moral philosophy mixed

anti-realism, moral

The theory that claims that there are no moral properties. Error theory and moral non-cognitivism are both anti-realist.

applied ethics

The branch of ethics concerned with the application of normative ethical theories to particular issues, such as lying or stealing.

arête

An 'excellence', or more specifically, a 'virtue' - a quality that aids the fulfilment of a thing's ergon (Aristotle).

attitude

A mental state regarding how the world is or should be. A cognitive attitude, e.g. belief, has a mind-to-world direction of fit. A non-cognitive attitude, e.g. desire, has a world-to-mind direction of fit.

belief

Affirmation of, or conviction regarding, the truth of a proposition. E.g. 'I believe that the grass is green.'

Categorical Imperative

Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.' (Kant)

character

A person's habitual dispositions regarding what they feel, how they think, how they react, the choices they make, and the actions they perform, under different circumstances.

character trait

An attribute that is exhibited by an individual as a matter of habit, e.g. honesty or being bad-tempered.

choice

What we decide upon as a result of deliberation, typically giving rise to voluntary action. Deliberate desire regarding something that is in one's power (Aristotle).

cognitivism

A cognitivist account of ethical language argues that moral judgements express beliefs, can be true or false and aim to describe the world. So 'lying is wrong' expresses the belief that lying is wrong, and is either true or false.

conscience

An inner awareness, faculty, intuition or judgement that assists in distinguishing right from wrong.

consequentialism, act

The theory that actions are morally right or wrong depending on their consequences and nothing else. An act is right if it maximises what is good.

contradiction in conception

In Kantian ethics, the test for whether we can will a maxim to become universal law can be failed if it would somehow be self-contradictory for everyone to act on that maxim.

contradiction in will

In Kantian ethics, the test for whether we can will a maxim to become universal law can be failed if, although the maxim is not self-contradictory, we cannot rationally will it.

deontology

The study of what one must do (deon (Greek) means 'one must'). Deontology claims that actions are right or wrong in themselves, not depending on their consequences. We have moral duties to do things which it is right to do and moral duties not to do things which it is wrong to do.

desirable

1) Worthy of being desired. 2) Capable of being desired.

desire

A state of mind that motivates a person to act in such a way as to satisfy the desire, e.g. if a person desires a cup of tea, they are motivated to make and drink a cup of tea

direction of fit

The direction of the relation between mind and world. In one direction, the mind 'fits' the world, as in belief. We change our beliefs to fit the facts. In the other direction, the world 'fits' the mind, as in desire. We act on our desires to change the world to satisfy our desires.

doctrine of the mean

Aristotle's claim that virtue requires us to feel, choose and act in an 'intermediate' way, neither 'too much' nor 'too little', but 'to feel [passions] at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way'.

duties, general/specific

Duties are obligations we have towards someone or something. General duties are those we have towards anyone, e.g. do not murder, help people in need. Specific duties are those we have because of our particular personal or social relationships, e.g. to keep one's promises or to provide for one's children.

duties, perfect/imperfect

Perfect duties are those we must always fulfil and have no choice over when or how (e.g. do not kill). Imperfect duties are cases in which we have some choice in how we fulfil the obligation (e.g. giving to charity). No specific person can demand that we fulfil an imperfect duty towards them.

emotivism

The theory that claims that moral judgements express a feeling or non-cognitive attitude, typically approval or disapproval, and aim to influence the feelings and actions of others.

end

What an action seeks to achieve or secure, its aim or purpose.

end, final

An end that we desire for its own sake, we can't give some further purpose for why we seek it.

ergon

'Function' or 'characteristic activity' of something, e.g. the ergon of a knife is to cut, the ergon of an eye is to see.

error theory

The theory that moral judgements make claims about objective moral properties, but that no such properties exist. Thus moral judgements are cognitive, but are all false. Moral language, as we mean to use it, rests on a mistake.

ethics

The branch of philosophy concerned with the evaluation of human conduct, including theories about which actions are right or wrong (normative ethics) and the meaning of moral language (metaethics).

eudaimonia

Often translated as 'happiness', but better understood as 'living well and faring well'. According to Aristotle, eudaimonia is not subjective and is not a psychological state, but an objective quality of someone's life as a whole. It is the final end for human beings.

experience machine

Nozick's thought experiment concerning a virtual reality machine which someone plugs into for life. The machine will create the experience of a very happy life, but Nozick argues that we value being in touch with reality more, so we won't choose to plug in.

faculty

A mental capacity or ability, such as sight, the ability to feel fear, and reason.

felicific calculus

In Bentham's ethics, the means of calculating pleasures and pains caused by an action and adding them up on a single scale. The total amount of happiness produced is the sum total of everyone's pleasures minus the sum total of everyone's pains.

first principles

Basic or foundational propositions in an area of knowledge or theory that are not deducible from other propositions.

formula of humanity

A version of the Categorical Imperative: 'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end' (Kant).

function argument

Aristotle's argument that the human good (eudaimonia) will be achieved by performing our characteristic activity (ergon) well. Traits that enable us to fulfil our ergon, which is rational activity, are virtues (arête).

