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procedural information
knowledge about how to preform a task or skill, often acquired through practice and becoming almost automatic
different from declarative knowledge
skill learning three stages
1. cognitive
2. associative
3. automaticity
cognitive
declarative knowledge
commit facts to memory
rehearse
requires attention
associative
strengthens connection that lead to desired result, get rid of actions that lead to errors
feedback is important
automaticity
fast, executed with less attention
declarative knowledge is less important
less verbalization
feedback is less important
when aiming for the same performance level, consistent practice is still needed
power law of practice
improvement follows a power law:
skill increases with more practice
but, the rate of improvement diminishes with time
ACT-R
adaptive control of thoughts: separates procedural from declarative knowledge
procedural knowledge is represented in the form of production (if-then statements: if (condition) then (action))
proceduralization: take declarative knowledge and turn into products
(declarative knowledge of conditions A, declarative knowledge of action B; product: if condition A then perform action B)
composition: after you practice, you string those all together; take several productions and join them together into one (if condition A then, preform action B, then preform action C)
ACT vs modern view
ACT is one way to conceptualize motor skill development, but this is a bit old view --> modern view: we have multiple systems that are operating in parallel, we have the system that is more of a declarative system and another system that's more important for procedural learning, happening at the same time
fast learning system
Explicit/declarative, conscious, goal-directed, effortful, flexible
slow learning system
implicit/procedural
unconscious
automatic
inflexible
serial reaction time task (SRTT) evidence
a sequence of lights appear on a screen, press the corresponding key as fast as you can
explicit training: there's a pattern, think about that
implicit training: just react asap
performance on learning sequences the same irrespective training type
slow (implicit) learning system consciously learns patterns in the background, even without being aware of them
our brains can pick up unconsciously, people are learning the pattern (even if they are not aware of it)
plus-maze evidence from rats
train (find reward)
test (from opposite location)
route learning: implicit skill
tested either early on or after extended training:
early on in the learning: driven by place learning (explicit skill) "fast" learning, hippocampus
extended learning: driven by route learning (implicit skill) "slow" learning, basal ganglia
chain response
feedback from one movement triggers the next, start the second step after the first step is completed --> WRONG
anticipatory movements during typing
motor program evidence
not response chaining (too fast)
fast and doesn't require feedback
hierarchical structure: abstract high level, specific low level
composed of subprograms (less abstract representations of movement sub-parts)(much slower when have to say more words because you need to load those sub-programs before you begin)
ex: signatures: using different muscles - but you have your signature looks basically the same (evidence for abstract motor programs AND hierarchical representations)
hierarchical representation (finger tapping experiment)
empirical evidence for hierarchial representation:
rosenbaum experiment
make a movement sequence (Lm, Rm, Lm, Li, Ri, Li, Ri)(m=middle finger)(i=index finger)
it should take you long time to press the first one (Lm) (because you have to travel quite far down) but not a long time to press the next one (because you don’t have to travel as far)(but going from Lm to Li will take some time because you have a long ways to travel (in the hieracharical structure))
rt time shows this (slow for the first button press then fast for the second, a but slower for the 3rd, etc)
our motor programs are organized hierarchially
properties of language
communicative
symbolic - map symbols onto meaning
mostly arbitrary (same words in other language often do not resemble each other
some exceptions: like kiki vs bouba example)
generative - can come up with infinite new sentences
dynamic - constantly evolving (eg slang)
structured (hierarchical)
kiki vs bouba example
a psychological experiment demonstrating how people assign sounds to shapes, where 'kiki' is usually associated with a spiky shape and 'bouba' with a round shape,
across many different languages these results held true, this is because “kiki” is a very sharp sounding thing while “bouba” is a round sounding thing which matches with the physical appearances that people assign them to (out of the 2 given shapes) however depending on the language these results are not as clear cut
language levels
sentence (largest)
phrase
word
morpheme
phoneme (smallest)
phoneme
smallest unit of sound used to distinguish words in a given language ("atoms" of sound)
different phoneme is different languages
ie stranger: strynj + er
morpheme
smallest unit of meaning
syntax
a set of rules that determine the grouping and arrangement of words in phrases in sentences
ambiguity
words alone aren't enough to convey meaning
lexical ambiguity
same words has 2 or more meanings
syntactic ambiguity
words can be grouped into more than one phrase structure
phrase structure
same words can sometimes be grouped into phrases differently which changes meaning
context effects in lexical access
how do we access the meaning of a word when we encounter it in a sentence?
