failed Negotiations: A Pakistan People's Party (PPP) delegation arrived in Dhaka on January 27; talks quickly deadlocked as the Awami League insisted on the Six Points as the absolute framework for the constitution, while the PPP "harped on socialist policies" without offering concrete alternative legal structures.
Bhutto's Strategic Pivot: Faced with the impasse, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto adopted a two-pronged approach:
West Wing Consolidation: He attempted to unite all West Pakistani political parties against the Six Points while lobbying to secure the PPP's inclusion in any future government.
Undermining Credibility: He actively sowed doubts regarding the Awami League's commitment to a united Pakistan to systematically ruin its credibility across the West Wing.
Raghavan - The Awami League’s Internal Dilemma & Radical Student Pressure
Junta-Bhutto Alliance Fears: The Awami League leadership grew deeply concerned over the visible political collusion between Bhutto and General Yahya Khan's military regime, fearing Yahya would indefinitely postpone the National Assembly debates.
Counter-Lobbying: To break isolation, the Awami League initiated consultations with other West Pakistani political parties to alleviate their anxieties over the Six Points.
Mujib’s Resolve vs. Radical Restraint: Speaking at a February 21 Language Movement memorial, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman signaled resolve to the junta and restrained his radical base by declaring that "no power on earth could subjugate the Bengalees any more".
The Independence Debate: While militant student factions aggressively demanded a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), Mujib resisted, arguing a UDI would give the junta a perfect legal pretext for an immediate military lockdown. He was also highly concerned about international reactions, particularly noting that the United States strictly desired Pakistan to remain united.
Raghavan - The 1 March Postponement & Mass Civil Disobedience
The Trigger: Recognizing the Awami League's open defiance, Yahya Khan sought a "whiff of the grapeshot" via martial law and announced the indefinite postponement of the National Assembly on March 1, 1971.
The Spontaneous Uprising: Within minutes of the broadcast, hundreds of thousands of people poured into Dhaka's streets. Government employees went on strike, banks and commercial centers shut down, and university campuses and law courts emptied out instantly.
Non-Cooperation Movement (Satyagraha): Mujib launched a structured six-day strike program to showcase the Awami League's absolute civil control. Intent on maintaining non-violent satyagraha, Mujib was deeply disturbed by outbreaks of communal violence targeting ethnic Biharis and non-Muslims.
Radicalization of the Left: Street sentiment rapidly outpaced Mujib's cautious strategy. Major student organizations united to form the Central Students’ Action Committee of Independent Bangladesh. Concurrently, the National Awami Party (NAP) demanded absolute self-determination, and various Communist parties openly called for armed resistance.
Raghavan - Deceptive negotiations and the military trap
Yahya’s Bad-Faith Mission: Yahya landed in Dhaka on March 15 under the guise of peace talks. In reality, his objective was to probe Mujib's intentions and gather confirmatory evidence of Bengali "obduracy and treacherousness" to justify a military solution; the army's operational plans to retake the East were already well advanced.
Mujib’s Four Preconditions: Negotiations opened on March 16, with Mujib presenting four non-negotiable demands:
Immediate withdrawal of martial law.
Immediate transfer of power to elected civilian representatives.
Withdrawal of all troops back to their cantonments and a total cessation of military reinforcements from the West.
A formal judicial inquiry into recent military firings on civilians.
The Illusion of Progress: The Awami League team initially felt a political settlement was in sight, a optimism mirrored in upbeat local press coverage.
The Provincial Compromise Pivot: Spurred by a shift in Yahya and Bhutto's rhetoric, Mujib and Tajuddin Ahmad altered their strategy: they dropped the demand for an interim national government—fearing Bhutto would use it to "wangle his way in"—and instead demanded an immediate transfer of power strictly to the provincial level.
The Trap Closes: The military junta intentionally seized upon minor technical differences in these provincial proposals as definitive proof of the Awami League's "perfidy," setting the stage for war. Sensing a sudden shift in Yahya's demeanor, Mujib correctly anticipated military action and learned of Yahya's secret departure from Dhaka.