Golden Rule

The moral guideline that says 'do unto others as you would have them do unto you'.

good

In ethics, what is good provides a standard of evaluation and what we should aim at in our actions and lives.

hedonic calculus

see felicific calculus

hedonism

The claim that pleasure is happiness and the only good.

Hume's 'fork'

We can have knowledge of just two sorts of claim: the relations between ideas and matters of fact.

imperative

A command or order. A hypothetical imperative is a statement about what you ought to do, on the assumption of some desire or goal, e.g. if you want to pass your exam, you ought to study hard. A categorical imperative is a statement about what you ought to do, without regard to what you want.

integrity

Acting on and living by the values that you endorse.

intention

A mental state that expresses a person's choice. It specifies the action they choose and often their reason or end in acting.

intuitionism

The theory that some moral judgements are self-evident, i.e. their truth can be known just by rational reflection upon the judgement itself. Moral intuitions are a type of synthetic a priori knowledge.

involuntary

According to Aristotle, an act is involuntary if it is either forced or done from ignorance that is not culpable (especially if it is regretted once the ignorance is removed).

is-ought gap

Hume's claim that judgments about what ought to be the case are very different from judgments about what is the case, and cannot be deduced from them. The claim is made as an objection to moral cognitivism.

justice

The principle that each person receives their 'due'. Aristotle distinguishes between wide and narrow senses. In the wide sense, anything legal is just, and anything illegal is unjust. In the narrow sense, justice is fairness.

justice in distribution

Justice concerning who gets which goods and other resources.

justice in rectification

Justice concerning how to correct an injustice.

maxim

A personal principle that guides our decisions, e.g. 'to get a good education'.

meaning, descriptive

The aspect of the meaning of a sentence that asserts something about the world and can be evaluated as true or false.

meaning, emotive

The aspect of the meaning of a sentence that expresses or evokes an emotion.

meaning, prescriptive

The aspect of the meaning of a sentence that acts like a command or imperative. For example, the prescriptive meaning of 'lying is wrong' might be 'do not lie'.

means

What is done to achieve an end. Instrumental means are actions done to achieve some further, independent end, e.g. chopping vegetables in order to eat them. Constitutive means are those which are done as achieving the end, e.g. relaxing on the beach is a way of having a good holiday.

metaethics

The philosophical study of what morality is, enquiring into the meaning of moral language, the metaphysics of moral values, the epistemology of moral judgements, and the nature of moral attitudes.

mind-dependent

Depending on a mind for existence or definition, e.g. ideas are mind-dependent.

mind-independent

Not depending on a mind for existence or definition. According to realism in perception, physical objects are mind-independent; according to moral realism, moral properties are mind-independent (in some important way).

morality

The rules, ideals and expectations governing fundamental aspects of human conduct. It concerns right and wrong, good and bad, in human action and character.

motive

A mental state or consideration that inclines someone to act in a certain way. Someone's motive could be a reason for acting, an end, or a desire.

naturalism, moral

A form of moral realism that claims that moral properties are natural properties. According to reductive naturalism, moral properties are identical with certain properties that can be identified through sense experience and science, e.g. the claim that goodness is happiness understood as pleasure (a psychological property). According to non-reductive naturalism, moral properties are natural - related to human nature - but not a kind of property that science can investigate, e.g. the good life is eudaimonia (a complex psychological, rational and normative property).

naturalistic fallacy

According to Moore, the mistake of identifying moral good with any natural property.

nihilism

The view that there are no moral values.

non-cognitivism

The theory that claims that moral judgements express non-cognitive attitudes. Moral judgements do not make claims about reality and are not true or false (they are not fact-stating).

non-naturalism, moral

A form of moral realism that claims that moral properties are not natural properties.

non-voluntary

According to Aristotle, an action is non-voluntary if it is done from ignorance and if the ignorance is lifted, the agent does not regret the action.

normative ethics

The branch of ethics concerned with developing theories concerning what (e.g. which actions, which character traits, which intentions) is right or wrong, good or bad.

open question argument

Moore's argument that identifying the property 'good' with any other property is never correct because whether that property is, in fact, good is an open question (logically, it can receive a yes or no answer), whereas whether good is good is not an open question.