many words have more than one meaning, but we don't usually get confused when we encounter them in context
swinney priming experiment (important come back to)
initially we access all possible meanings of a word (ANT, SPY),but very quickly (within a second) we narrow down the meaning and select the context-relevant one (ANT)
interaction of syntax and semantics
Active voice easier than passive voice sentences for semantically reversible sentences,
but not semantically irreversible sentences, suggests interaction of syntax & semantics
during comprehension
broca's aphasia
left frontal lobe
production difficulty
slow, halting speech (comprehension is intact)
ie what happened to you? - "stroke...sunday...hospital...bad"
wernicke's aphasia
left temporal lobe
comprehension difficulties
ie What happened to you? - "Boy, I'm sweating, I'm awful nervous, you know, once in a while I
get up, I can't mention the tarripoi, a month ago, quite ~~"
Fluent but make no sense
the neutral pathway for repeating a heard word
auditory cortex (receives incoming sound) to wernicke's area (processes MEANING of the received sound (comprehension)) to broca's area (converts the meaningful sound to a code for muscular movement required for speech production) to motor cortex (receives output from broca's area and initiates the muscular movement (mouth, lips, tongue))
the problem of language acquisition
language is complex:
need to learn how to distinguish language sounds from other sounds; need to break those sounds into phonemes; need to take phonemes, morphemes, and group them into words; need to figure out what the words actually mean; need to learn - how to combine words correct grammar
limited grammatical feedback when learning
adults typically do not correct grammar but do correct meaning; most adults don't say things like "No that's incorrect grammar" instead they might correct only when the meaning is wrong
linguistic universals
even when language is complex and there's limited feedback, we can still acquire language, general principles & innate
learning phenomes
phenome (smallest unit of language)
in 1st year infants can discriminate all phonemes from all languages
gradually they lose discriminations that are not important to their own language (narrowing)
motherese
infant-directed speech
when talking to infants (higher pitch, shorter sentences (slow rate), speak clearly and distinctly (exaggerated intonations))
exaggerated features help children understand boundaries between words or phrases
major stages of language development in children
1. holophrastic stage
2. telegraphic stage
3. learning syntax/rules/generalization
holophrastic stage
one word
no syntax yet
need context (gestures, affect) to understand
under/overgeneralization for first ~75 words
ie "dog" --> squirrels, rabbits, cats, etc
"dog" --> only to their poodle
telegraphic stage
two-words
begins to use correct use of word order (simple)
ie subject-action, action-object
"mommy go" "eat chocolate)
can convey lots of information succinctly
learning syntax/rules/generalization
start learning syntactic/grammar rules
examples: past tense, nonsense words
past tense- even if incorrect at first
ie "daddy goed" instead of "daddy went"
learning rules: past tense
U-shaped curve
at the beginning, children often use irregular past tense correctly (ie saying "did" instead of "doed")
then as they start to learn grammar rules, like adding '-ed' for the past tense they begin to overgeneralize ("saying "runned" instead of "ran")
finally they start to relearn the correct irregular forms as they build a more complete understanding of both the rules and the exception ---> curve goes back up
learning rules: nonsense words
learn general rules and apply them to new words (even if nonreal)
ie adding -s for plurals (eg "wug" to "wugs")
adding -ed for past tense "eg "rick" to "ricked")
language learning is generative: children create new forms based on rules they learned (not just imitating)
learning word meaning
children know massive amounts of words at a young age
will use clues from input from part/whole relationships (ie "this is a rabbit; these are his ears" --> "his" is a cue that the ears belong to the rabbit)
bias that new words refer to shape dimension (we have bias toward shape)
critical period effects
coptimal time window for language acquisition
people who learn languages after age 10-12 rarely acquire native fluency (regardless of how long they have lived in the country)
social isolation cases (children who were neglected (no social interaction unit 10) missed early exposure to language; even after rehabilitation couldn't reach native fluency)
this idea applies to both 2nd language and sign language
you can speak however you will never reach the proficiency as a native
problem
a problem consists of some initial state in which a person begins and a goal state that is to be attained, plus a non-obvious way of getting from the first to the second
well-structured/defined
clearly specified components
completely specified starting condition, goal state, and methods for achieving the goal (ie geometry proof)
ill-structured/defined
solvers need to define themselves
some aspects are not completely specified (eg writing the best novel, choosing a career, partner)
stages in problem-solving