Raghavan - Operation Searchlight: The Crackdown and the outbreak of War
The Radio Broadcast (26 March): In a national radio address, Yahya Khan framed the talks entirely from the junta's perspective, denouncing Mujib's "obstinacy, obduracy and absolute refusal to talk sense". He labeled Mujib and the Awami League "enemies of Pakistan," banned all political activity, and completely proscribed the party.
The Attack on Dacca University: The military launched Operation Searchlight, initiating gruesome violence at Dhaka University student halls, deliberately executing students and prominent faculty members.
The Targeted Targeting of Hindus: The Pakistani military systematically targeted the Hindu minority based on three distinct ideological biases:
They viewed them as the foundational electoral backbone of the Awami League's secessionist platform.
They perceived them as a "corrosive cultural influence" that diluted the Islamic identity holding Pakistan together.
They classified them as an active, treasonous "fifth column" for India.
The Aftermath (End of March 10, 1971): While the military established brutal control over the capital city of Dhaka, large swaths of the East Pakistan countryside remained completely out of its administrative or military reach.
The Flight to India: On March 31, 1971, after traveling incognito on horseback and foot for five days, top Awami League leaders Tajuddin Ahmad and Amirul Islam arrived anxiously at a culvert in the no-man's-land near the Indian border to seek refuge and build a government-in-exile.
A. R. Khan challenges the emphasis placed on the Language Movement
It is often argued that the Language Movement of 1948-52 was the seed out of which grew up the tree of nationalism that created the Bangladesh state’
Evident in historical memory - speeches and essays writtenfor memorial day
A view shared by journalists and university teachers
‘The desire to establish a link between the Language Movement and the creation of a political state, Bangladesh, often induces one to make subjective inferences without references to the historical realities. This at best gives a partial view of a very complex process of national formation in the region’
A.R Khan - the ambivalence of the elites
‘The state language debate was formally initiated by Dr Ziauddin of Aligarh University who suggested, in July 1947, that Urdu should be the official language of Pakistan
Neither the Pakistan government or the Muslim League expressed an opinion, but did not have any reservations
However, this was contended by the Bengali Muslims
Pride in their own language and cultural traditions
the government’s plans ‘intended to limit’ the use of Urdu ‘to the business of the central and in inter-provincial communication’
The provinces would be left to choose their own language
A section of educated Bengali Muslims accepted Urdu, even at a provincial level - idea of a united Muslim Pakistan
Bengali public opinion was confused - large sections of educated Bengalis were in favour of Urdu
Even more delicate as the language cause was supported by the Calcutta press - ‘giving substance to the argument that the Hindus were at the back of the state language problem in Pakistan’
A.R Khan - Dhaka student language demands
The Tammaddun Majlis of Dhaka university demanded the recognition of Bengali as a state language besides Urdu
Cultural organisation - gathered together various committed people
Members within the Muslim League, students, Calcuttans
‘In the meanwhile, there had emerged a ‘student power’ in Dhaka, the seat of the provincial capital. Although little more than a district headquarter at that time, Dhaka had attracted a new generation of youth from the mufassil who were keen on receiving a college education’
Student mpower demonstrated during the lectionf of 1946
Had much power against the government -contact with the prime minister and officials
E.g the students could hold the members of the legislature and provincial cabinet hostages in the Assembly building
Demand of bilingualism was as far as the demands went at this stage - did not contemplate challenging the authority of the new Pakistani state
Nazimuddin, the provincial PM eventually conceded to these demands, but 4 years later in January 1952, Nazimuddin, PM, retracted from his promise
‘The preceding years had already seen much discontent in the province over political and economic grievances and the situation had come to such a pass that a minor incident could ignite a trouble’
The students protested and moved towards the Assembly building - the police opened fire
A.R Khan - Extent of connection between the Language Movement and Bengali nationalism?
Certainly a crucial milestone ‘in the growing demand for cultural self-determination’
‘Helped to fix their perceptions towards the immigrant north Indian and West Pakistani elite and led to the growth of an increased assertiveness among them about their cultural identity’
But suggesting a definite link is ‘perhaps overstretching the argument’
‘Scholars, and nationalists, in search of a myth to justify an event after it had occurred often takes recourse to such myth making, which ignores historical realities and the dynamics of a movement’
There is no evidence of a nationalist movement within the Language Movement - ambivalence and division
‘It needed the tragedy of February 1952 to unite Bengali public opinion on the state language question.