partiality

Favouring some people, e.g. family and friends, over others

passions

In Aristotle, bodily appetites (for food, drink, sex, etc.), emotions, desires, and any feelings accompanied by pleasure or pain.

permissible

An action that is neither morally forbidden nor required (obligatory).

pleasures, higher and lower

According to Mill, one pleasure is higher than another if almost everyone who is 'competently acquainted' with both prefers one over the other. Higher pleasures include thought, feeling and imagination, while lower pleasures involve the body and senses.

practical ethics

see applied ethics.

practical reason

Reasons and reasoning concerned with what we can change and making good choices.

practical wisdom

(phronesis) An intellectual virtue of practical reason, 'a true and reasoned state or capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man' (Aristotle). It involves knowledge of what is good or bad in general and what is good in a particular situation, and the abilities to deliberate well and act on that deliberation.

prescriptivism

The non-cognitive theory that moral judgements are prescriptive, that is, moral judgements provide commands and recommendations about how to act.

property, moral

An attribute or characteristic of an object that is ethically normative, e.g. goodness or being a virtue.

property, natural/non-natural

Natural properties are those that we can identify through sense experience and science. Non-natural properties cannot be analysed in terms of or reduced to natural properties.

queerness, argument from

Mackie's argument that moral properties, understood as non-natural properties, are (metaphysically and epistemologically) puzzling and improbable, which is a reason to believe they do not exist.

realism, moral

The theory that claims that moral judgements are made true or false by objective moral properties that exist and are mind-independent (in some sense).

relativism

The theory that some area of discourse, e.g. concerning truth, knowledge or morality, is 'relative to' a society or person. According to relativism, a proposition may be true 'for' one person but not another; or an action may be morally right in one society but not another.

responsibility, moral

Accountability for the actions one performs and the consequences they bring about, for which a moral agent can be justly praised or blamed. Moral responsibility is commonly held to require the agent's freedom to have done otherwise.

right reason

(orthos logos) In Aristotle, the standard for judging whether a character trait or an action conforms to the mean. Virtues and right actions are in accordance with 'right reason'.

rights

Justified moral demands regarding how other people may treat us, especially the freedoms (e.g. from harm) or benefits (e.g. education) they ought to provide. We are entitled to our rights in the sense that others have a moral obligation to respect them.

secondary principles

In Mill, moral 'rules of thumb' that, if followed, generally produce happiness, e.g. 'tell the truth'. Mill argues that we have learned secondary principles through human history, through trial and error.

sentience

The ability to feel, perceive, or experience subjectively, in particular the capacity to experience pleasure and pain.

simulated killing

The dramatisation of killing within a fictional context, e.g. in video games, films and plays. It is not merely the description of a killing, as in a novel, but a fictional enactment of killing that the audience or gamer can see and hear.

skill analogy

The analogy between virtues and practical skills. In Aristotle, virtues are said to be like practical skills because we learn both through practice (what we do), not (just) theory; and we gain an expertise that is sensitive to individual situations.

soul

In Aristotle, that part of the person that relates to mind and life. According to Aristotle, the soul has three parts - a part relating to being alive, a part characterised by desires and emotions that are responsive to reason, and rational intellect.

speciesism

Unfair discrimination on the basis of what species something belongs to.

stealing

Taking someone else's property with no intention of returning it and without their permission (or without the legal right to do so).

subjectivism

The theory that moral judgements assert or report approval or disapproval, e.g. 'Murder is wrong' means 'Most people disapprove of murder'.

subjectivism, speaker

The theory that moral judgements assert the approval or disapproval of the speaker, e.g. 'Murder is wrong' means 'I disapprove of X'. Therefore, whether a moral judgement is true or false depends on the attitudes of the speaker.

theoretical reason

Reasons and reasoning concerned with what we can't change and what is true.

tyranny of the majority

The unjust exercise of power by a majority of people over a minority who have different values or desires, e.g. outlawing a minority religion because most people want it outlawed.

universalise

To apply to everything/everyone.

utilitarianism

The theory that only happiness is good, and the right act (or rule) is that act (or rule) that maximises happiness.

utilitarianism, act

The theory that only happiness is good, and the right act is that act that maximises happiness. Hedonist act utilitarianism understands happiness in terms of the balance of pleasure over pain.

utilitarianism, preference

The theory that we should maximise happiness, which is understood not in terms of pleasure and pain, but in terms of the satisfaction of people's preferences.

utilitarianism, rule

The theory that only happiness is good, and the right act is that act that complies with those rules which, if everybody followed them, would lead to the greatest happiness (compared to any other set of rules).

utility

The property of an object or action in virtue of which it tends to produce happiness.

utility, principle of

The defining principle of act utilitarianism: 'that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question' (Bentham).