form a representation, construct a (planning), execution (plan), checking/evaluation
problem representation
for many problems the repterm-51resentation many make it easier or harder to solve
*algebra problems easier as equations
*geometry problems easier graphically
*decision problems easier when laid out in a grid
problem space
whole range of possible states and operators (actions that move between states) only some of which will lead to the goal state
representation: nine dot problem
there are 9 dots arranged in a square below, using no more than 4 lines connect all dots without lifting your pencil
initial & goats states well defined
operators: 4 connected lines
presentation: graphical layout
problem space: all possible lines you can draw
go outside the imaginary box formed by the dots (most people assume they have to stay within the square but that's not actually a rule here)
shows the people often struggle with creating a good problem representation
removing constraints
representation: monk problem
text-based difficult
people imagine a single monk walking up & down the mountain --> misleading (this representation does not help solving the problem)
solution: modifying representation (imagine 2 monks instead of 1; who leave at the same time from different location at some point they must meet)
isomorph
isomorphic problems are equivalent underneath the underlying structure, even though the surface representation is different
ie 2 players, each draw 1 card at a time, first player to hold 3 cards sum to 15 wins can also think of this Sadako or tik tac toe
analogies
when we face a new problem, we often try to retrieve a similar problem we've solved in the past
people usually focus on surface similarities rather than deep similarities
duncker's ray problem
Real-world solution: use sub-lethal doses coming in from different directions.
10-20% of subjects came up with this spontaneously.
Would an analogy (isomorphic problem) help?
Gick & Holyoak (1980) first presented subjects with a story about a general (military problem)
participants were either asked to solve ray problem alone or after reading military problem (analog)
different surface, but similar deep structure
even though both problems have similar deep structures, participants couldn't connect the military ray when no hint was given (analogy, no hint 30%)
only after hint is given ("can you use the military problem to help you solve the ray problem") participants could connect --> 80%
top-down preconceptions
when we look at a new problem we tend to encode it in a way consistent with LTM
hinderance in problem solving: functional fixedness
we tend to assume that we can only use an object in a particular way
candle problem
can you fix and light a candle on the wall so the wax won't drip on the table below?
tacks outside or inside the box?
same materials, same goals but arranged differently
43% solved when tacks in box while 100% solves when tacks are loose
maier's 2 rope problem
2 ropes attached to the ceiling and the participants need to tie to the 2 ropes, there are other objects in the room
functional fixedness may make you think that the pliers function is only grabbing however if you think of pliers as creating a pendulum, rather than grabbing device, you can do the task
trains meeting problem
trains moving in opposite directions, bird flying from on train to another
trapped by familiar prespective
most people take perspective of the bird
some might use advanced mathmatics of infinite series and limits
but just notice how long the trains will travel (1 hr)
bird flying at 100 miles/hour, travels 100 miles
adopting the wrong frame makes it really hard to solve
stuck in set
a habit formed by solving earlier problems the same way
once we find a method that works, we tend to keep using it, even when simpler solutions exist
luchins water jar problem
This is a task used to study problem-solving. It's results demonstrated how people have a tendency to repeat solutions that worked in previous situations, even if a more efficient way is available (this is called a mental set)
first 5 the solution is the same however the 6th one give them an easier solution but people will be set in the same way they previously solved the problems; stuck in set
algorithms
completely specified sequence of steps guaranteed to produce answers
usually guaranteed to produce correct answer
but may be slower or laborious
heuristic
short cut/"rule of thumb"
never guaranteed to produce correct answer
but usually quick and easy
think-aloud protocol
people try different heuristics and short-cuts to solve things
try a lot of different things and then you might find something that seems like it might work, that becomes a heuristic and try all the different things that use that heuristic
people tend to adopt and start trying out differnet little rules of thumb, like finding a root word that in the scrambled word and trying those out, that’s what’s called a heuristic
protocols do not reflect all of the reasons why a person tried a specific configuration
difference reduction
a problem-solving method that involves reducing the difference between the present situation and the desired one
at any point, select the operators that move you closer to the goal state: is new state more similar to goal?