But then it was no longer necessary. The blood of the students had assured the place of Bengali in the Pakistani state. When eventually Bengali was recognised as a state llanguage along with Urdu by the constitution of 1956, no stir was caused by any one-Bengali or non-Bengali. The language issue was solved for the rest of Pakistan’s life’
Z.R Khan - conception of nationalism
‘Bengali Muslim nationalism is the product of many forces’
‘In this role of reinforcer of cultural values, nationalism draws upon different elements which make up the culture itself. Linguistic, religious, economic and political aspects are all used by nationalists to nurture, organise and direct nationalism for the fulfilment of elite ambitions and public aspirations to be elite and independent’
Impact of religion, language, tradition, economy and politics
‘What began as nonsecur nationalism’ eventually became ‘more religious-ethno-linguistic nationalism’ ‘under economic pressure from non-Muslims and later from non-Bengalis’
Pragmatism in Bengal nationalism
Z.R Khan - Muslim conversion in Bengal
History od Islam in Bengal
Missionaires were the most effective - converted the masses rather than the landed elite first
‘To a considerable extent, such interpretations of Islamic conversion in Bengal have coloured the perceptions of many opinion-building elites in the north and northwestern portions of India, Muslim and non-Muslim alike’
‘Instead of emphasising the Islamic concepts of equality, brotherhood and Islamic community, even Muslim elites have subscribed to such interpretations of the spread of Islam, disparaging the conversion process and downgrading the converts’
Z.R Khan - history of the Bengali langiage
‘There was good historical reason for the development among the Bengali Muslims of a seperate cultural and linguistic consciousness which significantly differentiated them from the Muslims of central and northwestern India’
The Bengali language and culture was emphasised due to limited resources from the Middle East and competition from Hindu Vaishnavism
‘For most Bengali Muslims, their language of thought and action received more adverse ideological interpretations than it deserved’
Found first expression at the beginning of the sixteenth century under the literary movement of Sayed Sultan
839 ‘During the heyday of Moghul rule in the 17th century the nationalistic identification of the Bengali Muslim elite with the Bengali Muslim masses weakened considerably’
Supporters of Urdu and persial culture - viewed Bengali as a language of Hindu elites
Neglect of Bengali scholarly literature, growth of folk literature
‘The net result was a widening gap between the elite and rural masses with regard to their commitment and contribution to the Bengali language’
‘Not until the middle of the 20th century did the elite lend its support to the linguistic nationalism that ultimately led to a political movement culminating in the emergence of Bangladesh’
Z.R Khan - religion and nationalism
‘Most ideologies undergo periods of decline or dormancy, followed by periods of revival and resurgence’
E.g Fairazi movement in 19th century Bengal - had great ‘socio political ramifications’
Continued by Dudu Miah, and later carried on by disciples of Syed Ahmed, Keramat Ali and also Fazlul Huq
‘All of these figures - whether religious or political - were instrumental in raising Bengali Muslim consciousness against exploitation by Hindus, the British and the West Pakistani industrial-entrepreneurial elites’
1906 - Formation of the Muslim League party in Dhaka
Fears of Hindu conspiracy to deprive Muslims of resources and opportunities
‘The 1911 revocaton of the partition of 1905, under pressure from the Congress Party, was seen by the Muslims of Bengal as further indication of a Hindu-British conspiracy to continue to deprive Muslims of opportunities for advancement’
was only when the Bengali Muslims were presented with a choice between India and Pakistan in the 1946 elections that they overwhelmingly voted for candidates fielded by the Muslim League party, while Muslim candidates from other parties (including the Krishak Proja) were soundly defeated
Drawn to the promise of a homeland for Islam
Demands for a United Bengal were not attractive at this moment
‘As later events were to show, Bengali Muslims wanted a political community guided by Islamic values and at the same time to preserve their regional rights as Bengalis’
Z.R Khan - The Ummah and Bengali Nationalism
Soon found that West Pakistanis and refugees from north central India dominated economic and political power
843 ‘for the time being, ummah became subsumed by regional and linguistic nationalism of Bengali Muslims’
Jinnah’s decision to adipt Urdu as the only national language
Fazul Haq, the chief minister of East Bengal, placed under house arrest
Replacing Bengali script with Arabic - further opposition - later concession of equal status but distrust already entrenched
Another effort to integrate Bengali Muslims into the greater Islamic um- mah of Pakistan during the Ayub regime also backfired.
The Bureau of National Reconstruction (BNR), which was set up to promote integration, organized cultural exchange programs between East and West Pakistan, offered grants to those Bengali literati and artists who agreed to advance the cause of integration through their works
844 ‘Meanwhile, in their attempt to win over a vocal section of the Bengal Muslim elite, the Ayub regime allocated resources that did help to create an entrepeneurial class of Bengal Muslims. The spill-over effects of these actions did contribute to the expansion of a fairly large Bengali lower-middle class’
Z.R Kan - distintegrative effect of these policies
Ironically, most of the policies designed to bring Bengali Muslims closer to West Pakistani Muslims proved disintegrative in practice. Viewed against the neglect of Bengali Muslim interests during the 1965 Indo- Pakistani war, when East Pakistan was left defenseless, and after the 1970 cyclone, which claimed about one million lives in East Pakistan, the earlier discrepancies, injustices, and suspected conspiracies of power wielders be- came even more pronounced in the eyes of the Bengali elites and sub- elites.
A genuine revolution of rising expectations had reached its apex in 1971 when the inaugural session of the national legislature, in which a Bengali nationalist party (the Awami League) held a majority of seats, was postponed by the Yahya Khan junta.
After the constitution came into force in 1972 Mujib found himself under increasing pressure from the Awami Ulema, a vocal and powerful section of Islamists within his party, for the reversal of secularist decisions that he and a few leaders around him had made on their own without widespread consultations’
‘In response to intense domestic pressures and without changing the constitutional emphasis on secularism, Mujib eventually reversed himself and made Bangladesh more Islamic than before’
Z.R Khan - Limits on Islam in Bengali nationalism
‘Constitutionally, culturally, and politically, Bangladesh nationalism seemed to overshadow Islamic fervor during the first two years of Bangladesh’s existence as an independent country’
Mujib’s hopes for secularism ending communal politics were even in the constitution ‘the principle of secularism’
Also due to the Hindus who had suffered the most in the civil war and stayed loyal to the Awami League, and Islamisation would have strained Bangladesh’s relations with India
Z.R Khan - Early Indian Reluctance & Electoral Perceptions (Pre-March 1971)
The Awami League's Early Query: In March 1971, the Awami League inquired about the prospect of Indian political asylum for activists or material assistance for a liberation movement in the event of a Pakistani attack.
Initial New Delhi Disinterest: India was highly reluctant to engage. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was consumed by domestic politics, having split the Congress Party in late 1969 to secure her grip on power and gear up for India's own general elections.
The Pro-Mujib Calculation: New Delhi initially watched Pakistan closely and believed Yahya Khan sincerely intended to transfer power to civilians. India welcomed the Awami League's electoral rise because its anti-communal, secular platform would ease Hindu migration into India. Furthermore, Bengalis did not share West Pakistan's obsession with Kashmir or threat perceptions regarding India, opening the door to reviving the trade links disrupted by the 1965 war.
The Fear of Secession: Despite favoring Mujib, India did not support outright secession. New Delhi feared a breakaway East wing could spark a cross-border "United Bengal" movement or allow pro-China communists to come to power. The expectation was that Mujib and Bhutto shared a common interest in cooperating to keep the military out of politics.
Z.R Khan - The crackdown and wait and watch policy
The Postponement Impasse: Following the National Assembly's postponement, Mujib's desperate requests for Indian help went unanswered. Indian missions in Islamabad and Dhaka sent reports suggesting a substantive constitutional agreement was at hand once Yahya arrived in Dhaka; consequently, Gandhi "thought it prudent to wait and watch".