sometimes you have to take a detour in order to be more efficient in solving a problem
description on how peoople solve things
means-end analysis
first identify the largest difference between current and goal state
set a subgoal (that reduces that difference)
find and apply an operator to reduce the difference
if the operator can’t be applied, new subgoal = remove obstacle that prevent applying the operator
EX
goal : take daughter to day care
the largest difference when current and goal state: distance
find a operator to reduce the difference: drive car to daycare
operator can’t be applied: car broke down
new subgoal: fix car
description on how people solve things
subgoaling
process of breaking down a complex problem/goal into smaller more manageable sub-goals that are easier to achieve
production system for means-end analysis
a framework that outlines the procedures and rules for applying means-end analysis to solve problems through a series of production rules and states
hobbits and orcs
the goal is to transport all 6 creatures across to the other side of the river
at not poitn on either side of the river can orcs outnumber hobbit
not possible to solve this one with difference reduction
people naturally want to do this difference reduction and if they get to an intermediate which looks like its not going towards the goal they tend to abadon it because they think they are doing the wrong thing (even though it necessary to get ot the goal)
working backward
transform goal state so it is more similar to the initial state (useful for maze-like problems)
means-end analysis cna involve working backwards
chess study
memorize where the chess pieces are on a chess board
and when you try to fill in the pieces and people that played chess a lot (had expertise) they were able to recall the positions more accurately due to pattern recognition and experience (was able to chunk)
however if you put the pieces in random position then the beginners are better than the experts because a lot of things on the random positioned board can’t happen in normal chess so they are dealing with functional fixness and top-down hinderance
practice
true that more practice is good and if you are an expert you probably have a lot of practice
depending on what domain you are looking at the number of hours of practice explain more of what’s called variance, can explain who’s gonna be better and worse in this professional class
depending on the domain practicce can explain quite a lot
power law of practice
the more times you spend the better you get
improvement dimishes with time
it takes VERY long to gain the small amount of improvementn that separates really good from great
expert problem solving
rich organized schema
have lots of well-organized declarative and procedural knowledge
more sophisticated representation
spend more time on representation
experts take longer to srart solution, but less time to complete it
Less means-end analysis
pre-sroted solutions in long term memory
fewer demandds on working memory
Moving forward, not backwards
More reliance on long term memory, less on working memory
deterministic reasoning
deductive
conclusion necessarily follows from premises
the process of deriving predictions from general laws/theories
conlucsion follows from the premise (a//b, b//c --> a//c)
theory -> hypothesis -> observation -> confirmation (irgnore base rates)
ed: if it is cloudy it will rain, it is raining
probabilistic reasoning
inductive
conclusion does not necesaarily follow from premises
the process of developing hypothesis from fact/observations (observation -> pattern -> hypothesis -> theory)
ex: how a psychologist diagnose clients
ex: pavement is wet, so it's likely that it rained recently
normative theory
how people should reason (rules of logic)
normally you should think this way
current evidence
symptoms (ex: does katies have a cold or does she have ebola?)
dcotots need to devide if it's a cold or Ebola
they need to take into account base rate
probability of diagnosis (es: what is the rate of diagnosis for ebola in the US? pertty low so its probably not ebola)
descriptive theory
how people actually reason
describes how people actually reason
biases & heuristics
normative inductive reasoning
Base rate and current evidence
Mammogram example: Doctors confuse P(H|E) and P(E|H)
P(H|E) (positive predictive value) is refering to the probability of having breast cancer (given a positive mammogram result)
P(E|H) (sensitivity) is refering to the probability of a positive mammogram result (given breast cancer is present)
a mammogram has a 90% sensitivity (p(E/H)) and a 5% positive predictive value (p(H/E)). This means that if a woman has breast cancer, the mammogram has a 90% chance of detecting it. However, if a woman gets a positive mammogram result, there's only a 5% chance that she actually has breast cancer
Normative inductive reasoning - bayes
how do we update out beliefs based on the evidence?