Misjudging Operation Searchlight: When the first reports of military action trickled in, Gandhi and her key advisers incorrectly assumed that negotiations would resume after a "short, sharp show of strength". Given the massive popular support for the Awami League, Indian officials found it difficult to comprehend what the Pakistani army hoped to achieve structurally.
Sovereignty Restraints: India was exceptionally reluctant to intervene because Pakistan was a UN member state, and unilateral action would be globally condemned as illegal interference in another nation's internal affairs.
Z.R Khan - Diplomatic maneuvering
Domestic Pressure: The Indian government struggled to control the domestic public narrative. Indian political parties organized mass demonstrations and public meetings condemning the crackdown, and student cohorts directly petitioned Gandhi demanding full support for East Bengal.
The Border Encounter: Arriving at the border post, Awami League leaders Tajuddin Ahmad and Amirul Islam were met by Golok Majumdar, the senior Border Security Force (BSF) officer in West Bengal.
The Legal Dilemma of Recognition: The Bengali leadership realized that no foreign government would offer formal aid until an official government-in-exile was constituted to declare a war of liberation. India provided material assistance and tactical advice on how to organize a structure to harness popular support.
The Delhi Proclamation: In meetings with Tajuddin, Indira Gandhi offered strictly managed material support but completely avoided the issue of formal diplomatic recognition. While in Delhi, Tajuddin tasked Amirul Islam with drafting the formal proclamation of independence of Bangladesh, and Islam wrote to the Indian President demanding official recognition.
The Prerequisite for Recognition: Delhi debated the request but concluded recognition could only be granted if the liberation movement demonstrated a tangible ability to take on the Pakistani army and gain the upper hand in the civil war.
Z.R Khan - Strategic imperatives and border contagion
Defining India's Interests: By late March, Indian officials realized a united Pakistan was effectively dead. India’s primary strategic interests shifted to ensuring that the newly emerging state of Bangladesh started out with friendly feelings toward New Delhi, and ensuring that the regime that took over was not oriented toward China.
Political Discomfort: Public pressure for recognition mounted outside the government via state legislative assemblies. Most uncomfortable for Gandhi was the aggressive demand for recognition coming from her principal domestic political ally, the Communist Party of India.
Avoiding Direct Intervention: New Delhi remained eager to avoid direct military intervention, fearing recognition would create false hopes that the Indian Armed Forces would instantly march in. Main deterrents included:
The China Factor: Fears of Chinese intervention, which risked creating immediate military difficulties along the Sino-Indian border.
Logistical Overhaul: A military intervention in East Pakistan demanded an immense reorientation of operational plans, a major redeployment of forces into the eastern theater, and vast logistical and administrative propaganda.
Z.R Khan - Shaping the "People's War" & The Refugee Crisis
Uncoordinated BSF Support: Initially, Bengali soldiers—termed the Mukti Fauj (Liberation Army) by India—were supported locally by Indian BSF troops without any specific high-level orders from New Delhi.
Conventional Failure: By mid-April, New Delhi grew deeply concerned over the complete lack of military progress inside East Pakistan. The Bengali forces, lacking technological parity, were unable to hold their own against the air power and superior technology of the Pakistani offensives.
Shift to Guerrilla Warfare: India advised a total reorientation toward a guerrilla-style "people's war". India's fine-tuned strategy had two overarching goals: to assist the government of Bangladesh in rallying its population, and to raise, equip, and train East Bengal cadres for guerrilla operations inside their native land.
The Refugee Influx & National Security: The strategy was complicated by a mass refugee migration into Assam, West Bengal, and Tripura, which touched off public outrage and heightened domestic political pressure.
The Insurgency Threat: The influx posed severe security threats to Northeast India, an area already teeming with indigenous ethnic insurgent groups operating out of safe havens inside East Pakistan. Concurrently, the recent Maoist Naxalite uprising in West Bengal had hurled that state down a dangerous spiral of domestic violence.
The Diplomatic Offensive: Faced with internal border instability, Gandhi changed tactics. She addressed Pakistan directly and launched a frenetic international diplomatic campaign to persuade the global community to bring pressure to bear to "bring Pakistan to heel".
Ziring - Monopolisation by the West Pakistan elite
‘The West Pakistani elite, primarily Punjabi and Mohajir, but not exclusively so, monopolised government, administration, the armed forces, business, commerce, banking, intellectual life, essentially all the important features of society’
‘Bengali demands for a proper distribution of the country’s resources and opportunities went unheeded’
‘By 1952 the language question crystallised Bengali nationalism. The idea of Pakistan, if it meant the virtual subordination of Bengali culture and identity, was replaced by the idea of a separate autonomous state for the Bengali speakers’
Rich in cultural expression - literature, poetry, music
‘for the Bengalis, the Muslim League had come to symbolise the worst of tyrannies. The dream that was once Pakistan, had become a nightmare’
Sobhan - overall argument
This chapter thus argues that a sense of relative economic deprivation lay at the root of the Bengali nationalist movement’
Denied the political power to correct this deprivation
Conceptual issues?
Define nationalism as ‘defining a sense of national identity for a particular community of peoples associated with a traditionally bound place of residence’
See themselves as distinct from other communities
78 ‘The notion of deprivation derives from the capacity and capability of a national entity to command access to goods, services, productive assets, control over the means of production, policy making and allocative processes, compared to a community other than its own’
Sobhan - 1946 Cabinet Mission Plan
Cabinet Mission Plan - Bengali speaking Muslims claimed a seperate national identity - this would have included all of Bengal and Assam where Muslims were the majority
‘the plan sought to devolve power on three sub-states of North Western, Central and North Eastern India, with minimal powers for defence, foreign affairs, national communications and some financial affairs vesting with the Centre’
This was rejected by Congress - agreement reached to Partition India on the basis of Muslim majority areas forming Pakistan
‘Bengali nationalism as it found expression in the Pakistan movement, ultimatley had to define its national identity int erms fo the majority community, defined by religion, located in the territories of Eastern Bengal and Sylhet’
80 ‘up to to 1947 the peoples of East Bengal in general and the Muslim Bengalis felt deprived’
West Bengal was more developed
Within East Bengal, Hindus were the majority of landowners, capitalist industry was largely in the hand of the British, hindus controlled much of the little manufacturing industry there was. And the bureaucracy, teaching and legal professions
Sobhan - Ambitions of the Bengali Muslims
The Bengal Muslims sought to advance themselves within a polity where they were politically in command of the machinery of state. They expected to assume control over title to land, to use the machinery of state to advance themselves by and in education’
Therefore ‘the Pakistan movement provided a coalition of expediency to capture local if not national power’
State of East Bengal was shared with Muslims of North Western INdia and refugees from minority provinces - had very different ideas and perspectives
Of all the divergent social forces which constituted Pakistan, the Bengalis had the most ambitious expectations because they remained perhaps the most deprived of the Muslims in India’
Bengali economists argued that the benefits of administration and military mostly went to West Pakistan, so East Pakistan should receive greater benefits in other respects’
Sobhan - Economic disparities
‘The available evidence suggests that at the partition of India the two wings of Pakistan inherited economies with not significantly disparate levels of development. Both regions had a negligible industrial base. West Pakistan however inherited a better developed infrastructure in the way of raods, irrigation faculties and power
1967-70 West Pakistan was 57.4% of Pakistan’s GDP
Higher rate of growth - higher rates of investment and diversification of industry
East Pakistan remained largely dependent on Jute, while ‘West Pakistan diversified itself away from a dependence on raw cotton, yarn and cotton piece goods’
These differences created gaps in the standard of living - e.g basic staples of rice consumed in East Pakistan vs. wheat in West Pakistan
‘The most severe disparities wee registered in the consumption of manufactured goods’
Cloth, paper, cigarettes, matchs, energy
Inequal access to public services
Hospitals, maternity and child wielfare centres, hospital beds, the numbers of doctors
Much better physical infrastructure - roads, wailway routes, radios, moter vehicles - this dispiaruty continued to widen
‘Bengalis came to believe that West Pakistanis ate better, were better clothed, had superior health care and education, lived in a more developed environment with superior transport, telecommunications and power services’
Attributed this the the policies of the Pakistani state