p(H) = overall probability that hypothesis is true
= prior probability
= BASE RATE
normative inductive reasoning - Bayes example
in this village, 80% of the animals are dogs adn 20% are cats. one night you hear a strange animal sound near bushes
How likely is it that the sound came from a cat, given that we heard it?
p(H|E) using Bayes' theorem
H: the sound was from a cat
H\ : the sound was not heard from a cat- it was a dog
E: you heard an animal sound at night
We need 3 pieces of info
P(H|E) : probability of current evidence if hypothesis is true (what is the chance you’d hear this sound at night, if it really was a cat?)(lets say 90% of cats meave at night P(H|E) —> 0.9)
P(E|H\) : probability of current acidence if hypothesis is false (what is the change you’d hear this sound if it wasn’t a dog (was a dog barking))(10% of dogsbark at night P(E|H\) —> 0.1)
P(H) : probability of hypothesis independent of current evidence (base rate") how common are cats in this village?)(cats make up 20% if animal population → P(H) =0.2)(cats don’t make up 80% of animal population —> P(H\)=0.8)
descriptive inductive reasoning
inductive (probabilistic, specific —> general) (based on evidence (observations make conclusions)
descriptive (how people actually people reason; describes how people actually reason (biases/heuristics)
we often pay too much attention on base rates and not enough weight to current evidence
OR
we sometimes ignore base rates and we don’t use logical calculations of base rate & evidence
ALSO people ignore base rate when thinking of similarity (people tend to judge more ‘random looking’ sequences as being more likely)
50/50 poker example
there are 2 bags (one contains 70 red chips and 30 blue chips)(the other contains 70 blue chips and 30 red chips)
a person picks one bag ar random (each having an equal 0.5 probability of being chosen)
if they then pull a red chip, bayes’ theorem calculates the probability that the bag chosen was the predominantly red one getting 0.7, however people typically answer 0.6 showing they rely too heavily on the base rate and don’t give enough weight to the new evidence
an example of descriptive inductive reasoning
representative heuristic
we assume an outcome is more probable simply because it appears to fit our expectations (our intuition often tricks us into believing that patterns ressembling “true randomness” are more probably even when statistics say otherwise)
when people focus on superfical patterns instead of statistical principles, their reasoning becomes flawed
emphasis on similarity regers to the tendency of people to judge the likeluhood of an event based on how much it represents their mental prototype of that category rather than considering actual statistical probabilities
COIN EXAMPLE
you flip a coin 5 times
the 2 sequences are presented
HHHHH
HHHHT
people tend to judge the 2nd sequence as more likely because it looks more random even though both sequences have the same probability, this is an example of a representative heuristic, it ignores base rate when making judgements
BIRTH ORDER EXAMPLE
there are 2 different birth sequences
GBGBBG (72 families observed)
BGBBBB *seeking the estimated count)
statstically the probability of any specific birth sequence in a six-child family is the same (girl 50%; boy 50%) thus the number of families with BGBBBB shoudl also be 72 however people often use the representative heurisitc and assume patterns that look more random are more likely than clustered sequences
lawyer and engineers
representativeness
judge whether A has some characterisitc by relying on the similarity of A to other things iwth that characterisitc
problem: tend to ignore the base rate
in part 1 of the experiment: there was no description given so they could correctly assess the probability of whether A is an engineer or a lawyer based solely on the provided information
In part 2 there was a description that matched the description of an engineer which led participants to ignore the base rate and the statistics and assume higher probability of A being an engineer based on similarity rather than actual base rates
when there was a neutral description there was a tendency to ignore the base rate entirely and they assigned equal probabilities in both cases this shows that once people focus on an individual’s characteristics, they often disregard base statistical probabilities
similarity of istance to catergory
CS major exaple
base rate: % of grad students in humanities is much higher than CS
however when given a description that matches one of CS major people judge based on similarity and ignore the base rate and assume that Tom is a CS major even though the base rate says that much less likely
how representativeness explains doctor’s tendency to confuse P(E|H) and P(H|E)
P(M+|C) = 0.8 : probability of a positive mammogram given cancer
P(C|M+) = 0.07 : probability of cancer given a positive mammogram
Doctors tend to think, “A person with a positive mammogram is similar to a person with cancer.” This emphasis on similarity leads them to overestimate the likelihood that a positive mammogram indicates cancer. They neglect the base rate—the fact that cancer is rare in the general population—which drastically affects the actual probability.