East Pakistan also had much higher agricultural potential % of all expenditure
Due to defence being located in West Pakistan - also investment in power, telecommunications and roads
‘It provided direct and indirect employment mostly to West Pakistanis and stimulated private economic activity by generating a demand for goods and services in the West wing economy’
Sobhan - Allocative biases
At the root of the political conflict - sense that East Pakistan did not receive a fair amount of public expenditure
Were discussed during the formulation of the Second Five Year Plan for Pakistan for 1960-65
Emphasised the need for regional investment but did not acknowledge the problem of imbalance
Sobhan - Awareness in the public sphere
Increasingly militant student movements ‘gave a political potency to the issue of regional disparity’
First Finance Commission Dec 1961 organised to discuss regional disparities
Argued for using a population ratio
Continued through the central government
Continued vt the Second and Third Finance Commissions
108 ‘The framing of the Third Five Year Plan in 1965 came at a time when the public debate, reinforced by the constitutional commitment and the report of two finance commissions, had brought the issue of regional allocations to the centre of debate around the plan’
Agreed to put more investment but did not follow through
‘Disparity within the plan period grew from 45.4% in 1964-5 to 61.5% in 1969-70’
‘by the mid 1960s no session of Parliament went by without disparity being at stage centre’
Awami League’s Six Point programme
Became the focus of the 1969 election programme
‘The failure of the Third Plan to reduce regional disparities meant that the issue of regional imbalance beca
Much bigger private sector in West Pakistan - between 1950-70 77% of development expenditure in the private sector was located in West Pakistan - due to public expenditure and lack of inheritng a business tradition - argued that the state should have played a bigger role, played a ;more activist role in promoting private entrepreneurship in the late 1950s’
Soham - Political representative grievances
‘Disparities between East and West Pakistan would have been more tolerable had the machinery of state been more representative in its composition’
Representative institutions were compromised
‘Impacted most adversely on the Bengalis who constituted the demographic and voting majority in Pakistan’
Power therefore exercised by the central bureaucracy and armed forces
Dominated by west Pakistani
Regimes of Ayub and Yahya Khan totally ecluded Bengalis from the centre of power
Bengalis tried to reach agreement on the 6 piubts abd show it was workable but brother Bhutto or Yahya Khan or advisories showed much cooperation
Only really important meetings were in March 1971, but by then it was too late
Pakistani leadership ‘had decided thst the issue of Bengali nationalism would be settled by blood and fire and not by political negotiations’
148 ‘between 1969 and 1971 what had traditionally been a movement dominated by the urban educated middle class was transformed inot a mass movement’
1968/9 - urban working class joined students in street - working class consciousness
1969-71 election campaign of Awami League spread awareness to every household
Alavi - Marxist approach
Marxist approach of analysing class forces and the superstructures of political and economic administrations
Pakistan - dominant position of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy in the state - but still needed politicians to fulfill a complementary role
By 1962, the politicians were put to work again in a parody of democratic politics under Ayub Khan’s system of ‘Basic Democracy’ - ended with his fall in 1969, but the bureaucratic-military oligarchy remained dominant
President Yahya Khan promised restoration of ‘constitutional government’ subject to his own veto - election of December 1970 ended in the political crisis which culminated in the secession of Bangladesh
Alavi - significance of the Language Movement
‘Although the focus of the Movement was on the issue of national language, an issue which by its nature was closest to the hearts of students and the educated lower middle class, it was nevertheless instrumental in creating a radical consciousness which extended beyond the immediate interests of those who voiced the slogans of the language movement and gave it leadership’
With an urban population of only 5 per cent of the total population, the educated middle class of Bengal is drawn overwhelmingly from villages and maintains close contact with the rural society
Alavi - Two traditions within the Bengali movement
Two traditions within the Bengali movement
Those who had aspirations to rise in the bureaucracy or the newly growing business community
The majority of the Awami League
Rural populist tradition - long standing grievances of the poor peasantry
Also a communist tradition as the Communist Party was illegal - concentrated in the Awami League