This bias can lead to unnecessary anxiety, further testing, or even overtreatment to patients who recieve false-positive results
availability heuristic
used when estimating the frequency or probability by the ease with which instances or associations could be brought ot mind
evaluate the probability or likelihood of na event by judging how easy relevant instances come to mind
accuracy of estimates compared to actual retrieval is pretty good (russian novelists/flower example)
because flower are more available in your memory, you estimate that you could name more of them - and you actually can
factors other than frequency that can affect retrievability
Tversky & Kahneman’s experiment: “famous names”
people say that the list had more female names than male names, B/c famous names are more available in your memory, you think that the list had more female names when asked to list 20 famous female names and 20 generic male names
frequency of lethal events experiment
each of the follow pairs of lethal events, judge which one is the more frequently occuring worldwide
people are often wrong about which is the more lethal event due to which one is more widely discussed in media and health campaigns, emotional impact, and which has more vivid dramatics event associated with it (as those are easier to retrive)
household chore experiment
asked couples to estimate the percentage of household chore they and their partner did, teh resulrs showed that each partner tended to overestimate their own contribution with the combined percentage often exceeding 100%, people are more likely to recall the instanced they themselves performed, leading to overestimate their contribution
biases due to retrieval (r____ word vs __r__ words; ____ing words vs _____n_ words)
most people say that more words that start with r_____ because its easier to recell them; but actually more english words have R as the 3rd letter
same for ___ing and __n_ every "-ing” word must also have an “-n-” at some point meaning that “-n-” words are at least as frequent or more frequent however because “-n-” do not come to mind as easily people would say more words end with “ing” than “-n-”
simulation heuristic
base judgment on how easily you can stimulate (how things will turn out in the future; how things would turn out in different circumstances (what if))
Mr Crane and Mr. Tees’s emotional reaction
Mr. Cane his flight left on time and he was late, while with Mr. Tees the flight was delayed
easier to image “if only I had left 5 min earlier” mental simulation for flight delayed
predicting daughter/mother eye colors (cause and effect scenarios)
Given that her mother has blue eyes, what’s the probability that a daughter has blue eyes? VS Given that her daughter has blue eyes, what’s the probability the mother has blue eyes?
both are mathmatically the same but people find the 1st one easier, b/c they can mentally stimulate the inheritancepath from parent to child, SAME for height example
causal links between action and actor: ease of simulating avoidance of accident
casual reasoning, is how people infer links between actions and outcomes, for a situation that describes a near collision but leaves the reason for its aviodance ambigious it prompts the reader to supply an explanation, most people attribute the accident avoidance to an agent’s action however alternative explanations exist
conjunction fallacy
occurs when people mistakenly believe that a conjunction of events (hot and sunny) is more probable than a single event (sunny)
which is more likely sunny and hot or just sunny?
people say “sunny and hot" but logically this cant be probable (subset)
caused by availability
if ‘hot and sunnny’ days are more vivid in you memory, they feel more likely
caused by causal reasoning
‘if it’s sunny, then it will be hot” even though that’s not always true
caused by representativeness
match the scenario to a stereotype - like ‘typical summer day’
linda the femisinst bank teller example
orignially posed by Tversky and Kahneman describe linda as a 31 year old, single, outspoken, and very bright with a background in philosophy and activitsm for social justice, participants are more likely to choose “linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement” even though it is mathmatically less likey this is b/c linda’s description fits the stereotype of a feminist activist more than a generic bank teller, leading people to overestimate the probability of the conjunction of 2 events, however the probability of the 2 events occuring together is always equal to or less than the probability of either event occuring alone
how a problem is frammed
same information presented in different forms can lead to differnet decisions
disease experiment
the wording where it makes it so people will be saved is more likely to be picked over the one that insinutates that people will die (even if the later option is the better of the 2)
gain frame —> risk averse
loss frame —> risk seeking
positive frame/risk avoidance/conservatism vs negative frame/risk seeking
negative frame: people are less likely to choose even if it means the same thing as the positive frame just wordered differently
why use non-normative heurisitics
simplify the mental task involved in reasoning
mental shortcuts that help people make desicions quickly and efficiently, can lead to errors
sunk cost fallacy
tendency to continue an endeavor if we have already invested time, effort, or money into it, even if the cost outweigh the benefits
types of deductive reasoning problems
quantifier (categorical syllogisms)
some A are B
all B and C
then some A are C?
EX
some businessmen are wealthy
all wealthy people are powerful
therefore some businessmen are powerful
are difficult
comparative (linear syllogisms)
A is stronger than B
B is stronger than C
A is stronger than C
conditional (wason task)(if-then logic)
if run, they you will be happy
you run
you will be happy
modus ponens:
if A —> B
and is A is true, then B must be true
syllogisms
ARE DIFFICULT
common reasoning errors
validity effect: we are biased towards syllogims that “look” valid
content effect: familiar topics (like dogs vs dinosaurs) make us likely to think something is valid
atmosphere effect: we like when the conclusion "matches” the language of the premise (eg some/some of all/all)
figural effect: we prefer when things are in simple, linear form (eg some A’s are B’s, some B’s are C’s)(more likely to accept syllogism when terms are in linear order)
conversion effect: we mistakenly believe the reverse must be true (eg All A’s are B’s —> all B’s are A’s)(all pets are animals —> all animals are pets ((INVALID))
all dogs are animals
some animals are pets
some animals are pets
therefore soe dogs are pets
all dinosaurs are animals
some animals are pets
therefore some dinosaurs are pets
both INVALID (but people endorse the first as valid)
some A’s are B’s
some B’s are C’s
therefore all A’s are C’s
INVALID
some B’s are A’s
some C’s are B’s
therefore some A’s are C’s
INVALID
wason selection task
conditional reasoning (if-then)
“if a card has a vowel on one side, then it must have an even number on the other” —> which ones do you need to flip over to test the rule
you have cards E, F, 4, 7
most people say: E and 4
correct answer: E and 7
you flip E to see if there’s an even number
you also flip 7- because if a vowel is hiding behind the 7, then the rule is broken
example of the content effects: the words “vowel” and “even number” lead our thinking in the wrong direction
if converting this to a bar scenario example (checking ID and age) people do much better - isomorphic change
formal rule theories
intuition: people are logical, but make sense (if A is true, and A implies B, then B must be true)
assumption: formal rules of logic are built in (reason by proof: apply rules until reach conclusion)
explanation of errors
misinterpret premise
some rules are unavailable
can’t find proof for conclusion
theoretical problems
if deduction depends on formal (content-free) rules, then why does content matter?
why would formal rules be built in, when they only apply to infrequent tasks (deducation)?
mental model theory COME BACK TO
people constrcut mental models (representations) that correspond to the premises, describe them, and then try to flasify conclusions by constructing alternative models (mental pictures)
can i think of a counterexample that falsifies the conclusion?
all of the artists are beekeepers
some of the beekeepers are clever
some of the artist are clever? not necessarily (b/c we weren’t given information about whether the clever beekeepers include artist (not all beekeepers are artist))
explanation of errors
we often mess up b/c of WM limitations (we can’t hold onto too many mental pictures)
syllogism that require more models are harder
theoretical problems
contrstructing counterexamples is a very complex process that is specific to deduction, would subjects with no training use it?
verbal reasoning theory
repeatedly use linguistic processes to try to extract more information from problem statement
rather than applying formal rules or searching for counterexamples
read the problem, and we keep rephrasing it in our minds, trying to get the gist of what it says and reasoning to understand the problem better.
we sometimes mess up because this process it built for communication not logical precision
that’s why we sometimes
addd in information that wasn’t really there
or miss information that was deductively valid
intuition: without training, subjects don’t have deduction-specific strategies
they do have sophisticated language comprehension processes
assumptions: repeatedly use linguist processes to try to extract more information form problem statements (rather than apply formal rules of searching for counterexamples)
explanation of errors
errors arise because linguistic processes are adapted to demands of communication, not deduction
in communication, we construct a plausible representation of the gist
includes inferred ifnromation that may not be deductively valid
may exclude deductively valid ifnromation that wasn’t emphasized