Later formed the National Awami Party - but populist base amongst the rural people remained with the Awami League
‘These two traditions were intertwined, but they remained distinct’
Sheikh Mujib bridged the gap between the elitist leadership of the Awami League and its populist mass base
Punjabi bureaucratic elite gradually yielded to some of the movement’s demands for a fair share of jobs and promotion - by the late 1960s much of East Benga’s provincial administration was almost wholly staffed by Bengali civil servants at all levels
Late 50s - demand for fair and adequate share of economic resources
East Bengali economists - detailed studies of exploitation and argued for a radical realignment of economic policies
Replaced the issue of the language as the principal issue in the Bengali movement
There was also a progressive radicalisation of the movement and socialist ideas began to gain ground
Alavi - Attempts to create a Bengali bourgeoise
Ayub Khan believed creating a Bengali bourgeoise would provide him with a political base in the province and counter the influence of socalist ideas - supported by the Pakistani bourgeoise
Idea of ‘contractors’ and ‘contactors’
Contactors - educated Bengalis with bureaucratic connections
Cash value - could be used by West Pakistani businessmen
Lived expensively, and few contributed to capital accumulation
‘This process transferred money into the pockets of a parasitic group of people, at the expense of the ordinary consumer who ultimately paid for their corruption in the forms of inflated prices’
Contractors - small business men awared consruction contracts at deliberately inflated rates - encouraged to become industrialists and awarded generous loans
‘The attitude of the newly created nucleus of the Bengali bourgeoisie towards the politics of Bengali nationalism was one of qualified support. They profited greatly from the pressures created by that politics. But, at the same time, they were apprehensive because of its leftward gravitation’
Some who supported right-wing movements and collaborated with the oligarchy - e.g after the fall of the Ayub Khan, threats of a revolutionary movement - many transferred their investments to Pakistan or abroad
‘While they supported a movement for regional autonomy and diversion of a larger share of economic resources to East Bengal, they also looked upon the bureaucratic-military oligarchy, which is based in West Pakistan, as a bulwark for the defence and protection of their own class interests; they therefore valued the link with West Pakistan’
Cannot explain the movement by attributing it to the aspirations of the Bengali bourgeoise - assessing the class basis, one must take into account for the fact that it existed and flourished long before the formation of the Bengali bourgeoisie
Alavi - Success of the Awami League in the December 1970 election
Guaranteed by the new support of the rural elite
Lineages of big farmers - wealth from moneylending gave them access to the bureaucracy - were able to further consolidate their local political power
‘These locally powerful rich farmers aligned with the elitists of the Awami League; the latter were after all their sons who had been given a university education and aspired to big jobs in the bureaucracy’
But they were apprehensive about the populist political base - didn’t wish to be overhwlemed by radicalism and destabilise the social order
‘It is this ambivalence which explains the anxiety of Sheikh Mujib to continue negotiations with General Yahya Khan in the first few weeks of March 1971 for autonomy within Pakistan, not withstanding the fact that, as a consequence of an effective general strike in East Bengal he was already in de facto control of state power in the provicel
Pakistan army was numerically weak and was unprepared for the action which it later launched against the people in East Bengal
This was testified to by Tajuddin Ahmed, the Prime Minister of the Bangladesh Provisional Government who, on the eve of his return to liberated Dacca, told newsmen that ‘The original demand for autonomy within the framework of Pakistan had been raised by the Awami League as a whole but the demand for independence grew when Pakistan not only refused to grant autonomy but also unleashed a reign of terror on the people of East Bengal.’
Alavi - The making of Bangladesh
The organization and strength of the armed resistence was not yet strong enough to overthrow the Pakistani army; but it was growing. Moreover the position of the Pakistani army was reaching a point of crisis because the weak economy of West Pakistan could not sustain the long military campaign.
There was an economic crisis in West Pakistan and outbursts of discontent. That opened up new prospects for the advance of the liberation forces in Bengal.
It was precisely at that moment that the Indians chose to intervene, to forestall the liberation of Bangladesh by popular forces and to install the Awami League elitist leadership in power.